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Abstract 
Victoria's prison policy 1851-1992: from hulks to unit management. 
The changing emphasis on the nature_ of imprisonment and the introduction of 
new prisoner management strategies has raised several important issues:- can 
prisoner management strategies be imported and implemented into an entire 
prison system without evaluation and trial? does the proposed prisoner 
management strategy require a different operational philosophy?; have prison 
policy-makers a framework to prepare future or analyse previous policies?; and 
do prison officers require a different type of training whenever a new prisoner 
management strategy is introduced? 
This thesis examines Victoria's decision to implement a new prisoner 
management strategy, which had been developed in the United States of 
America. Prior to this decision Victoria's prison policy was designed around the 
custody and control model of imprisonment. Traditionally changes to prison 
routine were simply incremental and had little implication for traditional 
prisoner/prison officer interactions. For example, Victoria's prison officer 
training was designed and developed to maintain order and most training 
courses highlighted the custodial aspects of prison officer work. 
The origins of current prison policy-making are to be found in the 1970s 
emphasis on 'openness' and accountability of prison operations. Prior to this, 
the system's senior penal administrator largely determined prison policy-making. 
Since the 1970s, however, prison policy-making has become a specialised 
function. Indeed, many prison organisations have policy-making units. The old 
custody and control models are of little use to contemporaty prison policy-
makers. They have to develop new policies to match changes in prison routine 
and function. When Victoria made the decision to implement the prisoner 
management strategy - unit management, it not only had a new government 
committed to prison reform, but also was in the process of creating a separate 
department of corrections. Departmental policy-makers had to respond to a 
multiplicity of demands to cover all aspects of the departmental activities. 
This thesis examines Victoria's prison officer training practices in relation to the 
implementation of unit management. This strategy was premised upon a climatic 
change in the traditional prison officer/prisoner interactions. Purpose-designed 
prisons were to be built to facilitate unit management. Prison officers and 
prisoners would no longer be physically separated as had been the practice in 
traditional prisons but would be together in small units, which would have 
limited decision-making abilities. The prison officers' roles were expanded. 
They were now expected to take on other duties such as counselling and be 
prisoners' case-managers. Changes in training strategies to meet these changes 
could have been expected but apart from some cursory attempts at lecturing 
course participants on the advantages of unit management and producing a 
handbook for operational use, prison officer training remained custodial. As a 
result prison officers gave lip service to the operation of unit management and 
traditional practices returned. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a media release dated 20 June 1991, Victoria's Correction's Minister, Mal 
Sandon, announcing the closure of the one hundred and thirty nine-year-old 
Geelong Prison stated, inter alia, 
We have built four new prisons - Barwon, Loddon, Tarrengower, and 
the Melbourne Remand Centre - as a demonstration of our commitment 
to pull the prison system into the 20th century.' 
The decision to build these new prisons was an acknowledgment that the 
current system was grossly inadequate. 2 The Government also decided to 
separate the prison system from its responsible department and employed a firm 
of management consultants to develop a set of standards for the new 
organisation.' In presenting their report, the consultants recommended that 
The Government take the opportunity to introduce modern management 
methods and procedures into Victoria's Prisons, based on the 
management of prisoners in small groups or units. Accommodation must 
be developed or redeveloped to facilitate such a change. Staffing must  
also be upgraded in skills and training to serve the needs of modern 
prison management. 4 
The 'modern prison management' identified in the Corrections Master Plan was 
unit management.' It was first introduced into the US Federal Prison system in 
the early 1970s, where it was also known as Direct Supervision. 6 
Media release, "Geelong Prison to close- Mr M. Sandon, 20 June, 1991. 
Corrections Master Plan. Victoria (The Neilson Report) Vol. 1 37 1983. 
3 	These consultants were to report on the following matters: 
define management between Head Office and prisons, 
2 	define management structure and assess manpower resources, 
3 	assess management and administration for prisons; and 
4 	define prison technological requirements for the management and 
administrative purposes on a cost benefit basis. 
Ministerial Statement, 9 August, 1983, Escapes from Pentridge Prison and events  
leading up to the proclamation of a state of emergency, 16-17. 
4 
	
The Neilson Report, Vol. 1 38, emphasis in original text. 
The different approaches to unit management and its implications are discussed in 
chapter 1. Victoria appeared highly influenced by American practices whereas 
Western Australia and New South Wales appeared to follow European directions. 
6 
	
J. Farbstein & Associates. Inc. with R. Wener, A Comparison of "Direct- and  
"Indirect" Supervision Correctional Facilities, Final Report, Washington, DC: 1989, 
National Institute of Corrections-Prisons Division United States Department of 
Justice, 1.1.2. 
It was also known as Functional Unit Management.' Victoria's prison 
administrators described how the concept could be applied. 
Unit Management [is] a method of managing groups of 10 to 70 
prisoners. A permanent staff team, which has delegated decision-
making powers, manages each group using a mixture of custodial 
interpersonal, program and individual management-planning skills. 8 
The introduction of this practice into Victoria's prisons followed favourable 
opinion of the experimental Barlinnie Special Unit in Scotland, Direct 
Supervision in the United States, and encouraging results from Sweden and the 
Netherlands. Barlinnie was established in 1973 to house long-term violent 
prisoners, and was based on the view that "the traditional officer/inmate 
relationship should be modified to approximate more closely to a 
therapist/patient basis while retaining a firm but fair discipline system." 9 The 
Barlinnie Special Unit had a capacity of 10 places, admission being purely 
voluntary, but had never been full in 11 years of operation. Barlinnie was 
deliberately small as 
the relationship between inmates and the 18 staff [is]crucially 
important, and if the unit was any bigger it might lose its cohesiveness. 
The unit has its own governor and is a prison within a prison. The staff 
rotate from other prisons, and it may be just as difficult for them to as 
for the prisoners, some simply cannot manage it. ° 
Barlinnie's success" combined with favourable reports of other 'unit 
management' regimes convinced the Governments of New South Wales 
(NSW), Western Australia (WA) and Victoria to implement the concept and 
build purpose-designed institutions. 12 
7 	M. Janus. Functional Unit Management: An Evaluation of Organizational  
Effectiveness in the Federal Prison System. U S Department of Justice, 1982. 
Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. Office of Corrections. Victoria, 1989,4. 
9 
	
	
A. Coyle. Inside: Rethinking Scotland's Prisons. (Edinburgh: Scottish Child, 1991) 
135. 
14, 	R. Smith. Prison Health Care. (Torquay: British Medical Journal, 1984) 109. 
For a prisoner's experience of Barlinnie. see J. Boyle, The Pain of Confinement. 
(London: Pan. 1985). 
1 2 	The Northern Territory later built a purpose-designed prison at Darwin. Tasmania 
tried to convert the Risdon Prison in Hobart to unit management. 
2 
Victoria's Director-General stated, 
It's important to acknowledge though that each country and State has 
adjusted the system to suit its own particular needs. Therefore the 
system of unit management, offered by the US Bureau of Prisons will be 
quite different to our own." 
Premises and Purposes. 
It has been claimed that changes in penal policies and practices are a 
consequence of interaction between social change, pressures for reform, and the 
initiatives of prison administrators." This thesis examines a critical aspect of 
penal policy - the relationship between policy change and prison officer training. 
Recognising that the prison officer is pivotal to ensuring policy success: 5 one 
would assume that prison authorities would ensure that prison officers receive 
the requisite training to implement a new strategy. This thesis is premised on the 
view that prison officer training is a critical element in the successful 
implementation of unit management. The proposition advanced is that 
limitations in the implementation of unit management were directly related to 
the failure to develop staff training programmes designed to meet the needs of 
prison officers. As a result unit management was conflated from an integrated 
approach to managing prisoners to simply another way of managing prisons. 
The main focus of prison officer training has always been directed toward the 
custodial aspect of the job. This tends to be regarded as the primary function of 
the position, "indeed, for many staff, maintaining good order and discipline is 
rightly perceived as their only business." 16 
13 	Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. Handout given to participants in 
promotional courses. 1988. 4. 
14 	T.A. Williams. Custody and Conflict: an organisational study of role problems and  
related attitudes among prison officers in Western Australia, Ph. D diss., 
University of Western Australia, 1974, 17. 
G.M. Sykes, The  Society of Captives. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
1958) 53-58. 
Coyle, Inside: Rethinking  Scotland's Prisons, 13. 
16 	R D. King, "Control in Prisons - in M. Maguire, J. Vagg, and R. Morgan (Eds) 
Accountability and Prisons, (London, Tavistock: 1985) 187-203, 188 
3 
Despite the continued emphasis on custodial training, there has been, however, 
a tendency by Head Office administration to 'broadband' the traditional prison 
officer role. Broadbanding is also known as multiskilling. For example, many 
Head Office administrators are increasingly facing reduced budgets and are 
instructed to use cost-minimisation strategies. As the largest percentage of 
prison budget allocation is taken by prison officer salaries, the obvious method 
of reducing this economic burden is to reduce staff," or to privatise. However, 
most Australian prison officers have tenured positions. 18 Head Office strategy 
has been to negotiate the reduction of positions with salary increases and offer 
the fiction that the prison officer role is being multi-skilled to cover staff 
shortages. 
Prison officers, on the other hand, resent the incursion of 'professionals' and 
civilian staff and argue that prison officers should undertake much of the tasks 
'civilians' currently perform: these tasks include, for example, welfare work, 
prisoner amenities officers, industrial or vocational training, and para-
professional medical support officers. In many cases prison officers undertook 
these tasks i9 but without the benefit of specialised training. By undertaking 
these tasks without the appropriate training, prison officers were laying the 
foundations for management to later fundamentally change the prison officer 
role under the guise of multi-skilling. 
Justification. 
History seems to show that the advances towards a more liberal penal 
system are invariably followed by retreats, although the distance 
backwards is limited by what in the meanwhile have come to be 
accepted as impassible "humane" or "civilised" boundaries. 20 
17 	The Tasmanian prison system has had an approximate 30 per cent reduction in 
uniformed numbers owing to a cut in the Department of Justice's budget 
appropriation. Discussion with Richard Bingham, Secretary of the Department of 
Justice. Tasmania, 11 June, 1997. 
is 	Many systems are now putting officers on enterprise agreements. For example, 
CORE in Victoria is asking staff to sign Australian Workplace Agreements. 
Message. No 4, Vol. 3 March 1998 
19 	J.E. Thomas. The English Prison Officer Since 1850: A Study in Conflict. 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972) 206-210. 
20 G. Playfair. The Punitive Obsession: an unvarnished history of the English prison  
system, (London: Gollancz, 1971) 122. 
4 
Victoria's decision to implement the prisoner management strategy of unit 
management into both new prisons and existing institutions should have 
heralded a new era in the State's penal history. Unprecedented funding by a 
Government committed to penal change gave Victoria's prison administrators 
the opportunity to lay the foundations to change a moribund system and take it 
into the next millennium. This has not happened. There are no simple reasons 
for this failure. The realities of policy implementation are often "distinct from 
the stated objectives and the procedures prescribed for achieving them." For 
example, some problems are more intractable than others, the diversity of the 
problems may make implementation difficult, the larger and more diverse the 
target group, 
The more difficult it is to affect its behaviour in a desired fashion, [and], 
the extent of the behavioural change the policy requires of the target 
group determines the level of difficulty in its implementation. 21 
That policy is often developed by bureaucrats with little operational knowledge 
of, or in, the policy area is a reality of modern organisations. Prior to the public 
sector reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, the English Civil Service notion of the 
'generalist' public servant had permeated the higher echelons of the Australian 
Public Service. 
The higher civil servant is meant to contribute to the direction of his 
department and to the supporting planning process a mind prepared to 
probe into policy as well as operating issues and to convert finding into 
recommendations for action. 22 
However, the notion that 'expertise' should also permeate the higher echelons 
of prison administration had been questioned in the 1970s 23 and the 1980s. 
21 	M. Howlett and M. Ramesh. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy  
(Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1995) 154-155. 
12 	
F.M. Marx. The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1957) 114-115. 
23 	T.O. Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 
(New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. 1976) 82-83. 
2 
It should be born (sic) in mind that the civil servants who work in Prison 
Headquarters are not members of the prison service. They are generalist 
administrators, many of whom spend a few years in "Prisons" on their 
way from "Education" before going on the "Agriculture." In other 
words, they have no life-time career commitment to the decisions which 
they make concerning the prison service. 24 
Williams has argued that "like all management problems, which are relative to 
their environment, the problems of prison management are in large part unique 
to the prison environment." 25 Following this argument, it would seem that the 
best advice addressing prison management problems would be solicited from 
experienced prison personnel. Again, another strategy is to seek assistance from 
other jurisdictions. But it appears that 
in policy formulation the members of policy subsystems are restricted to 
those who have some minimal level of knowledge in the subject area, 
allowing them to comment, at least hypothetically, on the feasibility of 
options put forward, to resolve problems put forward. 26 
The evaluation of unit management in Victoria's prisons has never been the 
subject of detailed inquiry. There has been little published material evaluating 
unit management's success or shortcomings - apart from internal Office of 
Corrections (00C) documentation. It would seem unlikely that any evaluation 
will take place, given that less than fifteen years after Henderson reported nearly 
50 per cent of the prison system is with private contractors. 27 Moreover, there is 
no evidence to suggest that unit management training for prison officers has 
been evaluated. A recurring theme, however, throughout the various prison 
reports to Victoria's Parliament is that of a need to or programmes which 
upgrade prison officer training. 28 
24 	A.G. Coyle. The Organisational Development of the Scottish Prison Service with  
Particular Reference to the Role and Influence of the Prison Officer. 
Ph.D diss.. University of Edinburgh. 1986. 95. 
25 	Williams. Custody and Conflict: an organisational study of role problems and  
related attitudes among prison officers in Western Australia,  9-10. 
26 	Howlett and Ramesh. Studying Public Policy. 124-125. 
27 Corrections Corporation of Australia (C.C.A.) operate the Metropolitan Women's 
Correctional Centre (M.W.C.C.). Australasian Correctional Management 
(A.C.M.) operate the male Fulham Correctional Centre for sentenced prisoners. 
Group 4 run the Port Phillip Prison for remandees. 
See Victoria's Prison Reports to Parliament from 1927 onwards. 
6 
Again, the Office of Corrections Staff Training College recognised the need to 
constantly upgrade training courses to meet the new challenges brought about 
by philosophical change. 29 It should also be noted, however, that prison officers 
"are products of their environment", and so pose particular problems for 
implementation or introduction of change. The belief systems of both middle 
management and base-grade staff "may not reflect malice or cynicism, but they 
may nonetheless limit the number of options for change available." 30  Moreover, 
it may be that prison officers are reluctant to undertake further skills training 
unless the training leads to some type of promotion. For example, a number of 
'unit management facilitators' courses scheduled to be held at the Victorian 
Staff Training College in 1992 had to be cancelled due to the lack of 
participants. 31 
Scope.  
The thesis is about prison policy, prison practice, prison management, and 
prison officer training. There are numerous practical accounts of prison officer 
training32 and sociological accounts of prison management. 33 However, there is 
a dearth of literature in prison policy. What is available tends to be of American 
origin (particularly in Victoria) with some European literature. This material is 
of limited direct use for the contemporary prison policy-maker. That Australian 
prisons have 'policy' has been questioned at both parliamentary and judicial 
leve1. 34 
29 	Initiatives for 00C Training and Development,  paper presented to the 00C 
Executive by the STC Manager, John Pini, 1991, JP-I24 / SS 
Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform.  87. 
31 	This course was designed to assist senior and chief prison officers implement unit 
management in their work environment. Unit Management in Victorian  
Prisons, Evaluation Handbook,  Office of Corrections, 1990 
3' Each State and Territory has prison officer training modules and manuals. 
33 For a detailed account, see J.J. DiIulio Jr, Governing Prisons. A Comparative Study  
of Correctional Management, (New York: The Free Press, 1987) chapter 1. 
34 	Report of the Board of Inquiry appointed to inquire into and report upon the escape  
of five prisoners from H.M. Gaol Pentridge, on Saturday 27th day of August, 1955. 
VPR 1955, No.7. (the McLean Report). Report of the Board of Inquiry into several  
matters concerning HM Prison Pentridge and the maintenance of discipline in  
prisons. 25 September, 1973, Victorian Government Printer (The Jenkinson Report). 
J.D. Henderson, A Report on the Correctional System of Victoria, Australia. 
Department of Community Welfare Services, April 1983. Report on the  
Accountability of the Office of Corrections,  The Ombudsman Victoria, July, 1990. 
7 
Prior to the 1980s many prison policy makers were accustomed to pedestrian 
and/or procedural work. While there were a few published studies on general 
aspects of prisons, there was little that policy-makers could specifically use to 
formulate new prisoner management strategies. This was particularly evident in 
Victoria when unit management practices and standards were devised. 
Moreover, until the early 1990s when a number of 'Direct Supervision' studies 
were published, there was little available information on Australian experience 
with unit management s' s 
It also appears that some of Victoria's prison policy-makers regarded unit 
management as a penal philosophy instead of a prisoner management policy. For 
example, the New South Wales Corrective Services had introduced unit 
management as the preferred prisoner management policy with the Justice 
Model as a philosophical bedrock. 36 Victoria on the other hand was, for all 
practical purposes, still operating on the 'Medical Model' philosophy with its 
attendant prisoner management strategy. 37 When a decision was made to 
implement the unit management concept, there seemed to be little attention 
given to changing the current operational philosophy. The implementation of 
unit management may have been seen as a precursor to later philosophical 
change, however, all of the unit management documentation issued by the 
Victorian Office of Corrections is singularly devoid of any mention of 
operational philosophy. 
Four purpose-designed prisons were built in Victoria during the 1980s. 
However, unit management was never properly evaluated in any of Victoria's 
existing prisons prior to the new facilities becoming operational. Resource 
allocation did not appear to be matched by practical endeavour. Prison officer 
training remained largely custodial. 
35 	R. Robson. "Managing the Long Term Prisoner: A Report on an Australian 
Innovation in Unit Management' . The Howard Journal, 
Vol. 28 No. 3 (Aug. 1989): 187-203. 
36 J. Gorta. Unit Prisoner Accommodation -The Bathurst Gaol Experience, 1983-1987. 
NSW Department of Corrective Services memorandum. 1988, 4. 
8 
The prison Staff College should have provided unit management training 
expertise but, instead, internecine squabbles and external political influences led 
to its closure. By 1993, however, the Kennett Victorian Government embarked 
on a programme of prison privatisation. The Government decided to close the 
Coburg Prison complex (Pentridge Prison and the Metropolitan Reception 
Prison) and to contract the building and operation of its several replacements to 
private industry. 38 Whether previous unit management operations had anything 
to do with this decision is a moot point. The simple fact is that 1980s prison 
policy had little support from the incoming Liberal government elected in 1992. 
Victoria's involvement with the unit management concept occurred in the 
period from 1983-1992. To understand the administrative process behind the 
decision to implement unit management and the attendant impact on prison 
officer training, unpacking the development of previous prison policies in 
Victoria is crucial. The thesis therefore traces the development of prisons from 
the establishment of the Colony of Victoria in 1851. The Penal Department and 
the prison system, which was administered by the Sheriff's Department, became 
part of the Chief Secretary's Department through a Royal Commission in 
1869;39 
Responsibilities for the administration of prisons was moved to the Social 
Welfare Department in 1960 then to the Department of Community Welfare 
Services in the late 1970s. Finally, in the 1980s, prisons attained a separate 
Ministry combining with the probation and parole sections to become the Office 
of Corrections. These administrative developments are important factors in the 
process in implementing unit management. It is important to note that prison 
'policy' emerged late - indeed until the 1970s little debate was engendered over 
prisons which remained primarily concerned with custodial arrangements. 
37 	In Victoria's case, the prisoner management practice was still custody and control. 
38 	Keypoints, Vol. 5 No. 2 (December 1993) 15. 
39 	Royal Commission into Penal and Prison Discipline, VPR 1870, 2, No. 18. 
Until the 1970s most jurisdictions had a strong administrator who made policy 
at will.° Indeed, one view was that the only policy before the 1970s was to 
"keep the Minister sweet." 4 ' 
Constraints and Limitations. 
Most, if not all, prison systems are closed to public scrutiny, or with access 
restricted or limited to examination of peripheral issues. Internal documentation 
is difficult to obtain and in many cases is less than fully comprehensive. Officials 
are reluctant to talk. Former administrators and Ministers may only highlight 
what they perceive as 'successes.' Moreover, most of the relevant prison 
literature originates from American sources. 
There is a perception that all prisons are similar. Prisons, however, are as 
diverse in practice and operation as other public and private sector organisations 
that operate similar technologies. 42 
Prisons may be prisons at one level of analysis, but the concept of 
domain may prevent us from making inappropriate comparisons of 
prisons with very different domains. 4 ' 
Thompson's insights raise further methodological questions; should the prison 
system be investigated as either a 'closed' or 'open' system? The early prison 
theorists such as Sykes, 44 Goffman, 45 and Cressey," argued that the system was 
'closed.' In contrast, however, Morris,'" Hawkins," Lombardo, 49 and latterly 
Maguire et al, 50  claim the prison system is open 
.10 I.L. Barak-Glantz, "Towards a Conceptual Schema of Prison Management Styles. - 
Prison Journal. 61, No 2, (1981): 42-58. 
41 	Interview with Tasmanian Prison's Chief Superintendent, 17 November, 1995. 
42 J.D. Thompson. Organisations in Action. (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1967), 26. 
43 	* Domain ' is a term formulated by Levine & White (1961), For a full description 
See Thompson. Organisations in Action. 26-29. For comment on prisons see 
F. Rinaldi, Australian Prisons. (Fyshwick. ACT: 1977, F&M) 13 
44 	Sykes, The  Society of Captives. 
45 	E. Goffman. Asylums. (Hardmonsworth: 1961, Penguin). 
46 	D.R. Cressey, The Prison: Studies in Institutional Organisation and Change.
(New York: 1961, Holt. Rinehart & Winston). 
47 	N. Morris. The Future of Imprisonment. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
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They argue that "the myriad links between the wider society and the prison 
system, individual prisons and prisoners serve to insure that no establishment 
functions in total isolation." 51 
Finally, it is important to note that "the idea that analysis is scientific, 
dispassionate and value neutral is a myth because research is inevitably 
influenced by the beliefs and assumptions of the researcher." 52 The researcher 
who has been part of the prison system for nearly two decades brings certain 
assumptions based on practical experience. However, as Coyle notes, 
Very few of the assumptions or beliefs held about the penal system can 
be defended by hard data or evidence. The practitioner who strays into 
the world of the academic is likely to find himself very quickly 
attempting to balance on a delicate tightrope. As an academic he may 
have to accept the likelihood that his findings will be unacceptable to 
policy-makers as a basis for action. As a practitioner he is participant in 
the bureaucratic power-structure and may have to abdicate the privilege 
of a distanced exploration of policy-possibilities. 53 
Outline of Thesis. 
Chapter 1 investigates three specific, but not mutually exclusive, variables: 
prisoner management practices; the link between Head Office policy and actual 
operational practice; and the assumptions behind prison officer training. The 
chapter commences by investigating the development of prisoner management 
practices through to the implementation of unit management. It will highlight 
the changing prisoner management practices in Scotland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and the United States from the late 1960s. The chapter will also 
demonstrate the link between the concepts developed in these systems and the 
practice that was eventually implemented in several Australian States, with 
particular reference to Victoria's prison system. 
G. Hawkins, The Prison : Policy and Practice, 
(Chicago: Uni. of Chicago Press. 1976). 
49 	L.X. Lombardo. Guards Imprisoned. (New York: 1981, Elsevier North Holland). 
51, M. Maguire, J. Vagg, and R. Morgan. (Eds) Accountability and Prisons, 
(London, Tavistock: 1985) 
51 	Coyle, The Organisational Development of the Scottish Prison Service. 111. 
52 	C. Ham and M. Hill. The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1984) 19. 
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The second part of the chapter investigates whether there is a gap between 
formal policy discourses and operational practice in relation to policy and 
practice within Victoria's prison system. Information contained in policy 
documents from the late 1970s onwards provides evidence of Head Office 
intention. These policies are compared to operational practice. The final section 
of the chapter analyses the assumptions surrounding prison officer training. 
While the role has been traditionally regarded as nothing more than a virtual 
'turnkey' and 'keeper', the changing nature of prison operation requires that 
staff are given something more than pure custodial training. However, a survey 
of prison officer training details the emphasis on the custodial nature of the task. 
Chapter 2 investigates whether there is a distinct form of prison policy-making. 
The focus adapted by Ham and Hill will be utilised to ascertain whether there is 
a method for analysing prison policy. 54 This chapter utilises the argument 
advanced by Davis et al that "values, interests and resources" are fundamental 
elements in the policy process. 55 These elements help develop a framework of 
analysis. A process orientation recognising the importance of 'values and 
interests' is a valid analytic tool to investigate the prison policy process. The 
'resources' category - both human and economic - are the fulcrum on which 
Australian prisons pivot. It should be noted, however, that 
values, interest and resources do not run float free, waiting to link 
together in an ever changing array of combinations. They operate 
within institutions which have values, interests and resources of their 
own. 56 
American correctional investigators have offered a number of policy models that 
can be utilised to investigate what type of policy a specific institution is 
implementing. 57 
53 	Coyle, The Organisational Development of the Scottish Prison Service, 4. 
54 	Ham and Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State. 
G.J. Davis, J. Wanna. J. Warhurst. and P. Weller. Public Policy in Australia. 
Second Edition. (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 1993). 
56 	Ibid, 4. 
57 	W.G. Archambeault and B.J. Archambeault. Correctional Supervisory  Management. 
(Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice-Hall, 1982); DiIulio, Governing Prisons, and J.W. 
Joplin and J.E. Hendricks, "Correctional Management: A Philosophical Perspective -
Corrections Today, Vol. 43, No. 6, 85-88. 
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They have also developed models for classifying prison operational 
philosophies. 58 These models are useful indicators of Victoria's prison policies 
from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. 
Chapter 3 will examine the origins of the Victoria's prison system and describe 
its changing role in the century from 1850-1955. Prison policy slowly developed 
during this period and the most practical method of investigation will be to 
examine the careers of the Inspectors'-Genera159 and detail the policies and 
changes implemented under their administration. Until 1923 Victoria's prison 
system had been run along military lines with ex military administrators charged 
with penal development. In 1923 the era of the 'educators' began with the 
appointment of Joseph Akeroyd. Akeroyd and his successor, Alexander 
Whatmore, viewed prisoner treatment and training as remedies against 
recidivism. Their practices fundamentally changed a moribund prison system. 
Whatmore was described as the greatest innovator in Victoria's penal history 
and directly administered the system from 1948-1960. 60 It will be demonstrated 
that later policy developments, including the decision to implement unit 
management, are a direct result of Whatmore's American sojourn in 1948. 
The policies and practices implemented in Victoria's prison system from 1956 
to 1983 form Chapter 4. Whatmore's blueprint for penal reform was accepted. 
The government created a new Social Welfare Department, which became 
responsible for the prison service. The Community Welfare Department was 
created on the break up of the Social Welfare Department. The prison service 
then went through some turbulent times with new policies being constantly 
framed by the prison bureaucracy. 
58 	V. O'Leary, and D. Duffee, "Correctional Policy: A Classification of Goals Designed 
for Change- Crime and Delin., 17 4 (1971): 373-386. 
59 	The title then given to the head of Victoria's prison system. 
61) 	 J. Armstrong, in Correctional Policy and Political Constraints, 
The Third Alexander Russel Whatmore Memorial Oration, 15 September, 1993. 
13 
Chapter 5 discusses the operation of the Office of Corrections from 1983 to 
1992. The chapter details both operational policy and the operating philosophy 
driving these operational activities. It will be argued that the departmental 
policy was, in hindsight, less than innovative. Data gained from analysis of 
official documentation is supported by interviews with former politicians 
charged with administering the prison system. Interviews were also conducted 
with former prison administrators, former prison Governors, and current serving 
personnel. 
The application of unit management in Victoria's prison system is discussed in 
Chapter 6. Case examples of this approach to prison management are taken 
primarily from the USA - the primary source of Victoria's unit management 
policy practice. Australian evidence provides an insight into the difficulties of 
transposing a concept from one jurisdiction, and on this evidence one could 
expect problems in gaining similar results without the benefit of evaluation. The 
chapter also examines the growing academic interest in the concept of unit 
management and underlines evidence which provides a critique of 'successes' 
claimed for unit management approaches. 
Chapter 7 investigates the history of Victoria's prison officer training. This 
chapter examines the type and function of prison officer training, and focuses on 
whether this training was appropriate for staff implementing a new mode of 
prisoner management. It will be demonstrated that as training reflected the 
operational mode of the prison, authorities clearly failed to consider the 
ramifications of their decision to implement the unit management concept on the 
custodial-oriented prison staff 
In Chapter 8 the thesis returns to the original argument and discusses the 
implementation of the new management practice in relation to the concomitant 
responsibilities for, and outcomes from, prison officer training. This chapter will 
demonstrate that Victoria's prison system, apart from building four new 
institutions and re-opening another former prison, has not made the progress 
anticipated by those involved in planning during the early 1980s. 
14 
The thesis concludes that the main reason unit management has not been the 
expected panacea was that Victoria's prison officers were neither adequately 
trained, nor, just as importantly, adequately informed about the practice. Unit 
management had little chance of success as the operating philosophical base was 
directed toward custody and control, with the result that prison officers have 
subsumed Victoria's variant of unit management practice into traditional 
concerns with prisoner management. 
15 
Chapter 1. 
Dilemmas in Prisoner Management. 
Correction, not mayhem' 
The extensive media coverage2 of the operational difficulties facing the 
management of the privately operated Port Phillip Prison in Victoria has 
focussed attention on what may in fact be a classic example of the disparity 
between prison policy and practice. Whilst the current media debate has 
centred, for example, on the ethics of private ownership of prisons, 3 the 
perceived lack of experienced prison staff, 4 and the need to train prison officers 
to manage in the new regime, 5 of more immediate concern is the question of 
whether there is any connection between formal prison discourses and enacted 
policies. In the current situation, for example, it is by no means certain that 
intention and implementation are congruent. 6 
The arguments raised in this thesis regarding unit management have current 
relevance. The tribulations faced in Victoria's private prisons in 1997-98 may 
stem from the difficulties of transplanting overseas penal philosophy into 
Victoria reflecting earlier difficulties explained more fully in subsequent 
chapters.' 
Editorial. Herald Sun. 16 March 1998 
"First suicide in private jail raises queries about design- Age. 7 November 1997: 
"Prisons must allow scrutiny- Age, 13 November 1997: 
"Cruel hoax sparks jail security worry- Sunday Herald Sun, 7 December 1997: 
"Anger at jail check" Sunday Herald Sun. 14 December 1997: 
"Call for prison inquiry- Herald Sun. 18 December 1997: 
-Prisoners need an ombudsman- Age, 23 December 1997: 
"Jail staff fear for their lives - Herald Sun. 7 March 1998: 
"HIV man found hanging- Herald Sun, 8 March 1998: 
"Jail scrutiny after HIV prisoner's suicide bid - Age, 9 March 1998: 
3 	"Poor start for private jails - Age. 8 January 1998: 
4 	"Jail mess no secret- Herald Sun, 10 March 1998: 
5 	"Riot breaks out at private prison - Herald Sun. 12 March 1998: 
"Jail bloodshed alert- Herald Sun. 13 March 1998 
6 	"What's wrong in system - Herald Sun, 20 March 1998 
Group 4 claim that the philosophy behind the Port Phillip operation has been 
proven to work overseas- -Prison owner flies in new staff' 
Weekend Australian, 21-22 March 1998. 
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The problems with unit management may indicate why apparently successful 
European prisoner management innovations had failed to realise their potential 
when transplanted into the Australian environment s The Victorian public prison -- - 
authorities could have informed private operators of their experiences with 	 
implementing a new prisoner management concept. However, it appears that _  
Group 4 Securitas management were confident that their United Kingdom 
experience would be sufficient to overcome any previous Victorian operational 
shortcomings. 9 It seems that, for whatever reason, the private prison company 
did not learn from Victoria's experience. 
Victoria's experience with implementing a new prisoner management concept is 
significant for future penal operation. The changing focus of prison 
officer/prisoner interaction in the unit management model will in effect 
determine prison policy in the 21st Century. As noted in the Introduction, there 
has been little published material evaluating unit management's success or 
shortcomings - apart from internal Office of Corrections (00C) documentation. 
There is also a lack of evidence to determine whether Victoria's prison policy-
makers carefully constructed the framework and pathways required for policy 
implementation. 
Again, there remains the question of whether Victoria's prison organisation 
provided the requisite training to enable prison staff to understand and 
implement a new concept. It would also seem prudent that the final question to 
be determined is whether the implemented policies were judged to be successful 
or deemed failures. 
For some general details of the Netherlands and Swedish Prison Systems, see 
R. Utting, "Freemantle Prison -Just Another Riot," Legal Service Bulletin. 
13 (2): 62-64; T. Vinson. Wilful Obstruction: The frustration of orison reform. 
(North Ryde. NSW: Methuen. 1982) particularly 85-89, 
and T. Vinson. "Prisons: A Stark Swedish Contrast" National Outlook, 
September 1988. 12-13 
9 	It appears. however, that Group 4 had similar operational problems at Britain's first 
private prison - the Wolds Remand Centre. which opened in 1992. 
-Mr Twinn - s double trouble- Herald Sun, 21 March 1998. 
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There are a number of reasons for policy failure: for example, the policy may be 
altruistic; the policy may not have been trialed in its new jurisdiction to ascertain 
whether it can be fully implemented; it may not have been fully explained to 
both management-and—staff; the policy may be subject to various subjective 
interpretation, there may not be the requisite finance to fully implement the .  
policy; there may be time constraints in implementation which limit the 
concept's effectiveness; there may be tacit or overt reluctance to change by 
those who implement the policy; again, the intention of the policy can be 
watered down by other competing demands; staff may not understand the 
policy's intention; and, staff may not have been fully trained in the change prior 
to implementation. In sum, there are diverse reasons that policies fail. 
Translating programs into practice is not as simple as may first appear. 
For a host of reasons relating to the nature of the problems, the 
circumstances surrounding them, or the organization of the 
administrative machinery in charge of the task, programs may not be 
implemented as intended. These are the realities of implementation, as 
distinct from the stated objectives and the procedures prescribed for 
achieving them. It is important to recognize these limitations if we are to 
understand the public policy process. `° 
Prison administrators, without doubt, are faced with seemingly impossible tasks. 
They have to marry policy initiatives with practical applications into an 
environment that, at best, can loosely be described as calm and orderly, and, at 
worst, as volatile and precarious. They have to meet, inter alia, executive 
decrees, implement political expectations, provide public accountability, 
motivate and lead staff, and provide systems" whereby offenders have 
programmes and structures which are deemed meaningful during incarceration. 
These programmes have the two-fold aim of assisting offenders' reintegrate into 
society while tackling the omnipresent recidivism problem. At the same time, 
prison administrators are being asked to manage these tasks in a climate of 
economic constraint. 12 
M. Howlett and M. Ramesh. StudyingRublic Policy:  
Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995) 154 
"System failures core of private prison's problems" Weekend Australian. 
28-29 March 1998. 
12 	
-Public v Private; The competition for correctional services - Law Institute Journal. 
September. 1996. 1-2. 
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The large-scale funding of the late 1970s and 1980s, which saw a dramatic rise 
in capital refurbishment, new prison building, and large-scale recruitment, 
particularly in Victoria, 13 have dissipated. Governments are either reluctant or 
unable to provide finance on such a previous scale. Prison administrators now 
require prison managers to work with decreased budgets, yet, paradoxically, 
— maintain or upgrade standards. While the planners or policy-makers dictate the 
framework of facility operation, the manager lives with the knowledge that 
performance and keypoint indicators are objective realities instead of subjective 
rhetoric. 14 
In general terms, managers are now judged on their ability to implement 
policies. A dysfunctional facility brings speedy admonition. 15 Yet managers are 
captive of some unrealistic and unmeasurable aims. In Victoria, for example, 
managers have to ensure that, among others, they are to provide "opportunities 
for rehabilitation, which prepare prisoners and offenders for law-abiding and 
productive participation in the community." 16 
If prison managers have difficulty in understanding how these policy 
requirements can be implemented, the obvious inference is that prison officers 
under their control and direction will continue to perform in a perfunctory 
manner. 17 Whenever policy directives are clear and unambiguous, strategies and 
training programmes can be developed and tailored to enable policy 
implementation to mirror policy intention. It helps, of course, if prison numbers 
do not increase. Whenever there is an increase in prison population, policies and 
strategies have to be modified, refined, upgraded, or in some instances, take 
polar directions to accommodate the increase. 
13 	Office of Corrections Annual Reports. 1984-1990. 
14 	Men's Prisons in Victoria: Correctional Policy and Management Standards, 
Department of Justice. Office of the Correctional Services Commissioner, 
September, 1996. 
15 	-- Watchdog to probe prison problems - Herald Sun, 20 March 1998. 
16 	Men's Prisons in Victoria. 3. 
17 
- Prison staff seek action' . Age, 14 March 1998 
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For example, a policy of single cell accommodation can be changed to 
accommodate increased offender incarceration. 18 Tougher sentencing leads to 
unanticipated imprisonment levels. 19 Scotland's exceedingly high imprisonment 
levels have already "created an increase in tension in prisons_and_an increase in 
stress on an already overloaded prison staff." 20 It has been noted, particularly in 
Victoria, that some overseas prison policies are difficult to transplant. 21 
Moreover, the "new breed" of prison managers with their "softly-softly style" 
may have difficulty controlling offenders and implementing policies. 22 Again, 
their actions may cause friction with subordinate staff 23 However, it appears 
that rather than blame policies for failure, Head Offices react by replacing senior 
staff. 24 
While it is of course singularly inappropriate to labour on the difficulties facing 
one private operated Victorian prison, 25 the simple fact is that all three privately 
operated prisons in Victoria are purpose-designed unit management prisons. 
The building of these types of prisons, combined with the introduction of a new 
prisoner management strategy, was to be the cornerstone of the Victorian 
Government's prison policy into the 21st century. However, a change of 
government in 1992 brought with it different perceptions on prison policies. By 
1998, nearly fifty per cent of the government operation was to be privatised. 26 
IS 	"Tough laws fill prisons" Herald Sun. 23 March 1998. 
19 	
-Tough courts crowd jails" Herald Sun, 23 March 1998. 
,() 	SNP News Release 07/03/97, "Salmond Makes Keynote Speech to Prison Officers 
'Crisis of Morale in Scottish System' " 
http://www.snp.org.u1c/press/news/archive/pr70307b.htm. 
- Inside a private 'hell' -Age, 14 March 1998 
22 	"The politest of prisons- Herald Sun, 23 March 1998. 
23 	
-Prison guards threat" Herald Sun. 14 March. 
"Prison firm set for staff shake-up - Herald Sun. 21 March 1998, 
"Overseas backup to control jail- Herald Sun, 21 March 1998, 
"Jails chief removed in wake of prison riot - Weekend Australian, 19-20 April. 1997, 
John Van Groningen. Victoria's Correctional Services Commissioner, has been 
'seconded to head a task force' to investigate private prison operation. 
-Prison, not a holiday- Herald Sun, Editorial 23 March 1998 
The others have by no means escaped media and public criticism. 
For example. -Jail fuel stockpile fear" Herald Sun, 1 October 1997 
(Fulham Correctional Centre) 
"Drug drama in women's jail" Herald Sun. 24 October 1997. 
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The salient contemporary issues - policy implementation mirroring intention; 
unit management operating philosophy; and prison officer training - are no 
different from the problems faced by the Office of Corrections in - I992. Indeed, 
the-significant publicity given in recent months to these areas highlights the fact 
that prison policy-makers appear to have made less than significant progress 
during the past six years. 
This chapter will address each of these issues but will first document the 
changing patterns of prisoner management prior to the introduction of unit 
management, which commenced in the United States Federal Prison System. 27 
Studies from Sweden and Holland 28 describe the strategies devised in these 
jurisdictions to complement changing correctional reforms. The Barlinnie 
Special Unit, a major correctional innovation, provides evidence of small unit 
prisoner management in the Scottish Prison System. 29 In Australia, the 
introduction of unit management in NSW ° prior to Victoria's initial trials with 
the concept provides a useful comparative example for differences in 
organisation and focus between NSW and Victoria. 
26•-New era for our prison system" Sunday Herald Sun, 29 November, 1992. 
27 	M. Janus, Functional Unit Management: An Evaluation of Organizational  
Effectiveness in the Federal Prison System. U S Department of Justice, 1982. 
28  For example. B. Apsey. M. Wockel and S. Johnson, Report of Visit to Correctional  
Jurisdictions in the Netherlands, Denmark. Sweden, Finland and the Union of the  
Soviet Socialist Republics, Department of Correctional Services, 
South Australia. 1989 (the Apsey Report): 
P. Norden, Study Tour of Swedish and Dutch Prison Systems, 
Catholic Prison Ministry Victoria. 1990; "Corrections in Sweden: 
Facts about the Swedish Correctional System- Kximinalvard Sverige, 
(February. 1993); Aims and Tasks of the Swedish Prison and Probation Service. 
Kriminalvarden, 1990: "Europe's Least Awful Prisons - The Economist 
(February 6 1988) 17-20; and M.J.M Brand-Koolen (Ed.) 
Studies on the Dutch Prison System,  (The Hague: Kugler publications, 1987) 
29 	Small Units in the Scottish Prison Service.  The Report of the Working Party on 
Barlinnie Special Unit. Scottish Prison Service, 1994, especially chapters 8 and 9. 
34) Robson, R. "Managing the Long Term Prisoner: A Report on an Australian 
Innovation in Unit Management - The Howard Journal,  Vol. 28 No. 3 
(Aug. 1989): 187-203. 
Types of prisoner management and the development of small units. 
There is no particular method of managing offenders. Various methods have 
been attempted or trialed depending on the operational philosophy. Simply, 
there are a small number of prison personnel who are charged with managing at 
least four times their number of offenders within the constraints of the -prison 
environment. This practice leads to specific strategies being developed so that 
prison personnel maintain order within their institutions. During the `Ancien 
Regime' management was based upon the concept of prisoner discipline. A 
small number of prison officers could manage a large number of prisoners. 
Prisoner movement was curtailed and association literally non-existent. Prison 
policy was based on custody and control with prisoner discipline being a 
fundamental tenet of prison operation. 
While obviously prison reforms have meant that these practices have changed in 
the twentieth century to more of a humane containment strategy, the dual 
concepts of discipline and control have formed the cornerstone of successive 
philosophical and policy change up until the 1970s. 3 ' The rise in imprisonment 
rates from the 1960s onwards forced administrators to reconsider prison 
operation. It set in train a set of procedures, which have fundamentally changed 
the nature, and tone of prison policy-making, as well as prisoner operational 
management. Moreover, overcrowded institutions have bred a new type of felon 
to whom order and discipline are anathema. 32 To appease this situation, 
administrators virtually had to abandon the discipline protocol relying on what 
prison officers consider as nefarious solutions. While these may be short-term 
measures, the long-term ramifications are a liberalisation of 
The security and custody of many institutions, arousing intense 
antagonism, and overt opposition from guards. This combination of 
population pressure, public disillusionment, fumbling reform, prisoner 
militancy, and guard intransigence has broken the fragile order inside the 
prison. 33 
31 	It also seems to be reappearing, for example. "Tear gas grenades put end to prison 
stand-off' Sunday Age 10 August 1997. 
32 	Ibid. also see P. Lynn and G. Armstrong. From Pentonville to Pentridge:  
A History of Prisons in Victoria, (Melbourne: State Library of Victoria, 1996) ch. 12. 
33 	M. Ignatieff. A Just Measure of Pain, (London: MacMillan, 1978), xi. 
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The aetiology of prison discipline is to be found in Elizabethan bridewells or 
houses of correction where men were imprisoned and put to work to learn "the 
habits of industry." 34 It is also in these—early bridewells that the genesis of the 
Medical Model of imprisonment s ' is to_belound_How_ever, the early bridewell 
detractors were doctors who perceived crime as a disease "which spreads _  
destruction like a pestilence and immorality as an epidemical disorder which 
diffuses its morbid qualities." s6 These doctors argued that institutional change 
could only take place when penal administrators changed their modus operandi. 
For example, in 1792 Pinel the superintendent of the Bicetre Asylum in Paris, 
struck the chains from the insane preferring a disciplinary regime of 
"surveillance, hard labour, and submission to rules." He maintained that while 
"chains merely constrained the body. Discipline actually habituated the mind to 
order." 37 
The penitentiary was well established by 1815. 38 Prisoners were stripped, 
cleansed to prevent the proliferation of disease, clothed in uniform institutional 
garb, and given standardised dietary fare. "Cleanliness was regarded as the 
outward manifestation of inner order; dirtiness, on the other hand, was seen as a 
sign of feckless in discipline." 39 The operating philosophy' was based on 
'quarantining' prisoners from destructive influences, imposing a 'silent regime', 
and making solitude a prerequisite for reform. 4° 
Authority must be founded either on the fear of punishment or on 
respect for superiors in whom the authority is lodged ... The question is 
how is this force of opinion to be imposed on the minds of these men? Is 
it by familiar conversation? Few men speak well enough to impose 
respect on their hearers - whilst every man has it in his powers to impose 
by silence and reserve. 4 ' 
34 	Ibid, 11. 
35 	D.E.J. MacNamara, "The Medical Model in Corrections: Requiescat in Pace" 
Criminology. 14. ( 1977 ): 435-448. 
36 	J. Hanwav. The Neglect of the Effectual Separation of Prisoners and the Want of  
Good Order and Religious Economy in Prisons  ... 1784, 4. quoted in Ignatieff. 
A Just Measure of Pain. 61. 
37 	Ignatieff. A Just Measure of Pain, 69. 
Ibid, 101. 
39 	Ibid. 
40 Ibid, 102. 
41 Paul. quoted in Ignatieff. A Just Measure of Pain. 104. 
23 
This model of prisoner management combined the rationalisation of prison 
administration with a regulated salaried prison staff and disciplined 
institutions. 42 The Pentonville Prison in England opened in 1842 and prisoners 
spent a minimum of eighteen months in solitude, later reduced to twelve then 
nine months respectively. ° Discipline such as whipping, branding, the stocks _ 	_ 
and public hanging, was "directed at the body," whereas liberal doses of 
Scripture, hard labour, and silent contemplation discipline were "directed at the 
mind." 44 English penal thought was married with American institutional design 
and later transplanted to the Australian colonies. 
And it appears that the American prisoner management philosophy of 
discipline° was the bedrock of Australian prison policy. But, 
the scope and range of the 'discipline' is limited by, and tied to, quite 
specific demands emanating from the requirements of governments, the 
penal bureaucracy itself and the activities of charitably - based reformers 
(later to be social workers proper). On these occasions, when definite 
ideas of policy are promoted, they become subordinated to the internal 
workings of organisations. For example, although a policy of 
classification of prisoners for treatment or reform did emerge in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, the actual implementation of these 
classifications followed the demands of good prison discipline rather 
than individual treatment." 
The 1870 American prison system tried to combine administrative order with an 
adaptation of Maconochie's prisoner treatment principles. ° But prison policy 
was trying to reconcile two fundamentally opposing perceptions. As Garland 
notes, "Like all complex institutions, the prison of this period had a multiplicity 
of discernible objectives that were inherent in its practices and routines."" 
42 	D. Garland and P. Young, The Power to Punish. (London: Heinemann, 1983) 60. 
43 	Ignatieff. A Just Measure of Pain, 4. 
44 Ibid. xiii. 
I L. Barak-Glantz. -Towards a Conceptual Schema of Prison Management Styles" 
Prison Journal. 61. No 2. (1981): 42-58. 42-47. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See J.V. Barry, -Alexander Maconochie 1787-1860- in H. Mannheim, Pioneers in  
Criminologv, second edition enlarged. (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith 1972) 
84-106. 
Garland. Punishment & Welfare. 11. 
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It is also important to remember that there was no great American prison master 
plan. American prison systems developed along the lines of the Auburn system 
after the Pennsylvania System was abandoned. 49 A meeting had been called, 
however, in 1870 to arrange the first American national prison association. This 
meeting formulated a Declaration of Principles and listed 37 goals. There was 
no mention of "vindictive punishment." Instead, "Classification, diagnosis, 
probation, and above all reformation were henceforth to be the goals of penal 
treatment." 5° On the other hand, Du Cane, the Chairman of the English Prison 
Commission, believed that the formal priority of that system was "the repression 
of crime." 51 
Indeed, prisoner reformation was never a fundamental consideration of English 
penal thinking. In 1863, for example, The Select Committee of the House of 
Lords on Prison Discipline rejected any efforts to impose a different 
philosophical purpose. 
They do not consider that the moral reformation of the offender holds 
the primary place in the prison system; that mere industrial employment 
without wages is a sufficient punishment for many crimes; that 
punishment in itself is morally prejudicial to the criminal and useless to 
society, or that it is desirable to abolish both the crank and treadmill as 
soon as possible. 52 
Any history of penal practice, and concomitantly policy, is replete with 
examples of administrative order. And to maintain order, the administrator 
required standardisation, routine, and discipline. Standardisation of prisons did 
not effectively take place in England until the Prison Act 1877, when an 
"exceedingly disparate and heterogeneous set of penal establishments ... with 
enormous variations of regime from prison to prison [were subject to] ... 
rationalisation, economy and uniformity." 53 
49 	T.O. Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 
(New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. 1976) 9. 
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(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972) 18-19. 
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Routine is expressed by the publication of prison standing orders and uniform 
documentation. However, it is also a fact that in the English prison system, 
the day-to-day operation of that system is established more by the 
expedient provision of finance, staffing and other resources, than by any 
ideology on how one ought to deal with crimer54 
By the time that American authorities had drawn up their reformation principles 
and the English system commenced the policy of 'repression of crime,' 
Victoria's prison system was trying to introduce a policy "in which a general 
scheme of discipline, both deterrent and reformatory in its action, might be 
brought to bear on the prison population." 55 Deterrence had been the 
cornerstone of English prison policy until 1895. 56 The Gladstone Report, 
however, demanded that the English service perform two primary tasks, "we 
start from the principle that prison treatment should have as its primary and 
concurrent objects deterrence, and reformation." 57 Rehabilitation through 
education and long-term detention of the habitual criminal became official 
English policy for over seventy years. 58 
According to Rotman, the early part of the 20th century found American 
penologists and criminologists adopting the "Psychotherapeutic Model" of 
prison reform. Rotman notes that "psychiatric interpretations of social deviance 
began to assume the central role in criminology and policy making." 59 
54 	Ibid. 4 
55 	VPR. Session 1873, Vol. 3, Penal Establishments and Gaols for the year 1872.  3. 
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who offer architectural renovations and esoteric theories relating to the cure for 
criminality as an answer on the one hand. and those who perceive that the everyday 
relationships between prison officer and prisoners may offer a platform for a change 
of attitude in the prisoner. Indeed. Murton claims that the perception that the prison 
can achieve either or any of these tasks is either altruistic or downright naive 
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Crime was diagnosed as an illness. This led to the promulgation of the 
Indeterminate Sentence. ° Prisoners under this sentence were held until 'cured'. 
Psychiatrists and psychologists now held the key - to- prisoner management. 
"Release from prison became the equivalent of release from a hospital." 6 ' 
Classification of the offender became critically important because of the new 
emphasis on diagnosis of criminality. This led to a revamp of custodial practices. 
Rewards, such as transfer to minimum-security institutions, were offered to 
offenders for good behaviour while transfer to maximum-security institutions 
awaited those who transgressed. Management of offenders now centred on 
"classification, work, discipline, education, and vocational training." However, 
Rotman points out that such rehabilitative ideals were doomed because of the 
intransigence of "badly paid and incompetent personnel" who made security 
their prime concern. 62 A period of enlightened prisoner management practices, 
however, began to appear in the 1920s. 
Thomas Mott Osborne became chairman of the New York Prison Commission 
in 1913. In November 1914 he accepted the position of warden at Sing Sing 
Prison. He inherited an institution that was beset by riots and turbulence. 
Osborne immediately rejected the contemporary notion of crime as a disease. ° 
Instead, he believed that offenders held the key to their reformation. He believed 
that reform could be effected by giving prisoners some decision-making powers 
- particularly in areas were they traditionally had no say. Literally, what Osborne 
was trying to accomplish was a form of offender self-government. He labelled 
this process a "Mutual Welfare League." 64 Prisoners could directly advise 
Osborne without going through the process of first informing their gaolers. 
Osborne's innovation led to offenders self-managing discipline procedures in 
many areas including the prison workshops. 
6(1 	For a description of Victoria's implementation of the Indeterminate Sentence. see 
Lynn and Armstrong. From Pentonville to Pentridge:  
A History of Prisons in Victoria.  121. 
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64 	Rotman. The Failure of Reform- , 180 
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However, prison officers were sceptical about the concept, particularly when it 
appeared that Osborne was negotiating directly with the prisoners. The 
combination of political interference and prison officer opposition resulted in 
Osborne resigning in October 1916. 6 ' 
In England during 1921, the Chairman of the Prison System, Ruggles-Brise, 
claimed that prison reform was not a "theory of punishment," rather, it was "an 
incident of it." He felt there was a necessity for "strict regulation to secure 
order, discipline, and obedience." 66 Moreover, Ruggles-Brise foresaw the 
influence of religion playing a major part in prisoner reformation. He also 
alluded to such 'innovations' as 
the issue to well-behaved prisoners who have completed six months of 
their sentences, of note-books and pencils, by which they are enabled in 
their leisure moments, to make a special study of some particular 
subject, which is likely either to be of benefit to them on discharge, or 
where their prospects on discharge might be impaired by the absence of 
any special means for maintaining the knowledge of any special subject 
which they previously possessed. Notes also may be taken from books 
regularly furnished from a well-stocked library, where such literary 
extracts are deemed to be of value to a prisoner for the improvement of 
his mental equipment. 67 
However, English prison officers had to adapt to meet the changing 
circumstances set in place after the Gladstone Report. Since 1895, there had 
been a demand for greater freedom for offenders. As Thomas notes, the 
absolute power of prison staff had been eroded when association and 
communication between prisoners was introduced. 68 The linchpin of future 
prisoner management strategies in the English system was to be "the process of 
control" based on prisoners earning privileges. 69 It took until the 1950s before 
English prison authorities trialed other innovations in the Norwich and Bristol 
Prisons." 
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The Massachusetts prison at Charlestown opened in November 1927. Its first 
warden was Thomas B. Gill - an economist. Gill believed that individualised 
psychological and sociological treatment in an environment, which replicated, as 
far as possible_a normal community would assist the offender to rehabilitate 
himself. Gill proposed that there should be units to house no more than fifty 
prisoners supervised by two prison officers. Each unit would elect members to 
become part of the Inmate Council, which would meet with Gill. This Council 
would have advisory powers only unlike Osborne's Mutual League, which had 
disciplinary powers. 71 This Council evolved into a shared decision-making body 
between staff and prisoners. 
According to Rotman, the major problem Gill faced was the animosity between 
the treatment staff and the prison officers. The house officers, who supervised 
the inmates in the units, considered the treatment staff to be "too soft and 
coddling of prisoners; the social workers, in turn, found the guards ignorant and 
cruel." 72 Rotman notes that while Gill tended to side with the treatment staff, 
the prison officers had significant day-to-day authority and were thus better 
positioned to undermine any attempts at radical prisoner reform. 73 Gill's initial 
plan soon came under pressure by the expedient factor of an increased prisoner 
population. He had to strenuously fight to keep his reforms in place. Gill's 
attempts to continue participative management ended when he was dismissed in 
1934 after "a political fight that lasted five months." 74 
Two American experiments with forms of prisoner participative management 
were light years away from previous practices. There is no comparison with the 
aforementioned English philosophy. Osborne and Gill appear aberrations in a 
system that was more concerned with prisoner and prison control. Again it 
would appear that both men foundered because of the intransigence of prison 
staff. However, both men were victims of other variables. 
71 	Murton, The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 207-213. 
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Osborne's demise was a direct result of allowing long-term prisoners to work 
outside the confines of the prison. He had also allowed prisoners to work in the 
administration building. It appears that this type of thinking was too liberal for 
the times. An order subsequently came from the Superintendent of Prisons 
overturning Osborne's directions. He was left with little room to manoeuvre. _ 	 _ 
According to Murton, Osborne felt that the effectiveness of his progressive 
programmes were threatened simply because the order to dismiss prisoners 
working in the administration building was an overt comment on his style. Sing 
Sing had the only administration building outside prison walls. 75 
Gill, on the other hand, was the victim of an increasing prison population. His 
intention of creating a milieu based on "social, medical, psychological, and 
educational techniques to the traditional reformative, industrial, and religious 
instruction" was premised on being able to control admissions to the prison. 76 It 
appears that Gill had an agreement with the state commissioner of corrections 
that he would only take "amenable types of inmates." 77 Gill felt that these 
prisoners would benefit from the casework approach he implemented. The 
commissioner ordered Gill to take hardcore prisoners whom, on arrival, 
immediately took advantage of the liberal regime. Gill was forced to 
shift the primary concern from rehabilitation to custody and enforced 
discipline. In fact, inmates became so unruly that Gill had to resort to 
solitary confinement with bread and water to restore contro1. 78 
Gill was dismissed after several escapes and comments that the system was too 
soft on prisoners. 79 However, it is a moot point whether the prisoner 
management concepts developed by Osborne and Gill were too liberal for the 
respective administrators and prison officers. It appears that governments 
favour administrators who maintain order and stability." But there is a greater 
danger that those systems that fail to develop will move backwards. 8 ' 
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It will always be difficult for administrators to post institutional change if they 
do not have prison officer support. Therefore, one of the major difficulties faced 
by any progressive prison administrators is trying to-convince a largely sceptical 
and mostly disinterested prison officer staff  that change is a necessary 
concomitant of new philosophical implementation. Prison officers traditionally 
are mainly conservative. The majority are normally conditioned by the 
organisational culture to perceive that any change in the status quo is either a 
softening or weakening by management toward prisoners on the one hand, or a 
gain for the prisoners on the other. 82 This perception can be reinforced when 
there is little funding available for prison staff amenities, but is made available 
for prisoner educational and vocational programmes. 83 However prior to 1930, 
as Rotman reports, in Illinios "the position of the guard was well-nigh 
s4 intolerable; not only a meager salary but also long hours behind the walls ... ,,  
Moreover, in California, "untrained guards worked for ten hours a day, seven 
days a week." 85 And it appeared that they were led by 
Wardens who had no serious interest in promoting rehabilitation or, for 
that matter, in doing much else than maintaining a secure facility and 
keeping the inmates in line. If the wardens had any expertise at all, it was 
in maintaining security as demonstrated by their previous careers in 
police and military service. 86 
However, many prison administrators still attempted change even though the 
milieu to effect changes had been condemned as unworkable." These prison 
administrators were thus faced with the dilemma of trying to implement 
strategies to assist prisoner reformation while trying to reconcile differences 
with sceptical prison officers. On the other hand, some Australian administrators 
perhaps had a different view of prison officer and prisoner interaction. 
32 	Fogel argues that the "guard is a bearer of stability, fixity and the status quo. - 
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The staff has worked well under difficult circumstances. The necessity of 
having a loyal and efficient staff cannot be too strongly stressed, as a 
great deal of tact and understanding of the different classes of prisoners 
are essential. The temptations are many, as certain-prisoners and their 
friends are only too willing to bribe a warder to traffic articles into the 
Gaol. Trafficking is one of the greatest dangers to the safety of gaols all 
over the world." 
In California, one far-sighted senior prison official fundamentally changed 
operational practices in 1940. Kenyon Scudder, the Superintendent of Chino, 
recruited a "cadre of fifty young men on the basis of merit alone. Most had 
college degrees. No one had ever worked in a prison before he was hired." 89 
Scudder thought that the introduction of these 'cleanskins' would help provide 
a prison environment which was "dedicated to rehabilitation rather than mere 
custody."" Scudder's argument had solid grounding. In order to facilitate 
prisoner reformation, both prison officers and prisoners had to communicate 
with each other. Yet, "mutual exchange of thoughts and feelings were opposed 
by the prison administration in California." An inmate seen talking to an officer 
could be labelled a 'squealer,' while an officer talking to an inmate could be 
accused of trafficicing. 91 Scudder's new practices were the antithesis of Head 
Office edict. 
However, progress was made after 1941. "Inmate Advisory Councils" were 
established in all Californian prisons. 92 These councils could "make suggestions, 
offer critiques of management policies, and ask direct questions of the prison's 
top manager, the warden or superintendent." 93 And, although the American 
Prison Association did not change its name to the American Correctional 
association until 1954, 94 it was evident that reformers were active in some parts 
of Australia. 
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During a Royal Commission into the Hobart Gaol in Tasmania, and arguing for 
a 'Director of Correction' to take over from the then senior administrator, the 
'Controller of Prisons: 95 a noted jurist commented, 
It should be the duty of the Director of Correction, immediately upon 
the conviction of any offender ... to procure a full case history of the 
--offender-since birth. He should arrange for the immediate examination of 
the offender by a psychologist, psychiatrist, medical officer, and a 
dentist, and should supply a report to be placed before a sentencing 
court which the court may make use of it as it thinks proper. After 
sentence the Director should plan a programme of rehabilitation fro the 
offender based upon his estimate of the individual offender's needs. 96 
Ironically, although the very nature of penal operation was now subject to 
constant questioning, with different prisoner programmes and practices 
introduced, prison officers were practically excluded from involvement. The 
reformative treatment-oriented approach drew upon the skills of psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social workers and others. 97 Prison officers became involved in 
"group counseling" in Folsom Prison in California in 1954. This 'counseling' 
referred to treatment under the leadership of "clinically untrained" prison 
officers. "The Deputy Director of Classification and Treatment met with 15 
prisoners, two correctional officers, a librarian and a sociologist, one night a 
week for about two months." 98 Prison officers and prisoners also met to discuss 
problems whether personal or institutional. However, the "group 
psychotherapists" - the professionally trained personnel - worried about their 
status - lobbied for detailed credentials and standards for 'group leaders.' Prison 
officers with little or limited educations were excluded from the process. Other 
prison officers, who had gained credentials, aligned with the 'therapeutic 
community' leaving custodial duties to less-qualified personne1. 99 
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A sea change, however, was happening in correctional personnel recruitment. 
Whilst custodial officers were still predominantly selected on the height and 
weight criteria,'" decision-making positions were attracting a higher calibre. As 
Eaton notes, 
Before World War II, men with education and humanitarian ideals had 
little to attract them to state prison work. But by 1959, most of the 
prison system's policy makers were at least college graduates (85%); 45 
per cent had Master's or doctoral degrees. Even among the correctional 
officers, as the guards had been renamed, 32 per cent had some college 
education. 101 
The influx of liberal thinkers to the American prison system provided 
procedures and principles, which have tended to dominate Western penal 
thinking and practice since that period. While obviously the pre 1950s 
Australian prison practice had developed along the lines of English operation, 
Australian penal practice in the 1960s, particularly Victoria's prison system, was 
certainly shaped by American thinking. 102  Alexander Whatmore introduced the 
treatment-oriented approach into Victoria. 103 Its practices and procedures 
polarised policy-makers and prison officers. It also led to "public concern that 
the prisoner's lot was being made too easy.' ,104 The custodial-trained prison 
officers viewed the liberalisation of customary practices and the influx of 
'civilian professionals' into the system as a recipe for losing control of the 
prison. Indeed, in 1954 there had been a major riot at Pentridge when prisoners 
protested at being locked up for long periods due to the lack of prison officer 
staff.'" Yet, funding was found for 'professional' positions. Again, the prison 
setting was not conducive to a treatment milieu. 
The very nature of a penal institution prevents it from becoming an ideal 
centre for training individuals to live in the community. Of necessity it 
has a restraining atmosphere.'" 
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However, Victoria's prison officers were not the only ones concerned with the 
introduction of professional staff into the prison environment. The warden of 
Sing Sing had pointed out in 1951 that 
The professional staff fails to realize the essential totalitarian structure of 
the prison ... Professional personnel fail to accommodate their 
techniques-to. the_prison ...__and seek to adopt the prison to their own 
specializations, conflict always results. The professionally trained ... 
often underestimates the intelligence of custodial employees ... and [the 
latter] often look upon ... [the former] with suspicion. The professional 
approaches his prison assignment with a deterministic theory of 
behavior. This leads to an impractical emphasis on positivism unsuited to 
the classically constructed prison community ... The pattern of custody 
is the oldest and first essential element of confinement. It is as much a 
part of the prison environment as the presence of inmates. All of the 
relationships in the prison community take place within the atmosphere 
of custody and treatment processes cannot take place apart from it. I" 
In May 1961, an "Increased Correctional Effectiveness Unit" was set up in San 
Quentin. It was housed in a construction dormitory outside the prison security 
wall system. It held sixty-six men. R18 Prisoners allocated to the unit were 
expected to put in "a full day's work."" After labour, they met four times a 
week with a variety of outside personnel including labour leaders, law 
enforcement officers, and community and parole officials among others to 
discuss the problems associated with offenders re-entering society. A 
remarkable concept - for the period - was that offenders' immediate families 
were allowed to attend these discussions between sixty and ninety days prior to 
the offender's release. 11° 
These unit innovations aside, academics investigating the prison system believed 
that providing change in a custodial-oriented prison was always going to be 
difficult. As Eaton noted, 
Prisons are islands of social interaction in which administrative planning 
aims to exercise what approximate absolute control of inmates in order 
to accomplish several socially sanctioned purposes." 1 
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Moreover, many American prison administrators thought that 'inmate councils' 
were only providing inmates with a reason to gain more concessions. Wardens 
labelled the councils "gimme groups." H2 They felt those inmates, once having 
received "one level of aspiration" simply moved to attain another. However,  it 
was argued that any penal innovations - such as small unit management - were _ 
simply the result of charismatic leadership and when these administrators were 
replaced, innovations were subject to review. Furthermore, the focus on 
changing the offenders' conditions was never matched by upgraded prison 
officer training to instil "feelings of acceptance by lower echelon staff." 113 Baker 
noted, 
Two features of these past experiments stand out, both containing the 
seeds of self-destruction - inmates functioning as disciplinarians, and the 
dependence of the systems on a lone individual for sponsorship.... As 
administered, most of the past experiments in inmate self-government 
were inadequately structured and implemented arrangements 
superimposed on an untrained staff by individuals whose zeal far 
exceeded their correctional management ability. All of the self-
government systems reviewed depended on a central figure and rapidly 
expired when that person departed. Apparently little, if any, effort was 
made to indoctrinate staff to lead them to an acceptance of this concept 
of managing prisoners. 114 
A further development in managing prisoners in small groups was the concept 
of the "functional unit" which had originated in the mid-to late-1950s but had 
been used exclusively in American federal juvenile correctional institutions. 115 
Simply, a "case load" of juvenile prisoners was housed in a "living unit" which 
had a "multidisiplinary staff' assigned for counselling and recreational 
programmes. 116  Zupan points out that these units were "so successful" that the 
adult correctional institutions trialed the concept in treating drug users within 
federal penitentiaries. 117 This later became a standardised feature by 1968. 
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Other penal jurisdictions were considering the use of small units to change 
prisoner behaviour. However, the unit's function was directed towards changing 
negative behaviour. In effect, the unit's purpose was the segregation of 
offenders-from the main_prison population. In 1966, the Scottish Prison Service 
had a distinct problem with "particularly difficult prisoners". 118 A departmental _ 
working party was set up to determine measures to handle "violent, subversive 
or recalcitrant prisoners." 119 A recommendation was made to set up a 
segregation unit. Certain assumptions were made: staff would not require any 
special training to handle these offenders; staffing arrangements in the prison 
would be sufficient to supervise the unit. The unit was set up in Inverness 
Prison. However, the unit's aims of controlling and changing prisoner behaviour 
failed. As Coyle notes, 
The unit, far from having the desired effect on some prisoners, appeared 
to exacerbate their unruly conduct. The more restrictive the regime in 
which they were held, the worse their behaviour became. 12° 
In the 1970s the American Federal Bureau of Prisons introduced the 
conceptually different goal of humane contro1. 121 The focus was now on prison 
officer/prisoner interaction. 122 Direct supervision or unit management would be 
the instrument to alleviate disciplinary problems. This change in prison practice 
(later fully discussed in chapter 6) has dominated most Western prison practice 
since the 1970s. Again, like other previous penal innovations, the unit 
management concept would prove to be contentious. 123 However, in the 
beginning, all of those concerned with the concept's implementation were 
optimistic about the future of the concept. Indeed, initial evaluations of the 
effectiveness of the functional units found that they offered a number of 
important advantages. 
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Among the most important were, inter alia, 
(1) [They] divide the large number of inmates into small, well 
_defined and manageable groups, whose members develop a 
common identity and close association with each other and their 
unit staff. 
(2) [They] increase the frequency of contacts and the intensity of the fl 
relationships between_staff and inmates, resulting in: 
(a) better communication and understanding between individuals; 
(b) more individualized classification and program planning; 
(c) more valuable program reviews and program adjustments; 
(d) better observation of inmates, enabling early detection of 
problems before they reach critical proportions; 
(e) development of common goals which encourage positive unit 
cohesiveness; and 
(f) generally a more positive living and working environment for 
inmates and staff. 124 
The most important difference, however, was that the creation of these units 
irrevocably changed prison officer/prisoner interactions. Bars and grills, among 
others usually physically separated prisoners from prison officers. Both prison 
officers and prisoners co-mingled in the new designed units. What both 
protagonists thought of this is a moot point. Prison officers were particularly 
conscious of the lack of separation. Their traditional management approach to 
prisoners was based upon custody and control. They now found that former 
practices would have to be modified to suit unit interaction - a fact known since 
1871. 
The task of changing bad men and women into good ones is not one to 
be confided to the first corners. It is a serious charge, demanding 
thorough preparation, entire self-devotion, a calm and cautious 
judgement, a great firmness of purpose and steadiness of action, large 
experience, a true sympathy and morality above suspicion. Prison 
officers, therefore, need a special education for their work; special 
training schools should be instituted for them, and prison administration 
should be raised to the dignity of a profession. 125 
Other jurisdictions were also trialing new prisoner management practices. 
124 	Lansing, Bogan and Karalci, "Unit Management: Implementing a Different 
Correctional Approach" 44-45. 
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Cincinnati. Ohio, October 12 to 18 1870.  (New York: The Angus Company, 1871). 
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For example, in the 1970s Correctional Services Canada (CSC) devised a 
prisoner management strategy based upon the notion of the therapeutic 
community. The Living Unit concept 
involves the assignment of each inmate to a residential_unit within the 
institution and to a Case Management Team, which monitors his 
progress and insures that the programmatic and security needs of the 
offender are being met. To facilitate the development of positive 
patterns of interaction between the staff and the inmates, Living Unit 
Officers, attired in civilian clothing, replaced uniformed security 
personnel in the residential units and assumed the dual role of counceling 
inmates and providing security. Initiated during the early 1970's, the 
Living Unit Program was subsequently adopted in nearly all federal 
correctional facilities. 126 
While the Living Unit concept was philosophically sound - being based on the 
Medical Model, the strategy had also introduced a change in normal prison 
officer/prisoner dynamics. Economics, however, determined that concept's fate. 
Citing the need to downsize its operations, CSC reduced the number of Living 
Unit officers and reintroduced uniformed staff. The units simply became other 
prison divisions. In Scotland the prison service was also trialing a unit system. 
The Scottish Prison Service, plagued by a large number of unmanageable 
prisoners, and finding the Inverness experiment unworkable, opened the 
Barlinnie Special Unit (BSU) in February 1973. 127 A working party had 
recommended that 
A special unit should be provided within the Scottish penal system for 
the treatment of known violent inmates, those considered potentially 
violent and selected long term inmates; and 
The traditional officer/inmate relationship should be modified more 
closely to a therapist/patient basis, while retaining a firm but fair 
discipline system. I28 
It was intended that the unit would be staffed by a combination of custodial and 
nursing officers and would operate as a "therapeutic milieu." 129 
126 	Unit Management Standards for all Correctional Service of Canada Institutions. 
set of guidelines issued by CSC, 1987. 54-58. 
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What made the unit unlike any other place was the way staff and 
prisoners were allowed a'nd encouraged to sit down and talk together. 
This was the single most important factor of the unit. It allowed us to 
break down all the barriers of hostility between us. This was by no 
means easy. In conjunction with this there were built-in weekly meetings 
where we all sat down as a group and discussed the week's events and 
decided on domestic issues. There are a number of examples of how 
effective these groups were. In the preliminary discussions which the 
staff had before the Unit opened they initiated some daft rules; being 
allowed one shower a week, and locking up the access to the shower 
taps. These were issues, which we eventually tackled through these 
meetings. Another silly rule was that the staff would make up our 
weekly wage on the basis of our daily attitude or dress tidiness, etc. ... 
When we heard this we honestly thought the staff were a bunch of 
loonies. The origin of these rules could clearly be traced to the old 
prison tradition of 'good order and discipline'. This clearly clashed with 
our history of chaos and_ lack of discipline. 130 
The BSU attracted considerable international attention due to the fact that it 
was allowed to "develop its own ethos during the early days" 131 The regime was 
"unstructured, ... based on the notions of mutual trust and responsibilities 
between staff and prisoners", and offered a number of features not available in 
any other Scottish prisons such as "unrestricted visits and non-compulsory 
work." 132 The perceived success of BSU encouraged other prison systems to 
make similar changes to operational procedures. In the Netherlands, for 
example, research reports from Dutch and other investigators, had "cast doubt 
upon the feasibility of rehabilitation." 133 The Dutch prison authorities decided to 
change policy from one emphasising theories of rehabilitation to "principles of 
humane containment and preparation of the offender for return to society." 134 
To achieve this, Dutch authorities devised three types of strategies. They 
decided to "change the organisation, ... change relations between staff, inmates, 
[and] ... change the prisoners. 135 
129 Ibid. 
130 	J. Boyle. The Pain of Confinement, (London: Pan, 1985), 11-12. 
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In 1985 the Dutch prison system had a mixture of 19th century and modern 
institutions. 136  The older institutions were very similar to those operating in 
Australia. However, the "social environment was strikingly different." 137 To 
implement organisational change, the Dutch authorities' proposed a strategy 
based on "aligning staff goals ... integrating functions ... [and] improving 
communication." I38 
One of the methods of achieving this strategy was to group staff into teams. The 
development and organisation of these teams was described as "one of the most 
characteristic and tangible manifestation of ... Dutch penal policy. I39 It was also 
considered crucial that the next level of staff - middle managers - agreed with 
this strategy. They, of course, would provide the link between the goals of 
management and the work teams. "A vital first step", therefore, was to gain 
their agreement. 140 On the other hand, in a demonstration of the commitment to 
effect change, the other main staff group, after middle managers and prison 
officer teams, - senior managers - had been given some responsibilities and 
delegations that had been previously handled by the directorate. 141 
It appears that under the previous philosophical regime prison officers "had 
solely a security function and did not participate when prisoners left 
accommodation areas for work and recreation." I42 However, the Dutch 
authorities decided that a change in the traditional officer role was necessary to 
reflect the philosophical change in penal operation. Officers would now be 
involved in "a broad range of functions in recreation and industry. "143 To 
facilitate this change in prison officer duties, the Dutch authorities built in two 
extremely important mechanisms: staff team meetings and policy meetings. 
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Note" 9. 
137 	Vinson et al. -Impressions of an Australian Visitor - in Brand-Koolen, Studies on  
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The staff team meetings gave basic grade officers the opportunity to inform and 
also question their team leaders and middle managers — as well as pass on 
information. 144 The traditional method of information and/or communication 
dissemination in the prison setting was downward from superior to subordinate. 
As Vinson noted, "The former custom of promoted staff isolating themselves 
from the hurly-burly of the shop floor no longer applies." 145 And arguably one 
of the major breakthroughs was the acknowledgment that policies may be less 
than successful. The Dutch authorities formalised this acknowledgment by 
forming a committee, which met on a monthly basis "to develop new ideas and 
discuss problems that have arisen with existing: policies." 146 All streams of staff 
were allowed to attend the monthly policy meetings. 147 
In a major attempt to change traditional prison officer/prisoner interactions, 
Dutch authorities used the dual strategies of "altering the [normal] ground 
rules" and encouraging staff and inmates to have "joint participation in 
programs. "148 One major bonus for the administration was that the majority of 
staff agreed with the proposed changes. The authorities also realised that 
officers could "retreat into defensive attitudes at first sight of traditional inmate 
behavior." On the other hand, they were cognisant that inmates could "exploit" 
the changing patterns of interaction. One of the methods employed by the 
authorities was to have officers trained to lead at least one type of group 
activity. 149 Inmates had a number of choices of what type of programme they 
wished to be involved in. For example, at the remand and assessment centre at 
Noordsingel, they had three choices: 
(1) An education wing where half of the inmates go to the workshop in 
the morning and the other half to classes (eg, in Dutch or, soon, how to 
cook a simple meal). The two groups then switch activities in the 
afternoon. (2) A drug-free wing ... (3) An old-fashioned remand wing 
where prisoners are assigned a job and left alone (or they can twiddle 
their thumbs all day in their cells if they are awaiting trial). 150 
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In 1988, the Swedish prison authorities had a policy of "decrimalisation. down 
penalisation and de-institutionalisation." There was also a "clear understanding 
-- in law" that the "deprivation of liberty should be an absolute last resort."'' 
Prisoner_programmes were regulated by the Act on Correctional Treatment in 
Institutions (1974). 
This law states that the goal of correctional treatment in institutions shall 
be to encourage the inmate's adjustment to society and try to counteract 
the deleterious effects of incarceration. Programs shall be directed from 
the very beginning toward preparing the inmate for life outside the 
institution, to the extent that this can take place without neglecting 
security requirements. In other words, the inmate shall be well prepared 
for release. 1 ' 2 
To achieve this goal, Swedish authorities attempted to create a "civilised" 
institutional milieu. There was particular attention given to the traditional 
interactions between prison officers and prisoners. The authorities wished an 
environment in which "relations between guards and inmates should be civil and 
cooperative." 153 Moreover, the institutions tried to create a "community 
environment" where workshops, administration and health services "as well as 
living areas" gave prisoners the opportunity to gains vocational and social skills 
to prepare them for eventual release. 154 
Apsey reports that the focus was on "managing prisoners in units of five for 
reasons of categorisation of prisoner types and for a quieter management 
environment." This obviously created a significant staffing resource problem. 
However, Apsey noted that it was evident the Swedish authorities had been 
provided with "the greatest amount of resources to build prisons and to meet 
extensive staffing arrangements. 155 Even though there were different categories 
of institutions in Sweden the policy was, as far as possible, to provide a 
framework of innovation that could be applied unilaterally. 
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While some prisons did not have programmes for unit officers "to take 
responsibility for, or to mentor, individual prisoners," departmental objectives 
were to increase officer interaction with prisoners. However, it was 
acknowledged that some older officers were "more fearful of greater 
involvement ... and change [was] difficult. 156 This problem only seemed 
apparent in older prison where traditional attitudes and culture would be 
difficult to change. In the new institutions "base grade officers [took] selected 
prisoners into the community for golf, swimming and other sporting 
activities." 157 
Although the concept of managing prisoners in a 'unit system' had been in 
operation for over six decades, the major difference between Osborne's 
innovation and the practices employed by the Scottish Dutch and Swedish 
prison systems was the reported positive attitude employed by staff directly 
interacting with prisoners. 158 And after an extensive tour of European prison 
systems it was evident to Apsey that the role and function of the Australian 
prison officer should be changed. 
The role of the correctional officer should be enriched in order to 
provide a more professional and fulfilling career through optimum 
utilization of officer's skills and attitudes [Moreover], 
The objective of enriching the role of the correctional officer should be 
to provide greater interaction between correctional officers and 
prisoners in the interests of improved security, and the development of a 
prison environment which is characterised by less tension and fewer 
incidents. 159 
However, prior to Apsey's European tour on behalf of the South Australian 
prison system, the NSW prison system had commenced a pilot unit management 
operation at a refurbished prison in Bathurst in 1982. 160  
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The NSW Corrective Services Commission approved a "management 
programme" for the Bathurst Gaol on Monday 8 March 1982. The programme 
was based on four clear principles, "Reality, Responsibility, Accountability and 
Predicability. „161  As Sutton noted, 
Simply put the programme is a system of management through positive 
incentives and interpersonal relational skills that will enable the gaol to 
meet its aims which are 1) The secure containment of prisoners, 2) The 
management of prisoners on humanitarian lines and 3) to ultimately 
reduce the offending rate of ex-Bathurst inmates. 
The management strategy has a three pronged approach. Firstly, a 
positive incentive programme based on work. Secondly, a unit 
management system. Thirdly, a set of sanctions for breach of rules. 162 
The incentive programme for prisoners revolved around a "system of monetary 
rewards for work done.” Prisoners were encouraged to apply for jobs in the 
prison in much the same fashion as they would if they were in a free market 
situation. Moreover, 
Because of the emphasis on work and to encourage prisoners to choose 
work as the way to productively spend their day, all recreational 
facilities will be closed off to prisoners until the end of the work day at 
3.30 p.m. Recreational facilities will of course be open all weekend. I6' 
A major organisational change, however, was in the development of a plan to 
change the traditional prisoner management approach. Sutton envisaged that 
unit management would be 
A system of management through interpersonal relational skills [which] 
will focus on the relationship between officer/prisoner, and 
prisoner/prisoner, particularly officer/prisoner. Traditionally 
relationships have been tenuous to say the least. It is hoped to be able to 
change that relationship to some degree through a change in 
management approach which will require different behaviours on the 
part of prison officers which will in turn influence prisoner's behaviour. 
This management system will revolve largely around the unit living 
situation. 164 
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It was anticipated that the unit living situation would be more personal with 
between twelve and sixteen prisoners accommodated in eight smaller units. Two 
prison officers would staff each unit. 
This style of accommodation creates a more relaxed and informal 
atmosphere, encourages closer relationships among the inmates and 
between inmates and. staff. By_resembling a normal_ environment it helps 
to prepare prisoners for their life after release.' 65 
The NSW Department of Corrective Services Annual Report claimed that unit 
management required "a far greater degree of communication between staff and 
management than used to occur..." Moreover, staff were given orientation 
programmes to assist them understand the philosophy of unit management. It 
was also noted unit prison officers received "two days training in this type of 
work. 
Why two days of training were considered the appropriate amount for the 
officers who were operating in the units is a moot point. There have been many 
attempts to improve and upgrade prison officer training throughout penal 
history. Simply, prison officer training has been shaped toward the custodial and 
security aspects of the role. In the prison environment, training has 
organisational, institutional, and individual implications. It is also dependent on 
operational and philosophical edict. Whenever a management innovation is 
implemented there can be quite profound implications for training design and 
development. For example, the contemporary focus to implement business 
principles into prison management concentrating on 'customer satisfaction' ' 67 is 
a fundamental change in officer/offender interaction. However, it is claimed the 
most important figure in the success or failure of any prison procedure is the 
prison officer.'" Hawkins, quoting Sykes, aptly describes the prison officer as 
being the "pivotal figure" in any prison process. 169 
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Again, as Thomas notes, 
the community perceives the prison primarily as a coercive organisation 
and measures its competence as such. In the real world of prisons, the 
burden of carrying out this task rests on the basic - grade uniformed 
officer. This is his role, and it cannot be combined with a reformative 
role. 1" 
If, as Thomas argues, the role of the prison officer simply rests on the 
application of custodial and security tasks, why did so many prison systems 
formulate policy with the prison officer being proffered as an agent of change? 
Perhaps the fundamental dilemma has been that policy makers have unrealistic 
expectations of their prison staff. In the case of unit management policy makers 
presumably assumed that prison officers would want to change their traditional 
operational practice for a task which, at first, would seem to be the antithesis of 
their training and culture. 
Assumptions underpinning prison officer training.  
In 1923, Lord Stanhope noted, 
It has been impressed on us that a prison officer is no longer a mere 
turnkey and disciplinarian, but is required to take his part in the 
endeavours which have been increasingly made of recent years to 
reform the offender and to restore him to sound citizenship."' 
Lord Stanhope made his comments during an inquiry into the roles and 
functions of borstal officers."2 While Lord Stanhope may have been sincere in 
his impressions, his comments from over seventy years ago highlight the 
fundamental dilemma facing contemporary prison management - what kind of 
training do you give to prison officers? It is now accepted that the modern 
prison has a multiplicity of tasks.' 73 
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171 	Quoted in Thomas, The English Prison Officer.  169-169. 
- 172 	
• In England, young offenders were placed in 'borstals instead of prisons. Prison staff 
euphemistically labelled 'housemasters' staffed these institutions. 
173 	Men's Prisons in Victoria: Correctional Policy and Management Standards.  
Department of Justice. Office of the Correctional Services Commissioner. 
September 1996. 
47 
Prisons are also subject to "conflicting management (as well as) criminal justice 
and community goals." 174 Moreover, at the prison management level, 
goal conflict arises because the system's aims are too abstract and not 
adapted to the reality of what can be achieved in prisons, goals are 
inconsistent or incompatible, -and they attempt to achieve their 
goals with too little resources 175 
While it is acknowledged that the task of being a prison officer "may be less 
complex and more straightforward" under a custodial rather than a treatment 
regime, 176 Hawkins claims "no less important than personnel selection is the 
training of personnel."" However, the history of prison officer training is 
littered with false premises, unfulfilled hopes, and unrealistic aims. One early 
comment on the type of person required to work in the prison is attributed to 
Sir George Onesiphorus Paul, regarded as the guiding light of the 
Gloucestershire prison system in England. Paul argued that prisoner discipline 
could only be accomplished if those charged with overseeing were divested of 
their "unregulated discretion." 178 
It was a principle desideratum of our undertaking to make a change in 
"race" or kind of men usually chosen for a gaoler or a keeper of a 
prison, with whose name and office ideas of cruelty and tyranny and 
oppression were so associated that it was not one of the least 
difficult parts of the undertaking to convince mankind that it was not a 
necessary association. 179 (Moreover) The humanity of the gaoler 
should rather be the result of coldness of character than the effect of 
quick sensibility... He should be endowed with a patience which 
obstinacy the most pernicious could not overcome, a sense of order 
which is method, rather mechanical than method and which few men 
obtain but by long habits of subordination and obedience. Such men ... 
would be found if ought for in a profession where the passions are 
habitually subjugated in discipline.'" 
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Paul's description of the type of officer he employed is obviously coloured by 
the philosophy of the time. Then, the officers' role was clear and unambiguous. 
Problems began to arise when the English prison system moved to a policy 
whereby the focus was now on "a system of training such as will fit the prisoner 
to re-enter the world as a citizen." 1 " Moreover, the reforms that had taken 
place - such as prisoner association, led to a situation whereby prison officer 
control - the essence of the discipline policy - was quickly eroded. Thomas 
claims that the greatly increased freedom meant that the staffing ration was 
"quite insufficient to exert any meaningful control over the prisoners. ,I82 
Prisoner officer training did not match the change in operating policy. 183 
Thomas notes, 
the community perceives the prison primarily as a coercive organisation 
and measures its competence as such. In the real world of prisons, the 
burden of carrying out this task rests on the basic-grade-uniformed 
officer. This is his role, and it cannot be combined with a reformative 
role. 184 
Prison experts from the 1960s, 185 the 1970s, 186 and the 1980s, 187 have long 
recognised the contribution of the prison officer to effect change. Yet prison 
officer training always appears to have a low organisational priority. 
Irrespective of what politicians and prison administers claim, the type of training 
conducted by the organisation reflects the government's actual prison 
philosophy and operating practice. It can also unfairly, be expected to overcome 
organisation deficiencies. 
Training, in Victorian England, as today, is a very attractive solution to 
organisational problems. It tends to be regarded as a magical process, 
and the expectations of the reformers, from the early days of the prison 
service, about the contribution which training could make have always 
been unrealistic. 188 
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It has always been presumed that prison officers want to be directly involved in 
the reformative process. Many staff did not wish to become involved with 
prisoners on a 'more personal level." 89 Indeed, "given the requirements of 
security and good order, the role of the ordinary officer cannot be defined as  
that of also being the prisoners friend and counsellor." 199 Murton also argues 
that prison officers are not the ideal agents for prisoner change. 
There is presumed to be something inherent in staffing patterns, 
qualifications, training, and concepts that uniquely equip correctional 
personnel with the right, wisdom, expertise, and motivation to 
"rehabilitate" their subjects. The implicit assumption is that there are 
essential differences in behaviour patterns, personality traits, and value 
systems between the guard and the inmates. 191 
As noted earlier, Hawkins claims that training is just as important as recruiting 
personne1. 192 Therefore, the obvious question is to ascertain what kind of 
person would wish to work in the prison environment? 
Homans claims no one is born to be a prison officer, indeed "there is little if any 
empirical knowledge of what makes a good correctional officer." 193 And there 
is no particular reason to seek employment in the prison environment. Some 
reasons include job security, 194 long term unemployment, d95 and betterment of 
employment, I96 among others. Thus the type of person who seeks employment 
in a prison setting may be determined in the first instance by job security, rather 
than some altruistic ideal about helping people reform themselves. In his survey 
of WA prisons, Williams found the decision to become a prison officer is often 
taken "independently of the decision to leave previous employment." 197 
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In a sample of 60 officers Williams discussed such forces as "redundancy, 
financial difficulties and dissatisfaction were pushing them out of their previous 
(employment)- before they had begun to think about becoming prison 
officers." 198 Many officers sampled indicated that they would have never 
considered this type of work had it not been suggested to them by "relatives, 
friends or acquaintances who were either prison officers themselves or who 
knew prison officers. -199 
A similar situation was found by Bullard on investigating the New South Wales 
prison system. His conclusions on job seeking patterns among officers 
highlighted the job security aspect, and his profile of the average recruit was one 
"with only a fundamental educational level, married and concerned to provide 
security for the family ... ",200 The profiles presented by both Williams and 
Bullard of officers in two Australian prison systems are, arguably, representative 
of recruits who enter the rest of the Australian prison services. 
Prison officer training has always been treated as an adjunct to prison operation. 
The most common type of training is a short programme reflecting the custodial 
primacy of the prison. Training usually highlights the practical aspects of the 
position with the occasional theoretical construct added in order that the course 
appears 'professional.' 291 And it has been argued that changes to prison 
philosophy over the years have only cemented the custodial function. 292 It seems 
that with every change in correctional philosophy the role of the prison officer 
has been narrowed while prison administrators seek professional involvement to 
cure criminality. Prison officers had little involvement in the reformative 
process. Moreover, the soundest attribute that a prison officer has, and one, 
which cannot be attained by any prison civilian or visiting professional, is 
prisoner experience. 
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Prison officers get to know those under their charge. Officers know prisoners 
patterns of interaction. They know the devious, the weak and the strong. 
Time brings skill, given a modicum of Sound judgement. As experience 
accumulates, so does ability to function effectively as a prison officer. 
There is no body of theory which can be mobilised to ensure that 
prisoners do not riot or escape, which is why training for prison officers, 
as for other occupations where thework is simple - and repetitive, is 
often regarded as irrelevant. 203 
Victoria's prison authorities decided that prison officers were to be facilitators 
of unit management. But prison officers had always been the means by which 
order was maintained. In Victoria both Akeroyd and Whatmore tried to upgrade 
prison officer skills, but only as a means to make them understand the changing 
process. If prison officers were involved in any reformative measures - such as 
the introduction of open prison camps - it was mainly to ensure that prisoners 
did not take advantage of the changing circumstances. 
Training did continue but changes in training were mainly a reaction to a 
deleterious episode and were meant to strengthen the custodial and control 
aspects of the position (see chapter 6). The first Director-General of the 00C, 
Bill Kidston, did in fact raise the profile of prison officer training and initiated a 
Master Plan to address perceived deficiencies. 2" Staff was trained "in such a 
way that they have the knowledge and skills to be able to meet the demands of 
these new developments [unit management] with professional merit and 
technical competence."205 The expectation that prison officers wished to change 
their traditional role and be directly involved with prisoners was subjective. The 
average officer joined the service because the role was strictly defined. That the 
system recruited a large number of personnel with some form of military 
experience is no mere coincidence. 206 Fitzgerald and Sim claim that while 
paramilitarism is well suited to the prison environment, it has proved to be a 
distinct obstacle to role extension. 2" 
203 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 43. 
204 
	
Work Force Planning and Training Plan. Office of Corrections, 
Revised December. 1986. 
205 	[bid, 1. 
206 
	
Fitzgerald and Sim, British Prisons, 121. 
207 
	
Ibid. 123. 
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Moreover, "it has been an important factor in the marked failure of prison 
officers to gain responsibility for 'treatment and training' and welfare work in 
prisons."2" But the major reason prison officers •wanted to be involved in 
prisoner treatment or training and welfare work was not_out-of some -sense of 
civic duty, it was because civilians threatened their primacy within prisons. 2" 
Victoria's prison officers normally complained about the undue influence the 
professional prison employees appeared to have with management. The 
majority, however, had never considered undertaking a similar function. Some 
staff had probably undertaken external courses to give them skills for promotion 
- rarely were they undertaken to move into the professional area. Yet Victoria's 
prison administrators thought that training would be sufficient to undertake a 
social facilitation role. Thomas describes the English experience. 
Officers were encouraged to go on courses of all kinds, no doubt with 
the expectation on their part that they would become in some vague 
kind of way trained in social work. They certainly hoped that their 
training would be put to some novel use. Once again, the implications of 
this situation had barely been considered. No doubt many, if not all, of 
the courses were good and worthwhile. No doubt many officers enjoyed 
them and gained a great deal from them. But they did not produce 
qualified social workers, nor was the situation in the institution 
influenced by this training. The role remained that of a controller. It may 
be that an officer, after a course, knew more about criminality, perhaps 
his approach to the prisoner was more informal, but this is not social 
work. 21° 
Unit management implementation was considered to be the process, which 
would revolutionise the operation of Victoria's prisons. The senior 
administrators who had journeyed to the USA to evaluate the concept had left 
the system. They had, like many other previous prison administrators, returned 
convinced of the need to build new prisons and introduce new prisoner 
management concepts. 211 They brought ideas, which had still to be evaluated. 212 
208 	Ibid. 
200 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer. 219. 
210 Ibid, 209. 
211 	J.E. Thomas and A. Stewart, Imprisonment in Western Australia, 
(Nedlands, WA: University of Western Australia Press. 1978) 70. 
212 	Zupan, "The need for research on Direct Inmate Supervision- 21-22. 
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Victoria's prison authorities literally started with a set of expectations. To their 
credit, they quickly produced policies, which covered a plethora of issues. 
- Capital expenditure meant new prison building. Employment, - planning and 
training strategies were _devised. 213 However, there was little apparent thought 
given to the provision of unit management training. 
Perusal of the Annual Report of 1986-87 provides detailed information 
regarding the many tasks the infant organisation had or wished to accomplish. 214 
There was scant mention.of unit management and no reference whatever to unit 
management training in either the Report or the Work Force Planning and 
Training Plan. It appeared that unit management training was to be an 
afterthought. 215 Again, this is not uncommon. 
Organisations often look to training as a means of coping with 
difficulties, not because it will solve them, but because training has 
overtones of professionalism and intellectual attainment, which can keep 
demands for radical change at bay. 216 
That the majority of prison officers generally ignored the unit management 
principles and viewed the training as a necessary evil is a moot point. What did 
happen was that many experienced prison .staff could not accept the intended 
change and left the service. There was an average eight per cent separation rate 
from 1984 - 1990. 2 " Custodial numbers grew exponentially from 971 personnel 
in 1984-85 to 1643 personnel in 1989 - 90. 2 " Despite this increase a major 
reason for concern was the average age and length of service of the staff. Over 
half the prison staff were aged 40 years and older in 1990. And by that time 
every rank from Governor grade III down to SPO had an average of at least ten 
years service. Base grade prison officers had an average of four years service. 219 
213 	Work Force Planning and Training Plan. Office of Corrections, 
Revised December, 1986. 
214 	00C Annual Report, 1986-87. 
215 	Denbeigh Richards, the former CBC Director, first heard of unit management when 
the Directors were informed that a handbook on the topic would be written in 1989. 
Interview in Hobart. 19 September 1997. 
216 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 209. 
217 	Office of Corrections Human Resources, 1984-1990, table not labled. 
218 	Office of Corrections Human Resources, 1984-1990, table unlabled. 
219 	Ibid. 
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Apart from the problem associated with uniformed staff being able to retire 
from the service at aged 50, there was the difficulty of training personnel who 
-6; 
had very little formal qualifications, and were reluctant to accept change. 22° 
Victoria's unit management training appears to have been perfunctory. It failed 
to provide even• the basic requirements to enable the concept to be 
operationalised. The new prisons opened all apparently operating on unit 
management principles. Each prison managed its peculiar brand. 221 While staff 
motivation was "at an all time high" prior to the prison accepting prisoners 222 
the realities soon set in. New edifices became ordinary prisons. Traditional 
practices reappeared. Unit management implementation became secondary as 
both staff and prisoners coped with change. Some experienced staff refused to 
undertake prisoner Individual Management Plans (IMPs) which was an essential 
element of their new roles as prisoner case managers. 223 Staffing shortages 
meant that the so-called unit teams hardly functioned because external 
replacements tended to bring conflicting operational views. Unit philosophies 
and operating procedures digressed. There was very little accountability apart 
from the custodial norms. 224 
The fundamental proposition of unit management is that the officer can assist 
the prisoner to change his ways. This proposition has two distinguishing flaws: 
the prison officer may not wish to become involved in the process and, even 
then, it may only be lip - service; the second, and perhaps more important, is 
that the prisoner may also give lip - service to the process. It was going to be 
very difficult to change 150 years of Victoria's prison culture overnight. 
220 	J. Braithwaite and M. Cass, "Note on the demographic composition of Australian 
police forces and prison services- ANZ J Crim.  12 (1979): 132-138, see tables 7&9. 
221 	See the comments in the Beeden Report. 
222 	Interview with Prison Supervisor Sandra Paterson - one of the original CPOs at HMP 
Barwon 22 August 1996. 
223 	Information provided by Prison Supervisor Sandra Paterson, see Unit Management in 
Victorian Prisons. principle 6. 
224 	Interviews with various unit managers at the STC. 
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Again, those charged with promulgating Victoria's version of the concept 
should have been aware of the ramifications arising from the "Medical Model.' 
Prisoners learnt to play the game. 225 
The inmate soon becomes painfully aware_that_his personal success in 
obtaining release from prison is directly related to the personal success 
of the professional staff assigned to correct him ... The inmate thus - 
chooses the game most likely to gain his ultimate release. He "wins" the 
game when the "rehabilitator" declares that the "rehabilitee" has indeed 
been "rehabilitated." 226 
Some notorious prisoners, however, do not wish to play the 'game' preferring 
to remain for the duration instead of accepting parole prescriptions. 227 
Moreover, Bowker has identified the most salutary explanation to the 
difficulties of operating unit management. He notes, "relations between officers 
and prisoners conform to a caste model, with limited interaction across the cast 
line and reciprocal negative stereotypes between the officers and the 
prisoners." 228 For example, Victoria's prison policy-makers took a relatively 
new prisoner management strategy and shaped it to suit their jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the policy makers assumed that prison officers would understand the 
policy intent. They may also have assumed that training could be formulated 
after the principles had been devised. There is no evidence that prison officers 
were ever consulted about the policy or training the staff to implement the 
intended policy. 229 
Victoria's policy makers formulated nine principles, which would provide the 
framework for Victorian unit management operation. 
225 	Murton, The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 73. 
226 	Ibid. 
227 	"Read shuns parole- The Age. 26 July, 1997. 
228 	Bowker, Corrections: The Science and the Art. 199. 
229 Colin Marston. a former senior Governor during the 00C Departmental years from 
1983-1992, claims that unit management was presented as afait accompli at the 
quarterly Governors' conferences at the STC -sometime during the mid eighties- . 
To his knowledge. training implications were never mentioned. 
Interview. 1 May. 1998. 
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They were: 
1 	The prisoner population is to be divided, either architecturally, 
geographically or administratively into manageable groups, and 
managed by permanent staff teams. 
2 	Prison staff are to permanently assigned to a staff team. For 
	 instance, each_security_accommodation_administrative, industry _ 
and executive unit will constitute a team. 
3 	Each staff team, provided it meets the goals of the prison, will 
have delegated power to control its own operations. 
4 	Staff teams will set times for regular meetings, some of which 
selected prisoners will be required to attend. 
5 	Staff and prisoners will be accountable for their own duties, 
obligations, responsibilities and the operation of the unit. 
6 	Staff in control of prisoners will be expected to perform a range 
of duties, which will include Custodial, Individual Management 
Planning and Programs Functions. 
7 	Staff are to support, maintain and provide a prison environment 
that reflects the diversity, demands and expectations of ordinary 
community life. 
8 	A system of direct sanctions and rewards for prisoners is to be 
devised by staff at the unit level, and is to be administered and 
controlled consistently and equitably. 
9 	Each team will set its own objectives, strategies and goals. These 
are to be reviewed at least once annually. Staff are to be 
encouraged to prepare additional goals and strategies for each 
review. 23° 
However, as noted, little thought had been given to training the staff in the 
operation of the concept (see chapters 6 and 7). The little available unit 
management training was cursory and desultory. 231 Staff was contemptuous of 
some of the presenters who had little prison credibility. 232 Their perceptions of 
the intended policy were quickly coloured. 
231) 	Unit Management in Victorian Prisons, 7-8. 
231 	Author's experience at the Staff Training College from 1989-1992. 
232 	Correspondence from former Victorian Governor Helen Holland, 17 April 1997. 
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Moreover, a schism developed between the staff appointed to new prisons and 
those who remained in the traditional custodial operated facilities. Custodial 
staff accused unit management staff of 'selling out.' 233 
The prison officer and prison policy. 
Most prison officers have a different perception of prison policy than that held 
by their operational managers. 234 In Victoria, for example, until recently all 
operational managers reached their position via the promotion system. 235 All 
had commenced as base grade officers and arisen through the various ranks. 
Despite this operational managers understandably identify with Head Office 
senior administrators. Operational managers have two-fold responsibilities: to 
lead subordinates; and be the conduit between uniformed staff and Head Office. 
The majority of Victoria's operational governors 236 had served since the late 
1960s or early 1970s. 237 They were versed in the custody and control regime. 
All served during the turbulence of the 1970s and early 1980s. They were all 
aware of the pitfalls of the Community Welfare Services policy-making era. On 
the other hand, there was also a new generation of senior administrators with 
other than custodial agendas. 238 
233 	Prather found similar instances in America. See L. H. Bowker, 
Corrections: The Science and the Art, (New York: McMillen, 1982) 185-186. 
234 	Hawkins, The Prison, 86. 
235 	
' Civilian ' prison staff have been laterally entering governor grades since 1993. 
236 	The managers of prisons were Governors. The larger institutions like Pentridge had 
three grades of Governors. A Governor grade III was operational manager with a 
grade II as his deputy. There were also Governors' grade I in charge of security, 
accommodation, rostering and classification, respectively. Small prisons had a 
Governor grade I in charge with a CPO as deputy. Eventually, many positions 
attained Governor rank denigrating the position. In 1997 the Governor grades have 
been abolished - the preferred title being General Manager with the Operational 
Manager as deputy. 
237 	From the author's interviews with Governors at the STC during the many 
Governors' conferences held there during the author's position as Co-ordinator of 
Training Services. 
238 	However, most senior Australian prison administrators have limited tenure and 
transfer to other public service departments In the 1990s heads of prisons in WA. 
David Grant, Victoria's Peter Harmsworth. and Queensland's Keith Hamburger went 
to Education. S.A.'s John Dawes became a Public Advocate, and S.A's Sue Vardon 
went to Canberra in the Service Delivery Agency. 
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Victoria's prison officers had every right to be sceptical of the new concept of 
unit management. There had been limited dialogue between senior management 
and the prison -officer grades about the concept. However, lack of 
communication between_Head 	Office and institutions is hardly new. 239 
Moreover, prison officers had to cope with, inter alia, a new organisation-the 
00C; new Directors'- General in Bill Kidston and Peter Harmsworth; new 
prisons being built; new Governor positions to be filled; new training 
infrastructures and practices; an expanding Head Office; and other senior Head 
Office administrators creating policies to meet all and any exigencies. 
Irrespective of the Director - General's motives and intentions, the harsh reality 
was that the new organisation had many varied tasks - the primary one being the 
establishment of the new department. And it may be that the failure to 
successfully identify and address all the problems of unit management and its 
implementation are to be found in the department's establishment. 
Murton, in discussing the dilemma faced by new prison administrators 
advocating change, commented, 
But since the official reformer often believes that organiZational 
structures, per se, hold the key to reform, he may concentrate on 
structure exclusively and consequently bargain away real prison reform 
for a more sophisticated bureaucracy. It is with this "progress" of 
bureaucratic structuring that reform measures wane, change is hindered, 
and achievement is thwarted by state agencies that tend to perpetuate 
themselves rather than to serve the needs of the citizenry. 240 
Cerrato argues that stability begets order. 241 The changing dynamics in 
Victoria's 1980s prison system created instability. Prison officers faced 
continued prisoner intransigence. The newly elected Labor Government acted as 
swiftly as the legislative machinery would allow. However, the prison officers' 
perceived that the new Minister, Pauline Toner, favoured the incarcerated. 
239 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, especially chapter 9. 
24() Murton, The Dilemma of Prison Reform, 101. 
241 	S. Cerrato, "Reform of Correctional Instability: Order or Stability." 
Crime and Justice. Vol. VII (1984): 87-99. 87. 
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Her actions during the strike in 1983 of declaring a state of emergency and 
threatening staff with dismissal cemented this perception.'" While the 
promulgation of a new Department of Corrections met general approval, the 
idea that prisoners conditions should be given priority was greeted with 
scepticism.'" Moreover, the Governors seemed vague about the unit 
management concept in general when questioned closely. It appeared to many 
prison officers that Governors were deserting their ideals and becoming solely 
concerned with ingratiating themselves with the new Head Office hierarchy. 244 
A schism developed between staff and prison management that never healed 
during the 00C years. While the strained relationships between Victoria's 
prison officers and operational Governors may have arisen because of the 
intended policy change, there, at least, was no industrial disruption. 
English prison officers, on the other hand, took industrial action when the 
Government tried to introduce conflicting prison policy. 2" English prison 
officers started to question the motives of prison managers in the late 1970s. 
The Home Secretary warned that "relations between prison officers and prison 
governorships are not good and this was one of the factors in the recent 
breakdown of industrial relations." 246 Prison officers have many conflicting 
relationships; they complain about prisoners, other staff, Headquarters, and even 
the prison union. 247 Moreover, many felt that Governors were siding with 
prisoners and professional staff. 2" And prison officers' perceptions of prison 
'civilians' are well known. 
many officers openly resent the introduction of probation officers and 
social workers into the prisons, identifying both the philosophy behind 
welfare and the welfare workers themselves as sympathetic to prisoners, 
and likely to line up with prisoners against them. Welfare workers as 
seen as concerned only with prisoners' interests and hostile to the 
custodial role of officers. 2" 
242 	MRD 046= QQA171= Melbourne CTO VIC 93/91 10.45P. 
243 	Interview with former prison Governor Grade III. Jim Armstrong, 24 June 1996. 
244 	Ibid. 
245 	M. Fitzgerald and J. Sim. British Prisons, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979) 127-129. 
246 	Quoted in Fitzgerald and Sim, British Prisons. 126. 
247 	Fitzgerald and Sim, British Prisons, 113. 
248 	Ibid. 127. 
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Victoria's prison officers were expected to completely change roles and would 
now be "dealina, with prisoners on a more personal level." 250 Under the 
custodial regime 
prison officers' tasks are clearly defined, and discretion, in principle at-
least, is reduced to the minimum. Prison Rules, Standing Orders and 
Circular instructions_are designed to prescribe a way of handling every 
situation. 251 
However, there was little indication of what the new role required. The only 
practical information available was a handbook given to all the custodial staff. 252 
Indeed, the handbook's foreword claimed 
it is probably true to say that prison staff have been given and have 
adopted many differing views and opinions on the exact nature of unit 
management, how it should function and how it affects them and their 
jobs. 2" 
Victoria's senior prison authorities, however, thought that staff would be able 
to manage the new unit management regime particularly with purpose designed 
prisons. The new prisons near Lara, (FLMP Barwon), Castlemaine, (I-IMP 
Loddon), and the Melbourne Remand Centre254 were built to facilitate unit 
management practice. But building new prisons was not a guarantee of success. 
As Murton notes, "Significant reform efforts in this century have addressed 
themselves not to institutions but to differential methods of managing prisoners 
within existing institutions." 255 Moreover, the idea that unit management would 
be implemented throughout the system may not have been wise. "Reform 
programs grafted onto existing prison structures fail to survive because they are 
rejected as foreign organisms." 256 Again, the proposition that unit management 
was a new concept was found to be questionable. 257 
249 	Ibid, 125. 
25o Unit Management in Victorian Prisons, Victoria, 1989: Office of Corrections, 6. 
251 	Fitzgerald and Sim, British Prisons, 120. 
252 	Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. 
253 	Ibid, 2. 
254 	The Remand Centre changed its focus its 1997 from a reception prison to an 
assessment prison It is now called the Melbourne Assessment Prison. A private 
company, Group 4, operates the new 600 bed remand Port Phillip Prison which 
opened in September 1997. 
255 	Murton, The Dilemma of Prison Reform, 17. 
256 	Ibid, 131. 
257 	Ibid, 209. 
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Prison policy and philosophy: interrelated or intertwined? 
- 	-  
There is a tendency in prisons to label almost any type of operational practice a 
policy. To the uninitiated (prison officers) the word policy has 'professional' 
connotations, or overtones of Head_Office_dogma. It is probably_the_most _ _ 
overused and misunderstood word in prisons. When a prison officer asks why a 
particular process is undertaken, the usual answer is that it is 'policy.' 
Prison practice is usually enshrined through various Standing Orders, Rules and 
Regulations, and numerous prison circulars which even the most astute prison 
officer would have difficulty interpreting - even if they are available. 258 Prison 
officers are normally issued with a set of prison standing orders on recruitment. 
These are usually bulky and cannot be carried on a day-to-day basis. 259 
Moreover, many of the current 'procedures ,260 have been adapted or remain 
unchanged from the originals, which were promulgated last century. 261 Prison 
Rules and Regulations are rarely displayed in institution on the premise that 
prisoners may use these to challenge practices. 262 
Any officer who strictly adheres to these procedures will soon find that 
practices change depending on senior personne1. 263 What one senior officer will 
allow, another may not. Indeed, many prison practices developed over the years 
and became enshrined as policy. Officers are taught these practices during their 
early years and quickly accept them as dictum. Practices become 'policy' by 
default. 
258 	M. Maguire. J. Vagg, and R. Morgan, (Eds) Accountability and Prisons,( London: 
Tavistock, 1985) 7. 
259 	In the 1980s the Tasmanian standing orders, for example, weighed nearly a kilo. 
Prison officers only used these for the examination for permanency. They were then 
discarded into lockers or left at home. In the nine years the author was a prison 
officer at HMP Risdon, he never saw an officer refer to these orders except for the 
examination. 
261) 	Procedures are used to describe standing orders, rules and regulations and 
circulars unless otherwise stated. 
261 	Thomas and Stewart, Imprisonment in Western Australia, 4. 
262 	Maguire et al. Accountability and Prisons, 6-8. 
263 J.J. DiIullio. Jr.. Governing Prisons. (New York: The Free Press, 1987) 221-222. 
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Indeed, most prisons are run on informal rather than formal policies 264 Both 
staff and prisoners become accustomed to these practices and, in the main, 
accommodate whenever some mirior change is implemented. Most prison 
managers deal with tangibles, and from a base of experience and rationality. 
Moreover, there is a definite set of procedures and practices, which can be _ _ 
referred to whenever a problem arises. Indeed it is only when managers are 
confused or uncertain "that they mask their insecurity and insufficiency with 
rigid rules and authoritative discipline." 265 
However, whenever a major operational change takes place - such as the 
introduction of unit management - the manager must expect difficulties with 
implementation from both staff and prisoners. The boundaries of officer and 
prisoner interaction have to be redefined and readjusted. It is not only the policy 
that is being changed but also, more importantly, the philosophy behind prison 
operation. 
There are a number of philosophies that have entered the lexicon of prison 
operation. 266 Newman argues that these have been sequential, but not mutually 
exclusive. 267 These philosophies have given rise to various models that reflected 
contemporary thought. For example, the Medical Model arose during the 
Rehabilitation era. The model assumed the prisoner was 'sick' and could be 
cured through professional treatment and intervention. 268 Prisoner management 
and operational policy was designed to accommodate each philosophy. Most of 
the prisoner intervention models were less than successful. In the Medical 
Model era 
despite increased staff, the acquisition of a host of treatment personnel, 
the creation of innumerable treatment programs, and the well - 
intentioned interest of society in curing the criminal, we have observed 
an increase in institutional violence, disorders, rebellion, and riots. 269 
.264 	Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 65-66. 
265 	Thomas The English Prison Officer, 9. 
266 	D.J. Newman. Introduction to Criminal Justice.  2nd edition 
(New York: Lippincott, 1978) 308. 
267 	Ibid. 
268 	Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 27. 
269 	Ibid. 
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Prison operational policy was much more clearly defined during the Restraint 
and Revenge eras. Indeed, philosophy and policy were contiguous. However, 
there was conflict between operational philosophy -and policy during both the 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration phase. The_Rehabilitation era was found 
wanting, 27° and has practically disappeared. 271 But there were tensions between 
professional and uniformed staff due to the disparate philosophy and operational 
policy. Treatment staff has traditionally complained that prison officers are more 
concerned with custody than prisoner programmes. 272 Prison managers and 
prison officers, however, are judged on their ability to maintain order. This was 
their primary function in Victoria until 1990. 27' The divergence between 
philosophy and operational policy has become more pronounced during the 
contemporary Reintegration era, mainly due to the authorities' lack of 
explanation about the purpose of policies, and the seemingly on-going emphasis 
on custodial prison officer training. 
Vinson has explicitly described the difficulties associated with trying to 
implement change in a prison environment that wishes to maintain the status 
quo. While Vinson advocated a change to prison philosophy, prison officers 
were determined that "an adequate standard of discipline be maintained." 274 
Vinson's experiences highlight the difficulties in implementing policy change. In 
Victoria's case, there was no apparent philosophical grounding for similar 
change. Indeed, it was very difficult in 1990 to ascertain the basis of Victoria's 
prison philosophy prior to the introduction of unit management. Many 
Australian politicians still utter the rhetoric of 'rehabilitation.' The current 
Victorian prison system has a highly publicised Statement of Purpose of 
"Protecting the Community and Rehabilitating Offenders." 275 
270 	R. Martinson. "What Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform - 
•The Public Interest, ( Spring 1974): 22-54. 
271 	D.E.J. MacNamara, "The Medical Model in Corrections: Requiescat in Pace... 
Criminology. 14 ( 1977 ): 446. 
272 	J.W. Eaton. Stone Walls Not a Prison Make, 
(Springfield. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1962) 134 
273 	M.C. Filan.  A Study of the Legal and Sociological Determinants of the Work Role of 
the Victorian Prison Officer, BA diss.. Canberra College of Advanced Education. 
1978, 39 
274 	T. Vinson. Wilful Obstruction, (North Ryde, NSW: Methuen, 1982)34. 
275 	Corrections. Protecting the Community and Rehabilitating Offenders, 
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But these are echoes of the Medical Model. And it is statements like these, 
which confuse both, prison officers and the general public that are sceptical 
anyway. These utterances identify the fundamental dilemma of Adstralian prison 
operation. There must be a philosophical base to which operating policy can be 
reflected. It is pointless implementing a new prisoner management strategy 
without a complimentary philosophy and the appropriate prison officer training. 
This was aptly demonstrated in Victoria during the 00C years. 
The most significant problem that the 00C faced was linking policy intention 
with operational practice. Prior to the introduction of unit management in 
Victoria prisoner management policy and prison operation were mainly 
congruent. Prison officers were custodians while civilian and professional 
personnel catered to prisoner programming. However, since the policy makers 
changed strategy to directly involve prison officers in effecting prisoner change 
there has been a disparity between policy intention and actual practice. Whether 
this is a direct result of unit management implementation is speculative. 
However, there is evidence that some policy intention foundered. 
Policy and practice: congruent or polar? 
Among the "Operating Principles" that CORE 276 proposed in its Business Plan 
1997/98 277 were several that will test whether the proposed "Public Correctional 
Services Authority" 278 can match policy intent with operational practice. CORE 
suggests that the relatively new organisation has the capacity, inter alia, 
to discharge with integrity and professionalism, its primary responsibility 
for the safety of the community by delivering effective supervision, 
custody, reparation and rehabilitation to prisoners and offenders and 
reparation to the community; 
to maximise the benefits to prisoners and offenders through the 
application of a continuum of care model; 
Department of Justice, Victoria, 1993. 
276 	The acronym for The Public Correctional Enterprise, the descendent of the 00C. 
277 CORE Business Plan 1997/.98: an innovative approach to corrections, 
Department of Justice, (CBP). 
278 	Public Correctional Services Authority Bill. 1998. 
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to follow best employment practices and promote the involvement of 
staff in achieving the organisation's objectives; [and] 
to empower staff to develop and use their skills and abilities to the full, 
while being held accountable for their performance. 279 
Whether the organisation accomplishes these tasks will no doubt be the subject
of some. future review.project. However, those conducting the review will have 
tangible evidence that contemporary policy makers have made explicit what 
they expect to achieve and have designated the mechanisms necessary to 
achieve this end. There is nothing implied in the Business Plan. Prison officers 
may not necessarily agree with what has been proffered. They cannot, however, 
accuse the organisation of duplicity. Previous policies were singularly devoid of 
detail. And it was the lack of such detail that caused much friction between 
00C prison officers and management. Prison officers argued that policy was 
shaped towards placating prisoners and that little was being done to assist them 
understand the unit management concept. 2" In the late 1980s senior managers 
had little tangible evidence to rebut their claim falling back on the official 
position that a unit management guidelines handbook was in the process of 
development. This did not eventuate until 1990. 2" 
Indeed, it was claimed in 1985 that the 00C had developed mechanisms to 
promote "high morale amongst staff working in the Office through involvement 
in decision making, support and direction of the work they were undertaking, 
and through training. '7282 Prison operational policy was to be "humane 
management of offenders and prisoners." 2" Prison officers, at the local level, 
were given a clear mandate: "Management of prisoners shall be minimally 
intrusive consistent with the maintenance of security and good order.” 284 
Offenders and prisoners subject to Office of Corrections jurisdictions 
shall be managed humanely in safe and appropriately secure facilities, 
and in a manner which is fair, just, constructive and contemporary: 28) 
279 CBP, 6. 
280 	Helen Holland interview April 1997. 
281 	Unit Management Guidelines: Achieving Leadership Excellence in Victorian 
Prisons, Office of Corrections, 1990. 
282 	Office of Corrections Strategic Plan 1985/86 to 1987/88, 3.4. 
283 	Ibid, 3.1.3. 
284 	[bid, 3.3.1 C. 
285 	[bid, 3.4. 
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In an attempt to change past prisoner management practice, policy makers 
decided that the new process "must be characterised by skilled interaction rather 
than physical/electronic constraint." 286 To aid the proposed changes, the Staff 
Training College (STC) was established. T_he College would-provide "intensive 
training, retraining, specialist and promotional courses." 287 Again it was 
recognised that "Training is an essential component in the development of any 
successful correctional system and the Office of Corrections training 
programmes are geared to provide high quality training in the future." 238 
By June 1990 it was recognised that the 1985 policies had not met Head Office 
expectations. It was noted that prison officers were increasingly reverting to 
customary practices. 
Experience gathered from introducing unit management into the new 
prisons has illustrated a need for the organisation to set out very clearly 
to operational staff its expectations of prison management. Without 
clear expectations, it has been found that staff tend, while implementing 
"change", to revert to old patterns of management, or they tend to 
propose changes that conform to traditional expectations. 289 
Head Office recognised that there was still a great deal to accomplish if unit 
management was to be successful. 
The system of management devised by the New Prisons Group was, and 
generally still is significantly divergent from the highly routinised [sic] 
system of management that had gone decades before. It called for not 
only a high level of skills acquisition amongst custodial staff, but a 
significant change of attitude by them towards their work.'" 
The mechanisms to provide information to prison officers were less than sound. 
In both the case of experienced and inexperienced staff the shift to a new 
management approach required the provision of a clear articulation of 
the new system and the vision senior management had for the prison 
system. Not only that, but the articulation had to be made conceptually 
accessible and attractive to staff possessing marked variations in their 
ability to deal with concepts. 291 
286 	Ibid, 3.4.1.2 (a). 
287 Ibid, 3.5. 
288 	Ibid, 4.4. 
289 	Prisons Structual Efficiency Implementation Plan,  Office of Corrections Version 1 
June 1990, Attachment 6. 
290 	Ibid. Attachment 5. 
291 	Ibid. 
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The 00C tried to address the disparity between policy intention and the 
practicality of unit management implementation. It, rather belatedly, set up a 
syndicate to look at measures on —How to - implement Unit Management in a 
prison." 292 The make up of the syndicate was an indication of how confused the 
implementation process had become. Of the six participants, two were 
Governors from open institutions — both soon to retire, the Superintendent of 
Building Development, a minor community corrections official, a manager of a 
community corrections region, and the manager of VPIC — the prison industry 
arm of corrections. 293 The intended target group of the syndicate's 
deliberations, prison officers, were extremely sceptical of any propositions 
emanating from Head Office regardless of whether a specific syndicate had been 
set up to assist unit management implementation. 294 Whether this syndicate 
made any progress is a moot point. On 4 October, after a state election, the 
00C was subsumed into the newly formed Department of Justice. 295 
Howlett and Ramesh maintain that "the extent of the behavioural change the 
policy requires of the target group determines the level of difficulty faced in its 
implementation." 296 As noted, prison officers' are extremely conservative. Any 
change to operational routine that affects the dynamics betweed prison officers 
and prisoners is subject to intense scrutiny, especially by prison staff. Prison 
officers' may perceive that their traditional authority is being eroded, or at least 
threatened by managerial edict. Again, prison officers' attribute their authority 
in their ability to manipulate a system of rewards and punishments. 297 However, 
when an edict is proffered which threatens this authority there will be a period 
when staff will question management's motives. 
	
. 292 	"The Way Ahead — Working Together - Proceedings of the Senior Staff Conference 
held at the Staff Training College on 4 July 1990. Unit Management, 10-18. 
Office of Corrections. 
293 	Ibid, 10. 
294 	Prisons Structual Efficiency Implementation Plan, Attachment 3 Issues. iv. 
295 	Keypoints. Vol 4 No. 2, December 1992. 
296 	M. Howlett. and M. Ramesh. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy 
Subsystems. (Don Mills. Ont.: Oxford University Press. 1995) 155. 
297 G. M. Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison. 
Sixth Edition. (Princeton. NJ.: Princeton Uni. Press. 1970) 50. 
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Unless there are some mechanisms available to explain policy intent and 
alleviate prison officer concern, the policy's chances of successful 
implementation are slim. 298 
There_ is no single method of overcoming implementation problems. 299 _ 
However, there was a number of factors which Victoria's prison managers 
could have utilised to overcome implementation problems. They could have, 
inter alia, involved employees — "especially those to be affected — in the 
planning process"; provided "more information to employees about plans and 
their probable consequences so that they will understand the need for change, 
the expected benefits, and what is required for effective implementation"; and 
developed "a pattern of effective planning and effective implementation"; they 
should have been "aware of the impact of proposed changes on organisation 
members and minimise[d] unnecessary disruptions While there is no 
formal evidence to suggest that these factors were ever considered or even 
undertaken, there is a body of anecdotal evidence from former senior governors 
that the planning process was flawed."' 
Indeed, criticism about the failure to effect change is usually from the 
perspective of those in charge of implementation rather than from the people 
they are trying to influence. 302 As noted, Victoria's Head Office personnel 
blamed prison officer intransigence on the difficulties with implementing unit 
management."' However, there is also the fact that groups react quite 
differently than individuals from the direction of other individuals. 
298 	Howlett, and Ramesh. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy 
Subsystems. 155. 
299 	J.A.F. Stoner, R.R. Collins and P.W. Yetton. Management in Australia, 
(Sydney: Prentice-Hall. 1985) 796. 
300 	Ibid. 165. 
301 	Interviews with Jim Armstrong, Helen Holland. Colin Marston and Peter Hannay. 
302 	D. Klein. -Some notes on the dynamics of resistance to change: The defender role" 
in W.G. Bennis, K.D. Benne. R. Chin. and K.E. Corey (Eds), The Planning of 
Change, third edition, (New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston, 1975) 117-124. 117. 
303 	Prisons Structual Efficiency Implementation Plan, Attachment 6. 
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Stogdill claims that performance and expectations are "characteristic of 
individuals." On the other hand, group dynamics are a powerful mechanism to 
prevent any change to the status quo. 
A group by definition involves interactions and performances (actions 
and reactions). A group also involves expectations. The structuring of - 
positions in a group tends to confirm differential expectations relative to — 
the predictable initiative of certain members and the predictable 
reactions of other members. In addition, the members tend to confirm 
for each other a normative set of values relative to the group purpose 
and member behavior affecting the group process. Not only do the 
members in interaction develop norms which define expected behavior, 
but they exert strong pressures upon each other to conform with the 
norms of the group. Purpose and norms represent mutually confirmed 
sets of expectations which must be regarded as characteristics of 
groups. 304 
Victoria's prison officers may not have perceived that there was a gap between 
policy intention and operational practice. They were aware of the attempt to 
implement unit management at the custodial-designed prison at Castlemaine. 305 
They also knew that the new prisons at Loddon (Castlemaine), Barwon (Lara) 
and the Remand Centre (Melbourne) were to be operated as unit management 
prisons. Many of the experienced staff who transferred to these institutions had 
undergone interviews for the unit management prisons. They were aware of the 
expectations. However, when these prisons became operational it soon became 
apparent that old management practices had not been eradicated. Moreover, the 
cursory attempts at unit management training by the Strategic Services Division 
of the 00C did little to impress ,upon prison officers that Head Office personnel 
were truly committed to change. 306 Most of the architects of unit management 
had departed, and the constant turnover in Head Office personnel (see chapter 
5) reinforced this perception. 
304 	R.M. Stogdill, -Group Achievement - in W. S Sahakian. Social Psychology:  
Experimentation. Theory, Research,  (London: Intext Educational Publishers, 1972). 
430-441, 431. 
305 
	
R. Moore and W. Higgins, Castlemaine Prison Pilot Unit Management Program 
Phase 1, 00C discussion document, 1986 
306 
	
J.R. Beeden, Report on validation of SPO/CPO Promotional Courses 1989 to 1991. 
Report to the Co-ordinator of Training Services. Bill Paterson, October, 1991. 7. 
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In a departure from customary practice, new prisons were allowed to write their 
own operational procedures. 3" The Barwon Prison Plan highlighted the new 
unit management concept. On the other hand, the Loddon Prison document is 
singularly devoid of any direct mention of the concept. And there is evidence 
that prison officers at different locations were also confused as to whether they 
were operating under unit management principles. 3" Many officers at the open 
institutions at Dhurringile, Won Wron and Morwell River could not understand 
the fuss. They claimed to have been working under unit management principles 
for years. 3" Again, it may have been that prison officers could not understand 
what Head Office policy makers were trying to achieve. Some officers claimed 
that there was "a need for Office of Corrections policies/objectives ... be 
explained to promotional courses in laymans [sic] terms/language." 310 
The problem faced by most prison policy makers is not whether their policies 
will be implemented; rather the major problem is where to find appropriate 
information. Contemporary Victorian policy makers are using business 
management principles as a basis for prison operation policy to meet Public 
Service reforms:" Previous policy makers had little to refer to. Chapter 2 
investigates the formation of contemporary prison policy. The following chapter 
establishes a framework for analysing prison policy, utilising public policy 
literature. 
307 	For example. Loddon Prison : Philosophy and Operational Arrangements, undated 
but probably I990,and H.M. Prison Barwon Philosophy and Principles of Unit  
Management. undated but probably 1990. 
308 	Beeden, Report on validation of SPO/CPO Promotional Courses 1989 to 1991,  3-15. 
309 	Ibid. 
310 	Ibid, 25. 
311 	Victorian Prison Service, Planning for Performance: Operational & Performance 
Plan 1996/97. 
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Chapter 2 
Victoria's Prison Policy: An Analytical framework. 
In the absence of genuine knowledge, those most responsible for making prison 
policy have been grasping at straws.' 
Victoria's Parliament and judiciary perceive that there is a 'discipline' of prison 
policy-making. Numerous Victorian parliamentary reports on prisons and 
judicial inquiries into prison operation criticise the lack of a systematic policy 
approach. 2 Prison administrators are usually criticised whenever a traumatic 
episode occurs and blamed for poor or non-existent policies. Parliamentary and 
judicial perception of what constitutes prison policy per se and what prison 
authorities perceive as policy appears at odds. There are two significant reasons 
for this. 
First, while the prison in Australia is "the largest power that the state exercises 
in practice, on a regular basis, over its citizens," 3 the seniority system combined 
with the custody and control philosophy meant that until the 1970s there was 
little accountability or government scrutiny of prisons. Under the old seniority 
system the long-serving officer could eventually attain a senior management 
position. Those responsible for the operation and management of the various 
Australian prison systems tended to retain custody and control approaches. 
J.J. DiIulio Jr. Governing Prisons A Comparative Study of Correctional  
Management, (New York: The Free Press, 1987) 12. 
Report of the Board of Inquiry appointed to inquire into and report upon the escape  
of five prisoners from H.M. Gaol Pentridge. on Saturday 27th day of August, 1955. 
VPR 1955, No.7 (The McLean Report). 
Report of the Board of Inquiry into several matters concerning H=M Prison Pentridge  
and the maintenance of discipline in prisons, 25 September 1973, 
Victorian Government Printer, (The Jenkinson Report). 
J.D. Henderson. A Report on the Correctional System of Victoria, Australia, 
Department of Community Welfare Services. April 1983. 
Report on the Accountability of the Office of Corrections, The Ombudsman 
Victoria, July 1990. 
N. Morris. The Future of Imprisonment. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1974) 2. 
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At the same time public policy-making and analysis was itself in an embryonic 
stage, with little direct utility to individuals or institutions concerned with 
prisons. Indeed, some commentators claimed "there has not been much attempt 
to develop theory, or to devise more general frameworks." 4 Second, the 1970s 
movement to make prisons and prison systems more accountable; 'open' 
prisons, and the enshrinement of prisoners rights, left senior prison 
administrators in a state of anomie. 
To counter criticism of prisons the government either retired or replaced those 
incumbents who did not resign. 5 Their replacements generally had wide-ranging 
expertise6 and experience in number of government areas.' This sea-change in 
prison leadership from the prison 'specialist' to the prison 'generalist' implicitly 
recognised that the old style of prison management was no longer relevant in 
the contemporary correctional climate. 
The change, however, was to have profound implications for prison policy, 
prison operation, and the role of prison officers. The new leaders were not 
content to have sinecures. They had been given a mandate for change, and were 
interested in utilising their resources to seek other methods of managing prisons, 
managing prisoners, and managing prison officers. Moreover, they accepted that 
previous prison practice had failed, presumably due to entrenched ideas and 
practices. The new prison managers also perceived that their skills, attributes 
and experience gained in the general public service stream could be readily 
adapted and applied into the prison system. Critical of what purported to be 
prison policy as fact, in sets of routines and procedures, managers applied their 
policy-making expertise to the prison environment. 
R.N. Spann and G.A. Curnow, Public Policy and Administration in Australia:  
A Reader. (Sydney: John Wiley, 1975) 456. 
A practice that still occurs, for example, "Jails chief removed in wake of prison riot' . 
Weekend Australian, 19-20 April 1997. 
For example, the New South Wales Government appointed a well known academic. • 
Professor Tony Vinson, from the University of Newcastle, to head the new Corrective 
Services Commission in 1979. 
For example. The Office of Corrections in Victoria appointed Peter Harmsworth as 
Director-General. He had wide-ranging managerial and policy-making experience in 
the Victorian Police and Public Service Board. 
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The results of their endeavours set in train a number of changes that singularly 
would probably have had minimal impact on the functioning and operation of 
the prison system. They introduced new operational policies, new methods of 
prison officer/prisoner interactions, and a liberalisation of prisoner routine. 
However, there appeared to be very little thought given to the changing role of 
prison officers. Indeed, in one particularly famous example, it was to be a 
number of years before a significant investigation of the roles and duties of the 
contemporary officer was to be undertaken.' 
Prison policy: towards a method for analysis.  
It is difficult to find studies on Australian prison policy which give the 
researcher a basis for further investigation. One Australian work resulted from a 
Royal Commission, but the author indicated that this should "not be taken as a 
model for future decision making by prison administrators unless as an example 
of what not to do."9 Again, it is clear when investigating the prison policy 
process the researcher should be aware that 
The idea of 'public policy' works on a range of levels. It can mean 
simply a written document expressing intent on a particular issue, or 
imply a whole process in which values, interests and resources compete 
through institutions to influence government action.") 
While Australian studies bear the hallmark of the investigators' discipline," 
American prison policy researchers have not been constrained by psychological 
and sociological investigative methods. 12 
8 	Small Units in the Scottish Prison Service.  TheReport of the Working Party on 
Barlinnie Special Unit, Scottish Prison Service. 1994, especially chapters 8 and 9. 
9 
	
	
P. Stein, -The New South Wales Royal Commission into Prisons - in S. Encel, 
P. Wilenski. and B.B Schaffer.(Eds) Decisions. 
(Melbourne:Longman Cheshire, 1981) 206-224, 206. 
10 	G. Davis, J. Wanna, J. Warhurst, and P. Weller. Public Policy in Australia.  2nd Ed. 
(St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 1993) 7. 
11 	M. Findlay. The State of the Prison, (Bathurst, NSW: Mitchellsearch, 1982), 
G. Zdenkowskiand D. Brown. The Prison Struggle, (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin. 1982). 
T. Vinson. Wilful Obstruction. (North Ryde. NSW: Methuen, 1982), R. Tomasic and 
I. Dobinson. The Failure of Imprisonment. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1979). 
12 	See Dilulio. Governing Prisons, especially chapter 1. 
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This reflects, perhaps, the view that 
policy analysis is linked more directly to the social sciences, particularly 
political science, economics, history, sociology, anthropology, and law, 
along with the management and planning sciences and philosophy, 
becauseTolicy problems_are preeminently human or social ones. The 
social sciences are concerned with human societies, their evolution, 
structure and dynamics, and are therefore are_dir_ectly relevant to policy 
analysis. b 
The fact that current prison policy-making has a relatively short history does not 
mean that it cannot be subject to analysis. It would appear that the appropriate 
tools are derived from the policy analysis literature. Ham and Hill claim there 
are seven different variants of studies of public policy (see Fig.2:1). 
Where can prison policy-making be located in order to commence analysis? 
There are "studies of policy content in which analysts seek to describe and 
explain the genesis and development of particular policies." 14 At first glance this 
category appears to be the ideal tool for investigation. The authors' place this 
variable into the "Policy Studies" section of their dichotomy. 
Figure 2:1 Types of Study of Public Policy-Making. 
Policy Studies 	 Policy Analysis 
Knowledge of policy 	 Knowledge in the policy process 
and the policy process 
Source: adapted from Hogwood and Gunn, 1981, 
in Ham and Hill. The Policy Process, 8. 
13 	L. Pal, Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. 
(Scarborough, Ontario: 1992, Nelson) 20. 
14 	C. Ham and M. Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State. 
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1984) 9. 
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Moreover, Encel et al note that policy studies are 
the systematic study of particular areas of government activity 
(health care, education, defence, etc.) with the emphasis either on the 
processes that lead to governmental action in those fields or on the 
definition and analysis of prescription of government activity relevant 
to those problems. Indeed, the study of public policy is sometimes 
taken to embrace_primarily policy analysis. I? 
Similarly, "studies of policy processes in which attention is focussed on the 
stages which issues pass and attempts are made to assess the influence of 
different factors on the development of the issue," 16 also appears to be a valid 
investigative tool for prison policy analysis. The major problem with using this 
variable is getting access to relevant data. Prison Headquarters are notoriously 
'closed systems' even with facilitated access through Freedom of Information 
legislation. 
Ham and Hill's other variables provide springboards to tackle many prison 
issues but are of limited utility by requiring a major input of often unobtainable 
or inaccessible data. These variables are, 
studies of policy outputs which seek to explain why levels of 
expenditure or service provision vary between areas. 
evaluation studies, marks the borderline between analysis for policy and 
analysis of policy. 
information for policy-making in which data are marshalled in order to 
assist policy-makers reach decisions. 
process advocacy, a variant of analysis for policy in which analysts seek 
to improve the nature of policy-making systems. 
policy advocacy, the activity which involves the analyst in pressing 
specific options and ideas in the policy process, either individually or in 
association with others, perhaps through a pressure group. 1 ' 
Ham and Hill suggest investigation be directed toward "analysis of policy and 
analysis for policy" (see Fig.2:.2). The authors' claim 
1 5 	Encel et al. Decisions, xiv. 
16 	Ham and Hill. The Policy Process, 9. 
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theory; "big questions'' specific policy; 
specific problems 
evaluation 
Goal change policies understand policies 
Focus 
Mode of Analysis 	explanation 
Research Agenda independent client determined 
Duration of ;Analysis 	lengthy 	 short 
	 1-- 
Value Orientation 	strive for "objectivity"; —7' accept client values; 
neutrality 	 advocate "improvements" 
This distinction is important in drawing attention to policy analysis as an 
academic activity concerned primarily with advancing understanding, 
and policy analysis as an applied concerned mainly with contributing to 
the solution of social problems." - 
This distinction is developed by Pal, who in arguing that the policy researcher 
has to be aware of "the total universe of policy relevant research," 19 suggests 
that policy analysis should be either "academic" or "applied." Academic analysis 
focuses on the relationship between policy determinants and policy 
contents, [whereas applied analysis is about] questions of evaluation, 
[and] of determining the effectiveness of the policy. 20 Academic policy 
analysts do not wish, at least initially, to change policies, but simply to 
explain and understand them. They conduct their inquiries 
independently, for themselves, and rarely, on -a contract basis. Their 
research tends to be lengthy and thus comprehensive. 21 
Figure 2:2 Summary of Differences between Academic and Applied Policy 
A i_ialysis. 
Academic Analysis 	Applied Analysis 
Source: Pal, Public Policy Analysis, 24. 
However, the prison patchwork approach 22 has been less than successful. There 
is also evidence that 'applied' policy analysis has been equally unsuccessful. 23 
While Pal clearly delineates the differences in both academic and applied policy 
analysis, is this a useful concept for analysis of prison policy making? 
17 	Ibid, 9-10. 
18 	Ibid. 
19 	Pal, Public Policy Analysis, 20. 
20 	Ibid, 21-22. 
21 	Ibid, 23. 
22 	Simply fixing up or adding to policies. 
23 	See chapters 2. 3 and 4. 
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Dunn, in addition, argues policy analysis is an "applied social science discipline 
which uses reason and evidence to clarify, appraise, and advocate solutions for 
public problems." 24 
If the 'academic' and 'applied' categories appear at first too restrictive for 
analysis of prison policy-making, and the seven approaches of Ham and Hill too 
general, can any of the elements from the typology be useful? Indeed, can 
contemporary or future prison policy-makers make use of such typologies? 
While public policy models may not be the ideal frameworks for analysing 
prison policy-making, they at least contain measurable variables that pertain to 
all organisations - including prison systems. Any method, which can be used to 
investigate prison policy-making and provides a framework for rigorous analysis 
will be a valuable aid to prison administrators and policy-makers. Such analytic 
frameworks need to recognise that prison policy is highly politicised. This is 
particularly the case in relation to policy failures - for example, prison riots, 
escapes, and hostage situations. Prison policy analysts have recognised the 
importance of politics in policy-making. 
Davis et al note that politics must be added to "values interests and resources 
mediated through institutions." 25 They claim politics is "the perpetual wrecker 
of ordered procedure, the great undoer of best laid plans [and it] introduces 
chance and circumstance to the policy process." 26 Given that in practice prison 
policy analysis has been at the discretion of "higher reaches of administration," 27 
there appears to have been little checks and balances on the impact of such 
discretion. As a result those in charge of prison systems "are likely to have 
significant discretion over many of the problems they pursue, solutions they 
devise, and strategies they choose for implementing such solutions." 28 
24 	W.N. Dunn, "The Meaning of Policy Analysis" in F.S. Lane, (Ed), Current Issues in 
Public Administration, 3rd Ed. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986) 247-252, 247. 
25 	Davis et al, Public Policy in Australia, 2. 
26 	Ibid, 7. 
27 	R.B. Reich, (Ed) The Power of Public Ideas. 
(Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) 124. 
28 	Ibid. 
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Checks and balances over such processes and outcomes should be the 
responsibility of the Minister, but the Minister may have other portfolios or 
responsibilities and rarely able to give each an equal amount of time. 29 The 
Minister would therefore rely on the Department's permanent head to formulate 
'government' policy, given that the Minister usually has limited knowledge of 
the prison portfolio. If the relationship between Minister and Head of 
Department is fractious, the Minister may turn to advisers to provide alternate 
solutions. 3° The high profile that prison management had achieved in Victoria 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s may have encouraged politicians to "have 
wanted an administrator to take the political heat for doing something too 
unpopular to be codified explicitly in legislation." 31 
Policy-makers have to continually upgrade or develop new policies to meet 
exigencies. But this is not unusual, "policy will often continue to evolve within 
what is conveniently described as the implementation phase rather than the 
policy-making phase of the policy process." 32 It may also be that some prison 
policy-makers have neither used nor have been exposed to contemporary policy 
analytical models. In a more positive light, policy-makers in the prison system 
are beginning to establish links with various academic institutions. 33 Continued 
links with academia - particularly departments or centres with an interest in 
correctional policy-making - may prove beneficial as the dynamics within the 
prison setting mean that policies have to be continually updated and refined. 
On the other hand, some prison policy-makers can justifiably argue that policy 
analytical frameworks can be too prescriptive to allow for specificities. 
However, this is not a new problem. 
29 	Interview with the Hon. Mal Sandon, former Minister for Police and Corrections. 
14 August 1995. 
30 	Mal Sandon, the last Victorian Labor Minister for Corrections felt his Director- 
General did not keep him fully informed of important decisions, rather presented 
them as a fait accompli. Interview 14 August 1995. 
31 	Reich, The Power of Public Ideas, 124. 
32 	Ham and Hill, The Policy Process, 12. 
33 	For example, in a cooperative approach Monash University's Centre for Police and 
Justice Studies and CORE are co-hosting a conference on the "changing face of 
prison management- 17 May 1998 
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In 1972 Vickers argued that policy-making had five elements which were 
"especially repugnant" to "scientific" study. These elements were: endurance 
through time; management of conflict; value judgement; modelling historical 
process; and, modelling the "artificial." 34 These_elements may_provide evidence 
that an appropriate methodology for prison policy has yet to be formulated. 
Vickers first variable, endurance through time suggested that "all major policies 
are concerned with the maintenance of relations through time, rather than with 
the attainment of goals which can be attained once and for all." 35 In this sense, it 
is impracticable to analyse any type of prison policy. As noted at the beginning 
of the chapter, prisons are Australian society's ultimate legal sanction. 
Following Vickers' argument, maintenance of the prison over time is State 
policy, and the attainment of goals - prison policy - is secondary. 
The second part of Vickers' framework is management of conflict. He argues 
that "all norms conflict because there are limited resources." Some conflict 
"inherently" while others are "complementary." Vickers claimed "No policy can 
completely reconcile such conflicts. They are not evidence of penury which 
affluence can alleviate." 36 The changed nature of prison operation and policy 
from being purely custodial as a primary goal to the provision of a multiplicity 
of prisoner services, has, as noted, left prison administrators with a fundamental 
dilemma. They are judged on their ability to 'control' the system. If they commit 
a large percentage of their budget to programme implementation they risk 
increased incidents because of lack of staff On the other hand, there will always 
be interest group pressure to provide prisoner services. Most prisons are run on 
business guidelines with a dedicated budget. They provide customer service and 
are subject to "rightsizing." 37 
34 	Sir G. Vickers. "Commonly Ignored Elements in Policymaking" Policy Sciences 3 
(1972): 265-266. 
35 	Ibid, 265. 
36 	Ibid. 
37 	Map Readings. Volume 3/97, 3 March 1997. 
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But private operators operating commercial correctional facilities for 
maintaining security may reduce resources to other areas. "The Junee 
Correctional Centre regularly fails to meet even the most minimal standards [for 
education]. In 1994 the public servant monitoring the contract reported there 
was no vocational training in the institution." 38 
Vickers' third variable was value adjustment. He claimed "policymaking is in 
fact the adjustment of the value system to the reality system through time, as 
well as the designed adjustment of the reality system to the value system." 39 
Public perception of prisons is largely shaped by the media and interest group 
pressure, or whenever a horrendous crime is committed. As the prison is 
currently the ultimate legal sanction, there is usually a spirited debate whenever 
a high profile offender gets incarcerated. 40 The debate normally centres on the 
conditions in new prisons. 4 ' Prior to 1970 the focus of the prison was mainly its 
deterrent value while the public generally ignored prison operations. 
Most Australian State and Territory Governments have committed a significant 
percentage of their capital works appropriations in the last ten years to upgrade 
and rebuild ailing prison edifices, or build new institutions. However, the reality 
is that the public believes that very little has changed. 42 But governments' value 
systems have changed. By mooting privatisation of prisons as a viable 
alternative, they are in the process of 'mutual adjustment.' Furthermore, it 
seems that the public's values have also changed. There has been very little 
criticism of the decision to pursue privatisation. 43 
38 	"Prison Sell- The Australian, 13 June 1997. 
39 	Vickers, "Commonly Ignored Elements in Policymaking," 266. 
40 	For example, Alan Bond in WA. 
41 	"Crims in 'Banvon Hilton' Herald. 23 January 1990, and "Barwon jail opens to 
mixed reception - Age, 24 January 1990. 
42 	"Bars to progress" Herald Sun, 1 February 1997. 
43 L. Timar, "Privatizing Prisons- IPA Review, Spring (1990): 41-44. 
81 
The fourth variable in Vickers' model, modelling historical process, suggested 
that "the temporal process which policymaking seeks to regulate is irreversible 
and non-repetitive." 44 Vickers claimed that policy-makers represent this process 
by formulating a model about the problem, why it has occurred, and the possible 
and probable implications by intervention. However, Vickers pointed out that 
this model cannot be used for "prediction nor validated by prediction." 45 Most 
prison policy-making is reactive and it appears prison policy-making is mainly 
an adjunct to prison operation. Whether private prisons operate any differently 
is yet to be determined. 46 However, the dearth of prison policy-making studies 
makes it difficult to validate Vickers' proposition. 
Vickers' final variable, modelling  the "artificial," in a sense addresses the•
fundamental dilemma for prison policy-making. He noted that it is difficult to 
predict because of uncontrolled elements such as "human intervention." 
Furthermore, "the human future is in part predictable, in part controllable and in 
part neither predictable nor controllable by those within the process." 47 
Therefore, prison policy-making must, by its very nature, be capricious. 
Vickers' variables provide significant reasons why it is extremely difficult to find 
evidence of an applied approach to prison policy-making by Australia's prison 
policy-makers. On the other hand, Parker warns that Vicker's variables may be 
no more than a "checklist" to which policy-makers "should be always alert." 48 
However, it would appear that an applied approach is unforeseeable unless 
Australian prison administrators determine the goals and purposes of their 
systems. 
44 	Vickers, "Commonly Ignored Elements in Policymaking" 266. 
45 	Ibid. 
46 	Australia's first privately owned prison, the Borallon Correctional Centre, opened in 
Ipswich Qld in 1990. 
47 	Vickers, "Commonly Ignored Elements in Policymaking" 266. 
4s 	R.S. Parker, "The Art of Judgement: A Study of Policy-Making," Aus. J Pub. Admin. 
Vol. 56, No. 3 (September. 1997): 140-141, 141. 
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Prison officers in dzibio. 49 
There is continuing debate on the purpose of the prison. And, it is argued 
building new prisons does not necessarily lead to improved conditions. It may 
often have the contrary result. `The new prison is built_ and_ the old -prison 
remains." 50 Moreover, 
the prison system has a tendency to create more problems than it 
receives and has an equal tendency to fail inmates because, out of its 
survival fear, it tends to respond to corporate threats, real or imaginary, 
rather than the real problem of inmates.' 
Whitfield rightly claims that the prison creates problems for prisoners, however, 
it also creates significant problems for prison officers. Whenever there is a 
change in prison operation the interaction between prison officers and prisoners 
has to be adjusted. In most cases, changes in prison routine and operation 
advantage the prisoner. In later chapters the different types of prisoner reform 
models are discussed. A recurring theme throughout these models is, however, 
that prison change is directed towards assisting prisoners. Little thought is given 
to understanding or even considering how these sometimes incremental changes 
affect what Poole and Regoli term "the social distance" between prison officers 
and prisoners. 52 
It would seem prudent that when authorities implement a different type of 
prison operation practice they would also re-skill prison officers. The 
advantages of this training are obvious. The training would not only ensure that 
staff skills are being upgraded, it would also give the proposed change a greater 
chance of success. 
49 
	
Literal translation, In doubt E. Ehrlich, A Dictionary of Latin Tags and Phrases, 
(London: Hale. 1985) 125. 
50 	D. Whitfield, (Ed.) The State of the Prisons - 200 Years On, 
(London: Routledge, 1991) 6. 
51 	M. Jenkins, quoted in Whitfield (Ed) The State of the Prisons - 200 Years On,  8. 
52 	E.D. Poole and R.M. Regoli, "Professionalism, Role Conflict, Work Alienation and 
Anomie: A Look at Prison Management" Social Science Journal,  Vol. 20 (1983): 
63-70, 64. 
83 
Prison officers request this training to assist them manage change. 53 English 
prison officers claimed that some managers mainly direct their energies towards 
alleviating perceived deficiencies in prisoner reformation. 54 
On the other hand, Victoria's prison officers believed that the Department had  _ 
failed to provide sufficient unit management training.' 5 Staff also perceived that 
they would largely be left to accommodate changes in operational routine 
without explicit direction 56 While this perception may not have statistical 
significance, it demonstrates that prison officers were concerned about the 
ramifications resulting from the operational changes. Again, there was a Head 
Office recognition that extensive negotiations take place between the union 
representing the prison officers 
and the outcome of those negotiations is intended to provide a catalyst 
for change so the unit management approach in prisons can be 
implemented across the State. Funding to staff training is essential to 
prepare staff to understand the changes and to implement the new 
philosophy in prison management.' 7 
Management at least recognised that "Prison officers are neither sufficiently 
multi-skilled [n]or productive to undertake duties in an unit management 
environment (sic)." 
As noted previously, Australian prison policy-makers have little source of 
information. American prison policy-making models are useful to investigate 
prison policy in the 1960s and 1970s, but tend to be restricted by time, culture, 
and academic emphasis. They can be utilised, however, to provide some 
framework for analysis of Victoria's prison policies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
53 	J.E. Thomas, "Training Schemes for Prison Staff: An Analysis of Some Problems' 
ANZJ Crim, 5,4 (Dec., 1972): 199-205. 200. 
54 	Rutherford found that governors who talked to prisoners risked alienating their 
uniformed staff. A Rutherford, Criminal Justice And The Pursuit Of Decency, 89 
5 
	
	J.R. Beeden. Report on validation of SPO/CPO Promotional Courses 1989 to  1991. 
Report to the Co-ordinator of Training Services, Bill Paterson, October, 1991. 
56 	Ibid 
57 	Memorandum from the Director-General to the Minister for Corrections. 
"Priorities for the Office of Corrections: 190-1992. - 18 May 1990 
58 	Office of Corrections, "3 Year Strategy Plan. 1990-91 - 1992-93." 
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American prison policy models. 
According to Archambeault and Archambeault, policy in any correctional 
agency or institution may be defined as 
any statement or set of statements that are written, expressed verbally, 
or presumed operative that outline the goals, objectives, purpose, scope, 
principles of organization and operation, values, beliefs, and ideology 
and that justify the continued existence of that organization. )9 
There is, however, one qualification. The authors claim that "to understand the 
policy-making process which occurs in any correctional agency or institution, 
the correctional organization must be analysed from an "open systems" 
perspective." 60 However, DiIulio notes, 
For years, a number of influential organizational theorists have been 
arguing that democratic management practices were most effective. 
Managers of business firms, schools, and even armies were encouraged 
to be "open" to their subordinates, to issue orders informally, and to 
otherwise de-emphasize the symbols and substance of formal 
organization authority. Management was to be understood and 
practiced as the art of human relations. To my knowledge, architects of 
the human-relations school of management made no reference to prisons 
in building their case. 61 
Archambeault and Archambeault write expressly about the American justice 
system. For this reason it appears difficult to utilise their ideas to examine the 
Australian prison policy-making process. In addition, Archambeault and 
Archambeault give correctional policy such a wide-ranging definition that it 
effectively covers all possible scenarios and contingencies. The authors also 
claim all correctional policy making can be compared against several previous 
correctional policy-making models. Archambeult and Archambeult developed a 
new model of "criminal justice and correctional policy" which can be utilised to 
analyse "evolving correctional policy" (see Fig 2:3). The Perturbated Spiral  
Compression Model was formulated to address the deficiency in existing models 
used to examine American criminal justice policy. 
59 	W.G. Archambeault and B.J. Archambeault. Correctional Supervisory Management, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice-Hall, 1982) 138. 
60 	Ibid. 145. 
61 	Dilullio. Governing Prisons, 35. 
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While its framework enables the researcher to investigate an entire criminal 
justice system, its validity for examining prison policy is questionable. As the 
effectiveness" of this model is yet to be determined its significance to - 
contemporary Australian prison policy-making is tenuous. However, according 
to Archembeult and Archembeult, 
One of the major influences brought to bear on any organization is a 
dominant model of correctional policy which is characteristic of a period 
and which reflects a broader scope of public and criminal justice 
policy. 62 
Perturbated Spiral Compression (PSC), holds that that the dominant policy in 
any period "evolves through a series of stages over time." Stage 1, the idea 
emerges; Stage 2, over time, the idea gradually gains acceptance and reaches its 
maximum point of influence on criminal justice policy-making; Stage 3 the idea 
declines in popularity and influence and is usually replaced by another idea or 
set of ideas. Stag4, the idea seems to "disappear" from view; in reality, the 
idea becomes assimilated into a broader body of accumulated knowledge and is 
redefined. Stage 5, the redefined or reconceptualized idea reemerges and stages 
2-5 are repeated. 63 
The repetition of cycles over time and the continuous process of 
redefinition result in a forward spiral effect, evolving towards 
some unknown future. However, each time an idea reemerges, it has 
been redefined by the existing state of knowledge at that point, but it 
continues to retain properties of its original definition." 
While Archembeult and Archembeult, taking a process orientation, were 
concerned with the emergence of policy, O'Leary and Duffee in an early study, 
focussed on policy categories. 65 Their work (in 1971) investigated the four 
dominant operating prisoner management philosophies (see Fig. 2:4). 
62 	Archambeault and Archambeault, Correctional Supervisory Management 158. 
63 	L.H. Bowker, Corrections: The Art and the Science. (New York: McMillan, 1982) 
49-50. 
64 	Archambeault and Archambeault, Correctional Supervisory Management, 158. 
65 	V. O'Leary and D. Duffee, -Correctional Policy, A Classification of Goals Designed 
for Change. - Crime and Delinquency. (October, 1971): 373-386. 
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Using a systems analysis approach which "emphasizes the interdependence of 
the whole process," 66 O'Leary and Duffee's model aimed at classifying goals for 
"probation, institutional, and parole systems [which] operate in splendid 
isolation, each with sharply different philosophies." 67 
66 	Ibid, 375 
67 	Ibid 
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Figure 2:4 Model of Correctional Policies. 
Emphasis on the Community 
2 Emphasis on the Offender 
High 
Low 
Rehabilitation 
(Identification Focus) 
-r- 
High 
Reintegration 
(Internalization Focus) 
1 Low Restraint 
(Organizational Focus) 
Reform 
(Compliance Focus) 
I Reform Model high emphasis on the community low emphasis on the offender 
Rehabilitation Model low emphasis on the community high emphasis on the offender 
I Restraint Model -r low emphasis on the community low emphasis on the offender 
t Reintegration Model high emphasis on the community high emphasis on the offender 
Source: O'Leary and Duffee. Crime and Delinquency, 1971. 
The authors concluded that 
now that processes aimed at influencing individuals have been 
linked to more generalized correctional concerns, it becomes 
possible to develop a system of classifying correctional 
organizations, a system that might permit us to make explicit some of 
the assumptions under which various correctional systems seem to be 
operating. It should also help us forecast the staff and offender behaviors 
likely to be found in such organizations and their probable 
consequence. 68 
O'Leary and Duffee's model has limited validity in contemporary Australia. 
While the assumptions and practices of the model are unlikely to be found in a 
contemporary prison system, it is useful to understand Victoria' s prison system 
in the 1960s. This period, and the model, were based on a 'correctional' system 
of justice. The category with the greatest significance to the Alexander 
Whatmore years in charge of Victoria's prisons is the Restraint policy with its 
low emphasis on the community and low emphasis on the offender. 69 Another 
model developed in 1981 used precisely the same correctional types proposed a 
decade previously. Joplin and Hendricks' experimented by using the 
classification of programmes as the dependent variable (see Fig.2 :5). 
68 	Ibid. 378. 
69 	Ibid, 379. 
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The manner in which the programmes are ordered indicated the prison's 
operating philosophy. 7° For example, if the prison is operating on a 
rehabilitation mode, the primary emphasis will be on counselling prisoners 
followed by provision_of__ education and vocational training, and so on. 
However, if the prison is dominantly custodial, the emphasis will be directed 
towards prisoner recreation with little application of counselling. When this 
model is applied to the 1960s Victorian prison system it appears that the 
dominant operating policy was that of Reform. 
Figure 2:5 Correctional Models. 
Programs Rehabilitation Reform Restraint Reintegration 
Education 2 2 3 1 
Vocational 
Training 
Recreation 
3 1 
3 
2 
1 
2 
4 
Counselling 1 4 4 3 
Religion 5 5 5 5 
Key 1 = High emphasis, 5 = Low emphasis. 
Source: Joplin and Hendricks Corrections Today. 
Another model formulated by Bowker listed "competing correctional 
philosophies." 71 These correctional philosophies are, retribution, restitution, 
maintaining social solidarity, general deterrence, special deterrence, treatment, 
incapacitation, and the just deserts or justice mode1. 72 The retributive philosophy 
is designed to satisfy the State because offenders have broken the law and 
deserve to be punished. Moreover, retribution should not be confused with 
revenge. Retribution "is the impersonal expression of social policy, and is 
devoid of the passion that characterizes revenge." 73 
70 	J.W. Joplin and J.E. Hendricks, "Correctional Management-A Philosophical 
Perspective- Corrections Today, vol. 43, (1981): 85-88. 
71 	Bowker, Corrections: The Art and the Science.  38. 
72 	'bid, 38-55. 
73 	E. van den Haag, quoted in Bowker, Corrections: The Art and the Science, 39. 
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Restitution demands offenders recompense their victims. "In the case of physical 
injury or death, the reimbursement has to be limited to the financial 
consequences of the act, since there is no way to completely eliminate the 
effects of assaults and homicides." 74 Both principles are similar. However, 
"retribution proceeds from the victim to the offender while restitution proceeds 
from the offender to the victim." 75 Maintainina Social Solidarity owes its origins 
to Durkheim and Galtung. 76 
Durkheim argued that crime was functional, inevitable and necessary for 
society. Punishment was necessary in order to keep society cohesive. If criminal 
acts went unpunished, the social fabric would crumble. 77 Galtung's work on the 
social functions of prisons introduced two variables that are relevant to the 
maintenance of social solidarity. These are the concepts of social sanitation and 
the reinforcement of the symbols of the power holders in society. 78 Simply, 
"social sanction" is where offenders are removed from society, and the 
reinforcements et al are the physical manifestation of society's sanction, that is, 
the prison. 79 The combination of both works provides powerful societal 
reinforcements. The more such symbols are reinforced, "the more they pull the 
members of society together around common standards of behavior." 80 
General Deterrence  hopes that society will be deterred from committing similar 
offences when viewing the offenders' punishment." S_pecial Deterrence assumes 
that the offender's behaviour will be altered by the imposition of a deterrent 
sanction. Treatment assumes that crime is a disease and the offender can be 
cured through pseudo-medical processes. Incapacitation means that offenders 
cannot commit societal offences when they are imprisoned. 
74 	Bowker, Corrections: The Art and the Science. 39. 
75 	Ibid. 
76 	Ibid, 40-42. 
77 	A. Giddens. (Ed) Emile Durkheim Selected Writings, 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. 1972) ch. 4. 
78 	Bowker, Corrections: The Art and the Science. 41. 
79 	Ibid, 41-42. 
80 	Ibid, 42. 
81 	Ibid. 42-43. 
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The Just Deserts or Justice Model assumes imprisonment itself should be the 
final sanction. Prison administrators forego theories such as treatment, 
rehabilitation, and deterrence. and provide a safe prison environment, giving 
prisoners rights, providing them with a form of self-government, and giving 
them access to another point of appeal - such as the Ombudsman. Moreover, 
the prison administrator still has to provide prisoner programmes but the 
prisoner has the right to decide whether the programme can help. Again, this 
model requires the elimination of the indeterminate sentence and replaces it with 
a determinate one. 82 
These eight philosophies appear to be an extension or an enlargement of Joplin 
and Hendricks' typology. While Bowker's analysis allows the investigator a 
micro view of the operation of each Victorian prison, Joplin and Hendricks' 
formula gives a macro or 'big picture' perception. The models, however, are 
indicative of the American prison system of the 1960s and 1970s. And it is quite 
likely that an investigator can find elements of each typology within a prison or 
prisons. The element that still has significant validity in the 1990s is the Just 
Deserts or Justice Model. The New South Wales (NSW) Department of 
Corrective Services uses the philosophy in conjunction with its unit management 
prisoner management strategy. 83 
The major problem with utilising prison policy-making models is that similar 
information is diagnosed and differing conclusions are reached. Prison policy is 
shaped by a multiplicity of internal and external influences. There are the normal 
constraints of finance, lack of resources, and pressure to produce workable 
policies. The prison policy-maker can also easily mistake one philosophy for 
another. For example, Joplin and Hendricks' Rehabilitation model appears 
identical to the Medical model. 
82 	Ibid, 49-50. 
83 	J. Gorta, Unit Prisoner Accommodation-The Bathurst Gaol Experience, 1983-1987 
Internal NSW Department of Corrective Services document, 4. 
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The medical model was a euphemism for 'treatment' and 
the principal assumption as to causation is evident in the use of the term 
treatment, which derives from the analogy with medicine. 
The offender is seen as suffering from some disorder-varying from 
 	psychopathy at one extreme to bad work-habits or lack of skill at the 
other-which is responsible for his criminality and failure to achieve 
satisfactory life-adjustment 1n society.. The "treatment program" which 
may be made up variously of psychological or psychiatric therapy or 
educational or vocational training is designed to change the orientation 
and behavior of the inmate so that he can be restored to normal 
functioning in society. 84 
Joplin and Hendricks claim: 
The rehabilitation model has chosen to emphasize the counceling 
program because (1) it is believed that the offender is "sick" and in need 
of a cure, and (2) the rehabilitation model is the best means available to 
become aware of and treat the offenders needs, thus effecting 
the needed cure. Because this model is focusing on the offender in 
identifying the needs of individuals, the most logical second choice in 
terms of priority is education. The focus here is important. The 
individual in a rehabilitation program is being educated for the 
betterment of the individual, not necessarily for the progress of society. 
The third program of importance is vocational training. The individual 
offender is expected to return to society one day, and be better prepared 
to fulfil a position in that society. 85 
Thus, depending on which model is applied, Victoria's priscin system during 
Whatmore's stewardship was either in the Rehabilitation mode, or was using the 
Medical model as operational policy. 
While prison policy suffers because there is only "fragmentary knowledge and 
untried opinions about how to improve prisons," 86 DiIullio claims that we 
should "recognize the current limits of our policy-oriented knowledge about 
prisons and try and obtain a policy-oriented body of knowledge."" Thus, the 
emphasis is that "the proper unit of analysis, however, is less the corrections 
agency as a whole and more the prison itself." 88 
84 	G. Hawkins, The Prison: Policy and Practice, 
(Chicago: UM. of Chicago Press, 1976) 79. 
85 	Joplin and Hendricks" Correctional Management: A Philosophical Perspective - 86. 
86 	DiIullio, Governing Prisons, 248. 
87 	'bid, 248-249. 
88 	Ibid, 237. 
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The most recent attempt at categorising prison models was undertaken by 
DiIullio. He investigated three systems in Texas, Michigan, and California. Each 
system -- had a philosophical bedrock which DiIullio - calls "The Keeper 
Philosophy." 89 Underlying this philosophy are two basic offender operating 
principles: deprivation of liberty; and treated humanely. The Texas Control 
Model demands that offenders have the "habit of obedience" and the "habit of 
laboring." In other words, offenders will be properly treated and respected if 
they obey lawful orders and institutional rules, and if they avail themselves of 
institutional work. According to DiIullio, the Texas prisons "were to be run as 
benevolent, paternalistic despotisms in the interests of the orderly, humane, and 
just treatment of convicted criminals." The Michigan Responsibility Model  
holds that incapacitation is the sole purpose of imprisonment. This keeps the 
public "safe from dangerous criminals."90 Under this model offenders are 
expected to refrain from violence and participate, if they wished, in prison 
labour. On the other hand, the California Consensual Model's defining feature is 
its "hodgepodge, crazy-quilt pattern of correctional principles and practices." 91 
If there is a single unifying principle of California's approach to 
correctional administration, it is the notion that prison government rests 
ultimately on the consent of the governed - that is, the inmates. 92 
Thus, three models of prison systems with the same philosophical bedrock 
operate three different types of offender management. In Texas it is still custody 
and control - prisoners are expected to work and obey orders. The operating 
practice in Michigan equates with the Just Deserts practice where the offender 
is in control of his actions and if he wishes to avail himself there are 
programmes to assist in rehabilitation. The Californian system finds the prison 
left in the hands of offender government. Prison officials only control the 
situation through offender acquiescence. There is no general agreement on what 
is the better system. According to DiIullio, what really matters is who governs 
the prison. 93 
89 Ibid, 167. 
90 Ibid, 179-181. 
91 	Ibid, 128. 
92 Ibid, 129. 
93 Ibid. 188-189. 
93 
While DiIullio never explicitly mentions prison officer training in his study of the 
three systems, it can be argued that these variations may have arisen as a result 
of different training -practices. For example,- in Australia Western Australia 
(WA) and NSW have tried a similar version _of_the Michigan_ Responsibility 
Model. The WA system's experience with a "concept of self determination for a 
stable population of medium security prisoners within an industrial complex" 94 
ended after seven years because 
modifications to that philosophy resulted in system failures which 
manifested themselves in control and discipline problems within the 
prison [Canning Vale], the progressive deterioration of staff morale, 
difficulties within prison industries and in assessment procedures. 9) 
Furthermore, the WA authorities had to keep issuing guidelines to staff. "As a 
relatively new concept there has been some confusion about what Unit 
Management is and what prison staff are required to do to make it work." 96 
Basically, it would appear that the WA authorities encountered problems when 
formulating training to meet the proposed change. Moreover, it may have been 
that the authorities only offered short preparatory courses in the concept and 
staff was unable or unwilling to accept change. Training should be ongoing 
when a fundamentally different practice is implemented. 97 .As Considine notes, 
In some cases the structure of the organisation responsible for a 
program will be the key determinant of outcomes. In other cases, the 
ability or inability to clarify goals will be a central concern. Elsewhere 
the policy will depend for its success upon the motivation and 
commitment of key staff. 98 
NSW had experience with a similar type of prisoner management strategy to the 
Responsibility Model. In implementing a programme which focussed on 
responsibility the outcome was a variation of the Californian model. 
94 	Canning Vale Prison Management Document,  cv. mgt/doc=99, undated, but 
probably 1990. 
95 	Ibid. 
96 	An overview of the objectives and principles of unit management in the Western  
Australia Department of Corrective Services. <ssu>ssu. kc. 1=99, 1.0, undated. 
97 	Thomas, "Training Schemes for Prison Staff: An Analysis of Some Problems- 201. 
98 	M. Considine. Public Policy: A Critical Approach, 
(Melbourne: MacMillan, 1994) 189. 
94 
Victorian prison officers who travelled to NSW to view the programme were 
less than saluatory about the experience. 
While encouraging prisoners to take more responsibility for the 
management of their own lives is an important principle of unit 
management great care needs to be taken in selecting the means by 
which it is put into effect. It is clear from the NSW experience that 
prisorie-r patatipation can lead to prisoners controlling the prison. 99 
Prison policy has unexpected consequences. It is "a dynamic system, without 
necessary start or finish, imbued with a tendency to chaos as simple initial 
conditions produce complex and unpredictable patterns." m 
There has been little attempt to ascertain whether prison policy-making is a 
specialised discipline, or at least requires the incumbent to have a rudimentary 
knowledge of prison operations. Moreover, there has been a tacit perception by 
the administrative and political heads that these bureaucrats had the requisite 
skills to undertake the prison policy-making task. It appears "civil servants, 
administrators and specialists in government [can acquire], to a greater or lesser 
extent, policy analysis skills." 1° ` 
In less than three decades the prison system in Australia has gone from a 
position whereby the senior prison administrator was the source and developer 
of 'policy,' to the situation whereby many prison organisations now have 
specialised 'policy units.' Whether these policy units have contributed towards a 
better prison system is a moot point. Indeed, the notion that policy can 
effectively change prison operation has been challenged by DiIulio, 
The lack of policy-oriented knowledge about prisons is no mere 
intellectual problem. Judges, administrators, and prison reformers are 
recommending policies based on the assumption that if the policy is 
adopted, then something good will happen-if budgets are increased, 
or double-ceiling eliminated, or correctional officers better trained, or 
prisoners' rights enlarged (or contracted), then the quality of prison life 
will improve. 102 
99 	W. Higgins and M. Naylor, Report of Visit to New South Wales, 3-5 June, 1987, 
00C internal document, 11. 
100 	Davis et al. Public Policy in Australia. 16. 
loi 	Ham and Hill. Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State,  3. 
102 	DiIulio. Governing Prisons, 12. 
95 
Victoria's current prison service has now become a "public correctional 
enterprise" (with the acronym CORE) to compete with private prison 
operators. 1°3  CORE administrators are now trying to provide policies to, - 
exceed industry efficiency and productivity benchmarks and follow best 
employment practices and promote the involvement of staff in CORE' s 
objectives. We aim to be the preferred supplier in the correction 
industry. 104 
CORE will attempt to formulate policies and three strategic initiatives focusing 
on "Customers, People and Business." 1°5 Victoria's administrators are 
optimistic that policies will enable CORE staff to have "the energy, the 
knowhow and the skills to ensure that we become the preferred supplier in the 
corrections industry, not just here, but possibly interstate and overseas." 106 
However, Victoria's prison system is currently the most privatised system in the 
world "on a proportional basis." 1°7 Critics have claimed that the introduction of 
economic rationalism in corrections is a "zealous pursuit of an ideological 
position." °8 Furthermore, 
If one of the primary reasons for privatising incarceration is cost- 
effectiveness, how can that be balanced with rehabilitation - how can 
enough resources then be directed to rehabilitation and reformation.'" 
It may be that one reason for CORE's existence is that previous organisational 
structures and prison policies were found wanting. This reinforces the 
significance of `politics;' "policies may often be more effective in giving the 
impression that government is taking action, and therefore in maintaining 
political support, than in tackling social problems." 11° 
103 	MRC Bulletin. 26 June, 13/96. 
104 	Message, No 1 Vol 1. (August 1996) 1. 
105 	CORE an innovative approach to corrections, publicity booklet issued by the 
Department of Justice, undated. 
106 	Message, No 2 Vol 1. (August 1996) 1. 
107
"Public v Private; The competition for correctional services," Law Institute Journal, 
(September. 1996): 1-2, 1. 
108 	Ibid.. 
109 	Ibid. 
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Prison policy-making - a discipline? 
It is difficult to describe what prison policy-makers do as policy-making. Prison 
policy-making outwardly appears to consist-of incremental developments, mere 
refinements and tinkering with little innovation." While it certainly cannot be 
labelled mendacious, prison policy-making has a history of finding itself in the 
'extremely difficult to prove and measure success' basket - the "wicked 
problem" of the policy-making process. 112 The general perception is that there is 
little skill to prison policy-making. Furthermore, there is a notion that seniority 
in the organisation 'qualifies' the incumbent to make policy while "there is no 
single body of knowledge or techniques that analysts must master." Most 
policy-makers attain a position because of academic and/or skills in report 
writing. Again, prison policy-making "is often distinguished by crisis response, 
short time horizons, and uncertainty." 114 As a result the individual policy-maker 
"satisfices rather than maximizes." 115 
The emerging process has been handicapped by accusations of incompetence, 
among others. But is this really the fault of the policy-makers? Prison policy-
makers have had to rely on a scrabble board approach of creating policies on 
the ends of, or bifurcating, previous adaptations. The philosophical bedrock, if 
any, is soon lost. However, 
Policy may sometimes be identifiable in terms of a decision, but very 
often it involves either groups of decisions or what may be seen as little 
more than an orientation. [Moreover] policy is not usually expressed in a 
single decision. It tends to be defined in terms of a series of decisions 
which, taken together, comprise a more or less common understanding 
of what policy is. 116 
	
o 	Ham, and Hill. The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 15. 
11 I 	See, for example, Men's Prisons in Victoria: Correctional Policy and Management  
Standards. Department of Justice Office of the Correctional Services Commissioner, 
September 1996. 
112 	H.W.J. Rittel and M.W. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning - 
Policy_Sciences, 4 (1973): 155-169. 
113 	Pal, Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. 19. 
114 	Ibid. 40. 
115 	H.A. Simon. Administrative Behaviour, third edition, 
(New York: The Free Press, 1976). 
116 	Ham and Hill. The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 11-12. 
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Most prison policy-makers are given a task with a definitive time-frame." 7 But 
how do they commence formulating policy? Do they begin by using previous 
policies as a yardstick? Is change incremental or do they adapt existing policy? 
Do they transplant concepts and introduce them ad hoc? Or do they modify 
principles, as Victoria did, to suit their jurisdiction? The adaptation of, and 
modification to, existing approaches is attractive. As a senior Victorian official 
noted, 
I wish to emphasise that the principles outlined here are not an idealistic, 
unattainable vision, they are the practical ideas of prison management 
that will guide the way we work in new prisons, and eventually, in all 
prisons throughout Victoria."' 
Australian prison policy-makers are handicapped by the lack of prison policy 
resources. What is normally available tends to be either purposely designed or 
from other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, Holland or Sweden, and 
America. 
While some of the American research may find parallels in Australian 
jurisdictions, prison policy models in the USA are mainly derived from the 
results of court decisions. 119 According to Newman, 
In recent years, courts, especially federal courts under Section 
1983 provisions of the Civil Rights Act, have intervened in cases 
alleging jail conditions to be cruel or unusual or otherwise violating 
inmates' civil rights. In some instances courts have ordered jails closed; 
in others they have mandated specific changes in physical structure and 
programs to conform more closely to minimum standards of decent 
treatment. In some places there has been a state takeover of local jails 
or the development of regional misdemeanant detention facilities. 
In New York the state legislature recently reactivated a State 
Commission of Correction empowered to set standards and investigate 
jail conditions, with authority to order changes and even lose jails in 
cases of noncompliance. 129 
117 	From the author's experience as the Research Officer in the Legislation and Policy 
Division of the Law Department which was charged with framing Tasmanian prison 
policy. 
138 	The 00C Director-General in Unit Management in Victorian Prisons,  Office of 
Corrections. Victoria, 1989, 3. 
119 	D.J. Newman. Introduction to Criminal Justice, 2nd edition 
(New York: Lippincott, 1978) 326-327. 
120 	Ibid. 
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In Australia public policy-making is formulated in a prescribed manner. 121 It is 
subject to political imperatives and input from interest groups. However, 
Hawker et al claim, 
policy is simply not "made"; policy processes are pluralist; they do not-- 
fit any neat rational model. Single individuals and single institutions 
seldom dominate them or impose on them a consistent logic or 
direction. 122 
Moreover, there is "no sudden rush by policy-makers to draw on academic 
research." 123 In prison the means (implementation) will always be judged by the 
ends (policy). Prison officers, those concerned with the ends, need to be 
reassured that policy changes have organisational support and recognise their 
particular positions and concerns. 124 If they perceive that a policy favours 
inmates it will encounter resistance. The result can be a watered down version, 
which is subsequently criticised. 
In the 1970s it is no longer possible to assume that when policies fail 
it is because they are badly designed or because implementation has 
been inadequate. It is not simply that we need new or better 
administered policies. Often the reasons for failure are inherent in the 
institutions themselves. The institutional machinery itself must therefore 
be subjected to much closer and much less formalistic study than in the 
past. It must be studied in action, in the making and implementation of 
public policy. 123 
Contemporary Australian prison policy-making emerged in the 'openness' of the 
1970s, and was influenced by the increase in academic inquiry in the 1980s.' 26 
Riots and insurrection in New South Wales in 1970, 127 Victoria 1973, 128 and 
Tasmania 1974 129 focussed public attention on the prison system. 
121 	Public Service Departments provide handbooks on how to write Cabinet 
Submissions. These are divided into "Procedures and Legislation" and follow a 
standard pro forma, Cabinet Handbook s Cabinet Office, Department of Premier and 
Cabinet, Melbourne, undated. 
122 	Hawker et al. Politics & Policy in  Australia, 22. 123 	Ham and Hill. The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 1. 
124 	Difullio, Governing  Prisons, 166. 
125 	Hawker et al.  Politics & Policy in Australia.  9. 
126 	See Findlay. The State of the Prison; Zdenkowslci and Brown, The Prison  
Struggle; Vinson, Wilful Obstruction: and Tomasic and Dobinson, The Failure of  
Imprisonment. 
127 	Findlay, The State of the Prison, 23-32. 
128 	The Jenkinson Report. 
129 Controller of Prisons Report for Year ended 30 June 1975, Parliament of Tasmania. 
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Prior to this, prison policy-making could be was similar labelled as 
"opportunistic decision-making." 13° Banfield claimed organisations had little 
inclination to—plan. Instead of looking to the future, they were content with 
"laying out_a course °faction which will lead all the way to the attainment of 
their ends, [and] they extemporize, meeting each crisis as it arrives." 131 This 
opportunism, and the chaotic conditions applying policy making was reinforced 
by Hawker et al. 
Public policy is shaped by individuals with ideas in action within 
institutions. Interaction between them is bounded by the 
consequences of past actions and by perceived opportunities 
presented by the environment. The problem of relating individual 
activity to the activity of institutions and then to patterns of policy have 
led to the emergence of many theoretical ideas and analytical devices 
which are often not easy to apply. 132 
Pal claims the policy process "as a political process, rests on power, influence 
and interests." 133 Prisons clearly operate by an interaction between power, 
influence and interests. Again, Davis et al propose that "values, interests and 
resources" are fundamental elements in the policy process. 134 The recent trend 
to privatise prisons demonstrates the validity of these elements. Davis et al claim 
that values "underlie our political behaviour," and that interests are "invariably 
part of the public policy equation. They are legitimately, and at times 
illegitimately, pursued by lobby groups and by individuals." 135 Victoria's prison 
system has radically changed the nature of its operation. 136 Whether the winds 
of change have come through government edict such as corporatisation 137 or 
pressure from lobby groups is a moot point. The awarding of contracts to 
replace the Coburg prison complex could be construed as a tacit admission that 
prison policies have not matched Government expectation. 
130 	E.C. Banfield, "Ends and Means in Planning- in A. Faludi, (Ed) A Reader in  
Planning Theory, (London: Pergamon Press, 1973) 139-149, 142. 
131 	Banfield, "Ends and Means in Planning- 142. 
132 	Hawker et al, Politics and Policy in Australia. 13. 
133 	Pal, Public Policy Analysis, 17. 
134 	Davis et al, Public Policy in Australia. 2. 
135 Ibid, 2-3. 
136 	Nearly 50 per cent of the system is now privatised and prisons at Pentridge, Sale and 
Monvell River have closed in 1997. 
137 	Map Readings, Vol 6/97 (4 April 1997). 
100 
One of the significant variables in deciding to relegate the Department into the 
Justice portfolio and later to privatise may have been that Victorian prisons 
operation did not meet -its highly publicised mission, "to reduce offending 
behaviour and encouraging offenders to be more productive individuals in 
society." 138 According to some government advisers, the State prison system 
had failed. There was simply no way of measuring success. Cohn notes, 
however, that 
when a correctional manager promulgates such oversimplified and 
inadequate goal statements as "rehabilitation of offenders" and 
"protection of society" (or some combination thereof) it is unlikely that 
outcomes which do occur can be related to such goals or that worker 
consistency in service delivery systems can be_developed. This lack of 
specificity in goal statements also provides the manager with too much 
opportunity to make changes in worker demands, as he develops new 
goals to meet exigencies, satisfy whims, or otherwise respond to the 
vagaries of external pressures. 139 
Again, the values of others may have helped determine departmental structure 
and priorities. 140 A major problem is that prison policy will probably be left in 
the hands of personnel whose expertise is in other areas. 141 The prison officer, 
on the other hand, has to deal with a lexicon in which words "are now used 
without explanation - the new vocabulary." 142 Many policies, are couched in 
bureaucratic and quasi-legalese language. Prison officers may not understand 
the intention of policy. 
138 	00C Annual Report, 1991-92, 19. 
139 	A.W. Cohn, "The Failure of Correctional management - Reconsidered" 
Criminal Justice Review, Vol.6 No.2 (1981): 55-61, 56. 
141) John Van Groningen was appointed to head the new 'Corrective Services Division' 
within the Justice Department. He was the Criminal Justice Unit Director in the 
Attorney-General's department and a former Superintendent at Pentridge Prison. 
141 	Ham and Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 3 Prisons or 
correctional agencies do not attract the same profile as other departments. Indeed, 
according to Mal Sandon, politicians 'fear the call to be Prisons Minister.' They soon 
realise that public concerns are not particularly inclined toward 'rehabilitation or any 
other prison practices.' Recent government strategy has been to bury the prison 
agency within another mega-department. There are some advantages to this. Prison 
administrators can call on departmental expertise to help formulate policies, provide 
economic advice and direction, and offer diverse promotional opportunities. 
142 A.G. J.Jordan and J.J. Richardson, -The Contemporary Language of Policy-Making -
Chap. 1 in British Politics and the Policy Process, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987) 
3-20, 4. 
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The application of business principles to prison operation and refer to the 
prisoners as "customers" or "clients" 143 has left prison staff with the feeling that 
policy-makers have little idea of prison operational practice. The feeling of 
many officers to policy-making is aptly summed up by an anecdote in the prison 
newspaper, "I can't see any future in this place [the Prison Service]. You've got 
square pegs in round holes at the top, right down the whole structure." 44 
Again, the attempt to give prisoners the opportunity to assess 'customer service 
provision' indicates a profound change in prison policy. 
But we also need to be aware that the Commissioner's Office has 
already started polling some of our customers (including prisoners at 
Tarrengower) about the service that we provide. As our competition in 
the men's prisons kick off, it won't be long before similar questions 
are being asked of male prisoners.. .and we have to ensure that we can 
demonstrate to Government that we really are in the quality end of the 
market - that's (sic) it's not just rhetoric on our part. 145 
Prison policy-making has often proven to be arbitrary and contradictory. It 
follows no general policy guidelines apart from public service pro forma. 
Therefore, can prison policy-making be located in either 'academic' or 'applied' 
category of policy analysis? 146 
For the last three decades politicians, lobby groups, welfare agencies, the 
church, and prison administrators have tried to shape the direction of prisons. 
As politicians, and particularly Prison Ministers, are unsure of the prison's 
purpose the prison policy-maker has had to react to contrasting pressures. This 
has led to the situation whereby some policies compete with one another for 
funding, others are contradictory, capricious, and idealistic. It is not always the 
fault of policy-makers that good policies fail, as "policies often, even invariably, 
fail to achieve their stated objectives. Problems are exacerbated rather than 
solved." 147 For example, the final 00C Report carefully outlined numerous 
developed policies initiated the previous year. 
143 	Message. No 4. Vol 2. (February 1997) 1; P. Weller, "Are Prisoners Clients?' 
Aus. J. Public Admin. 56 (1): (March 1997) 125-129. 
144 	S. Hill, in Message, Coburg Prisons Complex. February, 1997. 
145 	MAP Readings, Vol 6/97. (4 April. 1997). 
146 	Pal, Public Policy Analysis, 24. 
147 	Davis et al, Public Policy in Australia, 248. 
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There was great fanfare, for example, for the launching of the female prisoner 
policy "The Agenda for Change" in August 1991. 
The report outlines recommendations on the future direction of - - 
planning, development and implementation of programs and services for 
	 women prisoners and offenders, particularly in the areas of health, 
education, work, vocational training and access to children, over the 
next five years. 
The 00C appointed a "Women's Project Co-ordinator" to oversee the strategy, 
as well as an "Advisory Committee" to monitor implementation progress. 148 The 
timing of the launching of the project and the number of years of the project's 
implementation turned out to be prophetic. A new privately built prison opened 
on 15 August 1996 on the Melbourne outskirts 149 replacing Fairlea Prison. The 
Government now had only a minimum security prison at Maldon in country 
Victoria to cater for females. The Melbourne Women's Correctional Centre 
would, according to Dame Phyllis Frost, "help rehabilitate the residents." 15° 
Dame Frost's terminology was indicative of a philosophy - crime as a disease - 
which was found questionable in the early 1970s 151 and was, by and large, 
consigned to the waste-bin of correctional practice. Similar sentiments are 
echoed by politicians and bureaucrats. They use the rhetoric of rehabilitation, 
and give superlatives about new prison building policies and strategies like unit 
management. However, it appears the subject of prison operating philosophy 
confuses most politicians and many senior prison administrators. They obfuscate 
and issue statements such as "Yatala [a South Australian maximum-security 
prison] will be about rehabilitation not revenge." 152 The media is not entirely 
blameless publishing headlines such as "In a penal system run for profit, what's 
more important - the bottom line or the rehabilitation of prisoners?" 153 
148 	00C Annual Report, 1991-92, 3. 
I 49 	"Miffed by Jail Lockout- Herald Sun, 16 August 1996. 
150 	Reported on the 7 pm ABC evening news. Thursday 15 August 1996. 
151 	R. Martinson, "What Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform - 
The Public Interest, Spring (1974): 22-54. 
152 	"When Punishment outstrips the Crime -  The Australian, 23 July 1996. 
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As Davis et al note, 
Formulating policies is generally the easiest part of public-policy 
making; the delivery of policy and the transition of intentions into real _ 
outcomes is more difficult and unlikely to run smoothly according to 
plan. Even the best designed policies introduced with the best of 
intentions still require good implementation and delivery. History is full 
of well-intentioned (sic) policies which floundered through inadequate 
or flawed implementation or because of failure to take note of what was 
achievable. 14 
Thus, what is implemented may be contrary to expectation. However, it may be 
that the legislators feel "that the issue was not sufficiently important to merit 
their time and resources." I55 Policy-makers are normally subject to direction. 
While they may only be "the cogs in the system" or what Lipsky terms "street-
level bureaucrats," the lower-level officer can have major impacts on the policy 
which is implemented - in short, they have greater influence than their position 
would signify. 156 
'Street-level' policy-making is not about the advancement of ideals, "but rather 
the development of practices which enables officials to cope with the pressures 
they face." I57 Many unelected bureaucrats "rarely can rely on unambiguous 
legislative mandates." 58 Reich notes that statutes are often Written in "vague 
language" which are generally difficult to interpret. This ambiguity leads to 
situations where 'administrative discretion' is replaced by "personal doctrine 
because there are typically, too many decisions to be made, over too wide a 
range of issues, for even informal ties to bind." 159 This ambiguity is reinforced 
by a lack of professional training. Therefore, it may be that policies are being 
directed and written with little idea of the impact on prison operation. However, 
as Pal notes, "unlike physicians, lawyers or engineers, there is no clear standard 
defining professional policy analysis." 16° 
153 	"Prison Sell" The Australian, 13 June 1996. 
154 	Davis et al, Public Policy in Australia 182. 
155 	Ibid. 
156 	Lipsky in Ham and Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, 139-141. 
157 	Ibid, 139. 
158 	Reich, The Power of Public Ideas, 124. 
159 'bid, 125. 
160 	Pal, Public Policy Analysis, 19. 
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Prison policy-making - a discipline? - revisited. 
The chapter began by asking whether prison policy-making could be considered 
a discipline. According to Weller, "public policy is not, and never can be, a 
_ discipline; it is a field of study that is susceptible to analysis by many-different 
disciplines." 161  Following this argument prison policy-making is not a discipline. 
However, the field of prison policy-making still remains unexplored. It is a 
fertile area for academic inquiry subject only to the limitations imposed by 
"government secrecy, the past (and perhaps future) lack of effective freedom of 
information legislation and often problems of sheer distance mean that those 
outside the public service have little access to modern information." 162 Given 
that much, if not all, prison policy-making tends to be procedural, it seems a 
simple task to categorise it as just another example of the bureaucratic process. 
However, prison policy-making is more than just administrative procedure. It 
determines how a majority of prisoners spend their incarceration. And its effects 
are not constrained by walls. Prisoners' families, prison officers and their 
families, friends, relations and the public are all affected either directly or 
indirectly by prison policy. Therefore, prison policy-making needs intense 
scrutiny. It needs checks and balances, and needs to be accountable. But 
scrutiny and accountability only occur after the fact. Prison administrators are 
often reluctant to admit mistakes. Before the 1970s the prison system was rarely 
questioned. Prison Departments were a standard feature of Public Services. 
Administrative tenure was sacrosanct. It was not uncommon to find 
administrators reaching service milestones. 163 Since the 1970s, however, the 
average tenure is less than five years.'" 
161 	P. Weller, "The study of public policy . ' in G.R. Curnow, & R.L. Wettenhall, 
Understanding Public Administration, (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1981) 
237-245, 238. 
162 'bid, 240. 
163 	For Victoria. see chapter 2. Fig. 1. 
164 	Since 1990. each Australian State and Territory has had at least two changes in the 
top correctional administrative position. 
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Again, since the 1970s, however, each prison system has undergone massive 
reorganisation. Each change produced new blueprints for policy direction. Since 
1992, for example, Victoria's prison system has lost departmental status, has 
been a division within another agency, and is subject to significant privatisation 
and reform to a statutory authority. 165 Policy has constantly been changed to 
meet the new direction. As noted in information given to prisoners in Victoria's 
first private male prison in 1997: 
Fulham is about you. It is about providing you with the opportunities 
to prepare yourself for a return to the community as a law abiding, 
contributing member. Prisoner management is based on the principles of 
unit management and self-directed rehabilitation where you are expected 
to accept responsibility.for your life, just as others do in the general 
community. Within this environment you are expected to accept greater 
responsibility for your actions and achievements. While ACM will 
provide the environment, it is you who must make the effort to 
undertake the rehabilitation process. 166 
However, there is the chance that prisoners may have mistaken Fulham prison 
policies as signs of administrative weakness. 167 Prison policy-making is public 
policy-making. Although prisons have always had operational and procedural 
policies, these have been internal and largely unavailable for public scrutiny. 
Since the 1970s, prison policies have been openly presented for public 
acclamation. However, in many cases, this acclamation has been less than 
welcomed. 
The 'openness' of prison policy scrutiny has led to criticism and calls for 
'progressive' policy-making by varied interest groups. Contemporary prison 
policy has become a microcosm of government policy-making. Interest groups 
demand 'normalised' prison conditions. Prison policy-makers have little 
discretion or autonomy being subject to administrative or Ministerial whim, and 
mainly reacting to public comment. Moreover, is there a need for specialised 
prison policy-making units? 
165 	Map Readings, Vol 6/97 (4 April 1997). 
166 	Fulham Correctional Centre, Prisoner Information,  1997, Australasian Correctional 
Management, 1. 
167 	"Jail fuel stockpile fear" Herald Sun, 1 October 1997. 
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Weller claims, 
The study of public policy must be concerned with political activity, 
with the development and content of policies, with the processes 
which shape them and the institutions which mould them. These 
factors cannot be readily separated. Whether individual studies 	_ 
concentrate on policy or processes or institutions, the drawing 
together of these threads is at the centre_of our concern. 168 - 
As is expected, prison policy-making is subject to political activity. But prison 
policy-making is also constrained by public scrutiny and finance. Public scrutiny 
pressures action and change. In contemporary society the prison is 'open' and 
subject to review. Yet governments are reluctant to commit funding to 
complete, or even tackle, change. The movement to privatise is a tacit 
admission that prisons are costly and on-going financial black holes. It could 
also be construed that current administrators and policy-makers have yet to find 
answers. The major problem is that the questions remain unknown. All prison 
systems now use similar policies. Operational procedures may differ, but only to 
a matter of degree. 169 Again, it is difficult to measure government prison policy-
making against the private operation. Private operators are loathe to diverge 
information. 
For example, "contracts that are kept secret (like the operational details or 
staffing numbers, [are] said to be a matter of commercial confidentiality)." 170 
Whether prisons can be measured using business principles is debatable. Private 
operators expect profits while governments are keen to maintain economic 
rationality. Altman, however, argues prison operation should remain a state 
responsibility. 
There are economic libertarians who would extend privatisation to 
virtually the whole range of services we expect the State to provide, 
including services such as roads, prisons and police. They forget that 
governments provide services not to make money but for the welfare of 
society as a whole. I71 
168 	Weller, "The study of public policy" 237. 
169 	"New era for our prison system" Sunday Herald Sun, November 29 1992. 
170 	"Prison Sell - The Australian. 13 June 1996. 
171 	D. Altman. "Labor as a spend force - The Australian, 19 May 1997. 
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There is little to suggest that private prison policy-makers have different policies 
than currently offered by government institutions." 2 But there is an expectation 
that private prisonscan succeed where government institutions fail. 173  Again, it 
is difficult to evaluate_the_effectiv_eness of the contemporary government prison 
system unless the variables measured are rates of escapes or number of prison 
incidents. Moreover, prisons have become alternative social welfare systems 
providing programmes, inter cilia, for treatment of sex offenders, drug alcohol 
and violence problems, and intellectual disability." 4 Whether successes can be 
measured after prisoners leave the system is another matter. But there is 
evidence to show that former prisoners rarely use prison vocational training as a 
means of employment. 175 Again, the cost of providing these programmes vitiates 
against duty of care. Uniformed custodial officer positions are discarded when 
finances are strained. 176 
Government reaction to claims of understaffing is usually denial and counter 
claims, "In fact, we're overstaffed in terms of the number of officers there [the 
Coburg Prison complex] compared to the establishment figure." 177 But the 
reality is different. While Victoria's authorities were vacillating about the 
importance of team work in trying to address new prisoner management 
implementation, 178 American authorities were cutting back on direct supervision 
staff. "Prison officials realized that an officer could successfully supervise more 
than fifty inmates. The Bureau therefore established a new unofficial standard of 
64 cells in the general population housing unit." 179 
172 	Fulham Correctional Centre Prisoner Information Handbook, 1997, 1. 
173 	"New jail to attack drugs - Herald Sun. 26 March 1997. 
174 	"Nation's biggest jail to open as four close in prison overhaul" The Australian, 
4 April 1996. 
175 	J. Braithwaite. Prisons Education and Work. (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology. 1980) ch. 4. 
176 	The Tasmanian prison system has had an approximate 30 per cent reduction in 
uniformed numbers owing to a cut in Justice appropriation. Discussion with the 
Secretary of the Tasmanian Justice Department, Richard Bingham, 11 June 1997. 
177 John Griffin, CEO of CORE, "Prisons chief denies understaffing" 
Age, 9 November 1996. 
178 Unit Management Implementation 93.  2. 
179 	W.R. Nelson and R.M. Davis. "Podular Direct Supervision The First Twenty Years" 
American „Tails, (July/August, 1995): 11-22, 14. 
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Prison policy: untima ratio.  180 
The chapter commenced by asking whether there was a 'discipline of prison 
policy-making. Policy researchers accept that there is not a discipline of policy- 
making. is ' The examples of prison policy-making cited in this chapter have a - 	-- 
common theme - they are mainly a reaction to prison operational problems. As 
each Australian State and Territory committed massive resources to improving 
their prison systems, little attention was given to policy-making and/or 
implementation processes. As noted earlier, policy-making expertise in one area 
of government or business is not an indicator of success in other areas. Again, 
prior to the massive undertaking to rebuild, there was little call for prison policy 
expertise. There literally were no specialised policy-making units in prison 
departments. Placing prisons within other departments put operational policy in 
the hands of career bureaucrats. For example, the attitude to having prisons 
incorporated into the Law Department of Tasmania is aptly summed up by the 
then CEO, John Ramsay, "Oh Christ, not prisons." 182 
Moreover, it would have been a culture shock for career bureaucrats to be 
involved in prisons where they had so little expertise. For ekample, Ramsay 
noted that, 
Prison administration is no doubt a most complex, difficult and 
fascinating area of public administration. Human relationships have to 
be managed and developed in a hostile and closed environment. If that 
wasn't enough we enter pigs in the agricultural show; we install T.V. 
surveillance systems; we build shower blocks for prisoners and new 
administration blocks for staff, there are hearings before the Industrial 
Commission about such matters as prison officer manning levels for a 
prisoner in the local hospital, the Auditor-General wants to know what's 
happened to 10 dozen cracked eggs at the prison farm; the media want 
to interview a prisoner; the prisoners think the chicken for dinner is too 
tough to eat. I could go on. All these decisions need planning to the last 
detail. It is demanding, time consuming, and there is little room for 
error. 183 
180 	The final argument. 
181 	Weller, "The study of public policy" 238. 
182 	Prison Officers Association of Australia Annual Conference, 24-25 May, 1986,  4. 
183 	John Ramsay, addressing the Prison Officers Association of Australia, Annual  
Conference, 24-25 May, 1986, 5. 
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While Ramsay was commenting in 1986, prior to the massive rebuilding and 
redevelopment of the other Australian prison systems, his experience was not 
uncommon. It can be argued that those charged with developing new prison 
policy in other states literally learnt on the job. The question of whether prison-
policy-making can be measured was also posed. The major difficulty, as Ramsay 
pointed out, is prisons now have innumerable policies. Where and what do you 
begin measuring? Currently the issue tends to be more of a semantic rather than 
a realistic problem. The government decision to privatise certainly deflects from 
what, in the short term, could be embarrassing politically - the issue of 
overcrowding. Simply, if you build more prisons the state quickly finds 
prisoners. 184 But some issues may be unresolvable. This is because 
The intractability and immobility of the correctional bureaucracy is 
notorious in Australia. Change has been slow and often poorly planned, 
yet this is not to say the answer lies in privatisation. The answer is, of 
course, to make innovative policy decisions that are long overdue. 18 ' 
Until some of the philosophical issues such as the purpose of imprisonment is 
resolved, prison policy-making can be little more than a scrabbleboard process. 
In 1979 Hawker et al identified six different strands in the study of public 
policy; "structural and administrative studies; process studies; output studies; 
technical analysis; economic reasoning; and hortatory studies." 186 Using this 
framework, any attempt to classify prison policy-making strictly into any of 
these variables risks accusation of observer or disciplinary bias. Even though 
Weller claims "these strands are not mutually exclusive," 187 the external prison 
investigator soon realises that in order to complete an inquiry a significant 
amount of information is required. 
184 	A. George, "The state tries an escape- Legal Service Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 2 
(April, 1989): 53-57, 56. 
185 	Ibid. 
186 	Hawker et al. Politics and Policy in Australia. 8-9. 
187 	Weller, Understanding  Public Administration. 237. 
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As there are few, if any, studies in prison policy-making the investigator is faced 
with difficulties in gaining appropriate data. "Policy responses are shaped by the 
interplay of sectional and internal interests, by the technical aspects of the policy 
	design _and implementation, and by previous experience."'" But there is one 
aspect of prison policy which is measurable - that of prison officer training. 
Throughout penal history there have been attempts to upgrade prison officer 
skills. This is shown in an analysis of prison policy in Victoria from 1851 to 
1992. Victoria's first Prison Department developed from the difficulties of 
managing hulks and stockades. Less than 150 years later, Victoria's last Prisons 
Department lost its autonomy. Under the custody and control regime a prison 
officer was trained to maintain order. Progress through the service was 
dependent on application of custodial duties and the supervision of prisoners. 
The current movement is to have a multi-skilled officer capable of performing 
all prison tasks. However, it is simplistic to suggest that . there is an 'ideal type' 
prison officer. Most prison systems now recognise this fact by having 
specialised units.'" The movement to implement a new prisoner management 
strategy, and change the focus of prison officer/prisoner interaction demands a 
different training policy to meet the changing needs next shown by analysis of 
prison policy and practice. 
188 	Davis et al. Public Policy in Australia, 45. 
189 	For example. prison response teams, classification units, dog squads, and so on. 
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Chapter 3 
Victoria's Prison Policy and Practice - 1851 to 1955. 
An institution is the lengthened shadow Of one man.' -- 
The genesis of Victoria's prison system was in England. The system's founders, 
its early managers and the majority of early staff were English. It is safe to 
presume that many of the earliest incarcerated were also English. The origins of 
the modern prison are, however, not English. The inspiration for the 
development of the modern prison is commonly attributed to the Quakers of 
late eighteenth century Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania revised the English criminal 
statutes after the War of Independence2 and built the first penitentiary in 1790 at 
the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia. 3 It was meant to be a place of penance, 
where the wrongdoer could be isolated from society and encouraged to repent 
his crimes through a process of self-examination aided by "the uplifting effects 
of scriptural injunctions and solitary Bible-reading ..." 4 
For many years America had been the recipient of some of England's worst 
convicts. These felons had been sentenced by the courts to transportation - 
which was one of the methods of dealing with serious criminal offences in 
England. Prior to 1775 major crimes were punished with transportation, 
whipping, hanging, or pillory rather than imprisonment.' Defeat in the War 
of Independence forced the English authorities to reconsider options to 
transportation to the Americas. The lack of suitable alternatives eventually led 
to transportation to New South Wales (NSW). In January 1788 Captain Phillip 
arrived from England with the First Fleet and founded the penal settlement of 
NSW and the process of large-scale transportation to Australia commenced. 
R.W. Emerson. Essays First Series, (1841) History. 
2 	M.A. Ignatief. A Just Measure of Pain, (London: Macmillan, 1978) 24. 
3 	L. L. Zupan. Jails: Reform and the New Generation Philosophy, 
(Cincinnati, OH.: Anderson, 1991) 17. 
4 	N. Morris. The Future of Imprisonment, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1974) 4. 
Ibid. 
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By 1842 England had opened a number of new institutions including Pentonville 
Prison to combat the rise in imprisonment, but transportation, particularly to 
Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania) and NSW, remained the primary option. _ 
Victoria, or, as it was first called, the District of Port Phillip, was a part of the 
Colony of New South Wales until the 1st July, 1851. 6 The penal colonies 
rapidly developed from mere convict settlements. With progress came a 
significant amount of local crime. Prisoners convicted of serious offences were 
sent either to the Penal Establishment at Cockatoo Island (Sydney Harbour), or 
to some other place of detention in the Middle District of New South Wales 
until 1850. 7 When Victoria became a separate colony prison administration was 
under the jurisdiction of two separate instrumentalities. The Sheriff's 
Department had control over local gaols which held appellants, civil debtors, 
short term prisoners, and other sentenced prisoners prior to their transfer to 
Penal Establishments. The Penal Establishments enforced convict discipline. 8 
This duality of administration continued until 1870 when the position of 
Inspector-General was created . 9 
This chapter will focus on the role of the Inspector-General of Victoria's 
Prisons (see Fig.3:1). The Inspector-General, as Head of Victoria's Penal 
Department, was an extremely important figure in the colony's earliest years. 
His role demanded vision and negotiation skills of high order. It also required 
diplomacy. He dealt directly with Government Agents to gain materials and 
resources to equip Victoria's fledgling penal system. The position's high profile 
was gradually eroded and the Penal Department integrated into another 
Government department. The position, however, retained its importance and 
future incumbents set up a structure that in 1992 was still in existence. 
6 	D. F.Vicker, "The Penal System of Victoria" Handbook of Victoria. 
(Melbourne: Government Printers, 1915) 233. 
7 	Ibid. 
8 	J. Armstrong, The Bridge, Vol. 3, No. 4 (March 1980) 4. 
9 	This position arose from the Royal Commission of 1870 when both gaols and penal 
establishments came under one head - the Inspector-General. 
10 	P. Lynn and G. Armstrong. From Pentonville to Pentridge:  
A History of Prisons in Victoria, (Melbourne: State Library of Victoria, 1996) whit 
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The vision and foresight of successive Inspectors' - General have given the 
system much of its management structure, operating practices, classification 
procedures, prisoner treatment programmes, and prison policy. The edifices and 
systems they created _are_ largely_extant. These officers did not, however, 
administer a large Head Office organisation. In the main they worked alone, or 
with little help." Each made a significant contribution. The Penal Institutions of 
Victoria have been shaped by 14 Inspectors' - General, and the last long-serving 
autonomous Director of Prisons, Eric Shade. Knowledge of their contribution 
will help understand the manner in which Victoria's prison policy was 
developed. The position of Inspector-General was abolished with the 
proclamation of the Penal Reform Act (1956) in July 1957. The incumbent 
viewed the title as old fashioned and reflecting a bygone era in prison practice. 12 
The position was retitled Director of Penal Services. Former Inspectors'- 
General had built a prison system that at stages of its development exhibited 
both the best and worst of prison practice. The system's cornerstone being 
described as a "fine example of Australian prison operation" and, latterly, as 
"neglected and under-resourced." 13 
The chapter will demonstrate that Victoria's prison administrators were at times 
at the 'cutting edge' of penal practice and at others followers of correctional 
trends. The chapter will provide evidence that the system was never given the 
finances it required to keep abreast of penal change. Indeed, it can be clearly 
seen that the system was ready to collapse under the strain of antiquated 
edifices, growing use of imprisonment, and a mixture of outdated penal 
philosophies prior to the 1970s riots and insurrection. It is, however, too simple 
to blame the prison problems purely on government inertia. There are other 
compounding factors. 
In 1950 Head Office consisted of the Inspector-General, the Deputy Inspector-
General, the Chief Clerk who was also the Secretary of the Indeterminate Sentences 
Board, two clerks and two secretarial people. 
12 	Ironically the title reappeared in 1989 when the Director-General removed the 
Director of Prisons from his position. As the incumbent was on a contract he was 
given a created position and took the title - Inspector-General.' 
13 	Pentridge Prison described by Capt. Evans, Penal Report, 1900, 3, and by the 00C  
Annual Report. 1983-84. iii. 
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It is an oft-quoted aphorism that there are no votes in prisons. 14 However, when 
a new government finally addressed the system's pressing needs, the necessary 
infrastructure was not readily available. The chapter will also investigate the 
foundations of modern prison policy and compare Victoria's prison 
administration with the major stages of development in both England and the 
Americas. It will highlight Victoria's attempts to transform its system into first 
an English, and latterly an American version.' 5 
The chapter also researches the introduction of the modern variant of Victoria's 
prison officer training. The later discussion will demonstrate that until Joseph 
Akeroyd's tenure as Inspector-General prison officer training was generally 
perfunctory. Akeroyd, and his successor, Alexander Whatmore, were deeply 
committed to prisoner reform. However, they were also aware that prison 
officers had an important place in the reformation process. They introduced the 
forerunner of modern training programmes; they instituted education 
requirements for prison officer promotion; and they continually strived to 
upgrade prison officer skills. Indeed, they can be considered as the 'Fathers' of 
contemporary Victorian prison officer training. 
It is very difficult in retrospect to examine 140 years of Victoria's penal policy. 
Critics or sceptics could rightfully argue that prisons only ever had one policy-
custody and contro1. 16 Indeed, to a certain degree this still holds true. 
14 	Quoted to the author by several former Tasmanian Attorneys'- General for a study 
into the Tasmanian Prison Service, see W.C. Paterson, Prison Management  
Theory and Practice: With Special Reference to Risdon Gaol, M A diss., 
University of Tasmania, 1988. 
15 	The works of English prison administrators such as E.F. Du Cane, 
The Punishment and Prevention of Crime, (London: Macmillan & Co, 1885) and 
E. Ruggles-Brise, The English Prison System (London: Macmillan & Co, 1921) 
will be examined to measure Victoria's approach from inception until the 1930s. The 
intervening years up until 1955 will be investigated using works by later prison 
investigators such as J.E. Thomas, The English Prison Officer Since 1850: A Study  
in Conflict, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972),T.O. Murton, The Dilemma  
of Prison Reform, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976) and J.J. DiIulio Jr. 
Governing Prisons A Comparative Study of Correctional Management, 
(New York: The Free Press, 1987). 
16 	DiIullio, Governing  Prisons, 178. 
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Contemporary prison managers "must affect a government strong enough to 
control a community of persons who are most decidedly not angels." 17 There 
have, however, been many exponents of the prison system through the - ages. 
Their thoughts on penal theory will be used to put the respective positions, of_ 
Inspectors'- General in context in this and the following two chapters. The 
chapter also sets the groundwork to understanding the custodial role of the 
prison officer and the organisation's attempts to change it, and why the system's 
administrators decided to implement a new and untested prisoner management 
strategy - unit management - in the 1980s. 
Figure 3:1 Penal Administrators 1851-1975. 
Title Years Incumbent 
PENAL DEPARTMENT 
Inspector-General, 
Penal Establishments 
1851-1854 S. Barrow 
1854-1857 J. Price 
1857-1869 W.T.N. Champ 
CHIEF SECRETARY'S DEPARTMENT- 
PENAL AND GAOL'S BRANCH 
Inspector-General, 
Penal Establishments and Gaols 
1869-1869 C.Farie 
1869-1880 G.O. Duncan 
1880-1884 J.Castieau 
1884,1890 W.G. Brett 
1890-1903 Capt. J. Evans 
Inspector-General, 
Penal Establishments. Gaols and Reformatory Prisons 
1903-1910 E.O'Connor 
1910-1915 W.A. Calloway 
1915-1920 J.W. Freeman 
1920-1920 R. McIver 
( Deputy Inspector-General )* 1920-1922 G.C. Morrison 
( Deputy Inspector-General ) 1922-1923 C.S. McPherson 
Inspector-General, 
Penal Establishments. Gaols and Reformatory Prisons 
1923-1947 J. Akeroyd 
1947-1955 . A.R. Whatmore 
Director of Penal Services 1955-1960 A.R. Whatmore 
Social Welfare Department 
Director of Prisons 1960-1975 E.V. Shade 
The Inspector-General's position was not filled between McIver's 
departure and Akeroyd's appointment. Both Morrison and McPherson 
were officially designated Deputy Inspector-General. 
Source: Penal Reports, 1851-1975. 
17 	 Difullio, Governing  Prisons, 235. 
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There are a number of quite discrete, although not mutually exclusive, periods 
in Victoria's prison history. While researchers may debate their relative 
importance, the major epochs can be identified as forming around, 
• _ the Champ years which set the foundations of the system; 
• the Royal Commission on Penal and Prison discipline of 1870 which 
brought local gaols and the penal institutions under a single head; 
• the establishment of the Reformatory system with the Indeterminate 
Sentences Board; 
• the era of the educators beginning with Akeroyd and continued 
by Whatmore, 1923-1960; 
• the Social Welfare years, 1960-1978; 
• the Department of Community Welfare Services, 1978-1983; 
• Office of Corrections, 1983-1992 
Victoria's initial prison policy and practice. 
Although Victoria's prison system was not founded until 1851, its earliest 
administrators were experienced penal operators Their perceptions of how to 
manage a prison system had been coloured by an amalgam of the thinking which 
designed the American penal edifices in the 1820s and of the English perception 
toward dealing with criminality. The Americans created the penitentiary in the 
Walnut Street Jail where solitary confinement and prisoner reflection on their 
crimes was supposed to produce reformation. This 'Pennsylvania System' was 
developed on the 'separate and silent' regime and the Western State 
Penitentiary at Pittsburgh was one of its first practitioners when opened in 1826. 
However, it is when the Eastern State Penitentiary opened in Philadelphia in 
1829 that the Pennsylvania System attracted world attention. Prisoners worked 
alone in their cells and were allowed out of seclusion to do maintenance work 
"only when blindfolded." 18 This system persevered until 1913. 19 
18 	E.H. Sutherland and D.R. Cressey, Criminology. Tenth Edition, 
(Philadelphia: Lippincott. 1978) 523. 
19 	[bid, 523. 
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By 1794 American prison authorities were unhappy with the ramifications of the 
Pennsylvania System. Cases of insanity, intransigence and suicide increased 
instead of prisoners being reformed through a process of solitude and silence. 
Another system was immediately established which became known as the 
Auburn System. Based roughly on the former system, its practices were _ 
enshrined in the new prison at Auburn, which opened in 1816. Again, the 
experiment of keeping prisoners in solitary confinement was found to be 
injurious. The authorities therefore allowed prisoners to work in silent 
association but still retained the practice of solitary confinement at night. Thus 
the Pennsylvania System became the "segregate system" while the Auburn 
System was known as the "congregate system." 20 English prison commissioners 
visited both American systems in 1835 with the view to recommend one or 
either for the intended prison building programme. The commissioners adopted 
a modified version of the Pennsylvania System. 21 
The general objectives of the late Victorian penal system (1865-95) were to 
repress crime. 22 However, as a disciplinary institution, the prison was 
considered to be "a serious failure." 23 The earliest acknowledged American 
prison policy was that prisons were to be used for puriishment. 24 A general law 
was passed in New York State in 1788, which determined that jails or 
workhouses could be used as "places of punishment." 25 Furthermore, by 1797 
the inscription over the door of the New Jersey state prison cemented this 
perception. It read "Labor, silence, penitence. 1797. That those who are feared 
for their crimes may learn to fear the laws and be useful. Hic labor, hoc opus .. ,726 
English penal thought was married with American institutional design and 
transplanted to the Australian colonies. English prison policy and practice were 
to dominate Victoria's penal operation for the first 100 years of its operation. 27 
20 	Ibid, 524-525. 
21 	Ibid, 525. 
22 Ibid, 11. 
23 	Ibid, 59. 
24 	[bid, 519. 
25 	Ibid. 
26 	Ibid, 521. 
27 	For example, see Lynn and Armstrong. From Pentonville to Pentridge ., 
A History of Prisons in Victoria. 
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Although the earliest Australian penal administrators were recruited from the 
military because of their organisation and administrative experience, some 
thought deeply about prisoner conditions and were literally instrumental in 
focussing thought other than on the prisoner as an inanimate object. Alexander 
Maconochie was the penal administrator at Norfolk Island - a settlement which 
took "the dregs of the convict system, irreconcilable and irreclaimable." 28 
Maconochie abhorred the cruel prisoner treatment and deleterious practices 
which had become the hallmark of the Norfolk prison administration. 
Maconochie efforts to change the system and the philosophy he espoused 
became the forerunner of Walter Crofton's Irish system. 29 Simply, Maconochie 
instituted a 'mark' system where prisoners were awarded marks for their daily 
endeavours. When the prisoner had accumulated a specific number of marks he 
was eligible to seek the termination of his sentence. Maconochie instituted five 
principles to effect his penal philosophy. These were: 
(i) sentences should not be for imprisonment for a period of time, but for 
the performance of a determined and specific quantity of labour; in 
brief, time sentences should be abolished, and task sentences submitted; 
(ii) the quantity of labour a prisoner must perform should be expressed in a 
number of marks which he must earn, by improvement in conduct, 
frugality of living, and habits of industry, before he can be released; 
(iii) whilst in prison a prisoner should earn everything he receives; all else 
should be added to his debt of marks; 
(iv) when qualified by discipline to do so he should work in association with 
a small number of other prisoners, forming a group of six or seven, and 
the whole group should be answerable for the conduct and labour of 
each member in it; 
(v) in the final stage, a prisoner, whilst still obliged to earn his daily tally of 
marks, should be given a proprietary interest in his own labour and be 
subject to a less rigorous discipline in order to prepare him for release 
into society. A 
Maconochie's system was possibly never given the recognition it was due 
during his lifetime - indeed, its practices were condemned and, in part, were due 
to him losing his prefecture in 1844. 3 ' 
28 	J.V. Barry, "Alexander Maconochie 1787-1860" in H. Mannheim, Pioneers in  
Criminology, second edition enlarged, (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith 1972) 
84- 106, 92. 
29 Ibid, 99. 
30 	Ibid, 91. 
31 	Ibid, 97. 
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From humble beginnings to the Champ era (1851 - 1857). 
Prior to the separation of Victoria from New South Wales, Port Phillip had 
limited capacity to deal with incarceration of offenders. The first permanent 
prison was the Melbourne Gaol, which opened on 1st January 1845. This was 
simply used for detention. There were no facilities for industry and classification 
other than separation by sex. It also provided the only holding centre for those 
declared insane. 32 By 1850 the gaol was becoming overcrowded and the 
authorities felt that convicts sentenced to hard labour would be better-utilised 
"on the roads of the colony than being idle and well fed in the Melbourne 
Gaol." 33 According to contemporary accounts, on the 5th December, 1850, 
sixteen prisoners from the Melbourne Gaol were marched to the Pentridge 
Stockade. 34 
The first Superintendent, later Inspector-General, of Penal Establishments was 
Samual Barrow. 35 He had been recruited from the penal colony of Norfolk 
Island where he had been the resident magistrate. Previously he had been a 
police magistrate in Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania) and prior to that a London 
barrister. 36 Barrow's regime was harsh. He kept the inmates of Pentridge in 
servitude and under absolute control. They were put to work making roads in 
the vicinity. He put all new prisoners in chains while working to ascertain 
whether they could be trusted working unrestrained. 
As a result of the discovery of gold in Victoria in 1851, the Government 
commenced the issuing of mining licences thus attracting to the Colony 
"desperate characters from all quarters which rendered necessary considerable 
changes in the Penal System." 37 
32 	Armstrong. The Bridge. 4. 
S. Barrow, A return from the Superintendent of Penal Establishments upon the  Penal 
Department of the Colony By Order in Council. 21st November, 1954. 
34 	Armstrong. The Bridge, 4. 
35 	Vicker, Handbook to Victoria, 1914, 234. 
36 	R. Broome. Coburg Between Two Creeks (Melbourne: Lothian, 1987) 99. 
37 	Vicker, Handbook to Victoria, 234. 
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The first change being the provision of stockades, and the second that of 
Floating Prisons or Houses of Correction which were proclaimed as follows:- 
Stockade Date Proclaimed No. held on 1/12/1883 
Pentridge 20 April, 1852 260 
Richmond 23 June. 1853 50 
CoRingwood 21 February, 1853 104 
Marine 7 September, 1853 120 
Source: 	Armstrong. The Bridge, 1980. 
The Stockades were eventually emptied with the exception of Pentridge, which 
became the Penal Establishment for the whole of Victoria. 38 In 1851 Barrow 
proposed introducing 'task work' based on Maconochie's mark system 
implemented in Norfolk Island. 39 Simply, those who exceeded their daily work 
targets reduced their sentences by a set amount, while those who failed to meet 
the quota were punished. Barrow foresaw the increase in crime and realised that 
permanent facilities were required. He recommended the construction of a 
central penitentiary at Pentridge capable of housing a thousand cells. 40 "By Act 
of Council 16 Vic. No. 32, 22nd January, 1853, the old legislation relating to 
Gaols was repealed, and provision made not only for Gaols and Houses of 
Correction, but also for hulks or floating prisons." 4I The hulks were proclaimed 
Public Prisons on the following dates:- 
Name of hulk Date proclaimed Capacity 
President 1 February, 1853 90 
Deborah 1 February, 1853 200 
Success 27 June, 1853 125 
Sacramento 15 March, 1854 128 
Lysander 29 March, 1854 300 
Source: Broome. Coburg. 
38 	The beginnings of Pentridge, see Broome. Coburg, chapter 5. 
39 	For an account of Maconochie's innovation see H. Mannheim, (Ed) 
Pioneers in Criminoloq, 2nd Edition, (New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1972) 
chapter 5. 
40 	Broome. Coburcr, 103. 
41 	Vicker, Handbook to Victoria. 234. 
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In 1854 Barrow left the Penal Department and became Immigration Agent for 
Victoria having seen the embryonic prison system rise from a daily average 
-population (DAP) under - four hundred inmates to almost eleven hundred by 
1853. His legacy to Vict_oria's prison system was in the forerunner of the 
modern day remission. He was replaced as Inspector-General by John Price. 
The period between the arrival of John Price as Inspector-General in 1854 and 
his death at the hands of inmates in March, 1857 is viewed by many as the 
harshest ever penal period in Victoria, dominated by cruelty, complete 
obedience, and efficiency. 42 Price, like his predecessor, had been an overseer of 
convicts in Van Diemen's Land and stationed on Norfolk Island. His 
incumbency as Commandment at Norfolk Island shaped his prefecture of the 
Victorian Penal system. 43 
According to Barry, while at Norfolk Island, Price ordered gross and arbitrary 
punishments for minor offences. There were beatings, floggings, and the use of 
irons in addition to convicts being tied to boltholes in cell walls and left dangling 
on their tip toes. The Catholic Bishop of Hobart visited the Island in 1852 and 
found that 39 men had been flogged the day prior to his visit. 44 In his first report 
to Victoria's Parliament Price condemned the penal establishments of 1854. He 
claimed discipline was slack - by both inmates and officials, that conditions were 
deplorable and insurrection rife. 45 His predecessor, Barrow, had left him "No 
system of classification ... beyond confining the longest sentenced prisoners 
aboard the prison hulk. [He found it] impracticable to effect much alteration at 
this point."46 Price argued the conditions of the buildings were so bad that it 
"render it impossible effectually to separate the old offenders from those 
primarily convicted." 47 Price believed that the task system introduced by Barrow 
was unjust. 
42 	For full details see J.V. Barry, The Life and Death of John Price, (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1969). 
43 	Broome, Coburg, 107-109. 
44 	Barry, John Price. 56. 
45 	Select Conunittee on Penal Discipline. 1857. 22-27. 
46 	Penal Report, 1854, 6. 
47 Ibid. 
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Price argued that it favoured strong men over weaker men. Recidivists had an 
advantage over first offenders, and that the inmate could possibly deceive the 
overseer. He claimed the practice encouraged shoddy work." Price replaced the 
task system with one of labour and conduct reports which could serve "as the 
criterion on which the remission [of his sentence be granted] of a portion not 
exceeding one third of his period of servitude." 49 As the population of Victoria 
increased there was a need for more penal accommodation. According to 
Buckley, the population in 1838 was just over 3,500. This had risen by 1851 to 
just fewer than 77,500. The gold discoveries attracted just under an additional 
half million people. Thus in 25 years the population of Victorian had increased 
six-fold. 5° 
Price insisted on additional cell accommodation but met with little success from 
the Legislative Council. It was pointed out that living conditions were appalling 
for the majority of recent arrivals to the gold fields who failed to succeed in 
mining. There was also a great deal of resentment towards the operating costs 
of the Penal Department. Consequently the Budget for the years 1854 to 1860 
fiscal years was pruned. 51 Price recommended the building of a large central 
penitentiary with 200 separate stone cells in September 1855. He argued that 
proper control, discipline, and classification of prisoners could only be affected 
by permanent and adequate prison buildings. He also wanted a 100-bed hospital 
and dormitories to house 1200 prisoners. Price claimed the cost would be "30 
thousand pounds" if built by prison labour. 52 Price, however, made many 
enemies by the rigorous use of authority and his treatment of inmates. His 
stewardship was challenged by a series of public meetings which led to two 
Select Committees of Inquiry - one from the lower house and one from the 
upper. 53 
48 	Correspondence 1854, Gaols and Penal Establishments, 1854, VPRS 687, vol. 1 
49 	Penal Report. 1854, 6. 
50 	B. Buckley. Life Behind the Bluestone Walls from 1800's-1980, 
First edition. (Melbourne: Pentridge Printing. 1981), 7. 
51 	Armstrong, The Bridge, 1980, 6. 
5' 	Broome, Coburg, 112. 
53 	Notes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council 1856-7, 563. 
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The Legislative Council Select Committee's report stated that 
The condition of the Penal Establishment is unsatisfactory; that this has 
arisen chiefly from want of adequate _accommodation from the carrying 
out of a proper system of penal discipline, and from the consequent 
impracticability of enforcing the necessary classification of criminals. 
The Committee are also impressed with the opinion that the reformation 
of criminals has not been allowed to exert that practical influence upon 
the management of the institution which its importance demands.' 4 
The report concluded 
As the bulk of the reliable evidence goes to show the utter hopelessness 
of accompanying anything efficiently of a reformatory character with the 
present establishments, your Committee are of the opinion that a 
properly designed building, commensurate with the wants of the 
department, ought to be immediately commenced, and completed as 
soon as possible. 5 ' 
The report also recommended "a system of punishment of prisoners based on 
the four principles of centralisation, classification of prisoners, employment of 
prisoners, and uniformity of discipline." 56 Price did not live to see the 
Committees report. On the 26 March 1857, he went to hear complaints by 
prisoners incarcerated in the hulks at Williamstown. 57 Arguments broke out 
between Price and the convicts who killed him. 
Although Price's tenure will be better remembered for its cruelty and harshness, 
his legacy forced the Government to address the penal issue. John Price's 
successor as Inspector-General was William Thomas Napier Champ. In 1856 
Champ became the first Premier of Tasmania. In 1857 his ministry was defeated 
and Champ was offered the position of Inspector-General of the Penal 
Department, Victoria. 58 He took up duties on 3 June 1857. 59 
54 	Notes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council,  1856-7, 563. 
55 	Ibid. 
56 	Ibid, 178. 
57 	Memo, Price to Chief Secretary. 25 March 1857. Penal Establishments, 1857. 
VPRS 1189 Box 388. 
58 	Broome, Coburg, 114. 
59 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge ., 
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 47. 
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The building years (1857-1869). 
Champ inherited a system of prison hulks and stockades spread over several 
locations:- -One- of-his- first acts was to propose the centralising of the penal 
_ system. Apart from being easier to manage, the  notion was politically expedient. 
The Legislative Council had complained about the cost of housing, feeding, 
transporting convicts, and the cost of warder salaries. Champ speculated that by 
centralising the system he could reduce overheads considerably. Champ claimed 
centralisation could only take place when he had a secure environment. He 
suggested Pentridge as the appropriate site. The Legislative Council approved 
an allocation of seventy thousand pounds to build a bluestone Panopticon-style 
building. In 1859 Champ had secure accommodation, albeit in dormitory fashion 
for 552 prisoners. His annual report noted that he had disposed with "2 
Superintendents, 1 Assistant Superintendent, 3 Chief Warders, 4 Clerks, 4 
Shipkeepers (from the Hulks), 6 Overseers, 3 Sergeants, 1 Corporal and 36 
Warders saving in salaries [pounds sterling] 13,218,12/6." He wryly noted that 
this was more than the interest being paid on the Panopticon. 6° 
Champ began a building programme much of which remains' at HM Prison 
Pentridge. The Panopticon was partially completed in 1859. 61 The Women's 
Prison, the Hospital, the Towers and Main Gate were all started and completed 
within several years. 62 He built a model-prison based on that at Port Arthur, 
Tasmania. All the perimeter walls surrounding Pentridge (140 acres) were 
completed by 1866. 63 Champ then turned his attentions to the inmates. In June 
1857, he suggested that criminals should pass through three imprisonment 
phases, "Firstly, Absolute seclusion at all times; Secondly, Association when at 
labour, with separation at all other times; Thirdly, Association under a proper 
supervision at all times."64 
60 	Penal Report, 1859-60, 10. 
61 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge; 
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 52. 
62 	Broome, Coburg. 118. 
63 	Ibid. 
64 	Penal Report 1887, 9. 
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The first stage of the project was to build individual cells where absolute 
seclusion (solitary confinement) for no less than three months could take place. 
Champ hoped to have 178 cells ready in the Panopticon by December 1887. 
Champ rigorously enforced the 'silent regime' after lock up, "criminals could 
plot after hours, disparage the staff, and would not reflect on their lawlessness 
unless an atmosphere of contemplation was encouraged." 65 People charged with 
breaking the strict silence could still be sent to one of the remaining hulks. 
Champ's views on penal policy may well have been shaped by his contacts with 
contemporary English prison authorities. 66 
Two regimes had been developed to deal with 'contamination' - a malady 
administrators viewed as a perennial prison problem. According to Thomas, 
contamination occurred because 
society took people, many of whom were criminally unsophisticated, and 
propelled them into a situation where they faced physical and moral 
danger. Society had called into the prison community, but felt uneasy 
because society's agents, the prison staff, lost control of what was 
happening to people who had been put in a position of enforced 
dependency. On the hulks, for example, where association was 
inevitable, there was 'terrorism.' Contamination was made possible by 
this 'association,' especially where young and old, male and female were 
herded indiscriminately, and it followed that the reductiOn or elimination 
of social contact was necessary to eliminate contamination.° 
The silent regime had proved almost impossible to control when association 
took place. The authorities answer was to cease association. The remedy to 
contain communication and reduce contamination was the introduction of the 
separate system." While Champ demanded discipline, he also realised the 
predicament convicts faced on release. 69 He argued against issuing 'tickets of 
leave.' Champ thought the 'ticket of leave' was a stigma. 
65 	Penal Report 1887,9. 
66 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 47. 
67 	Tbid, 30. 
68 	'bid, 31. 
69 	Memo, Champ to Colonial Secretary, December 1857. Penal Establishments. 1857, 
VPRS 1189, Box 406. 
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Champ recommended 
No person convicted after a certain period should be allowed to receive 
a ticket of leave but that the rule under which_ applications for pardons 
are entertained after the expiration of two-thirds of a prisoners sentence, 
should be applied in all cases. 7° 
Many prisoners were destitute when released. They committed further crimes in 
order to survive. Champ proposed that released prisoners could remain on the 
public works for a maximum of six days and paid five shillings per diem. 71 
Likewise, Champ's qualities towards staff were exemplary. 
He was first and foremost an excellent and determined disciplinarian, he 
possessed a high sense of justice, a keen insight into character, and his 
mode of dealing with all ranks of the service was thoroughly impartial. 
Exact in the administration of the minutest details of his office he 
restored confidence amongst all his subordinates, which was one of the 
principal elements wanting at this period in the management of 
convicts. 72 
Champ altered the Penal Department to 
Protect the interest of society by ensuring the safe custody of prisoners, 
while at the same time subjecting them to such an amount of discipline 
as might tend to deter them from a repetition of their crimes; secondly, 
to effect as far as possible a reformation in the convict; thirdly, to reduce 
the expenditure of the department and to render the labour of the 
convicts as reproductive as possible to the state. 73 
Champ left an indelible mark on the Penal System. He initiated policy that dealt 
with offenders in a humane fashion. He introduced a process whereby inmates 
proceeded through a graduated system, recognised the stigma attached to 
imprisonment, and suggested remedies to assist the released. He centralised 
services and set up the system of prison administration that, by and large, still 
exists. He also employed schoolteachers to assist in remedial areas. Champ was 
succeeded in the office of Inspector-General by Claude Farie in January, 1869. 
70 	Penal Report, 1887 12. 
71 	Ibid. 
72 	H.A. White, Crimes and Criminals in Reminiscences of the Penal Department in  
Victoria, (Ballarat: 1890) 141. 
73 	Ibid. 
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Of Farie it is said "Although (he) did not possess such an extensive knowledge 
of the management of convicts as his predecessor did, he had many of those fine 
qualities of character which make any man in authority deservedly popular 
among his subordinates." 74 Farie's term of office was extremely brief. He died at 
Pentridge after a short illness. 75 His replacement was George Duncan, a 
previous Pentridge Superintendent. 
Autonomy to confusion: the wilderness years (1869-1902). 
From contemporary accounts it would appear that Duncan was a weak 
Inspector-General. 
It would have been well if this gentleman had declined the appointment, 
as although an excellent superintendent he was not qualified for the 
highest position. His want of discrimination of character, as well as his 
too evident love of popularity often placed him in undignified positions, 
and so entirely failed to secure the good will of his subordinates that an 
antagonistic feeling soon arose both towards himself and Mr. Gardiner, 
the superintendent. 76 
The 1870 Royal Commission recommended that gaols and penal establishments 
be brought under the direction of the Inspector-General. Departmental status 
was lost and the new body became part of the Chief Secretary's Department 77 
(Fig. 3:2 lists Penal Establishments and Gaols under Duncan's control in 1872). 
Duncan noted, 
During the past year it became my further duty to endeavour to bring the 
various gaols of the colony under regulation, with the view of making 
them more efficient as institutions in which a general scheme of 
discipline, both deterrent and reformatory in its action, might be brought 
to bear on the prison population. Th 
74 	Ibid, 163. 
75 It should be noted that both the Inspector-General and the Pentridge Superintendent 
lived on station. This practice of senior officers in charge of Pentridge living on 
station only ceased on the retirement of Governor Ian Grindley in 1975. 
76 	White, Crime and Criminals, 164. 
77 	Prison Departmental status was not restored until 1983 when the Office of 
Corrections gained autonomy from the Department of Community Welfare. 
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By 1879 Duncan was forced to complain 
That the Department may become, as is aught to be, deterrent and 
reformatory in its influence on the prisoners, an abundant supply of 
work must be provided. The want of suitable employment is the chief 
obstacle in the way of the prisons becoming, almost, if not together, self 
supporting. If work cannot be procured it is impossible to keep the 
criminals industriously and actively occupied. 79 
The origins of Duncan's theme of deterrence and reformation as Victorian penal 
policy can be documented by tracing English penal policy from the 
centralisation of the English system. The English prison system stems from the 
Penitentiary Act of 1799. This Act established a national penitentiary. 
There were three principal methods of punishment for serious offences at the 
end of the 18th century; execution, confinement in the local prison, or 
transportation. Prisons and bridewells had been administered by a variety of 
authorities, mainly the local justices." Transportation problems finally forced 
the English Government to become involved in prison administration." The 
Hulks Act 1776 had been passed and the use of hulks was to be limited to two 
years. The final hulk administered by the English Government closed in 1875. 82 
The Penitentiary Act proposed "the establishment of a regime which was to 
include labour of the hardest and most servile kind, and compulsory attendance 
at religious services.”" In 1863 the Select Committee of the House of Lords on 
Prison Discipline made a series of recommendations which, according to 
Thomas, were to have drastic effects on English prisons. 
They do not consider that the moral reformation of the offender holds 
the primary place in the prison system; that mere industrial employment 
without wages is a sufficient punishment for many crimes; that 
punishment in itself is morally prejudicial to the criminal and useless to 
society, or that it is desirable to abolish both the crank and treadwheel as 
soon as possible." 
78 	Inspector-General's Report for 1872,  3. 
79 	Ibid, 5. 
80 	Bridewells were not prisons. They were originally set up for the destitute. 
81 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 10. 
82 	Ibid. 11. 
83 	Ibid. 12. 
84 	Quoted in Thomas. The English Prison Officer. 18-19. 
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However, discipline became lax in Pentridge. Warders sent a petition to the 
Chief Secretary complaining about Duncan's suitability for the position. 85 The 
Prison system deteriorated under Duncan's influence. Gains made during 
Champ's tenure were abrogated, and_in_ some instances dismissed as fortuitous, 
with the system being continually subject to press comment s' The general _ 	_ 
feeling toward Duncan was 
With respect to his treatment of prisoners as superintendent (Governor 
of Pentridge) he was severe but just in punishing them, but when he 
became Inspector-General he descended from his position ... to preach 
to and sing hymns with them. The old adage, "Familiarity breeds 
contempt" was somewhat frequently exemplified in consequence." 
Duncan retired on the 18th October 1880 after reading of his immanent 
retirement in the local newspaper in the September of that year. uHis retirement 
left the conjoined system in a state of disarray. 
Figure 3:2 Penal Establishments, Gaols and Prisoners Held 31/12/1872. 
	
Penal Establishments 	Gaols 
Males Males Females 
Pentridge 571 Ararat 4 • 	1 
Hulk Sacramento 112 Ballarat 53 13 
Williamstown & Sandridge 
Defence Works 
17 Beechworth 60 5 
Castlemaine 75 12 
Geelong 19 12 
Kilmore 9 
Maryborough 36 6 
Melbourne 255 149 
Portland 58 1 
Sandhurst * ,- 72 16 
Total 1341 215 
* Later named Bendigo, + emptied 29/12/1879. 
Source: Inspector-General's Report, 1872. 
85 	White. Crime and Criminals, 174. 
36 	Ibid., 166-67. 
37 	Ibid, 164. 
88 	Memo, Duncan to Colonial Secretary, 7 September 1880, Prisons, 1880, 
VPRS3991. Box 1173 
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The Americans, having trialed both the Pennsylvania silent segregate system and 
the Eastern State's Auburn silent congregate system in Philadelphia," were 
building Reformatories - both the Pennsylvania and Auburn philosophies had 
failed to achieve their objective. Authorities turned to a three-face model of 
reformation based on education, religion and hard work. The first Reformatory 
was built at Elmira New York in 1876." Both English and American systems 
were based on the deterrence aspect of prisoner management practice. 
America saw the moral reformation of the prisoner as a primary tenet in the 
fight against recidivism and in curing 'criminality,' a theme abandoned in 
England. The English authorities had also trialed the 'Crofton' system between 
1854 and 1862. In this system, a prisoner spent nine months in solitary 
confinement and was then transferred to a public works project. After this stage, 
he resided in a halfway house and worked without supervision. When he had 
satisfactorily completed these stages, he transferred into an after-care 
programme (parole). 91 
However, in Victoria the embryonic system of gaols and penal establishments 
appeared to lack direction. J.B. Castieau -the Governor of Melbourne Gaol - 
replaced Duncan as the 6th Inspector-General. Castieau's relatively short term 
in office (1880-84) commenced with a Government demand to cut costs in the 
penal system. 92 Castieau duly made staff cuts in both 1880 and 1881. He 
accomplished considerable reductions and "the change was made without any 
marked interference with the discipline and good working of the 
establishment." 93 
89 	Both systems maintained absolute silence. The segregate system was based on 
prisoners working in their individual cells in silence. The congregate had prisoners 
working together but still in strict silence. 
91) 	T. 0. Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 
(New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. 1976) 16. 
91 	Ibid. 
92 	Penal Report. 1881. 1389. 
93 	Ibid. 
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The Royal Commission of 1870 had recommended that C Division male 
dormitories be occupied by female prisoners. The men were moved to the 
separate cells in the women's prison. Centralising the male prison increased - 
security and lowered staff costs. 94 The females, however, were moved to the 
Melbourne Gaol. C Division became a Reformatory for boys. 95 It was a number 
of years before females returned to Pentridge. 96 By 1884 Castieau's policy, 
however, appeared to be subjugation, 
the only real deterrent in our gaols is solitary confinement on bread and 
water, with no remission of sentence while undergoing such terms of 
imprisonment. 97 
The disorganised state of affairs alienated the staff at Pentridge. Local residents 
and staff complained to the Chief Secretary about the unprotected and 
dangerous condition of the stockade. 98 There was a Government inquiry "for 
the purpose of securing an unbiased report as to the general working of the 
Penal Department, and more particularly at Pentridge." 99 Castieau was given six 
months leave of absence then finally dismissed. 
The selection of Mr. J.B. Castieau (Governor of Melbourne Gaol) as 
successor to Mr. Duncan proved in the end a most unfortunate one as he 
possessed but few of the qualifications requisite for so high a position, 
and it was also a matter of notoriety that he was of unsteady habits. 
Although the greatest blame fell rightly on Mr. Castieau, a general feeling 
of regret was felt that one so kind-hearted and generous should have 
terminated a long and useful career in the service so ignominiously. ' 00  
Castieu was succeeded by W.G. Brett who immediately argued for an increase 
in staff. He wished to set up a system of penal discipline, "criminals should earn 
their bread by the sweat of their brow." I° ' 
94 	Broome Coburg, 122. 
95 	Royal Commission into Penal and Prison Discipline, 2nd Session, 1870, 
Vol. 2, No. 18. 
96 	Females returned to Pentridge in 1894 following the completion of what is now D 
Division. 
97 	Penal  Report, 1883. 112. 
93 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge, 
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 106. 
99 	White Crime and Criminals, 176. 
ioo 	Ibid. 
to' 	Quoted in Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge:, 
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 106. 
The report for 1884 indicates 
It will be sufficient therefore for me to say that a false economy, a slack 
state of discipline and an indulgent system of management, especially in 
the Penal Establishment at Pentridge and the Melbourne Gaol prevailed 
with few exceptions, throughout the Department,_which could only be 
changed with safety by a systematic course of judicious and extensive 
reforms, carried forward by degrees, and as I became familiar with the _ 
internal economy of the different establishrnents. 102 
Brett alluded to his management of prisoners: 
To keep prisoners in idleness is not only an injustice to the taxpayers, 
but it is attended with the worst possible consequences to themselves, 
and I hold that a penal system should recognize the principle that 
criminals must earn their bread by the sweat of their brow. l°3 
Brett focussed on first offenders and introduced a system of classification for 
these prisoners. This consisted of separate treatment calculated on the period of 
confinement. Prisoners spent twenty-three hours in their cells. All sentences 
fewer than six months were spent exclusively in solitary. All sentenced prisoners 
with periods over the six months still spent the first six months in separate 
treatment. 
At the expiration of the maximum period of solitary the first offender was then 
placed in a different division, but kept apart from those with second and more 
convictions.'" Brett began the foundations of the modern classification system 
in Victoria. 105 He continually demanded additional staff at Pentridge to assist in 
the implementation of organisation and prisoner policy. Brett saw Pentridge as 
being the central focus of the prison system. "Country gaols are of secondary 
importance as all long term prisoners are sent to Pentridge. Here it is all 
punishment, Pentridge is the stronghold, in fact it is the centre of the system." °6 
102 	Penal Report, 1884, No.33, 3-4. 
103 	Ibid, 7. 
104 	White Crime and Criminals, 183. 
105 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge -, 
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 107. 
106 	W.G. Brett. Statement to Board of Inquiry - into the Pentridge Penal Establishment. 
1890, 10. VPRS 1226, Box 30. 31. 
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Brett had inherited a staff of 90 warders at Pentridge in 1884, but managed to 
increase that number to 106 by the end of the decade.'" Brett retired in 1899 
being replaced by Captain James Evans. 
The period between Brett's resignation in 1889 and Joseph Akeroyd's 
appointment as Inspector-General in 1924 did little to further progress in both 
penal administration and prisoner reformation. As Akeroyd commented, 
The Department in 1923 was in a state of disorganization. A fair 
percentage of officers were ill trained and negligent, whilst some were 
openly disloyal and corrupt. The treatment of prisoners was far from 
satisfactory. In the main they were regarded merely as persons to be kept 
in restraint. 108 
Akeroyd pointed to obsolete and unsuitable buildings and equipment being less 
than adequate. He complained that there was both a public and Government 
lack of appreciation of the true functions of prisons. Akeroyd noted the type 
and nature of offenders held within the system, "much is lawless and so apt to 
take advantage of any leniency that officers are apt to be dominated by the 
security view point and so lose sight of the final aim - education in the 
fundamentals of citizenship." 1°9 
His first task was to tighten control albeit in a fair but firm fashion. He 
concluded, "The iron hand in the velvet glove must remain." 0 But why had 
three successive Inspectors-General allowed the system to become moribund? 
For the first three decades of the twentieth century the major problem in prison 
management was the competing influences of prison design and operation 
philosophy. Victorian prisons had been designed to ensure prisoner separation 
but were now being called on to allow association. Association had its 
champions in the penal reform movement." Administrators and prison staff had 
great difficulty coping with the change. 
107 	Penal Report, 1888, 13. 
108 	Ibid, 1943, 1363. 
109 'bid, 1365. 
io 	Ibid. 
J.E. Thomas and A. Stewart. Imprisonment in Western Australia, 
(Perth, W.A.: Uni of W.A. 1978).64. 
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As 
Freedom increased for the prisoners, the restrictions and strain on staff 
increased proportionately. In such a situation any attempt to liberalize, 
or even change a prison system is doomed, especially if, as happened in 
England, policy makers ignore the evidence thrust at them. 112 
Victoria's-prison. system_ was also to suffer from the_implementation of the 
indeterminate sentence, which had been introduced in America in 1870. In that 
jurisdiction there was no effective policy towards prisoner reform."' This 
sentencing option was introduced in all Australian States. But it took decision-
making in sentencing from the courts and put it in the hands of a largely 
inaccessible Indeterminate Sentences Board which 
Gives no account at how it arrives at its decision to the person affected 
by it. The real reason for this is that the criteria for release centre around 
such generalities as 'attitude', 'co-operation', 'stability' and the rest. 
Only very arrogant people will claim skill at evaluating such features of 
human behaviour, and only extremely persuasive people would find it 
possible to convince others, especially customers, of the accuracy of 
their analysis or the certainty of their predictions." 4 
Captain Evans claimed, after touring European and American prisons, that: 
We are practically working on similar lines to those obtaining under 
the English system. I venture to assert that no better model has yet been 
presented to us. The success of our methods depends very largely upon 
the degree of care taken in regard to classification and the facilities 
available for suitably employing the prisoners, such occupations as stone-
breaking and oakum picking are well enough, and even desirable, for a 
certain class of gaol habitues, but to deal reasonably with what may be 
termed hopeful cases, work which will give interesting and stimulating 
employment is needed. 115 
Evans introduced a rigorous form of prisoner classification in 1899. Prisoners 
were divided into two types: special and restraint. The 'specials' were mostly 
first offenders and were sent to a wing of Pentridge's new A Division in the 
hope that reformation would take place. They were kept apart from other 
prisoners and worked in adjoining gardens and selected industries. 
112 	Ibid, 85. 
113 	Murton, The Dilemma of Prison Reform, 9. 
114 	Thomas and Stewart. Imprisonment in Western Australia, 85. 
115 	Penal  Report, 1900, 3. 
135 
The 'restraints,' on the other hand, were difficult young offenders, "the street 
corner larrikin type, for whom coercive treatment is demanded." 116 They were 
also housed in A Division but under strict discipline procedures and were 
subject to close supervision_while atlabour. 
■ 
Prisoner labour, which had been the cornerstone of successive Inspector-
General reformative policies, consisted in 1901 of unskilled farm work, 
maintenance or cleaning work, tailor shops, oloc making, and brush making, 
among others. By 1903, flax growing took up nine acres. Evans, however, was 
hamstrung in his endeavours to facilitate change by the lack of budget. He 
pointed out "the last ten years the money allowed for prisons has not been 
sufficient to meet many of the actual maintenance demands." 7 
Evans retired in 1902 without making a great deal of change. His actions were 
certainly kinder than his predecessors. He abolished the practice of punishing 
prisoners by placing them in 'dark' cells, and reduced solitary confinement on 
admission. He also ended the practice of prisoners spending their last six weeks 
in solitary confinement prior to release. Evans encouraged participation by the 
Prisoners Aid Society to prepare prisoners for discharge. And he introduced a 
refined form of prisoner classification, which lasted for many years. The 
incoming Inspector-General, E.C. O'Connor, wrote of Evans, 
On the 31st March of this year Captain Evans severed his connection 
with the Prisons Branch, having held office as Inspector-General for 
over twelve years, or for a longer period than any of his predecessors. 
His regime was marked by many improvements in the prison system, and 
by thoroughness of administration. Compelled by failing health to 
relinquish the office he had filled for so long, Captain Evans has left a 
record of good work, and an example of earnest application to duty. 118 
116 	Quoted in Broome, Coburg, 26. 
117 	Report of the Inspector-General on the Prison Systems of Europe and America. 
VLA 1901 Vol. 2. No. 5 8. 
118 	Penal Report. 1902, 3. 
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From custody towards treatment.  
O'Connor, the former Secretary of the Department for Neglected Children and 
Reformatory Schools, had a good insight into the problems facing the penal 
system...He had been_ Chief Clerk _of_the branch and, as such, worked in tandem 
with the Inspector-General." 9 He continued Evans' work. The declining prison 
population aided his transition, and he was able to close the Maryborough 
Gad" (see Fig. 3:3 for prisoner numbers from 1871 to 1937). 
The pressures associated with classifying prisoners to particular divisions, 
however, still presented problems. O'Connor acknowledged the work of his 
predecessor in opening 'special' divisions and noted those 
who come under the category of hopeful cases, continue to yield results 
that are very encouraging ... these divisions have continued to afford 
prisoners who have not yet acquired the crime habit and who desire to 
retrace their steps an opportunity to do so. 121 
O'Connor, however, was concerned that the nearness of the special divisions to 
other classes of prisoners would result in the hopeful cases being contaminated. 
He argued that a separate institution be established, one that was different in 
operation and demeanour to an ordinary prison. O'Connor envisaged this type 
of institution having workshops to provide labour for all offenders. O'Connor 
hoped there would be land to grow vegetables and crops, which in turn would 
make the institution part ways self-sufficient. O'Connor acknowledged the 
disparity in staff. His recommendations were that the staff should be selected 
"embracing officers capable of imparting instruction in the various 
occupations." 122 O'Connor recognised that he needed specifically selected 
trained officers if he hoped to achieve prisoner reformation. The major event in 
O'Connor's tenure as Inspector-General was the Government's decision to 
implement an Indeterminate Sentences Bill. 
119 	It was not unknown for the Chief Clerk to act as Inspector-General whenever the 
incumbent was on leave or travelling interstate or overseas. 
120 	Penal Report. 1904. 3. 
121 	[bid. 
122 	[bid, 1907. 268. 
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There had been severe criticism of the Judiciary's sentencing trends. Many 
sentences handed down were short-term and, according to the prevailing school 
of thought, were of little use in helping the offender reform. The practitioners of 
the Indeterminate Sentence philosophy maintained that offenders needed to be  
incarcerated for a considerable period. This would allow the process of 
reformation to take place. There was considerable public pressure to declare 
repeat minor offenders as habitual criminals and give them indeterminate 
sentences which, hopefully, would facilitate reformative practices. 123 
FIGURE 3:3. 
Victoria's Daily Average Number of Prisoner in Confinement, 
1871 to 1937. 
Year Males Females Total 
1871 1345 274 1619 
1881 1294 304 1598 
1891 1550 350 '4900 
1901 951 200 1151 
1911 713 100 813 
1921 741 54 795. 
1931 1391 50 1441 
1933 1393 65 1458 
1934 1320 55 1375 	• 
1935 1220 44 1264 
1936 1179 43 1222 
1937 1072 41 1113 
, 
Source: Victorian Year Book, 1937-38. 
O'Connor recognised the usefulness of the concept, but was wary of the 
tribulations which lay ahead. 
The Indeterminate Sentences Act is essentially a reformative measure, 
and its success and usefulness will largely depend on the adequacy and 
efficiency of machinery for giving effect to its provisions, it will 
therefore be of the utmost importance that the officers of the 
reformatory prisons shall be specially and carefully elected for their 
personal qualities, and their fitness for the duties imposed upon them. 124 
123 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge; 
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 121. 
124 	Penal Report, 1907, 268. 
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Indeed, this is the first mention by an Inspector-General that prison officers had 
a particular role to play in the prisoner reformation process. And although he 
acknowledged that different types of officers were required for specific tasks - 
in this_instance _a _reformative role - his Report is singularly devoid of any 
mention of prison officer training. Clarifying the intention of the Act to the 
Chief Secretary in 1907, O'Connor stated, 
In declaring_ an offender to be an habitual criminal the Judge may direct, 
as part of his sentence that, on the expiration of the term of 
imprisonment then imposed on him he be detained during the Governor's 
Pleasure in a reformatory prison. 125 
The Indeterminate Sentences Act came into force on 1 July, 1908. Its main 
provisions were: - 
1/ 	The adoption of the intermediate sentence for (a) habitual 
criminals, and (b) certain classes of offenders. 
2/ 	The appointment of an Indeterminate Sentences Board.. 
3/ 	The establishment of reformatory prisons. 
4/ 	A system of probation applicable to adults as well as minors. 
In his final report, O'Connor noted that 
no prison has yet been set apart as a reformatory prison for habitual 
criminals, and none of these has yet arrived at the indeterminate 
stage of their sentences. For the accommodation of other offenders 
ordered to be detained in a reformatory prison during the Governor's 
pleasure, the Castlemaine Gaol is utilized as a temporary 
expedient. 126 
O'Connor, through his reference to using specifically chosen officers, set in 
train a set of staff training principles and initiatives which in turn eventually led 
to the 1980s implementation of the American concept of Unit Management. 127 
O'Connor retired in February 1909. His successor was W.A. Calloway. 
125 	Ibid, 282. 
126 	Ibid, 268. 
127 	Correctional theorists agree on a similar set of principles and practices needed for an 
institution to stand a chance of achieving its goal. The institution must be purpose - 
designed and have specially selected staff. In addition, the staff must be specifically 
trained to carry out program initiatives and operational policy. The other important 
element in this framework - the prisoner - should be amenable to the proposed 
practice and should be classified as such. 
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Calloway noted, "the Government had a most painstaking and conscientious 
officer, who did not spare himself in carrying out the works on the lines laid 
down by his predecessor, Captain Evans, in Whose footsteps he trod." 128 
Calloway's appointment was intriguing. He was the Deputy-Inspector General 
but also the Under Secretary - the administrative head of the Chief Secretary's 
Department. In his role as Under-Secretary Calloway was responsible for 
O'Connor, but as Deputy Inspector-General he was responsible to O'Connor. 129 
By the time Calloway took up his appointment on 1st March, 1910, the daily 
average prison population had been steadily falling. 
The reason for the declining prison population was changes in sentencing, the 
greater use of bonds and better economic circumstances after 1900. 130 The 
system of solitary confinement still continued. Calloway set out the standards 
for this policy. 
Under the Victorian prison system the period of detention in 
separate confinement is graded according to the length of service 
thus:-2 years = 3 months in separate, 3 years = 3 months in separate, 
4 years = 4 months in separate, 5 years = 5 months in 
separate, 6 years = 6 months in separate. For misconduct a 
prisoner may be detained as long as nine months in separate. 131 
Calloway, however, complained about the courts using prisons and gaols as a 
"place of refuge for many persons without means of support and in need of 
shelter ..." 132 Calloway realised that it was extremely difficult to change or 
reform a person while incarcerated, 
Gaol life is so out of touch with social activity that imprisonment cannot 
be a training for citizenship save as inducing in the mind of the culprit a 
determination to avoid the anti-social impulse which led to his privation 
of liberty. 133 
128 	Penal Report, 1909, 229. 
129 	The position of Deputy Inspector-General was rarely filled on a long-term basis. 
130 	Broome. Coburg, 276. 
131 	Penal Report, 1910, 10. 
132 	Ibid, 1914. 224. 
133 	Ibid, 228. 
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Calloway dismissed the government notion that prisons should make money. He 
decried "the inexperienced theorist and government officials who sought to put 
... imaginary value to the labour performed in order to balance accounts." 134 By 
the end of 1914, with exception of the McLeod, Langi_Kal_Kal and Fairlea 
Prisons, the system he controlled was practically identical to the one operating 
45 years later. 135 Calloway appears to have thought a great deal about the 
function of prisons and their usefulness as a tool of society. He advocated 
change, particularly in offender self-education, 
Before my advent any ostensible desire of a prisoner to improve his 
mind by study in his cell was invariably regarded with suspicion, but it 
has been my wish to encourage any apparent genuine aspirations for 
self-improvement, of course, with proper precaufions. 136 
In his final report, written the day before he retired, he forecast the problems, 
which beset prisons and corrections in the 1970s. 
Science has not yet devised an instrument to make the punishment fit the 
crime, and the human agencies employed are of varying degrees of 
imperfection, but it must be patent to anyone who reflects on the matter 
that the worst use to which a man can be put is to imprison him. 137 
John William Kerr Freeman replaced Calloway. The highlight of Freeman's 
tenure as Inspector-General was the opening of an afforestation camp at French 
Island. This major policy change in prisoner incarceration was due in part to the 
Indeterminate Sentences Act. Reformatory Prisons had been declared in part of 
Pentridge on the 5th September 1909, at Castlemaine, and in the Female prison 
situated at the Pentridge site on the 2nd November 1909 (see Fig.3:4). The 
opening of the French Island camp in July 1917 set a trend for open-style 
Victorian prisons. I38 Freeman left the position in 1920 to be succeeded by R. 
McIvor from the Crown Law Department. His prefecture was limited and he 
was in turn replaced by the Public Service Commissioner, G.C. Morrison. 
134 	Ibid. 
135 	see the 1959 Penal Report, 739, for details of prisons. 
136 	Ibid, 1914, 227. 
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Figure 3:4 Prisoners Held in Victoria's Reformatory Prisons 
1914-1919. 
Year/Site Pentridge Female Castlemaine _ 	. French Island 
1914 55* 3 30 
1915 68* 4 35 
1916 70+ 2 22 
1917 51 5 - - 	18" - 28 	- 
1918 54 3 32 28 
1919 55 3 178 83 
The figures have been rounded for these years. Authorities used decimals when 
describing statistics in the early reports. 
Females were moved frequently and the various institutions in 
which they were housed had different titles. b9 
Source: Penal Reports. 1914-19. 
Morrison's input to the system was more administrative than policy making and 
he soon left to be succeeded as Deputy Inspector-General by C.S. McPherson. 
McPherson duly noted that several important changes had taken place. First, 
approval was given to a regulation under the Gaol's Act 1918 to provide for the 
payment of wages to prisoners who worked. Second, the electric light had 
replaced gas for lighting purposes at Pentridge Prison. Third, the decision had 
been made to close the Melbourne Gaol. The closure of Melbourne Gaol and 
the payment to 'working prisoners' was due to the fluctuating nature in the 
numbers imprisoned. 
The prison population had fallen during the First World War but had an 
incremental increase from 1919. There was a decrease, however, in the numbers 
being held under the Indeterminate Sentence particularly in the early years of 
implementation (see Fig. 3:5). 
138 	Open prisons would later open at Corriemungle, Won Wron, Morwell River, 
Dhurringle, and Langi Kal Kal. 
139 	For example. the 1916 report mentions the Coburg Female Prison whereas the 1917 
report discusses the Female Reformatory Prison. The 1918 report mentions the Jika 
Reformatory for Females. 
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Figure 3:5 Daily Ayera2e Numbers Held in Reformatory Prisons 
1922,1923 and 1929. 
Prison 1922 1923 1929 
pentridge 	_ 	_._ 42 31 93 * 
Castlemaine 49 27 94 
French Island 36 29 42 
Female Prison 2 0 2 
Beechworth 31 
Metropolitan 2 
Geelong 12 
Total 129 97 276 
* rounded 
Source: Penal Reports, 1922, 1923, and 1929. 
The era of education. 
The appointment of Joseph Alceroyd as Inspector-General in 1923 began a 
period in Victoria's penal history which saw it lead the rest of Australia's prison 
systems in terms of prisoner classification and offender management. Akeroyd 
was a former inspector of primary schools and his belief was that the penal 
problem was an educational one. 140  However, he realised the task ahead would 
not be easy. Akeroyd's first priority was to establish a set of standards which 
would be applicable to both staff and inmates. He found little discipline among 
both staff and inmates. He was clearly worried about inmates whom he felt were 
treated little better than caged animals. Akeroyd's first impressions of the task 
ahead can be gleaned from the 1923 Report when he confined himself to 
discussing "statistics and kindred matter." 141 
140 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge ., 
A History of Prisons in Victoria 127. 
141 	Penal Report, 1923, 2. 
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Akeroyd clearly viewed the classification process as the key to assisting in 
treatment of the offender, 
As an aid and as a guide to treatment close inquiry is made into the 
career of each prisoner received in the Penal Establishment, Pentridge, 
and the Castlemaine Reformatory. 1.12 
Akeroyd introduced the Stanford-Binet I.Q. test to prisons after ascertaining 
that "youthful criminals as a whole are very backwards in schooling and sadly 
deficient in ideals." 143 He negotiated with the Education Department to establish 
schools at both the Pentridge complex and the Castlemaine Reformatory 
Prison.'" But imprisonment rates nearly doubled by 1931. Akeroyd realised that 
a key to helping prisoners reform was getting the staff to accept his ideas and 
help in the process of implementation. He felt the process could be refined if his 
staff were more than just 'turnkeys.' Akeroyd commented, 
In order to raise the standard of efficiency in the service, it will be 
necessary in future for a warder appointed on probation to pass an 
examination before being confirmed in his position. A further 
examination, of which prison administration will be the chief subject, 
will have to be passed for promotion to higher rank. 145 
Thus, with a single edict, Akeroyd changed the entrenched warder seniority 
practice and clearly set the guidelines, which were to be the hallmark in his 
dealings with both staff and prisoners. Akeroyd achieved much in a short 
period. The system was near to collapse when he took over as Inspector-
General. He had little information to guide him. 
Akeroyd's predecessors left him little in the way of information, and the various 
Annual Reports were little more than public relations exercises. Moreover, 
overseas information may not have been all that useful. For example, in 1921 
Ruggles-Brise wrote a treatise on the English prison system and compared the 
English model with other European and American systems. 
142 Ibid, 1925, 2. 
143 Ibid, 3. 
144 Ibid, 4. 
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Ruggles-Brise claimed to have been "greatly impressed with the singular 
ignorance that existed, both on the Continent and in the United States, of the 
character of British penal methods." 146 He thought those international penal 
conferences were a waste of time and that information gained there superfluous. 
In 1921 Ruggles-Brise wrote 
It must not be supposed that an Englishman, going to hear discussions 
on penal subjects in a foreign country where the laws, habits and 
character of the people are entirely different, is going to bring back new 
ideas of Prison administration, which he will be able at once to apply, 
with advantage, in his own country; nor must it be supposed that he is 
going to carry with him instructions and opinions on these matters which 
other nations will readily adopt. With a pardonable pride in his national 
institutions, he is disposed to think that his Prison system is the best in 
the world; but when he goes abroad he must not be surprised to hear the 
same claim raised by other countries. 147 
Ruggles-Brise viewed prison policy and the purpose of imprisonment, in order 
of priority, as 'retributory, deterrent, and reformatory. ,148 Australian prison 
systems followed this model. Their prisons replicated the great stone edifices 
spread throughout England. Their operating practices were based on the 
'military model' used to great effect by the English. 149 
Although Akeroyd tried to achieve the dual aims of establishing treatment 
programmes for prisoners and upgrading staff, his intentions were to founder 
through lack of finance - particularly for capital works. In 1934 Akeroyd noted 
that 
owing to the need for rigid economy little money has been made 
available for repairs and renovations to gaol buildings for several years 
past, while improvements have been out of the question. The result is 
that considerable expenditure has become necessary. 150 
146 	Ruggles-Brise The English Prison System. 2. 
147 	Ibid.. 
148 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 126. 
149 	Ibid, 47-50. 
150 	Penal Report. 1934, 7. 
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Akeroyd refined the classification system but was sometimes forced to use the 
regulations to keep unruly or antagonistic prisoners from associating with each 
other. 151 One of the hallmarks of his administration had been the liberalising of 
contact between prisoners from other divisions. However, he argued that the 
system was moribund, and had been unchanged for years. Akeroyd noted that, 
The prison system is too centralized in Pentridge and affords little scope 
for efficient classification and the application of modern methods for the 
treatment of prisoners. 152 
Akeroyd was denied the use of Reformatory Prisons for ordinary prisoners as 
these were used solely for those under the Indeterminate Sentence - a practice 
that Akeroyd severely criticised (see Fig. 3:6 for the use of reformatory prisons, 
1941-1949). 
Nowadays, however, the prisoner has usually been an offender from an 
early age, and the problem becomes one of training him to live in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the community in which he 
resides. The problem is the same for gaols as for reformatory prisons 
despite the fact that the Parliament of Victoria has decreed a sharp 
distinction between the two. In fact, a completely scientific gaol system 
would be entirely indeterminate. 153 
In 1943 Akeroyd alluded to the fact that he had now been in charge of prisons 
for twenty years. He noted that there is great pressure upon those charged with 
administering prison systems. 
Prisons are instituted and prisoners placed therein for the protection of 
society, and the problem of the prison administrator then becomes one 
of ascertaining what to do with each prisoner in order that on his release 
society may benefit from his imprisonment. 154 
Akeroyd gave a simple answer to the problems of recidivism. "An all round 
education with particular attention to ethical standards is the only answer." 155 
151 	Ibid, 1938, 5. 
152 	Ibid, 1934, 7. 
153 	Ibid, 1943, 4. 
154 	Ibid, 2. 
155 	Ibid, 4. 
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The major change in Victoria's prison philosophy and policy making since . the 
Royal Commission of 1870 had taken place in the early 1920s through Joseph 
Akeroyd. Successive Governments, however, had let this change in Victoria's 
prison managem_ent and direction falter through lack of funding. Whereas 
Victoria could have led the rest of Australia into a new era, the opportunity 
afforded by one man's vision was allowed to founder. Akeroyd's tenure as 
Inspector-General concluded in 1947 after twenty four years, the longest 
stewardship in the history of Victoria's prison system. He relaxed the regime, 
and introduced sophisticated methods of classification. His use of psychological 
testing on a large scale was the forerunner for a whole professional prison 
industry. His insistence that young offenders be given at least a rudimentary 
education, as well as vocational training, set in motion the current liaison 
between prisons and the various departments involved in prisoner education. 156 
Akeroyd strived to upgrade his prison staff and formulated a set of procedures, 
which led to a regulated system for permanency and promotional opportunities. 
In 1943, he wrote, 
That as a post-war measure an adequate sum of money be set aside to 
build and equip modern Reformatory Prisons and also modernize 
existing buildings for prisoners sentenced to definite sentences in 
order that the educational work at present in being may be 
supplemented and rendered more fruitful of results. 157 
Figure 3:6 DAP held in Victoria's Reformatory Prisons. 
1 	1 	2 	 3 	 4* 
Year Male Female Male Male Male Total 
1941 59 1 60 74 46 244 
1942 64 49 61 46 220 
1943 47 50 104 49 250 
1944 59 48 70 46 223 
1945 57 49 63 46 215 
1946 46 43 63 50 202 
1947 51 45 52 33 181 
1948 34 2 31 47 36 150 
1949 32 1 50 50 19 152 
1 Pentridge, 2 Beechworth, 3 Castlemaine, 4 French Island. 
Source: Penal Reports. 1941-49. 
156 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge ., 
A History of Prisons in Victoria, especially chapter 10. 
157 	Penal Report, 1943, 2. 
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Towards a new direction. 
It took Akeroyd's successor, Whatmore, little time to set his guidelines. He 
travelled to New Zealand to investigate that system. On his return he made 
extensive recommendations which he. maintained__ were essential to the 
development of modern penal principles. He summarised them under the 
following headings: - 
a) The establishment of an adequate probation system as an 
alternative to institutional treatment ; 
b) A broader development of the Borstal principles in 
reformatories with a completely new institution 
in lieu of Castlemaine Reformatory ; 
c) A revision of the Indeterminate Sentences sections of the 
Crimes Act ; 
d) Some after-care provisions during the period of remission. I58 
Whatmore also saw an expanded role for the Deputy Inspector-General. He 
argued that the 
wide disparity between the head of the department and the next 
senior officer ... is a grave weakness in organization especially if the 
latter is incapable of going beyond routine and unsuited to act as a 
deputy for the Inspector-General. [The role should] undertake 
instruction and training of staff including the supervision of warders 
under initial training, probationary warders, promotion examinations. 159 
Whatmore could not send the 'ordinary' sentenced prisoner to a Reformatory 
Prison - these were for prisoners under the Indeterminate Sentences Act. Again, 
the low imprisonment rates of 1948 would not last. Within four years the prison 
population would rise from a DAP of just over 400 in 1948 to 1300 by 1952. 1" 
Whatmore realised that he would not assist those who received short-term 
sentences. He was at least philosophical about it. 
158 	Ibid, 1947, 8. 
159 	Penal Report, 1947, 8. 
160 	Figures from Penal Reports, 1948 and 195 1 . 
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Short-term institutional treatment cannot effect any marked change in 
moral outlook nor enable effective training in any useful trade. Short 
sentences may protect society temporarily from the depravations of these 
petty thieves and vagrants who pray upon it. The grim and costly cycle of -- 
law enforcement provides temporary alleviation without effecting a 
cure. 161 
Part of Whatmore's design was realised with the purchase of the Langi Kal Kal 
homestead. The buildings and surrounding land would provide accommodation 
for young offenders and take them from the confines of adult prisons. 
Whatmore had been very impressed with similar facilities on his trip to New 
Zealand. He recruited the Superintendent of the New Zealand institution to 
direct the planning of the new addition and manage it on completion. The use of 
an open institution for young offenders was a major change in Victoria's prison 
policy. The provision of both vocational and educational courses at Langi Kal 
Kal were essential if there was to be any hope of success in young offender 
reform. 
Education and a proper combination of sport, recreational, and leisure 
activities would be the corner-stone in the development of character 
building in young offenders. 162 
Whatmore, however, put a caveat on those who could participate on the 
treatment programme. 
It is felt that a minimum period of two years is essential in planning 
courses to suit the individual trainee, and to enable his progress 
through varying degrees of trust until conditions immediately prior to 
his release are as closely akin as possible to the conditions he will 
experience when released under supervision. 163 
Whatmore gained Government approval to undertake a world tour to seek new 
developments in penal policy. He had drafted a set of propositions which, if 
implemented, would fundamentally change Victoria's prison policy and 
direction. The Government decided that, as part of his tour, he should compare 
the efficacy of his proposals with those currently operating in other penal 
jurisdictions. Whatmore set out his propositions in his Annual Report of 1948. 
However, he had no illusion about the enormity of the task. 
161 	[bid, 1948, 4. 
162 	Ibid. 
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Whatmore realised that the major barrier to Akeroyd's vision was 
Government's reluctance to finance capital works and provide an adequate 
budget. Whatmore's framework included the provision of :- 
1. 	Establishment of a Remand Centre for investigations before 
sentence. 
2. Development of a probation system as an alternative to 
institutional treatment and as a means of supervising all 
conditional releases. 
3. Establishment of a Detention Centre for those requiring a 
sharp salutary lesson. 
4. Establishment of Training Centres for Corrective Training in 
lieu of Reformatory Prison. 
5. Preventative detention in normal prisons should be imposed 
on habitual criminals. 
6. The Intermediate Sentences Board should be re-constituted as 
a Board of Review. 164 
Whatmore realised that, even if he could convince the Government to approve 
his plan, he still required legislative changes to complement his propositions. 
Moreover, he faced the prospect that certain elements of society did not 
approve of his tactics. There were many that thought he was being too soft in 
his approach. To alleviate their concern, he noted 
It is emphasized that there must always be an important punitive and 
deterrent aspect in our treatment of crime. There is little room for sheer 
sentimentalism, but a realistic approach must never overlook the 
importance of the reformative and rehabilitative aims. This is essential, 
both from a humanitarian and economic point of view. 165 
Whatmore was completely aware of Akeroyd's problems with budgets. Yet he 
sincerely believed that he could achieve where kkeroyd had failed. The 
continuing liberalisation of the prison system would prove a constant source of 
criticism. 
164 	Ibid, 9. 
165 	Ibid, 19. 
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The fact that association creates as much stress and dissatisfaction as it 
removes, is confirmed by prisoners' accounts of their experiences. The 
prisoner who is propelled into an inmate society which can only be only 
loosely supervised by staff, is likely to find himself from time to time in a 
situation which may be intolerable, and from which he must find relief At 
the same time, with the greater freedom which association brings he is 
probably going to reflect on the increased feasibility of escape. And 
finally, much to the -dismay of liberal administrators, as more restrictions 
are removed, those which remain become intolerable. Days when hair 
was cropped, food was meagre, silence was imposed, and officers carried 
guns are soon forgotten, and eventually it becomes apparent that 
reformation which means something more than the issue of extra letters, 
logically demands the removal of all restrictions. At last the community 
of inmates is left with only one major restriction, the wall, which is the 
most intolerable of al1. 166 
By 1949 Whatmore noted that the new legislation he so urgently sought was 
now in the course of preparation and he expected that it would "bring penal 
administration in the State of Victoria into line with the most recent 
developments overseas." I67 He had argued that the Indeterminate Sentence and 
the Reformatory prison structure were handicapping his plans for change. His 
view at that time was that prisoner reformation could only take place through 
vocational training. 
Whatmore required the legislative base to create Training Prisons where the 
focus would be on the prisoner attaining vocational skills. He closed the 
Castlemaine Reformatory Prison and replaced it with Langi Kal Kai.'" This 
institution was to be solely used as a Reformatory prison for young offenders. 169 
The parameters of Whatmore's grand vision were detailed in the 1950 Penal 
Report. The machinery for change now included: 
1. Pre-sentence investigations, 2. Probation, 3. Classification and 
training according to type, 4. Preparation of pre-release plans, and 
5. Parole and after-care."° 
166 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 159. 
167 	Penal Report, 1949, 8. 
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Progress, however, was still slow. In the 1951 Report Whatmore pointed out 
that "At present this State lags considerably behind modern penal developments 
and important changes need to be effected. These plans will take some time to 
bring to fruition and an early start is recommended."' 
Whatmore closed the Reformatory prison at Beechworth. This was later 
designated a Training Prison under the new legislation. Moreover, he hoped to 
re-open the prison at Bendigo as a Training Prison in 1953. 172 He lobbied for a 
separation of female prisoners from male prisons and achieved his objective by 
the decision to establish a female prison at Fairfield. Whatmore mooted change 
for the long-term administrative hierarchy, which had remained unchanged since 
the turn of the century. He argued that several new senior positions were central 
to progress. He also required a Supervisor of Industries. Moreover, he 
envisaged a position that would interface between prisoner labour and education 
and felt that an Education and Training officer would meet this need. 
Whatmore also required a professional classification committee to select 
prisoners to be trained under the new methods. He achieved these aims by 1954, 
but noted, 
The year has produced material progress in realization of many 
features of the long-range programme previously submitted by me, and 
it is hoped that complementary legislative action will be completed in 
1955. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the work of this 
department is an important component of our social framework and 
public understanding of the principles involved in modern penology is 
essential. The intention of sanctions are Punishment; Deterrence; 
Protection of Society; (and) Rehabilitation. From a reformative point of 
view imprisonment is not an unqualified success and it is now 
generally accepted that the old regime of rigid safe custody under 
crude negative conditions must be supplanted by a positive 
treatment programme. Victoria has in the past year made dramatic 
strides in developing its treatment programme and the impact of 
these changes cannot be assessed in a short term, but improved 
morale and tone are already evident. 173 
171 Ibid, 1951, 6. 
172 Ibid, 5. 
173 Ibid, 1954, 2-3. 
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By 1954 Whatmore had realised part of his objectives by appointing a Chief 
Education and Training Officer, Eric Shade, a future Director of Prisons. He 
was still aware that his staff had concerns about the changing nature of their 
task but recognised that training was to be linchpin of his vision. 
The Chief Education Officer has already implemented important 
changes - in-staff training for recruits, and ffirther comprehenstve 
changes are in course of preparation for promotion exams. 
A proper appreciation of the principles and practice of modern 
penology among all officers is imperative in the effective 
implementation of a good treatment programme, It is pleasing to 
regard that, even among officers at first sceptical of innovations 
there has been a desire to understand and to co-operate. In their daily 
contact with prisoners, officers can exercise a profound influence over 
them.'" 
Whatmore's new plans received a setback. He tried to implement a liberalised 
regime without planning for all contingencies. On Saturday 27 August 1955 
Whatmore gave permission for prisoners to play the final of a football match on 
the Prison farm which was within the walled confines of Pentridge. The 
prisoners accessed smuggled rifles, bailed up the prison officers and escaped. 
Although they were later recaptured, there was an outcry and an inquiry 
resulted.' 75 The inquiry (the McLean Report) was critical of the prison 
administration. "It must not be forgotten ... that the primary purpose of penal 
administration should be security ... and that a natural desire for the reform of 
criminals should always be subservient to that purpose." 76 McLean was further 
scathing about the staffs failure to note that there was something out of the 
ordinary in the daily interaction between prisoners and staff, 
A prisoner who has plans for escape will, naturally, by good behaviour 
in gaol, endeavour to lull his gaolers into a false sense of security in 
regard to himself 177 
174 	Ibid, 5. 
175 	Report of the Board of Inquiry appointed to inquire into and report upon the escape  
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Moreover, 
The majority are cunning criminals, men who wage a constant 
warfare against society. Unfortunately, such an individual will _ 
constantly strive for, and will welcome, any degree of tolerance in his 
treatment, or relaxation in his discipline, merely as something which he 
may be able to turn to his advantage.'" 
Whatmore was not dismayed by this setback. He negotiated with the 
government to effectively half the size of Pentridge and give seventy acres, 
including the prison farmland, to the Education Department. 179 This public 
relations coup deflected the growing criticism of the prison operation and 
allowed Whatmore sufficient time to recover his agenda. The building of the 
female prison at Fairlea was almost complete.' 8° Whatmore noted that the 
removal of female prisoners from Pentridge would give him the capacity to 
develop two alternate sections for "short term vagrant types, (and) for a 
psychiatric clinic." 181 The cornerstone of his vision, the legislation, was finally 
ready. 
Whatmore recorded, 
The year 1955 will remain as a landmark in the history of this 
department, as late in the year, the new Penal Reform Bill was 
introduced in Parliament. This is the first significant penal legislation for 
approximately 50 years and its passage will bring important changes into 
the treatment of offenders. The Bill will establish three distinct but 
closely related services in this branch, namely Probation, Prison, and 
Parole Services. Probation will provide Courts with an alternative to 
imprisonment for appropriate cases, and the establishment of a Parole 
Service will provide a necessary corollary to a positive treatment 
programme in prisons designated to assist in the ultimate rehabilitation 
of offenders. This is expected to decrease the rate of recidivism. 
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The Bendigo Training Prison opened in May, but Whatmore was realistic. He 
commented, "The very nature of a penal institution prevents it from becoming 
an ideal centre for training individuals to live in the community. Of necessity it 
has a restraining atmosphere." 182 Sykes argues, "It is a cliche of modern 
penology that placing the offender in prison is for the purposes of punishment, _ 
deterrence, and reform "183 
Punishment and deterrence ideals are clear, but the notion of reform is more 
complex. 
When we turn to the idea of imprisonment as reform, it is clear that 
there are few who will quarrel with such a desirable goal - the 
disputes center on how it can be accomplished, if at all. 
In seeking to use imprisonment for the rehabilitation of the offender, 
the aim is to eradicate those causes of crime which lie within the 
individual and imprisonment is commonly regarded as a device to hold 
the patient long enough so that this can be achieved. Unfortunately, the 
advocates of confinement as a method of achieving rehabilitation of the 
criminal have often found themselves in the position of calling for an 
operation where the target of the scalpel remains unknown.'" 
The notion of prisoner reformation was central to Whatmore's thesis. The Penal 
Reform Bill was promulgated on this premise. Victoria's Prison System had 
developed by 1955 into a large central institution, training prisons, reformatory 
prisons, local and short-term prisons, and open prison camps. Penal policy had 
moved from the silent 'segregate' system through theories of reformation to the 
treatment movement. Prisoners had progressed from limited association at work 
to limited general association. Barrow had introduced a form of prisoner 
remission. Champ had set the foundations for classification by graduating the 
prisoner through different scales of confinement. He employed teachers for 
prisoners. The beginnings of the classification system commenced with Brett. 
Evans abolished solitary confinement on admission and during the last six weeks 
of sentence. 
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O'Connor recognised that a separate prison with specifically trained staff was 
needed to keep first offenders from contamination. Calloway admitted to the 
conundrum of trying to rehabilitate a prisoner in the prison setting. Freeman 
opened the first minimum classification prison farm. Akeroyd instituted prisoner 
psychological testing.. Akeroyd also recognised that better trained staff would _ 	_ 
assist in the process of change, and introduced officer promotion examinations. 
Several American penal innovations had been trialed. Whatmore's overseas tour 
led to a change in Victoria's prison direction. The recommendations would 
completely change the system's purpose, but his master plan was still to be 
implemented. 
In over 100 years of operation the raison detre for Victoria's prisons had yet to 
be decided. While penal theorists were debating the usefulness and purpose of 
imprisonment, prison officers still continued with custodial duties. They were 
judged on their capacity to maintain control and order. Training, if any, was 
perfunctory and purely designed to assist in daily endeavours. Training officers 
were senior uniformed staff whose seniority was judged adequate to impart the 
nature and type of custodial duties. That most were uneducated and could 
hardly express themselves was of little consequence. 185 , Whatmore was 
attempting to introduce different operational concepts into an organisation, 
which previously had been reluctant to accept change. Moreover, the majority 
of his middle-level prison management were Akeroyd's appointments. Chief 
Penal Officers were "Gods" and their word was "law." They were suspicious of 
Whatmore's intentions and if they did not approve of the changes, the process 
had very little chance of being implemented.' 86 However, events were to 
overtake them. Whatmore had a mandate for change and his tour of America 
and the United Kingdom cemented his desire to effect change. He viewed the 
latest penal developments and on his return framed his blueprint for government 
approval.'" 
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Whatemore, however, made the fundamental mistake of not considering what 
effect these changes would have on prison officers. They were the conduits by 
which success or failure depended. Their training had yet to be upgraded in any 
noticeable fashion. They were still basically working in a custodial regime.___ 
Thirty years later, a study confirmed the basic tenets of prison officer duties. 
Simply, there are only four fundamental tenets of prison officer work: security 
and control; maintaining social distance from the prisoner; officers must be 
tough and knowledgable enough to dominate the prisoners in their care; and 
officers must have enough "savvy" to know when they are being conned. 188 
While the authors conducted their research within American prisons, their 
findings would arguably be replicated in many contemporary Australian prison 
• settings. Moreover, it was arguably how Victoria's prison officers viewed their 
role in the early 1950s. 
The following chapter discusses Whatemore's blueprint for change and his 
attempts to deal with an increasing prisoner population. The chapter also 
documents pre 1960s prison officer training and highlights the confusion, which 
resulted when prisons moved to another department. 
1 
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The Keepers: Prison Guards and Contemporary Corrections, 
(Springfield. IL: Charles C Thomas. 1980) 63-109. 
157 
Chapter 4 
From Penal Reform to Community Welfare Crisis, 1956 7 1983. 
_ 	There is absolutely nothing inevitable _about poor prison conditions and much that 
can be done to overcome them 
A small prison in Norwich was the harbinger of radical change in the English prison 
world of the mid 1950s. The Norwich experiment with a new prisoner management 
regime included: all convicted prisoners dining in association; an increase in the 
amount of time that prisoners could work without increasing staff numbers; officers 
moving about workshops instead of sitting on raised platforms; prisoners freely 
conversing in workshops, officers conversing with prisoners; and the allocation of 
groups of prisoners to specific officers. 2 The experiment appeared successful and 
more small prisons implemented the 'Norwich system.' The strategy, however, had 
yet to be trialed in a large major prison. 
At roughly the same time Whatmore was attempting to introduce a similar set of 
practices in Victoria's major prison at Pentridge. Whether Whatmore was aware of 
the English experiment is a moot point. It may, however, have been to his 
advantage to ascertain whether the Norwich experiment could be successfully 
adapted to a large institution. Prison administrators have traditionally taken 
programmes from other jurisdictions and implemented them without much thought 
of the unintended consequences. It is a peculiar axiom of prison procedure that 
when a practice has success in one institutional setting administrators believe it 
should easily translate to another. Thomas and Stewart point out, 
the pattern of prison administration is shaped substantially by the history 
and traditions of the society in which prisons are set. This latter fact 
accounts generally for the failure of attempts to transplant penal ideas from 
one country to another.' 
J.J. DiIulio, Jr. Governing Prisons A Comparative Study of Correctional Management. 
(New York: The Free Press, 1987) 206. 
2 	F.E. Emery, Freedom and Justice within walls. (London: 1970, Tavistock) ix. 
3 	J.E. Thomas and A. Stewart, Imprisonment in Western Australia, (Nedlands, WA: 
Uni. of WA, 1978) 71. 
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This chapter will outline the policies of Victoria's prison system from 1956 until 
1983 when the Office of Corrections (00C) was established. 4 Victoria's prison 
system had then been operating approximately 130 years. Major philosophical 
_ changes had occurred in the 1950s and were meant to _proyide direction and 
purpose for many years. Three decades later the system was in turmoil and near 
collapse. 
It has been acknowledged that Whatmore was a 'driving force' in penal innovation 
and managed to implement rapid prisoner management change. 5 In retrospect, 
Whatmore's prison changes appear pedestrian. However, later administrators had a 
large Head Office support staff proving advice, support, and information, among 
others. 6 Whatmore, by and large worked alone. Prior to 1950 . his 'Head Office' 
staffing arrangements were minimal - seven people reported to Whatmore. This 
increased to ten in 1960 with the advent of the probation and parole divisions.' In 
1957 the Penal Service employed 360 people, of whom 350 were custodial officers 
working in 11 prisons. s In contrast, by 1992 the 00C employed 2290 people of 
whom 1845 were custodial personnel working in 14 prisons. 9 If determination of a 
bureaucracy is made on the size of the organisation alone, Victoria's 00C fitted 
this classification. 
4 
	
Australia has followed American prison doctrine "to adopt names which exclude 
reference to their primary activity. We have in Australia 'corrective' correctional' and 
'corrections,' rather than 'prison' departments. This is not so much a reversion to early 
nineteenth century English labelling but rather follows the adoption of an American 
practice - a practice of very dubious validity - of grouping together prison, probation and 
parole personnel under a single administration. - F. Rinaldi, Australian Prisons, 
(Fyshwick, ACT: F&M, 1977) 3. 
J. Armstrong, in Correctional Policy and Political Constraints, The Third Alexander 
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Victoria's prison system administration had grown exponentially since the 1950s, 
and the American prison had evolved from an autocracy to a fully-fledged 
bureaucracy by 1981. 1° But this is not a particularly American phenomenon. The 
---Scottish Prison Service _is_ "a typical _large _ bureaucratic organisation." 11 
Contemporary prison analysts accept that the modern prison is 'open.' 12 
Whatmore's 1950s prison organisation was not a classical bureaucracy but prisons 
were 'closed' systems. '  
Prisons have "bounced between the poles of anarchy and tyranny; between the 
Hobbesian state of inmate predators and the autocratic, arbitrary regime of iron-
fisted wardens.” 14 As DiIullio notes, "prison directors change, and with every 
change any long-term plans or commitment to a way of doing things goes right out 
the window." 15 It is difficult, therefore, to make many prisons accountable. English 
prisons are a good example of "closed and total institutions" where accountability 
tends to be internal. 16 However, "Accountability within government departments is 
a precondition of wider managerial accountability to the outside world." 17 There is 
only one certainty about prisons. Each prison manager must maintain the three 'Cs' 
of institutional practice - Custody, Care and Contro1. 18 
o 	I.L. Barak-Glantz. "Towards a Conceptual Schema of Prison Management Styles 
Prison Journal. 61, No 2, (1981): 42-58. 
A.G. Coyle, The Organisational Development of the Scottish Prison Service with  
Particular Reference to the Role and Influence of the Prison Officer, 
PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1986, 112. 
12 	W.G. Archambeault and B.J. Archambeault. Correctional Supervisory Management, 
(Englewood Cliffs. N J: Prentice-Hall, 1982) chapter 4. 
13 See, for example, E. Goffman, Asylums, (Hannondsworth: Pelican, 1976); A. Etzioni, 
A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, Revised and Enlarged Edition. (New 
York: The Free Press, 1975) chapter 1; and P.M. Blau and W.B. Scott. Formal  
Organisations, (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962) 42-45. 
14 	DiIullio, Governing Prisons, 236. 
15 	Ibid. 189. 
16 	M. Maguire, J. Vagg, and R. Morgan, (Eds) Accountability and Prisons, 
(London: Tavistock, 1985) 5. 
17 J. Vagg, R. Morgan, and M. Maguire, "Introduction: accountability and prisons- in 
Maguire et al. Accountability and Prisons, 4. 
18 	D.B. Kalinich and T. Pitcher, Surviving in Corrections, 
(Springfield, Rhinos: Thomas, 1984) 5. 
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Prison experts from the 1960s,' 9 the 1970s, 2° and the 1980s, 2 ' have recognised the 
contribution of the prison officer to effect change. Yet prison officer training 
always appears to have a low organisational priority. Irrespective—of---what 
politicians and prison administers claim, the type of training conducted by the _ 
organisation reflects the government's actual prison philosophy and operating 
practice. It can also, unfairly, be expected to overcome organisation deficiencies. 
Training, in Victorian England, as today, is a very attractive solution to 
organisational problems. It tends to be regarded as a magical process, and 
the expectations of the reformers, from the early days of the prison service, 
about the contribution which training could make have always been 
unrealistic 22 
From Chief Secretary's to Social Welfare Depaitment 1956-1960. 
With the Penal Reform Act being passed in April 1956, Whatmore had his 
legislative mandate to proceed. His reformative ideal was based on a package of 
prison, probation, and parole. Whatmore claimed this model was the harbinger of 
penal reform when he presented his blueprint in 1953. While American jurisdictions 
had implemented these concepts and had the infrastructure, Whatmore was 
• attempting to develop and establish a new penal system whose only infrastructure 
was prisons. But he was implicitly directing his energies towards alternatives to 
imprisonment. Examination of his blueprint clarifies the approach to be taken. 
1. Machinery for adequate pre-sentence investigation; 
2. An organized probation service as an alternative to institutional 
treatment; 
3. Adequate classification machinery, with a diversity of programme 
leading up to release; 
4. Adequate after-care machinery. 23 
19 	G. Hawkins, The Prison, Policy and Practice, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 
zo 	J.E. Thomas, The English Prison Officer Since 1850: A Study in Conflict, 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). 
21 DiIullio, Governing Prisons. Vinson, Wilful Obstruction, 
(North Ryde. NSW: Methuen, 1982). 
22 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 89. 
23 	Penal Report, 1953, 2. 
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Whatmore claimed these elements were interdependent. The part in need of most 
change, the prison, in retrospect would become the achilles heel of Whatmore 
-master plan.And-while-he still had to staff the probation and parole divisions, he 
-worried about the. training of prison officers. He saw the prison officer as having a 
significant role against recidivism. 
Some changes have been made, but a more comprehensive plan of staff 
training is being developed as it is recognized that the influence of trained 
officers in daily contact with prisoners can be a potent factor in the 
treatment programme. Specialists in various fields are essential, but all 
ranks, especially officers with long experience of regimentation, need a 
proper understanding of the principles and practise of modem developments 
in penology. 24 
Whatmore was confident that his proposals would effect change. 
Victoria's approach to the problem of treatment of offenders is now in line 
with the best overseas developments in the field, and development of the 
administrative machinery, recruitment, and training of personnel and other 
facilities is proceeding satisfactorily: 25 
The training prison regime was almost ready for operation. Whatmore anticipated 
that probation and parole would be used to punish low risk offenders and thus keep 
prisons free for the high risk miscreant. His first priority was to formulate a senior 
management structure to reflect the change of penal operation (see Fig. 4:1.). 
Figure 4:1 Penal Services Organisational Structure. 
Director of Penal Services 
Deputy Director 
Chief Training and Education Officer 
Chief Clerk 
Probation service 	Prison Service 	Parole Service 
11 Custodill institutions 
Source: Penal Report. 1957. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, 1956, 12. 
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The eleven institutions available to Whatmore in 1957 ranged in size from the 
quaintly described 'multi-purpose' prison at Pentridge which accommodated 1106 
prisoners, to the small local and short-term prison at Sale which held 39 prisoners. 
Victoria's prison system operated under the philosophy_ of Punishment, Deterrence, _ 
Protection of Society and Rehabilitation, and prison officer training matched that 
operation. 26 Whatmore's intention was to create a reform system based on 
vocational, as well as educational, training for the prisoners. The situation required 
someone with educational expertise to undertake this new direction. Whatmore also 
required a person who could develop and implement training programmes to meet 
the future needs of staff. This position would therefore fulfil two needs, "a Chief 
Training Officer specifically for inmates, however, he would also contribute to the 
• work of (prison officer) staff trairung. ,,27  Whatmore had realised the need for a full-
time training officer for prison officers in 1951 but, at that stage, had not been able 
to justify the expenditure. 28 
Central to Whatmore's reform plan had been his ability to utilise cell 
accommodation in the available institutions. He could not use the Reformatory 
Prisons, which were designated for those under the Indeterminate Sentence Act. He 
needed institutions that could be gazetted as Training Prisons. Langi Kal Kal 
opened in February 1951 to accommodate young offenders, under 21 years of age, 
committed to Reformatory Prison. This allowed Whatmore to close the 
Castlemaine Reformatory Prison. He also closed the Reformatory Prison at 
Beechworth in July. 29 Whatmore turned his attention to Pentridge Prison and the 
problems of classification. Whatmore refined the different classes to reflect the 
intention of his blueprint. The 'restraint' prisoner was classified as someone who 
was under 21 years. 
26 	Ibid. 1954, 2. 
27 	VPR No. 25. Report of the Inspector - General of Penal Establishments on  
Developments in Penal Science in UK. Europe. and USA together with recommendations 
Relating to Victorian Penal Administration. 19. 
28 	Penal Report. 1951.4. 
29 Ibid, 3. 
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This type would attend primary school in the morning and work on the Pentridge 
farm in the afternoon. If the prisoner progressed satisfactorily, he could be sent to 
Langi Kal Kal. The 'special' was any prisoner over the- age- of- 21—who had no 
previous prison history. This type would be incarcerated in A Division. Whatmore 
hoped to be able to send this classification to the Training Prisons - once they were 
gazetted. Whatmore's other category, the 'ordinary' prisoner, would be 
accommodated in B and C Divisions where intractable prisoners were held. He 
toyed with the idea of having an orientation period at Pentridge "for the effective 
development of a classification procedure." 3° Aware of the critics of his treatment 
agenda, he added, 
Let it be clear, that it is not desired to make gaol a pleasant place, nor 
to pamper prisoners. Correctional treatment may be regarded as re-
educational; it is certainly a process of re-adjustment in which many 
and various conflicts have to be resolved. They are unlikely to be 
resolved and might even be intensified by a purely negative programme 
of safe custody, hard labour, and the passage of time. 31 
He argued that prison industries were central to his plan for prison change. 
The primary purpose of prison industries is to provide usefill 
employment to prevent the evil of idleness. In doing this, two further 
important objectives may be achieved. These are, to cultivate habits of 
industry in prisoners and to recoup some of the high costs of gaols to 
the state 32 
Whatmore's assumptions were perhaps idealistic. .Many prisoners only attend 
labour because they have to. In most jurisdictions it is an offence for an inmate to 
refuse work. 33 Those who work, generally, do so under sufferance. Many use the 
occasion to meet other inmates from different divisions or units. Work is usually 
minimal. In the prestigious industries like the kitchen, library, or education facilities 
privileges and scope to access 'contraband' are much greater. 
3o 	Ibid, 1956, 24-25. 
31 	Ibid, 27. 
32 	Ibid, 19. 
Law Department (Tasmania' Corrective Services Division Prison Standing Orders. 
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There is also the opportunity to work with professionals instead of prison officers 
and meet members of the public. To lose one of these prison labour positions is lose 
-.prestige among prisoners. 
Raising revenue through prison industry is now recognisedas —le—sS than practical. 
Most prison industries have antiquated machinery and those who do produce, 
mainly have contracts for other government departments. In any case, unions have 
effectively determined what prisons can produce. 34 Work stops prisoners from 
being bored and causing conflict. It may also have enabled a number of prisoners to 
gain some skills, which they could use on the 'outside.' A secondary consideration 
was that the concept would be deemed successful if the enterprise was self-
sufficient, or even made a profit. In a seminal work on prison industries, 
Braithwaite noted that "most practicing prison administrators see the main 
advantage of prison work as resting in its efficacy for preventing offences from 
occurring while the offender is in prison rather than after his release." 35 However, a 
contemporary view is that the process is a valuable reintegration tool. "All industry 
positions will be linked to TAFE programs that will result in trade or vocational 
qualifications." 36 
Undaunted, Whatmore pressed ahead with his plan to re-organise the prison 
system, and by 1956 the Penal Reform Act had been passed. 37 The major impact of 
this legislation was that it abolished the Indeterminate sentence and freed up the 
former Reformatory Prisons. Whatmore could now implement his strategy. 
Training Prisons would provide vocational education to those deemed eligible by 
the classification process. Bendigo was officially opened as a Training Prison in 
May, 1955. The women's prison at Fairlea had been opened in June 1956, which 
gave Whatmore extra accommodation in Pentridge. 
34 	J. Braithwaite Prisons Education and Work. 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1980) 139. 
35 	Ibid, 31. 
36 	Group 4 Securitas The Port Phillip Prison Prisoner Information Booklet (1998) 5 
37 	P. Lynn and G. Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge:  
A History of Prisons in Victoria, (Melbourne: State Library of Victoria, 1996) 144 
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By 1957 Whatmore had accommodation for 1,800 male prisoners. He had space at 
three adult training prisons for 280, and Langi Kal Kal Training Centre offered 
another 64 places. Whatmore believed that vocational training was central to 
  prisoner reform. 38 However, as 13raithwaite pointed out in 1980,__there are many_ 
variables to consider when trying to gauge the effectiveness of such a concept. He 
argues that demonstrating that there are a number of reasons why vocational 
training programmes should work "is a far cry from demonstrating that they 
actually do reduce recidivism."39 It may be that those who are selected on 
vocational programmes may be less seriously committed to a continuation of crime 
upon release. Another is that the vocational course offered may not reflect 
societies' labour demand. 4° More importantly, the prisoner is usually allocated to a 
particular industry on the basis of his security classification rather than on any 
expertise he may be able to apply. 41 
For example, a study in two American institutions investigated the effect of 
vocational training in office machine repair, mechanics, carpentry, body repairs, 
hairdressing, shoe repairs, and machinist work. A follow up study three years later 
"showed no significant effect on recidivism in a comparison with untrained 
controls." 42 However, it was reported that when a trainee succeeded in finding a 
job related to his area of training, his chances of becoming a successful parolee 
were improved. Braithwaite concluded "It is possible, then, that vocational 
programs fail because the skills acquired cannot be applied in the employment 
market." 43 
38 	'bid, 138. 
39 	J. Braithwaite, Prisons Education and Work, 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 1980) 28. 
40 	Ibid, 34. 
41 	Ibid, 143. 
42 	W.G. Gearhart. H.C. Keith and G. Clemmons. "An Analysis of the Vocational Training 
Program in the Washington State Adult Correctional Institutions" 
(Department of Institutions, State of Washington. Research Review No 23, 1967, 
quoted in Braithwaite, Prisons Education and Work, 34. 
43 	Braithwaite, Prisons Education and Work. 34. 
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As Braithwaite points out, vocational programmes are invariably weak, and have 
little chance of achieving the intended objective of imparting skills that prisoners 
can utilise on release. Perhaps this-is-a- result-of-prisoners being given "vocational 
_ training in skills which are no longer used in the outside labour market ."44 On the _ 
other hand, Murton argues that vocational training, prison industries, and education 
have not addressed the two central problems of the prisoner, "he needs to change 
his attitude and to learn how to survive in the free society." 45  Braithwaite, however, 
notes, 
No matter how well conceived and empirically grounded a 
vocational program is, it attempts to change the habits of a lifetime with a 
strategy which impinges on the life space of the prisoner for part of the day 
over a period of months. Planned interventions are minuscule forces 
compared with the pervasive forces at work in the wider social structure. 46 
On an ominous note, while some prisoners looked forward to a change in operating 
practices, there were still some that the system could not control or change. The 
building at Pentridge of a security block known as H Division was expected to be 
completed in 1958 and would "enable proper housing and control of intractable 
types." 47 Whatmore's legislative programme was progressing, - 'the Penal Reform 
Act had been incorporated in the Crimes Act.  48 The staffing of Training Prisons 
with their vocation and education emphases required more than the usual type of 
custodial officer. Other systems, however, had tried change and found it daunting. 
The English prison system that Whatmore had recently visited was in turmoil. 
Thomas notes, "It was in the person and role of the officer that the confusion of 
tasks reached its most visible, as well as its most disastrous, expression." 49 
44 	Ibid, 54. 
45 	T.O. Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1976) 58. 
46 	Braithwaite, Prisons Education and Work, 53. 
47 	Penal Report. 1957, 15. 
48 	Ibid, 1958, 3. 
49 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 206-208. 
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While claiming efforts at prison reform were undermining their task, prison officers 
demanded to be involved in the reform process. In 1957 prison officers were 
involved• in group psychotherapy. The practice involved allocating a group of 
prisoners to a particular officer who would then be involved in_counselling. Neither 
prison officers nor prisoners deemed the trial period successful. The process failed 
partly because of the officers' natural reluctance to be more than cursorily involved 
with the prisoners; and partly because of the prisoners perceiving the officers as 
agents of the state and the legal system, which had sentenced them. It was to be the 
closest officers ever became involved as rehabilitative agents. 5° Thomas concluded 
the plan failed because several key issues had not been addressed. 
First, that the number of institutions that made any pretence at wishing 
to develop the officer's role in this way, was very small. Second, that 
there was by no means universal involvement of all the staff in these 
few institutions; and third, that the quality of the reformative work carried 
out ... was not high. 51 
In trying to change the system, Whatmore perhaps did not take account of the 
dynamics in introducing change to an environment, which had maintained stable for 
nearly a century. Both prison officers and prisoners treat change in prisons with 
suspicion. Prison officers feel any change in operating practice is asign of weakness 
on the side of the hierarchy. For example, the introduction of female welfare 
officers into Pentridge was treated with scepticism and derision. 52 Officers 
maintained that the `crims' would soon 'con' these people and their introduction 
would lead to security concerns. Moreover, the officers believed that the welfare 
officers would take the prisoner's side and sympathetically view their grievances 
against staff. 53 
50 	Ibid, 206. 
51 	Ibid. 
52 	Interview with Chief Prison Officer Sandra Moore. Melbourne Remand Centre, 1 March 
1996. She was one of the first female officers to work in the Pentridge Prison complex. 
53 	The author who, after nine year's service as a prison officer in Tasmania, became the 
sole welfare for the Tasmanian system has proved this view. Within weeks, after coming 
out of uniform, prisoners forgot that I had been a prison officer and started 
complaining about uniformed staff. 
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Prisoners, on the other hand, took any changes that were aimed to assist them as a 
sign of weakness on the management's part. The 'carrot and stick' approach that 
dominated early prison practice had been eroded by the farce of the privilege—
policy. It has long been argued that prisoners have something to aim for whether it 
be better visiting rights, extended letter writing privileges, access to personal 
belongings, or even more articles allowed into the cell accommodation, and so on. 
The authorities, therefore, had a 'carrot' to offer and a 'stick' to take back, if the 
prisoner defied authority. However, the privilege did not take long to become 
enshrined as a right. The classic example is prisoner remission. As Thomas notes, 
In June [1937] the Home Secretary announced that it was better to give an 
inmate privileges at once, with the threat of losing them, rather than to 
offer 'the rather indefinite hope of getting something later on if he behaves 
well.' Remission is an example. Originally a prisoner had to earn it; now it is 
automatic and he can lose it for misbehaviour. In fact it is much more 
difficult to remove a privilege once given, than to award it as a culmination 
of good behaviour. Privileges that are given almost at once, cease to be 
privileges. They become accepted as rights, and their value as stimuli to 
good behaviour and hard work is lost. )4 
With the proclamation of the Penal Reform Act 1956 and the abolition of the 
indeterminate sentence, Whatmore now had four training prisons ,available to him at 
Beechworth, Bendigo, Geelong, and Langi Kal Kal. He detailed the training prisons 
philosophy, 
1 	Loss of liberty is itself a punishment. 
2 	The period of incarceration should be used for a positive 
treatment programme calculated to ensure that the prisoner 
leaves prison better equipped to face the problems of life in the 
community. 
3 	The treatment programme should be integrated with an adequate 
after care service." 
While Whatmore may have been sincere in his desire to assist the prisoner through 
a training regime, the approach had no scientific basis. 
54 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 205. 
55 	Penal Report, 1957, 6. 
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Hawkins claims there is a tendency by prison administrators to label everything that 
happens to prisoners after reception as 'treatment.' He argues this solution is 
rendered-the-more plausible because the term "treatment" is ambiguous 
and can be legitimately be used to refer to anything the prisoner 
undergoes at the hands of the prison authorities:-It-is,-of course, utterly 
unsurprising that in regard to results or "cures" no significant relationship 
between prison "treatment" programs and behavior after release from prison 
has been found. But to suggest, as reformers do, that those programs have 
failed because of the failure to invest sufficient resources in this enterprise is 
like saying that necromancy might solve all of our problems if only its 
practitioners were adequately funded.' 6 
Murton summarises the four phase dogma of penology as "the criminal is a deviant, 
he needs to be incarcerated, because he will return to society one day, he needs 
rehabilitation, and, the people to do this ... are those on the prison staff." 57 
Following from this dogma criminologists have reacted with models "to explain the 
deviancy, facilities to incarcerate the deviants, methods of rehabilitating them based 
on the deviancy models, and employment of treatment staffs to carry out the 
rehabilitation programs." 58 
Murton noted that the prevailing school of thought during the fifties was based on 
the notion that criminals are such because they lack education and training. This 
gave rise to the educational-training model?' the very model Whatmore was basing 
his whole strategy on. The major difficulty facing Whatmore at this stage was the 
staff's attitude towards changing prison practice. He was forced to address their 
concerns. 
Despite published statements to the contrary, I have no hesitation in 
saying that penal officers are intensively loyal and are accepting and 
understanding of the changing philosophies of our treatment 
programme. Many are displaying eagerness to study and develop 
progressive techniques in their work and in general the standard of penal 
officers in this State compares favourably with any I have seen. ° 
56 	Hawkins, The Prison, 20. 
57 	Murton, The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 54. 
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Whatmore faced the fact that the Government was to be less than forthcoming in 
providing finance to iriiplemenf his concept for prisons. 
The priority given to works in this branch is apparently very low as even 
with the maximum urgency it is usual for two years to elapse between the 
--- requests for-and the commencement of works." 
Government apathy was not unexpected. Akeroyd had faced similar difficulties for 
a number of years and Whatmore was naive to think that things had changed. As 
Hawkins points out, "politically, there has been no great incentive to invest 
resources of men, money, and materials in correctional reform." 62 Whatmore's 
vision for a treatment-oriented regime in the training prisons depended largely on 
the skills and capacities of his prison officer staff. 63 While he may have had some 
reservations about the calibre of staff he inherited in 1948, he had directed their 
selection, training and progress in the interim. 
Victoria's prison officer training 1950-1959. 
Following the implementation of the Social Welfare Act 1960 the Department had 
• established a separate Training Division under the authority of section 19 of the 
Act. 64 This was a major change in prison officer training policy. Prior to training 
being enshrined in legislation, previous practice had been arbitrary. Although 
deemed sufficient to meet the organisation's needs, training had been viewed as a 
necessary concomitant. Training at the beginning of the previous decade was simply 
based on prison practice, rules and regulations, the control of situations, and a 
cursory course on firearms use. 
61 	'bid, 1959, 6. 
62 	Hawkins, The Prison, 18. 
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Whatmore realised that the role of training had to change if he intended changing 
current operational practice, but he underestimated his staff's perceptions. - 
The arrival of a conventional reformer poses no real threat-to-the-guard_ 
force once it is clearly understood that he does not intend to change the 
prison staff structure. -Staff can quite easily adapt to a new mode of 
performance once terms are defined and purposes made explicit. 
Basically, all that is involved is the acquisition of a new jargon and possibly 
other outward changes such as physical improvement of the facility or the 
creation of highly visible, but ineffective, programs. There may be some 
grumbling and dissatisfaction over the inconvenience of moving inmates 
around for a variety of "programs," but as long as control is maintained the 
guard force does not see this change as a personal threat to its safety or 
potency.° 
In his Report for 1951 Whatmore commented, 
The penal officer is no longer merely an armed guard but is required to 
know more about human behaviour and to exercise, at close range, a 
personal influence on the reformative programme. Staff training is, 
therefore, being intensified and the Government's approval of four full-
time scholarships for penal officers ... is encouraging. 66 
By trying to upgrade the training of his staff, Whatmore was not only relying on 
their capacity to understand his direction but to have the intellectual or educational 
capability to undertake more than basic or rudimentary training. 
In Victoria, the basic minimum qualification for a warder is grade 6 
Arithmetic and Grade 8 English, and to become permanent he has to 
serve satisfactorily one year's probation and pass an examination in Rules 
and Regulations. Eligibility for promotion depends on passing examinations 
in (1) Acts and Regs and (2) The Principles and Practice of Prison 
Management. Each subject is treated in a very elementary fashion and 
requires only a little application to lectures and notes and about Grade 8 
level of education. With the exception of the Superintendent of Langi Kal 
Kal who is a University graduate, not one field officer in the Victorian Penal 
Department is matriculated. 67 
64 	Social Welfare Report, 1962. 65. 
65 	Murton, The Dilemma of Penal Reform,  86. 
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Three decades later the situation was similar - less than 4 per cent of Australian 
prison: officers had tertiary qualifications and a significant number had little formal 
 skills. 6-8—In-an effort to accelerate change, Whatmore considered the potentially 
hazardous industrial decision to latterly recruit. Whatmore envisaged trialing .the 
position of Deputy Superintendent at Langi Kal Kal which was equivalent to Chief 
Warder - the rank which mainly governed minor or small scale prisons. 69 By 1954 
Whatmore appointed Eric Shade - a future Director of Prisons as the Chief 
Education and Training Officer. 
The Chief Education Officer has already implemented important changes in 
staff training for recruits, and further comprehensive changes are in course 
of preparation for promotion exams. A proper appreciation of the principles 
and practice of modern penology among all officers is imperative in the 
effective implementation of a good treatment programme, It is pleasing to 
regard that, even among officers at first sceptical of innovations there has 
been a desire to understand and to co-operate. In their daily contact with 
prisoners, officers can exercise a profound influence over them. 79 
The McLean Report of 1955, noted complaints about staffing shortages and the 
administration's reluctance to pay overtime. 7I This meant that no training would 
take place. By the end of that year the situation had not improved. The Annual 
Report noted a net gain of 15 officers. Training, however, was revamped. The 
duration of the courses was increased from two to four weeks. The training 
syllabus was expanded and now included "gaol rules and regulations, general 
education, firearms use, first aid, elementary penology, court procedures, and 'on-
the-job' instruction and practical experience." 72 Whatmore made two senior 
appointments. He promoted Eric Shade to the position of Deputy Inspector-
General. 
68 	J. Braithwaite and M. Cass, "Note on the demographic composition of Australian police 
forces and prison services- ANZ J CRIM, 12.(1979):132-138. 
69 	This idea was rejected and did not come to fruition until 1992 when the Department of 
Justice, Corrective Services Division, put 'civilians' in operational managers positions. 
70 	Penal Report, 1954, 5. 
71 	Report of the Board of Inquiry appointed to inquire into and report upon the escape  
of five prisoners from H.M. Gaol Pentridge, on Saturday_27th day of August, 1955, 
VPR 1955, No. 7. (McLean Report). 
72 	Penal Report, 1955, 3. 
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George Smale - another educationist, following in the footsteps of both Whatmore 
and Shade, who had come from the Education department, filled shade's position 
of Chief Training Officer. 73 Whatmore's persistent lobbying of the Public Service 
Board was rewarded with approval _ for extensive changes in staff training and 
promotional examinations taking effect in 1957. Penology was now included at all 
levels in training. Recruits would undertake Penology 1, promotion to Senior Penal 
Officer would include Penology 2, and promotion to Chief Penal Officer depended 
on the participant successfully completing Penology 3. There would also be training 
in institutional management and prison accounting. Whatmore commented, 
The days of the purely custodial officer are vanishing and wider training is 
designed to fit penal officers to make a fuller contribution to the 
rehabilitative programme of all institutions. 74 
Prison officer training was at last being approached in a professional manner. The 
Public Service Board abrogated the arbitrary manner in which permanency to 
prison officer positions had been conducted. Amendments had been made to the 
regulations dealing with permanent appointment of penal officers. The Public 
Service Board ruled that from the 25th January, 1957, no officer could be 
permanently appointed until after successful examination in the following, "English 
Expression, Arithmetic, Rules and Regulations, Penology Part 1, Characteristics 
and Use of Firearms." Moreover, the Board also gazetted new regulations to cover 
promotions. To become a Senior Penal Officer, the applicant had to successfully 
complete "Institutional Book-keeping and Store keeping, Penology Part 2, and the 
Acts associated with Penal Establishments." Applicants for Chief Penal Officers' 
positions had to complete "Institutional Management and Penology Part 3." 75 By 
the end of the decade, prison officer and promotional training had developed from a 
cursory pragmatic model to a systemised career-orientated programme. 
73 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge: 
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 139. 
74 	Penal Report, 1956, 4. 
75 	Ibid, 1957, 8. 
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Whatmore had realised the need for change in both policy and training to 
implement the anticipated changes. Others may not have been as prescient. As 
Dunphy has commented, 
Failure to anticipate change, refusal to recognise the need for change, a 
delayed reaction to it, can result in organisational and personal disasters 
through the loss of contro1. 76 
A burgeoning prison population.  
Whatmore's major concern was there might be an increase in imprisonment rates. 
He argued in his 1957 Report for new accommodation. He noted there had been an 
increase of just under 15 per cent on the previous year's DAP, rising from 1385 in 
1956 to 1583 in 1957. 77 Numbers in 1958 were down on previous rates but 
Whatmore put this down to the use of probation, and parole as part of the 
sentence. 78 He argued for new accommodation to alleviate congestion at Pentridge 
and to close the obsolete 'C' Division (Fig. 4:2 details prisons by type and 
accommodation in 1957). 
• Pentridge accommodation had decreased by 92 places. Whatmore argued that "two 
medium security prisons for 100 each will need to be planned if and when funds are 
available" 79 However, he was desperate for more bed space. 
the whole structure of our prison service is dominated in terms of 
numbers by the multi-purpose prison at Pentridge. Although wrongly 
conceived according to modern standards Pentridge has many good 
features but the total elimination of the archaic and obsolete C Division is 
essential. This cannot be done until alternative accommodation is 
provided." 
76 	D.C. Dunphy, Organisational change by choice.  (Sydney: McGraw-Hill, 1981) xii. 
77 	Penal Report. 1957, 8. 
78 Ibid, 1958, 3. 
79 Ibid, 1957, 6. 
80 Ibid, 7. 
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Figure 4:2: Victoria's Prisons by Type and Accommodation 1957. 
Location Purpose Max. Accom. DAP 
_Ballarat_ _ Local / Short Term 	_ 70 54 
Beechworth Training 75 65 
Bendigo Training 85 79 
Castlemaine Semi-Hospital 107 97 
Corriemungle Open Farm 49 39 
Geelong Training 120 119 
Langi Kat Kai Training Centre 64 51 
McLeod Open Farm 89 80 
Pentridge Multi-Purpose 1106 934 
Sale Local/Short-term 39 19 
Total Male 1800 1537 
Fairlea Female Prison 100 46 
Grand Total 1900 1583 
Source: Penal Report, 1957. 
Whatmore's criticism of Pentridge was justified. Its design belonged to a different 
era and prisoner management policy. Pentridge had been mainly built when the 
'separate' system was in operation. It was never designed to allow prisoners 
relative freedom. As Thomas points out, "The most significant Problem in modern 
prison administration has arisen because prisons which were designed to ensure 
separation are now called upon to allow association." 8I The problem, however, was 
not confined to Victoria. 
There are twenty - five prisons in the United States over a hundred years 
old. Sixty - one prisons opened before 1900 are still in use. Inside these 
fortress structures only a small fraction of those confined are exposed to 
any kind of correctional service other than restraint. 82 
Whatmore was realistic enough to note that Pentridge "has many good features and 
on economic grounds alone it will continue for many years as our main prison" 83 
(see Fig. 4:3 for Penal Service and Pentridge structure). 
81 	Thomas and Stewart, Imprisonment in Western Australia, 63. 
82 	N. Morris and G. Hawkins. The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control, 
(Chicago: UM. of Chicago Press, 1970) 111. 
83 	Penal Report, 1958, 6. 
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Figure 4:3 Penal and Gaol Branch - 1950-1956. 
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However, Whatmore's treatment programmes were questionable. A 1954 review 
concluded "most tre&menf programs are based on hope and perhaps informed 
speculation rather than—on—_verified—information."" Cressey noted that prison 
administrators tended to be "labelling as 'correctional' almost anything convicted 
criminals are expected to do [so that] whatever is done with prisoners to keep then 
occupied and/or productive and quiet is likely to be called a correctional 
measure. „85  By 1959 an unsympathetic public still doubted the wisdom of 
Whatmore's reform. 
there is still a very great need for a better community realization of the 
purposes and efficacy of our penal services. So many theories 
concerning crime and the treatment of offenders have been deeply 
ingrained into our social structure that they are accepted as infallible 
when in truth there may well be ample evidence that the accepted 
remedies are as effective as the bloodletting of the medical practitioners of 
a century or two ago.” 
Whatmore failed to appreciate the innate indifference that the general public and 
most officialdom have towards prisons, prisoners and any concept of reformation. 
Most would gladly forget that prisons and prisoners exist. When a particularly 
heinous crime has been committed there are the usual vociferous calls for the 
reintroduction of capital punishment. Indeed, sometimes public concern is reiterated 
by its elected officialdom. 
The Minister for Social Welfare, when criticised some years ago 
for letting his prisons run down so badly, retorted that even if 
he had a few extra million dollars this would be spent on "social 
welfare" projects and not a cent would be available for prisons. 
Such must inevitably be the order of priorities in a department 
concerned essentially with social welfare and having prison 
administration artificially engrafted upon it." 
84 	B.C. Kirby, "Measuring Effects of Treatment of Criminals and Delinquents," 
Sociology and Social Research 38 (1954): 368-374, 374. 
85 	D.R. Cressey. "The nature and Effectiveness of Correctional Techniques" 
Law and Contemporary Problems,  23(1958): 754-771. 763. 
86 	Penal Report, 1959, 2. 
87 	Rinaldi, Australian Prisons, 2-3. 
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Newman has noted that there seems to have been an historical shift in the major 
emphasis of corrections "that is reflected today in the kinds of institutions, 
programs, and conditions most commonly found in correctional services or desired 
as future correctional interventions."" These have been identified as the four 'Rs': 
Restraint, Reform, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration. 89  Prison officer training 
usually reflects the philosophical mode in each institution's operation. Each mode 
became dominant at different times in the past. None has disappeared entirely. All 
of these emphases are identifiable in prisons, 
But discrepancies between the objectives exist and probably will persist. 
Strong emphasis on restraint may prevent or cripple serious reintegrative 
efforts. Yet restraint, the "incapacitation" of offenders as a legitimate 
purpose for sentence, will undoubtedly continue to be operative in the 
future. Strong reform motives, prompting use of punitive techniques to 
condition offenders into "good work habits" and other patterns of 
conforming behaviour, may exist simultaneously with rehabilitative goals in 
sentences to probation as well as prison. 90 
Whatmore's impetus for penal reform was slowed by the Government's decision to 
create a new Department of Social Welfare. He was invited to become the 
foundation Director-General. The rationale behind Whatmore's appointment was 
quite bizarre. 
Victoria has a completely absurd structure in that its prisons 
are administered by the department whose primary concern is 
caring for deserted wives and orphans, the Department of Social 
Welfare. This peculiar structure originated in 1960 solely as a 
political accident, a guarantee to the then director of penal 
establishments that he would be elevated to the top position in the 
new Department of Social Welfare provided he continued also to 
administer the prison system. 91 
The formation of the Social Welfare Department heralded the end of an era in penal 
change (see Fig. 4:4 for the 1960 Penal Branch structure). 
88 	D. J. Newman, Introduction to Criminal Justice. 2nd Ed, 
(New York: Lippincott, 1978) 308. 
89 	V. O'Leary and D. Du.ffee, "Correctional Policy: A Classification of Goals Designed for 
Change" Crime and Delin., 17 4 (1971): 379. 
90 	Newman, Introduction to Criminal Justice. 309. 
91 	Rinaldi, Australian Prisons. 2. 
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Whatmore had tried to change a prison service that had remained in a state of 
inertia Since the beginning of the twentieth century. But what had he accomplished 
after-12 years?—The-prison system he inherited in 1948 still remained largely intact. 
There was no significant increase in the number of custodial staff to assist the 
philosophical change in prisoner management practice. The explosion in 
professional staff to assist in prisoner reformation was still in the future. Prisoner 
numbers were rising and, apart from a small downturn after probation and parole 
became sentencing options, would continue to dominate prison operation through 
to the crisis in 1983. 
The Victorian Government was reluctant to commit more funding than what was 
legislatively required, and only occasionally were cursory funds made available. 
Prison officers were wary of new practices, and grudgingly acquiesced to new 
training programmes. Whatmore, however, had changed archaic penal legislation 
and had given the courts some alternatives to imprisonment. He had abolished the 
draconian indeterminate sentences and closed the so-called . Reformatory Prisons. 
Whatmore's view that education was the foundation for a change in prison attitudes 
- in both staff and prisoners - was perhaps coloured by his vocational background. 
Whatmore's prison policy was shaped in the first instance by a mixture of ideas and 
practices he observed on his sojourn overseas 10 years earlier. There was a dearth 
of formalised penal knowledge and the exchange of penal ideas between the various 
Australian States and Territories had yet to be initiated by Whatmore. 92 
Whatmore's schedule and increasing workload would have permitted only cursory 
study of non-related penal matters including formalised policy analysis. 93 Whatmore 
was acknowledged as both an excellent educator and proactive prison 
administrator. And he was erudite - as reference to his overseas report indicates. 
92 	First Australian Conference of Prison Administrators Notes and Resolutions,  Melbourne. 
June 6-10, 1960. 
93 	Formally recognised in 1951 by: D. Lerner and H.D. Lasswell, (Eds), 
The Policy Sciences, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951). 
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From Social Welfare Depattment to Community Welfare Services. 
With the advent of the following simple statement in the Department's first report 
-the-Victorian-prison- system-was subsumed into a mega department whose primary_ _ 
function was social policy. 
The Social Welfare Act has brought the functions of the Children's Welfare 
Department and the Penal Department under the control of the 
Director-General of Social Welfare and six divisions will be established. 
They are:- 1. Family Welfare, 2. Youth Welfare, 3. Prisons, 4. Research and 
Statistics, 5. Training [and] 6. Probation and Parole. 
The Social Welfare Act 1960 becomes operative on 11th July, 1960 94 
The autonomy enjoyed as part of the Chief Secretary's Department had gone and 
the prison system became a number in the game of playing budgetary politics along 
with its adoptive siblings in the Social Welfare Department. The prison system, 
arguably, became a junior partner. 
The prison profile was largely negative while the other Divisions commenced from 
a sympathetic and positive position. The prison system faced more than two 
decades of turbulence and overcrowding, and was to wait 24 years before it 
achieved the autonomy of a Ministry in its own right. An examination of the Social 
Welfare Department years, particularly in the areas of prison officer training and 
prison policy development, will outline the difficulties faced by a prison system that 
had gone from Government prominence to departmental oblivion with a stroke of 
the pen. Whatmore's penal deputy, Eric Shade, became Director of the Prisons 
Division. The Chief Education and Training officer, George Smale, headed the new 
Training Division. 
94 
	
Social Welfare Department, Victoria, First Annual Report. 20th September, 1960. 
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It appeared that Whatmore had carefully maintained his penal infrastructure. And it 
would seem that his penal policy could now receive greater ministerial attention. 
The major difficulty, of course, was that Whatmore headed six diverse Divisions — 
. and literally had, to abrogate responsibility to his Divisional Heads. Whatmore's 
penal blueprint for prison officer training foundered simply because Training 
Division become eclectic. Upgrading prison officer training continued. Shade and 
Smale, however, had other agendas and other pressures. 
Smale had to set up a Training Division. Shade had to deal with the myriad 
problems of running a Prisons Division - a task in which he had little experience. 
Moreover, Shade had to liaise with Smale on training issues. Both men were now 
equal whereas Smale had previously been subordinate to Shade. Both Divisions had 
to compete for funds on an equal basis. Smale's allocation for training had to 
service the other five Divisions of the department. Shade desperately required funds 
for staffing and capital works. The 'Social Welfare' years would shape prison 
direction and philosophy until the beginning of the 1990s. In that period prisons 
would achieve Department status, and just as quickly be subsumed into another 
Department. 
Prison policy 1960 - 1979. 
The Prisons Division's primary concern was neither policy nor training. More 
people were being imprisoned. The Director of Prisons, Eric Shade gave out the 
following figures. 
Number of prisoners Date 
1571 31-12-59 
1727 30-06-60 
1875 30-06-61 
1968 20-04-61* 
Highest DAP 
Source: Social Welfare Report. 1961, 8. 
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To accommodate this increase the former hospital at Pentridge converted to a 
dormitory giving 120 beds. A second dormitory opened at Langi Kal Kal Prison 
with 64 beds, -80-beds came with the opening of Morwell River Camp, and McLeod 
Prison Farm opened up another 40 places. 95 Bed_space was still insufficient (see 
Fig. 4:5). 
Despite these additions to accommodation, a serious overcrowding problem 
remains, and to provide the future increases it is essential that a medium 
security prison to accommodate 250 prisoners must be built relatively close 
to Melbourne as soon as possible. 96 
Shade was expected to implement a dubious treatment policy. Apart from 
addressing the problems of overcrowding, 
The administrator of the maximum security prison, then, finds himself 
confronted with a set of social expectations which pose numerous 
dilemmas when an attempt is made to translate them into a concrete 
rational policy. Somehow he must resolve the claims that the prison 
should exact vengeance, erect a specter to terrify the actual or 
potential deviant, change in the personality of his captives so that they 
gladly follow the dictates of the law - and in addition maintain order 
within his society of prisoners and see that they are employed at useful 
labor. If the policy of the prison sometimes seems to exhibit a certain 
inconsistency, we might do well to look at the inconsistency of the 
philosophical setting in which the prison rests. 97 
Shade also alluded to the fact that 
Penology is particularly a field of infinitely diverse opinions, 
strangely held. Historically, it is one of social fields in which 
individual or minority opinion tenaciously held and persistently 
advocated has influenced the wider public and political opinion to 
effect reform. In recent years, overdue and necessary changes in prison 
policy and practice in this State have thus evolved . 98 
The Director of Training's position had similar difficulties. He had "to instruct the 
staff in human relations with a view to maintaining correct attitudes between 
officers and also between officers and prisoners." 
95 	Social Welfare Report, 1960, 929. 
96 	Ibid. 
97 	G.M. Sykes, The Society of Captives, (Princeton, N.J.: Random House, 1956) 17-18. 
98 	Social Welfare Report, 1962, 38. 
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Moreover, he would "instruct in correct procedures in accordance with the law and 
to stimulate thought so that current procedures are in line with modern methods." 99 
Figure 4:5 Victoria's Prisons and Accommodation, 1962 and 1963. 
Prison Cells DAP Cells DAP Held 
1962 1963 
Ballarat 74 61 73 61 68 
Beechworth 125 115 125 112 107 
Bendigo 120 113 120 114 110 
Castlemaine 115 106 115 91 89 
Corriemungle 60 51 60 55 55 
Geelong 130 113 130 117 130 
Langi Kal Kal 128 106 128 102 108 
McLeod 102 98 102 98 102 
Morwell River 80 45 80 70 73 
Pentridge 1274 1127 1210 1104 1132 
Sale 38 27 38 27 32 
Fairlea Women 100 30 100 38 38 
Total Prisoners 2346 1992 2281 1989 2044 
Source: Social Welfare Reports, 1962-63. 
George Smale began developing mechanisms whereby a largely uneducated prison 
staff was encouraged to help inmates with their problems. In the early 1960s the 
ancient dichotomy between keeper and kept was very strict. Neither side 
encouraged the other to interact and there was severe retribution for those who 
cared to attempt to bridge the gap. 
This staff training should bring about a two-fold result. The long-range plan 
should tend towards training officers to assist prisoners in solving their own 
problems. The most immediate effect of correct attitudes and procedures 
would be well-organized institutions free of incidents usually associated 
with penal establishments. 101 
99 	Ibid, 8. 
100 	The author was a prison officer in the Tasmanian Prison Service for 9 years and can 
verify that to interact with prisoners even in the mid-1970s brought severe admonition 
from senior staff. 
101 	Social Welfare Report, 1961, 11. 
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Smale's premise was based on several assumptions: the first, that prison officers 
would want to assist the prisoner; second, that the prisoner would wish the officer 
to be part of his 'rehabilitation', third, and most salient, that-the—standard of 
currently _serving officer had the intellectual_ capacity, the educational standard, or 
even the motivation to undertake training to assist prisoners. 102 One clear fact 
emerged, however, that future prison management, direction and practice could be 
read into the prison section of the Annual Report. The prison policy was enshrined 
in the Social Welfare Act, 1960.  As Shade noted, 
The purposes and functions of a prison system are many and 
varied. They are simply but effectively stated (thus) 
(a) To control and supervise all persons imprisoned or detained in 
any gaol; and 
(b) To assist in the rehabilitation into the community of all persons 
released or discharged from any gaol.' °3 
Shade argued that unless there was a dramatic increase in the number of prison 
beds available the whole prison structure would collapse. The increasing prison 
population soon dissipated the reformative practices initiated by Whatmore. 
Alternatives to imprisonment - probation and parole - were not the answer. Shade 
had to use the dilapidated facilities in C Division which still carried 200 beds. E 
Division hospital had been remodelled to give accommodation for another 120 
prisoners. Plans were afoot to construct a dormitory block at D Division to house 
80 prisoners.'" Shade gained another 80 beds at the Morwell River Prison, and 
proposed remodelling the Sale Prison to give him another 35 beds. He planned to 
establish a second reforestation prison in South Gippsland. 1°5 By the following year 
prison overcrowding was still creating problems. Whatmore's grand vision for 
prisoner reformation had been lost in the morass of Social Welfare. 
102 	Smale's intentions were to be realised two decades later in both the Dutch and Swedish 
Prison systems. 
103 	Social Welfare Report, 962, 35. 
104 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge:  
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 150. 
105 	Social Welfare Report, 1962, 38-40. 
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What seems ironic is that Whatmore knew about prisoner overcrowding from his 
days in charge yet did not seem to act on Shade's behalf Although it has been 
— -claimed-that the Social Welfare days were the best years for prison operation the 
evidence does not support that conclusion. ' °6 The emphasis on providing prison _ _   
accommodation relegated reform to the 'pending' basket, and reinstated the former 
prison officer - prisoner practice. With the shadow of overcrowding dictating his 
short and long-term goals, Shade produced his idealistic blueprint for future prison 
direction. 
The justification and purpose of imprisonment is ultimately to protect 
society against crime. Therefore, any period of imprisonment must be 
used to ensure, as far as possible, that the offender deprived of liberty 
is returned to society with the will and the ability to lead a law-abiding 
and socially useful life. Imprisonment in itself is afflictive by removing 
from the prisoner all or most of his right of self-determination. 
Consequently, no prison system, except under special conditions 
incidental to justifiable segregation or discipline maintenance, should 
aggravate the inherent suffering imposed by deprivation of liberty. It is 
upon these principles that the structure and administration of Victoria's 
prison system is based. It is towards these implied goals that policy is 
directed. 1°7 
The numbers being sent to prison increased. Prison accommodation was stretched. 
The Pentridge prison chapel was utilised on a permanent basis to house 50 
prisoners. There was no apparent short-term resolution. 
Unless there is a marked decrease in the crime rate-and there are no 
apparent reasons for such optimism-or significant changes are made in 
the methods of dealing with offenders, or a very large-scale building 
programme is implemented in the immediate future, it is obvious that 
the State is facing a prison crisis. Each year we are losing ground in 
the race to provide sufficient accommodation for the increasing prison 
population.'" 
Paradoxically, the worst thing that could have happened at this stage was a fall in 
prison numbers. Shade's pleas for additional accommodation or finance to improve 
and expand facilities were based on existing prison numbers. 
106 	Interview with former Governor, Jim Armstrong, 14 August 1995. 
107 	Social Welfare Report, 1963, 37. 
108 	Ibid, 1964, 34. 
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The government, however, would be reluctant to provide finance or react to a 
falling imprisonment trend. But prison numbers would drop in 1965 to a DAP of 
1880. Shade, however, had other strategies to artificially reduce prison numbers. 
He utilised the provisions in the Social Welfare Act. This allowed Special Leave for 
prisoners to have short-term release to be involved in "community services and 
sporting and social activities." 109 
In recent years, Victoria has made substantial progress in establishing 
and improving_ the bridge between prison life and the community. This 
has been done by bringing the community into the prison and by 
allowing the prisoner, as far as is practicable, to participate in 
community activities. Such policy aims at smaking the community more 
understanding and conscious of its social obligations in relation to the 
wrong-doer, and simultaneously aims to make the wrong-doer more 
conscious of his obligations to the community. The degree to which 
these dual aims are achieved will largely determine the success of prisons as 
an instrument for the protection of public welfare."' 
Overcrowding had produced some creative manipulation of the Crimes Act 1958. 
There had been significant lobbying to amend the Act to allow both the fixing of 
minimum terms and for the administrative discretion of 'good conduct' remissions. 
The reduction in imprisonment rates also produced, in retrospect, a classic example 
of short-term planning. The ancient Ballarat Gaol was closed. However, the 
intended new prison at Ararat was not scheduled to open until late 1967. Ballarat 
had accommodation for 74 prisoners. Moreover, the pride of Whatmore's vision 
for young offenders, Langi Kal Kal, was given to the Youth Welfare Division of the 
Social Welfare Department with the loss of 128 beds. In a matter of a month over 
200 bed places were lost to a system which was just about to have another 
imprisonment explosion. The purchase of a homestead at Murchison - the quaintly 
named Dhurringile Rehabilitation Centre would eventually have places for 60 beds 
by 1967. 111 The level of imprisonment in Victoria in 1967 reached an all time high. 
The system's DAP was just under 2400. Shade noted, 
109 Ibid. 
lio Ibid. 
'bid, 1965, 21. 
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The dominant and most alarming feature of the past year has been the 
sudden and continuing increase in the number of prisoners held in the 
State's prisons. If this trend continues-and current indications are that it 
will- prison resources of buildings-staff-and facilities, strained to cope even - 
with present numbers, will be dangerously inadequate to meet the State's 
— - needs. 112 
He called for the immediate building of both a youth prison and a short-sentence 
institution to solve "the State's most pressing prison problems [and] each prison 
should be geared to meet its specific purpose." 113 In an implicit reproach to his 
superior, Whatmore, Shade decried the loss of both Ballarat and Langi Kal Kal, 
"Victoria's prison administrators are fully aware of what is required to meet the 
needs of these two groups; facilities alone are lacking." 114 Whatmore realised the 
prison system was rapidly running down but was handicapped by the lack of 
Government commitment. The Social Welfare Department was Victoria's first 
mega-department. The high profile Divisions of Family and Youth Welfare, 
received a significant proportion of the Department's appropriation. Whatmore 
could hardly siphon funding from other Divisions to prisons. He pleaded with the 
Minister to allow him "a greater share of funds to cope with existing needs." 
There was a concerted effort by various groups to offer advice*in ways to reduce 
imprisonment. These ranged from weekend imprisonment to work release. Both 
Whatmore and Shade saw these approaches as cosmetic and trendy. 
It is pertinent, however, at this stage to offer a note of caution as to the 
action needed. There is a very real danger that enthusiasts carried away 
with enthusiasm and without clear perception of the outcome and in 
disregard of the past few years of experience proffer dramatic solutions 
which may best be described as gimmicks. There are examples of this 
where publicity has been given to countries described as socially 
progressive. When analysed, these bright schemes are found to be 
applicable to such a small field that they can only be described as 
window-dressing or gimmicks. 116 
112 Mid, 1967, 28. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid, 1967, 4. 
116 	Ibid. 
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The escalating prison numbers combined with a severe shortage in accommodation 
forced Shade to look at various means to keep numbers to a manageable level (see 
Fig. 4:6). One method was a greater use of the special leave provisions of the 
Social Welfare Act. There was the usual outcry forcing Shade to defend his 
strategy. 
Both private and group leave for prisoners have great rehabilitative value 
and are now an established and effective part of prison practice in the State. 
The practice is in confirmatory with modern penal policy that the prisoner 
should, as far as possible, maintain a continuing contract with the 
community to which in nearly all cases he will return.' 17 
Prisons at Dhurringle and Won Wron had been officially opened in 1970. 
Dhurringile had been operating for a couple of years but Won Wron gave him 
another 85 beds. Although Whatmore had been Director-General for a decade, he 
was still committed to prison reform. Whatmore had leverage with the Minister and 
continually pressed for extra funding. With his retirement, prisons were at the 
mercy of bureaucrats with little, if any, understanding of prison operation. 
The crisis, however, was about to happen and no one was prepared. The 
resignation and retirement of so many junior prison officers should have given some 
indication that all was not well. The majority of staff was unskilled and the prison 
service was a tenured position with an abundant supply of overtime. Why would 
they wish to leave? 
Prison officers may have been disillusioned by the change in prisoner management 
operation, the change in promotional opportunities, the increasing prisoner 
population, a combination of all, or just plain sick of the job. There may even have 
been better opportunities in the general workforce. For whatever reason, they were 
leaving the service in droves. Shade noted that it was difficult to recruit staff and 
complained about the wastage being "high and expensive." 8 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid, 1966, 8. 
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Fig. 4:6 Victoria's Prisons by location, purpose, and accommodation at 
30 June, 1968. 
Location Purpose Max. Accom. DAP In Custody 
Ararat General 200 124 144 
Beechworth Training 115 107 111 
Bendigo Training 120 115 112 
Castlemaine Semi Hosp. 112 102 103 
Cooriemungle Open Farm 60 50 48 
Dhurringle Rehabilitation 70 56 63 
Geelong Training 130 128 139 
McLeod Open Farm 133 126 129 
Morwell River Reforestation 80 72 77 
Pentridge Multi-Purpose 1302 1172 1166 
Sale Local / Short term 75 68 70 
Won Wron Reforestation 85 56 63 
Total Male 2482 2176 2225 
Fairlea Women 100 57 57 
Total 2582 2233 2282 
Source: Social Welfare Report, 1968. 
The former staff members, however, may have been victims of what Murton has 
termed "The Fiction of Prison Control." 119 Murton describes this as a situation 
where both prison officers and prisoners "act" as if the prison officers actually 
control the prison. There is an implicit acknowledgment that prisoners will only 
allow the prison officers to exercise the necessary amount of authority to enable 
them to perform their tasks. 
The inmates allow the guards to remain ostensively in control as long as the 
inmate power structure is allowed to function sub rosa. It is advantageous 
to both groups that the fiction be maintained. 120 
Prisoners create the fiction of good order and lull the authorities into a sense of 
complacency. Once they achieve this, they are then free to take control over the 
weaker prisoners. The junior officer knows that this happens. 
119 	Murton, The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 65. 
120 	Ibid. 
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He has the most face-to-face prisoner contact. He notices his senior staff accept the 
situation. He is then - ficed by the dilemma of accommodating this malfeasance. If he 
wishes to survive in -the-prison -system, he will conform until such time that he is 
either in a senior position or has a great deal of experience. He knows that if he   
attempts to enforce rules he will meet resistance from both prisoners and senior 
staff Prisoners can make a junior officer's task hard or easy. They can act so that 
the junior officer is deemed incompetent. On the other hand, senior staff will just 
keep moving the rule enforcer to more unpleasant prison positions until he leaves 
or conforms. By that stage, the junior officer will have rationalised that 'this is the 
way it is.' If he cannot acquiesce and play the game, he will leave, or be forced to 
leave, the system. t21 
The incoming Director-General of Social Welfare, AG Booth, the former Head of 
Youth Welfare, had been appointed for his administrative skills. Murton writes 
about the practice of appointing bureaucrats as American prison administrators: 
Almost all executives may have certain expertise in administrative problem 
solving, they rarely have realistic notions about prison administration. 
Being unknowledgeable in the area of penology, officials must rely upon 
their advisers and may fall victim to the "committee, consultants, and 
concrete" syndrome that promises a solution to prison problems. 122 
The administrative expansion of Victoria's prison system began with the 
appointment of a Deputy Director of Prisons in July 1972. This was a similar 
position to the defunct Deputy Inspector-General - a post held by Shade. Whether 
this position was created in view of Shade's imminent retirement or whether the 
Director-General wanted his own man in the system is a moot point. The prison 
system, however, was rapidly reaching a point of no return. Shade noted, 
Our prison system, still equipped in the main to meet security and control 
requirements, is inadequate to cope with the many demands now being 
made on it. The increase in prison population and acts of indiscipline and 
insubordination by prisoners at several prisons and especially Pentridge, 
have clearly indicated that this is so. 
121 	Ibid, 65-66. 
1 22 	Ibid, 82. 
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The only effective means of meeting this situation is by very substantial 
increases in improvements in accommodation, facilities and staff, including 
specialist in the field of training, welfare and rehabilitation. I23 
To overcome the deficiency in staffing numbers, and unable to recruit locally, the 
Department sent staff to the United Kingdom to recruit officers. The -y managed to 
recruit 15 trained prison officers and 80 who wished to become prison officers. I24 
By this stage, Bodna, Shade's Deputy, had been promoted to Deputy Director-
General of Social Welfare. 125 Bodna's advice was to make amendments to the 
Social Welfare Act and create a Prisons Advisory Council. The Director of Prisons 
was now answerable to a committee and had to take their advice on policy and 
direction. It appeared that prisons were to be de facto administered by a committee. 
The functions of the committee were : 
(a) To advise the Minister concerning the policy to be adopted and 
programmes to be undertaken from time to time in relation to 
the custody, care, education, discipline, training and treatment of 
persons imprisoned or detained in prisons: and 
(b) To report on any matter referred to it by the Minister, or on any 
matter on which it is authorised by this Act to report. 126 
The use of a Prisons Advisory Council may have been implicit 'recognition by the 
Department that it could no longer meet its obligation to manage the prison system. 
However, membership of the Prison's Advisory Council was not based on 
knowledge of prisoners. Shade was nearing the end of a long and illustrious career 
and may have welcomed the addition of some 'informed' opinion. He had been 
fighting a losing battle for resources since Whatmore's retirement, and had borne 
the brunt of prison criticism for nearly 15 years. Shade became part of the Advisory 
Council as Director of Prisons. It was agreed that the Director of Prisons should be 
ex officio. 
123 	Social Welfare Report, 1972, 33. 
124 	Mid, 1974, 7. 
125 	He was promoted to the position of Director-General on Booth's retirement in 1977. 
126 	Social Welfare Report, 1974, 8. 
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After having undergone a similar experience in the Arkansas prison system in 1968, 
Murton" wrote, 
The usual form of inquiry results from the appointment of a group -of - 
prestigious citizens, representing a cross section of the community, to 
investigate the prisons and report their findings and recommendations 
to the Governor. Unfortunately, more often than not, the principal 
attribute the members share in common is their abysmal ignorance of 
penology. 127 
Murton's experience with a committee in Arkansas is also salutary. He noted, 
They are not appointed for their knowledge of the area under study; 
they are appointed for their credentials of demonstrated "success" in a cross 
section of "professions." The inference that competency in one discipline is 
transferable to another unrelated field defies logic. 128 
To remedy overcrowding, prisoners were to be given an additional type of 
remission "not exceeding 15 days for each complete calendar month of a sentence 
actually served." 129 The system was rapidly collapsing and the general public was 
sceptical that anything was working. 
Prisons in Victoria aim to protect society more effectively by involving 
prison staff in the correction and rehabilitation of persons convicted of 
offences for which imprisonment has been imposed. This task of Prisons 
Division has not altogether been accepted by the public and adequate means 
will need to be provided to enable this task to be implemented. Only a social 
conscious community will be convinced of the need to generously provide 
funds to enable the effective implementation of rehabilitation 
programmes. L' ° 
The previous year there had been a Government enquires into the maintenance of 
discipline at Pentridge. I31 The Jenkinson Inquiry found little evidence of the skills 
needed to implement any type of treatment programme. Jenlcinson was scathing in 
his comments on prison staff and the type of training they were undertaking. 
127 	Murton, The dilemma of Prison Reform,  82-83. 
128 	Ibid. 
129 	Social Welfare Report, 1974, 9. 
130 	Ibid, 33. 
131 	Report of the Board of Inquiry into several matters concerning HM Prison Pentridge and  
the maintenance of discipline in prisons, 25 September, 1973, Victorian Government 
Printer (The Jenkinson Report). 
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Prison administration calls upon management skills which the Social 
Welfare Training Institute is not yet sufficiently funded to provide. 
I am myself involved in prison staff training in Victoria, both as 
Chairman-of-the Social Welfare Council and as an examiner in 
Penology III., and I am bound to say that this training is inferior to our 
•courses for child care and youth workers and toprison courses - run-by--- -- 
the Australian Foreign Affairs Department, by Wakefield Staff College 
in England and by other prison services. I can see no worthwhile 
improvement in prison discipline that will not begin with the better 
discipline of staff through education in criminology and penology. 132 
There was a change in the management structure at Pentridge in 1975 with the 
retirement of the Governor. The Governor and Deputy-Governor positions were 
abolished. A 'professional' Superintendent and a 'professional' Deputy 
Superintendent installed in their place. 133 Pentridge was sub-dived into three 
prisons - Northern, Central and South - each controlled by a Governor grade II 
with a Principal Prison Officer as his deputy. Prisoners were able to see full-time 
Welfare officers. A small administrative section to assist the professional 
management team was added. The McLeod Prison Farm at French Island was 
closed along with Pentridge's notorious C Division. In 1976 Shade retired after 21 
years service with the prison system. Peter Lynn replaced him. 134 
One of the Lynn's first tasks was to establish Attendance Centres, which were 
used as alternatives to imprisonment. 135 The Cooriemungle Prison Farm closed in 
1977. In two years, two open camps for minimum-security prisoners were closed. 
While the prison administration claimed the decision was based on economic 
grounds, the reality was prisoners did not want to go to these institutions because 
of the travel for family, and the labour of clearing land was extremely difficult. 
Prisoners would rather put up with the depressive atmosphere of Pentridge. 136 
132 	Ibid, 11. 
133 	John Van Groningen was recruited from the United States as the Deputy. When Van 
Groningen was promoted to Superintendent. another American, Gerry Meyers, became 
his Deputy. In 1992 Van Groningen became the Head of the Prison Service when the 
Liberal Government took office. 
134 	Social Welfare Report, 1976, 8. 
135 	Ibid, 6. 
136 	Rinaldi, Australian Prisons. 7. 
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On the other hand, the prisons were closed "because it was extremely difficult to 
get staff to work so far away from home." I37 In 1977, Victoria followed several 
other Australian jurisdictions by labelling its prison and associated functions as 
'Correctional Services.' According to the 1978 Report _ 	 _ 	_ 	_ 
The name change recognises that the Division is responsible for a broader 
range of correctional programs than simply the administration of 
prisons. 38 
There was still, however, the commitment made to prisons. 
Prisons' Division staff have been working on the development 
of a Five-Year Plan for corrections in Victoria. The Plan is part of 
an overall Departmental thrust towards forward planning and is 
expected to provide a sound basis for developments in Victorian 
prisons over ... ten years. 139 
Following a 1978 White Paper, Report on the Future of Social Welfare in 
Victoria:40 the Government split the Social Welfare Department. A new 
Department, Community Welfare Services, would be established in 1979. The new 
department would to take over the functions of prisons, probation and parole, 
family and adolescent services, and regional services. The Government made clear 
its prison policy and direction. 
The Government will re-organise correctional services in Victoria to 
separate first offenders, with sentences of less than 12 months who have 
not previously been imprisoned, from all other offenders. There will be a 
greater emphasis on promoting alternatives to institution penalties. Work 
release schemes and attendance centres will be expanded. Community 
Service Orders will be developed. There will be a commissioner of 
correctional services within the Community Welfare Services Department to 
identify the specialist nature of the correctional service division. High 
security accommodation will be extended, and the prison system will be 
improved to reach UN minimum standards: 41 
137 	Interview with Jim Armstrong, former Governor Grade III, 24 June 1996. 
138 	Social Welfare Report, 1978, 67. 
139 	Ibid, 1977, 27. 
140 	VPR, 1978, No. 5. 
141 	Social Welfare  Report, 1978, 24. 
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Prison officers' argued for a separate Corrections Ministry. The Government 
claimed that the welfare community "supports the continued integration of family, 
regional and correctional services. The Government-continues -to-view community 
welfare services as including the three elements." 142 Moreover, the Government _ 	_ 
was establishing a "Director of correctional services within the community welfare 
services department to identify the specialist nature of the correctional services 
division." 143 John Dawes was appointed as Director in 1979. 144 
Policy 1979-1983. 
Australian senior correctional administrators have traditionally undertaken tours of 
interstate or international agencies involved in a similar field. A new incumbent 
naturally wishes to compare current trends and practices. He can, perhaps, gain 
some much-needed insight into alternative methods. 145 
In 1979 Dawes undertook an extensive overseas tour. His itinerary included the 
USA, Canada, England, Sweden, Germany, Japan and Singapore.' brief inter 
alia was "to determine that the new directions in Victorian practice are sound when 
compared to experiences in other more developed systems." 147 The focus of the 
Dawes' trip was to be, paradoxically, on prisons. Dawes, it appears, had little 
interest in the probation / parole / prison justice administration networks. The 
American authorities had established these justice services in the 1960s to little 
effect and even less acclaim.'" 
142 	Ibid, 25. 
143 	Ibid, 24. 
144 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge:  
A History of Prisons in Victoria, 170. 
145 	Traditionally males have headed Corrective Services in Australia. In 1996 South 
Australia had the only female Director-General - Sue Vardon. 
146 	M.J. Dawes. Overseas Study Tour Of Correctional Institutions, July/August 1979, 
Report to the Department of Community Welfare Services. 
147 	Ibid, Introduction, 1. 
148 	For an in-depth analysis of this American innovation see Newman, 
Introduction to Criminal Justice,  especially chapter 3. 
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Dawes' interests were "high security and high rise prisons, security developments, 
prison industries, staff training and community based programmes." 149 Moreover, 
Dawes questioned Victoria's capacity to undertake change due to "outdated 
management systems and a_ shortage of senior personnel in head office." 15° His 
report consisted almost entirely of recommendations for upgrading the existing 
prison system, prison and head office management, prison staff training, and 
prisoner programmes. 151 
Most of Victoria's prisons were dilapidated and required an extensive infusion of 
capital. The low imprisonment figures were to some degree explained by the fact 
that Victoria's parole system had seemingly collapsed. 
The prisons branch of the Social Welfare Department has apparently 
ignored the fictional head sentence and used the parole eligibility date 
as an effective measure for release. Thus a large number of prisoners 
who might still be in prison are 'missing on parole. 152 
By the end of the 1970s, many Western prison legislators faced considerable 
pressure to change prison philosophy and policy. Contemporary practice was based 
on the 'Medical Model.' This model held crime was a social illness and the 
offender sick. Indeterminate sentences gave time for treatment. Corrections would 
facilitate a cure. While not the panacea, the model had been a significant step 
forward over custody and control mechanisms. However, in 1974 prison reform 
received a mortal wound. Martinson published his study on treatment programmes 
aimed to combat recidivism and concluded 'nothing works.' 153 
149 	Dawes, Overseas Study Tour, 1. 
150 
 
[bid, 2. 
151 	Ibid, 3-37. 
152 	R. Tomasic and I. Dobinson, The Failure of Imprisonment, 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1979) 37. 
153 	R. Martinson. -What Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform" 
The Public Interest, (Spring 1974): 22-54. 
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In 1977, MacNamara challenged the idea of rehabilitation as a goal for corrections. 
The new penologists posit a basic conflict between a medical 
model maintaining that crime is the product of individual defects and 
disorders that can be corrected in a program of medical, psychiatric, 
and social rehabilitation and a readjusted or reformed offender 
returned to his rightful place in society verses a justice model based 
on the more classic doctrine of the free moral agent and of individual 
responsibility for one's criminal behavior. 134 
The results of Martinson's inquiries ultimately led to the demise of the medical 
model and left prison administrators in a quandary: should they carry on with 
current practice? The major difficulty was that, unlike most private enterprise, 
prison practice change had to be incremental. To suddenly change an operational or 
philosophical approach would meet resistance by both staff and inmates. The 
majority of prisons were architecturally designed to meet the custody and security 
approach. 
Australian prison administrators, however, could cautiously claim that Martinson's 
New York research did not mirror Australian jurisdictions. Furthermore, to lobby 
for additional finance to implement new programmes is to risk accusation that 
either the government or the administrator is neither topical nor innovative. Again, 
the chances of extra finance for prison innovation may be negligible. When the 
general economy declines drastically, certain types of crime increase, government 
budget priorities are readjusted, with correctional budgets among the first to be 
cut. 155 Australian prison administrators historically have looked to overseas 
jurisdictions for ways and means to operate their institutions. Before the 1950s 
administrators would journey to the United Kingdom. 156 
154 	D.E.J. MacNamara, "The Medical Model in Corrections: Requiescat in Pace" 
Criminology, 14 ( 1977 ): 435-448, 446. 
155 	Archambeault and Archambeault, Correctional Supervisoty Management, 155. 
156 	The United Kingdom has three distinctive prison systems The English Prison Service 
which includes Wales; The Scottish Prison Service; and The Northern Irish Prison 
Service. 
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However, in the mid-fifties a procession began to the United States. 157 Many 
American prison practices, promulgated on the containment system, were 
implemented into an Australian--setting--designed to deal with custody and 
contro1. 158 By the middle of the nineteen sixties some Australian jurisdictions were _ 
importing American administrators. I59 These American administrators cemented 
their appointments and justified their particular expertise, by introducing 
programmes and changing architectural design to accommodate American ideas. 
The Australian prison system thus became a hybrid of both British and American 
prison philosophy and practice. 
It was again acknowledged that Victoria's system was at straining point. Building 
"the proposed Remand Centre and a further security prison at Castlemaine" could 
only avert the accommodation crisis. 160  A new ultra security division, Jika Jika, had 
been built within Pentridge to contain "violent prisoners incarcerated for longer 
terms" by 1980 161 A State election in 1981 brought the ALP to Government. The 
new Minister, Pauline Toner, believed that imprisonment should be regarded "as a 
last resort, and reserved only for offenders who constitute a serious threat to the 
community. »162 In an attempt to 'normalise' imprisonment the recruitment of 
female officers continued and it was now official policy to place them throughout 
the prison with no distinction as to sex. I63 
157 	The United States has a three-level prison or gaol system. There are Federal and State 
prisons and penitentiaries, and Local or County gaols. 
158 	The American containment system was premised on large institutions where inmates had 
relative freedom within the institution to move between cellblocks or divisions. This 
strategy meant that the institutions had armed Perimeter walls to keep people from 
escaping. On the other hand, Australian prisons had been designed on the British model 
of control where prisoners were kept in divisions and only had controlled access to other 
prisoners usually at prison labour. When prisoners moved within the confines of the 
prison they were escorted by prison officers. 
159 	Victoria led this importation by appointing an American prison official as 
Superintendent of Pentridge Prison. 
160 	Community Welfare Services Report,  1979, 8. 
161 	'bid, 1980, 47. 
162 	Community Welfare Priorities, Ministerial Statement by The Hon. P.T. Toner, M.P., 
7 December 1982, 7. 
163 	Community Welfare Services Report,  1980. 52. 
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In a break from previous practice, the prisoners were allowed to make reverse 
charge phone calls. 164 Overcrowding was so severe in 1982 that the department 
gave prisoners 7 days early release, and refused to accept new receptions. At the 
beginning of  1983, the Government commissioned an American prison expert, 
James Henderson, to evaluate the security at Victoria's walled prisons - especially 
the major prison at Pentridge. Partly as a result of his scathing commendation of 
the state of security and the institutional facilities available, the Government made 
some major departmental re-organisation. A decision was made to 
Separate adult correctional services into an essentially separate 
organisation. The historical perspective may show that much that was 
significant, innovative and fruitful was achieved within prisons and 
community corrections during the association with welfare services in 
this State, but that poverty eventually overwhelmed the joint 
endeavours. The Department, among other initiatives following 
community concern after escapes from Pentridge, pressed for a Master 
Plan for the development of correctional services in Victoria. 
It is hoped that this approach will provide convincing arguments for the 
investment necessary to construct secure and modern prisons, and develop 
sound and adequate community alternatives to imprisonment. I65 
The Royal Commission of 1870 had abolished the Penal Department and 
incorporated it into the Chief Secretary's Department. The decision made by the 
new Labor Government to separate corrections from administrative control by 
Community services in 1983 would later lead to corrections having full 
Departmental status by February 1984. Whatmore's blueprint for penal reform had 
been mainly implemented by 1970. 166 The strategy designed to give prisoners 
treatment programmes and the courts alternatives and adjuncts to imprisonment 
had all been found wanting. Prison officer training was essential to Whatmore's 
three-pronged penal reformative approach. Whatmore created specific training 
positions to aid both prison officer and prisoner and utilised scarce resources to 
assist the process. 
164 	Ibid, 1982, 38. 
165 	Community Welfare Services Report, 1983, 1-2. 
166 	Interview with Jim Armstrong, former Governor Grade III, 23 August 1995. 
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Jenkinson, however, found that the level of prison officer training was inadequate 
to even control and contain prisoners. 167 The parole system had all but collapsed by 
1976. 168 Prisons were overcrowded. Prison management was questioned. 169 The - 
system could not afford to upgrade existing prison facilities yet committed $7 
million to open Jika Jika. 1 " Prisoners escaped. Insurrection was rife. There were 
fires, bomb explosions, and inmate deaths. 171  A committee ran the prison system de 
facto. 172 The problem may have been, as Murton comments, 
Administrators do not innovate, they do not foster change, they do not act - 
they only react to demands from outside pressures. This pressure may be 
from an investigative committee, concerned citizens, the legislature, the 
press, or the inmates themselves. 173 
The system had been operating for over 130 years and it appeared that little 
progress had been made. Prison numbers kept increasing but there were few 
strategies available for administrators. The former Liberal Government had 
rigorously ignored the prison service. The incoming Labor Government had to 
somehow address the decaying structure. The Liberal apathy would surface again in 
the 1990s, but this time the solution was clear - let private enterprise deal with the 
problem. 
From 1956 to 1983 the prison system was part of three separate departments. In 
retrospect, the decision to move prisons into the new mega Department of Social 
Welfare effectively halted Whatmore's attempt at prison reform. His new task 
meant that he could no longer keep his finger on the 'penal pulse.' Whatmore had 
to entrust that to Shade. But while Whatmore had the ear of the political head of 
the department, his successor was not afforded the same consideration. 
167 	The Jenkinson Inquiry, 11. 
168 	Tomasic and Dobinson, The Failure of Imprisonment, 37. 
169 	See, for example, The Jenkinson Inquiry. 
170 	Jika-Jika High Security Unit, HM Prison Pentridge,  1980, 
Department of Conununity Welfare Services. 1. 
171 	See Community Welfare Services Reports, 1979, 48; 1980, 51; 1982, 43; and 1981 33. 
172 	Social Welfare Report, 1974, 8. 
173 	Murton,  The Dilemma of Prison Reform,  100. 
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Perhaps this may have been because Whatmore was dealing with a new Minister for 
Social Welfare. Whatmore and the former Chief Secretary, Sir Arthur Rylah, had 
worked -together- since-1-955: 74 Shade had to run a neglected prison system. 
Whatmore had been unsuccessful obtaining funding from Rylah but Shade had to 
lobby Whatmore for the extra finance. Shade continued prisoner rehabilitation: 75 
but by the time Community Welfare Services controlled prisons, Shade had retired. 
The Parole and Probation sections were looked upon as the shining lights of the 
new Corrective Services division, and prisons relegated to the bottom of 
Community Welfare needs. The result of this neglect was manifest. Prisoners 
lobbied for 'rights.' 176 Prisoners also took advantage of the relaxation of the 
custodial regime. The scale of incidents and assaults on both prisoners and staff 
escalated as prisoner numbers grew. 77 Prison accommodation was scarce and the 
use of dormitories widespread: 78 The prison system lost credibility when prisoners 
escaped from Pentridge Prison. However, it took a series of major incidents and 
escape attempts before the Labor Government took firm action. 
The following chapter deals with the decision to separate 'corrections from 
Community Welfare Services and the formulation of a distinct Office of 
Corrections. The decision was to have a profound effect on prison officers. The 
new department decided to implement a new prisoner management strategy but it 
will be argued, failed to provide the necessary prison officers' training to enable 
them to both understand and then implement the strategy. 
174 	J. Holmes, The Government of Victoria, 
(St Lucia, Queensland: UM of Queensland, 1976) 103. 
175 	Social Welfare Report, 1962, 1115. 
176 	Hawkins claimed in 1985 that prisoners did not have rights, rather they were "voluntarily 
clisentitled. - G. Hawkins, "Prisoners' Rights. The John Barry Memorial Lecture -
ANZ J Crim, Vol 18 No 4 (December 1985): 196 -205, 203. 
177 	Lynn and Armstrong, From Pentonville to Pentridge:  
A History of Prisons in Victoria, see chapter 12. 
178 	Ibid. 
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Chapter 5 
The Office of Corrections, 1983-1992. 
--mutato nomine l 
This chapter - details Victoria's prison operational policy from 1983 when the 
00C was formed until 1992 when a change of government abolished the 
department. The chapter will also highlight the complexity of creating a new 
department, building new prisons, and introducing a new prisoner management 
strategy. The development of new policies was crucial. But whether the new 
organisation had the time and resources to formulate the myriad policies 
required for such a transition was, at that stage, unknown. As Davis et al point 
out, 
The authors of policy are often unable or unwilling to be precise about 
their objectives. Moreover, public stated objectives may differ markedly 
from the real objectives of a policy. 2 
The chapter also examines the organisational restructures and personnel 
changes in the department's short history. It never appeared to have a degree of 
stability or decision-making consistency during these years. Moreover, the new 
department needed strong Ministerial support to fight for sufficient resources 
and defend it, if required in Cabinet. The department also required a charismatic 
political spokesperson to 'sell' the new organisation to a sceptic public. 
However, the major problem was that the corrections portfolio was added to 
other Ministerial responsibilities. The 00C had four Ministers in nine years of 
operation. 3 
In the early 1980s Victoria's prison system was run down, beset with staffing 
problems, and appeared to lack direction. Motivation was at an all-time low. 
Literal translation, "with the name changed - E Ehrlich, A Dictionary of Latin Tags  
and Phrases. (London: Hale, 1985) 152. 
G. Davis, J. Wanna, J. Warhurst, and P. Weller. Public Policy in Australia, 2nd Ed. 
(St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Uni,vin, 1993) 185. 
Pauline Toner was the Minister of Community Welfare. Jim Kennan was the 
Attorney-General; Steve Crabb was the Police and Emergency Services Minister as 
was Mal Sandon. 
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There was a feeling that the 1970s emphasis on prisoner rights had given 
inmates defacto control of the institutions. 4 However, in any prison system there 
are a number of informal prison practices which have tacit support by both 
prison management and prisoners. 
The institutionalized system of rights and privileges that inmates enjoy, 
one may suggest, gains -the qualities of a moral 'order over time and 
when violated by prison administrators, leads to anger arid outrage over 
perceived injustices. 5 
Victoria's 1972 Social Welfare Report detailed the type and nature of offender 
being sent to prison. 
Victorian prisons are becoming not only receptacles for those who 
breach the social code but for those who are little more than misfits and 
failures in our community and more in need of assistance than 
punishment. Our prison population to-day comprises persons ranging in 
age from 17 to 70 and includes alcoholics, drug addicts, incorrigible 
criminals, petty offenders, sex deviates, and offenders against 
Commonwealth defence policy. 6 
Moreover, as Armstrong noted, "there was a different type of criminal entering 
the system. The 'old crims' were in their forties and had enough of prison. They 
knew about discipline - a lot having been returned service men. The new lot 
were woeful and were a continual problem."' In late 1982, the _Minister, Pauline 
Toner, acknowledged that "Prison is seen by very few as rehabilitative. Rather it 
is a punishment or removal from the community of those who are perceived to 
represent a risk to society." 8 She also accepted that the administration of prisons 
was not a simple matter. 
The management of prisons is a demanding and sensitive area 
requiring carefiil consideration if community expectation about 
security and protection is to be fulfilled. The resources previously 
provided have not been commensuarate (sic) with the task. 9 
4 
	
Interview with former prison Governor Grade III, Jim Arrnstrong, 24 June 1996. 
F. J. Desroches, "Anomie: Two Theories of Prison Riots" Canadian J Crim, 
Vol 25 No 2 (1983):173-190, 182. 
6 
	
Social Welfare Report, 1972, 34. 
Interview with former prison Governor Grade III, Jim Armstrong, 24 June 1996. 
Speech by the Minister for Community Welfare Services at the opening of the 
Bendigo Attendance Centre, 29 October 1982. 
9 
	
News Release, Minister for Community Welfare Services, 7 December 1982. 
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Moreover, Toner was conscious of the sensitivity of her portfolio. 
We are all aware that running a corrections system is a most difficult 
task. We collect a lot of brick-bats and very few bouquets. If we run a 
humane and compassionate system, we are too soft. If we tighten up 
rules and procedures, we are accused of being callous and brutal.  1° 
_On the other hand,. Toner _found that "Normally humane_ citizens revealed 
attitudes more appropriate to the Inquisition when the subject of prisons was 
raised." The Minister, however, assured senior managers of her support and 
informed them, "It is a conundrum that in bad physical conditions you have 
developed the best correctional services system in Australia. Together we will 
make it the best system in the world." 12 Tackling prison overcrowding became a 
government priority. The Minister announced the location of the proposed 
remand centre which would cost $21 million and be completed within three 
years. I3 
The centre, once completed, will represent a radical departure from 
that proposed by the former government in respect of low level 
accommodation, recreational facilities and a more humane approach 
to security. The building will provide single room accommodation for 
between 220 and 240 unconvicted men and women. The removal of the 
remand facility from Pentridge will greatly assist in the proper 
implementation of justice in that persons, as yet untried, will be 
physically separated from convicted criminals. I4 
The catalyst for prison organisation change had occurred on 3 January 1983 
when two prisoners escaped from Pentridge Prison. The Acting Minister 
announced "an extensive process of informal consultation with experts overseas 
has been worked through and we are now at the stage when a formal request 
for assistance can be made later this week." 15 However, on 30 July 1983 four 
extremely dangerous prisoners escaped from the high security Jika Jika prison 
situated within the walls of Pentridge Prison. 
10 	Speech by the Minister for Community Welfare Services,  to open a Senior Staff 
Officers Conference, 16 December 1982. 
11 	J. Hurst, "The Battle for a Humane Penal System" quoted in G. Hawkins, "Prisoners' 
Rights. The John Barry Memorial Lecture" ANZ J Crim, vol 18 no 4 
(December 1985): 196 -205, 202. 
12 	Speech by the Minister for Community Welfare Services,  to open a Senior Staff 
Officers Conference, 16 December 1982. 
13 	News Release, Minister for Community Welfare Services  6 December 1982. 
14 	Ibid. 31 March 1983. 
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The two officers on duty at the time of the escape were transferred to other 
duties. Pentridge prison officers went on strike on 1 August. After negotiations 
between the Government and the Prison Officers union failed and "In response - 
to the prospect of diminished security at Pentridge and worsening conditions as 
time went on, the Government decided last Friday 5 August that a State of 
Emergency should be proclaimed in Victoria." 16 Prison officers received a 
telegram: 
The Governor-in-Council has declared a State of Emergency stop 
Regulations now confer power on the Minister for Community 
Services to take necessary action for the proper and secure conduct 
of Victoria's correctional facilities stop You are therefore directed to 
report for duty at 9 a.m. Saturday 6th August, 1983 stop 
I now have power to dismiss prison officers or other officers 
employed by the Department of Community services who refuse to 
perform duties as directed. 
Pauline Toner, Minister for Community Welfare Services. 17 
The strike ended on 6 August. Prison officers were convinced that the 
Government was more interested in prisoner welfare than security. With the 
system at the point of collapse, the Government separated Corrections from the 
Department of Community Welfare Services (DCWS). The final DCWS 
correctional services report noted 
1983 has been an eventful but difficult year for corrections. Escapes 
from "J" Division and Jika Jika at Pentridge caused extensive manhunts 
throughout Victoria and triggered a review of the whole prison service 
within Victoria. 18 
James Henderson, an expert from the United States Federal Prison System, 
conducted a security review of Victoria's prison system. He found 
a relatively fragmented though centralised administration, functioning 
without a coherent body of policy and procedure, not performing many 
of the traditional auditing functions that are associated with centralised 
management. 19 
15 	[bid, 4 January 1983. 
16 	Ministerial Statement by the Honourable Pauline Toner, M.P. Minister for  
Community Welfare Services, 9 August 1983: Escapes from Pentridge Prison and  
events leading up to the Proclamation of a State of Emergency, 1. 
17 	MRD 046= QQA171= Melbourne CTO VIC 93/91 10.45P. 
IS 	Department of Community Services, Report. 1983, 33. 
19 	J.D. Henderson. The Department of Community Welfare Services, "Focus on 
Prisons- Newsletter. No. 14, (September. 1983) 3. 
Henderson was particularly critical of the system's apparent lack of direction. 
Perhaps the singular most notable feature of this office was the lack of a 
• 	well-developed body of policy and procedure for uniform 
implementation throughout all facilities. 20 
Henderson recommended the appointment of consultants to develop a "master 
plan to guide filture de‘Telopment. Re -Sources are now being spent without the 
regard to the long range needs of the system or society in general." 21 The 
government accepted Henderson's recommendations but noted 
We feel very angry that decades of neglect have resulted in a system so 
run-down that a massive injection of funds is necessary for a re-build. 
Our development programme won't occur overnight but will be 
carefully staged according to our master plan. 22 
The Premier and the Minister for Community Welfare Services announced the 
creation of a separate Office of Corrections (00C) on 5 July, 1983. "The Office 
will operate within the Department of Community Welfare Services and will be 
directly responsible to the Minister for Community Welfare Services." 23 A 
separate Director-General of Corrections with permanent head powers would 
be appointed to head the 00C. 24 Amending legislation was required to establish 
the Office and would be achieved in the Spring Session of the Parliament. 25 The 
newly appointed Director-General of Corrections, Bill Kidston, was recruited 
from Western Australia (WA). The Minister acknowledged Kidston's 
accomplishments in changing the moribund WA system and was confident that 
he would achieve similar results in Victoria. Toner, however, stressed the need 
for time to affect change. 
It needs to be clearly understood that because of decades of neglect 
the Victorian prisons system cannot be fixed up overnight. However, 
with this appointment and the formation of a separate Office of 
Corrections within my Department the first important steps towards the 
achievement of that goal will have been taken. 26 
20 	Ibid. 
21 	J.D. Henderson, A Report on the Correctional System of Victoria, Australia. 
Department of Community Welfare Services, April 1983, 	112-113. 
22 	News Release, Minister for Community Welfare Services, 6 June 1983. 
23 	News Release, From the Office of the Premier of Victoria, 5 July 1983. 
24 	Ibid. 
25 	Ibid. 
26 	Newsletter. No. 14. (September. 1983) Focus on Prisons, 2. 
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Corrections Master Plan Victoria. 
On 11 August 1983 the Victorian Government commissioned a team of 
consultants, Neilson Associates, to furnish the-State-with a - blueprint to change 
the ailing correctional system. 27 Their brief was to "provide an integrated _ _ _ 
Master Plan for the 00C out-lining goals, phases and development strategies 
for correctional facilities, programs and systems." 28 The consultants' remarked 
The overwhelming impression is one of a prison system starved of funds, 
and plagued by partial (and frequently unsatisfactory) short-term 
decision-making on capital works. There exists a succession of 
unfulfilled development plans for individual prisons, each of which 
involved substantial resources in its preparation, and all of which 
appears to have fallen by the wayside. 29 
The Master Plan (the Neilson Report) pointed out that there had already been 
five year plans for prisons prepared in 1975 for 1976-1981, and again in 1978 
for 1979-1984, but, "These plans were never adopted as Government policy." 3° 
Changes in prisons had been left to individual Governors who initiated building 
programmes using local financial resources, staff and prisoner labour to 
complete tasks. 3I These tasks, however, should have been directed or co-
ordinated by Head Office. 32 
Our review of physical conditions and programmes in the State's 
prisons identifies a real sense of neglect, gloom, frustration and 
tension which pervades the whole system. The prisons are, by 
current standards, disgraceful places in which to house people, 
however serious their offences, and disgraceful places in which to 
expect prison officers to work. 3 ' 
The Report was highly critical of the management regimes and argued that 
unless both prison physical conditions and prisoner management practices 
changed the system would implode. 
27 	Neilson Associates, Corrections Master Plan Victoria, (The Neilson Report) 
August 1983, 1. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, 35. 
30 [bid, 1. 
31 Ibid. 
32 	Ibid. 
33 Ibid, 33. 
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Prison officers have a highly stressful and difficult task to perform just 
in supervising prisoners in these primitive conditions. There is little hope 
of them developing more positive and participatory roles in prison 
management and officer/prisoner relationships while the conditions in 
which they work are frustrating and offensive for prisoners, who are 
tense and aggressive as a consequence, as well as for the officers 
themselves. When it is considered that, in all prisons, small numbers are 
supervising. large numbers of fit, aggressive, idle and frustrated young 
men, it is more surprising, to say the least, that there have not been 
more serious riots, fires, or other major disturbances. Victoria's prison 
system could be likened, without too much exaggeration, to a powder 
keg waiting for a lighted fuse. 34 
The consultants posed the question, "Will the Victorian prisons serve the needs 
of the State over the next twenty years and beyond, without major new 
investment?, the answer must be "Absolutely not." 35 The consultants 
acknowledged that the Government accepted the existing system could no 
longer provide "secure and humane" conditions. 36 They were, however, 
concerned that unless a massive infusion of finance was made available "the lack 
of decisiveness on the part of the Government and the parsimony which 
characterises expenditure on the prison system [would continue]." 37 They 
recommended the State begin a building programme "to upgrade prison 
accommodation and facilities." 38 
AS PART OF THAT PROGRAMME, THE GOVERNMENT 
TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE MODERN 
MANAGEMENT METHODS AND PROCEDURES INTO 
VICTORIA'S PRISONS, BASED ON THE MANAGEMENT OF 
PRISONERS IN SMALL GROUPS OR UNITS. 
ACCOMMODATION MUST BE DEVELOPED OR 
REDEVELOPED TO FACILITATE SUCH A CHANGE. 
STAFFING MUST ALSO BE UPGRADED IN SKILLS AND 
TRAINING TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF MODERN PRISON 
MANAGEMENT. 
(Section 7.4. Priority - HIGH). 39 
34 	Ibid, 34. 
35 	Ibid, 37. 
36 	Ibid. 
37 	Ibid. 36. 
38 	Ibid, 37. 
39 	Ibid, 38, (note, published in upper case). 
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The consultants suggested the administration trial both the new prisoner 
programmes and prisoner management concept in one or two of the smaller 
existing prisons "with the assistance of specialist staff' over the- period when 
new prisons were being constructed. Information would then be available to be 
analysed by the authorities prior to the commissioning of new prisons. If _ 
successful, the projects could be immediately introduced upon opening. 40 
Modern prison management in the United States and elsewhere 
relies on the subdivision of accommodation within prisons into 
small units, with prisoner management based on the operation of 
these separate units. This allows flexibility in the treatment of 
different groups of prisoners, in the range of security environments 
available within prisons, and, at the same time, provides for more 
human contact at the "small group" level, which is of benefit to both 
prisoners and prison staff. 
We believe this concept should be introduced into the Victorian 
prisons, largely to ensure that, in prisons of up to 250 people, 
management and design are planned hand-in-hand to ensure a 
humane living and working environment in new facilities, for 
prisoners and officers. 41 
The foundation of the Master Plan was a set of key policies which defined the 
fundamental purpose of the Victorian correctional system. These policies were, 
1. 	imprisonment is to be regarded as a punishment Of last resort. 
2 	the correctional system, and especially the prisons, should be 
developed and administered in a manner which is: 
(i) humane; 
(ii) efficient; and 
(iii) effective. 
3. 	to develop a humane prison system it is necessary to ensure 
that: 
(i) loss of liberty is the sole punitive aspect of imprisonment. 
(ii) acceptable standards of accommodation and facilities are 
met. 
(iii) productive work is available. 
(iv) prisoners' and officers' rights are respected 
(v) prisoners' health and welfare is protected. 
(vi) prison management emphasises human contact. 
(vii) prisoners' participate in decision making. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, 44-45. 
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(viii) size and physical development of prisons enhances 
policies of humane containment. 
(ix) there must be adequate staff. 
(x)staff must participate in prison management. 
(xi) there must be effective staff development 
programmes. 
(xii) staff and their families must be protected from criminal 
acts by offenders or others. 42 
The Neilson Associates Master Plan was one of the most significant documents 
in the history of Victoria's prisons. It is comparable with Whatmore's blueprint 
for prison change in the 1950s. The Master Plan would radically change 
Victoria's prison design. It was the harbinger for prison building on an 
unprecedented scale since the nineteenth century. The new prisons would be 
built according to 'unit management' principles. The Plan recommended a new 
type of prisoner management strategy, one albeit not scientifically evaluated. 
Prison officers would have to be retrained to meet the standards expected in the 
new regime. Although the Government accepted the Master Plan in principle, 
the propositions would have to be studied by the 00C and either accepted or 
modified to determine a new set of policies. Bill Kidston, the Director-General, 
took up his appointment on 10 October, 1983. 43 The Community Welfare 
Services (Director-General of Corrections) Act 1983, came into operation on 
22 November. This gave "legislative force to the partitioning of the Department 
of Community Welfare Services, the establishment of the Office of Corrections 
and the responsibilities of the Director-General of Corrections." 44 
42 	Ibid, 22-23, (note,upper case in original). 
43 	Newsletter, no. 14, (September, 1983) Focus on Prisons, 2. 
44 	00C Annual Report, 1983-84, iii. 
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Building the Office of Corrections.  
The primary objectives of the new organisation were: 
To provide for the development and delivery of a range of custodial and 
non-custodial adult correctional programs in a manner which is 
consistent with both—die maintenance of public Safety and prisoners' 
rehabilitation; 
To manage the use of capital and manpower resources to optimise the 
efficiency of delivery and effectiveness of adult correctional program 
(sic); 
To provide for a process of organisational change within the Office of 
Corrections which will promote rapid performance improvement in 
prison security, prison accommodation, prison industries and activities 
available to prisoners consistent with security and their effective 
management; and 
To provide effective leadership to both uniformed staff administering 
institution-based adult correctional programs and non-uniformed staff 
administering community-based correctional programs to establish and 
maintain a cohesive and competent organisation. 45 
Kidston organised the 00C into four Divisions - each with a primary focus. 
Prisons were incorporated into Custodial Services, and the other Divisions 
reflected the nature of the work to be undertaken: Community-Based Services; 
Strategic Services; and Management Services. 46 The Prisons Division assumed 
all the functions of the former Correctional Services Division apart from 
Attendance Centres which would be "oversiQhted" by the Community-Based 
Services Division. 47 The Director of Prisons, Barry Apsey, had a great deal to 
accomplish. 
A prime concern of the new Division has been the development of an 
environment which will strengthen the management of prisons in 
Victoria. In response to the inadequate management structures 
identified in the former Correctional Services Division two changes have 
been made. Firstly, the fourteen Prison Governors have been made 
directly responsible to the Director of the Division and given new 
delegations of authority to strengthen their autonomy and 
accountability. 
45 	Newsletter. 1983. 2. 
46 	00C Annual Report, 1983-84, iii. 
47 	Ibid. 
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This move has overcome the blurred lines of responsibility with which 
Governors and Headquarters staff previously had to cope. Secondly, 
specialist advisers on prisoner classification and placement, prison 
inspection and investigation, and prisoner programs have been appointed 
to upgrade the quality of support services available to the Director and 
governors. 48 
Kidston's immediate task was to appaint -a senior management team. However, 
the appointees were to be mainly career bureaucrats - a practice which was not 
uncommon. 
Those behind the changes have acted in the belief that there is nothing 
distinctive about correctional management. In the central office and the 
institutions, managers with absolutely no correctional experience, but a 
decent record in other state agencies, have been hired. 49 
A team of management consultants had developed and recommended the 00C 
organisation structure (see Fig.5: D." Kidston, however, successfully argued for 
a Deputy Director-General. He interviewed and appointed senior managers by 
the end of December 1983. 51 Kidston's tenure in fact was to be marked by 
changing senior management personnel, but there was some semblance of 
stability during the organisation's first years of operation (see Fig. 5:2 for 00C 
personnel from 1983-1992). 
The government continued to implement the Master Plan, however, the Minister 
pointed out that the government "inherited a prison system that was Dickensian, 
failed to meet minimum United Nations standards and was inhumane. The 
system is run down, barbaric, inefficient and potentially unworkable." 52 
48 	Ibid. 
49 	J.J. DiIulio, Jr. Governing Prisons, (New York: The Free Press, 1987) 135. 
50 	History of the Office of Corrections Victoria. 00C Resource Centre, September, 
1984, 8. 
51 	Ibid. 
52 	Speech at ALP meeting, Eltham Court House. Eltham Victoria, 30 May 1984. 
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Figure 5:1 00C Organisational Structure and Associated Functions. 
Director-General 
Deputy Director-General 
1 	 2 	 3 	 4 
Classification Prosecutions Unit Personnel 
& Staff Development 
Policy and Programme 
Development 
Inspections/ 
Investigations Unit 
Special Supervision 
Unit 
Staff Training College Research 
Programme Co-
ordination 
Projects General Administration Planning & Review 
Projects Parole Board 
Secretariat 
Finance & Accounting Building Development 
Governors Court Advisory 
Services 
Freedom of Information Legislative Development 
Unit 
Regional Managers Catering and Nutrition Information System 
--7 -1 Public Relations & 
Publications 
4 
1 	Director of Prisons 
2 	Director of CBC 
3 	Director of Management Services 
4 	Director of Strategic Services 
5 	Director of Special Projects 
Source: adapted from 00C Annual Report, 1983-84. 
Mrs Toner claimed the Cain Government had "increased expenditure on 
corrections by 22%, to a figure of nearly $50 million." 53 Moreover, the Minister 
announced on 12 June that the State's first "Correctional Centre" would be built 
in the Shire of Corio. Work was expected to commence in early 1985 and 
would cost $25 million. 54 "Mrs Toner said the Government's first correctional 
centre would place great emphasis on rehabilitation programmes for its 
prisoners." 55 
53 	Ibid. 
54 	News Release, Minister for Community Welfare Services,  12 June 1984. 
Ibid. 
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Figure 5:2 00C Senior Management Personnel and Functions 
1983-92.' 6 
Year Prisons I CBC (1) DMS (2) 	 DSS (3) 
1983-84 - B Apses' D Richards G Drury C Foley-Jones 
1984-85 B Apsey D Richards P O'Grady C Foley-Jones 
1985-86 D Grant D Richards P O'Grady 	 C Foley-Jones 
1986-87 T Abbott D Richards P O'Crrady 	 '13 Priest 
1987-88 N Banner D Richards P O'Grady P Priest 
1988-89 J Griffin D Richards P O'Grady R Eldridge 
1989-90 J Griffin D Richards P O'Grady R Eldridge 
. _ 
1990-91 J Griffm D Richards i P O'Grady R Eldridge 
1991-92 vacant D Richards P O'Grady 	 vacant 
(1) Community Based Corrections. 
(2) Management Services. 
(3) Strategic Services. 
Acting,. 
Position title changed to Policy and Research. 
Source: 00C Annual Reports. 1983-92. 
Mrs Toner's statement sent mixed messages to Victoria's prison officers. While 
some prison officers assumed the Minister's statement demonstrated her welfare 
bias, others believed that the government had "gone soft on prisoners."" But 
this perception is a classic example of the fundamental dilemma of prisons in the 
1970s and 1980s. There is normally a divergence between a prison's penal 
philosophy and the actual operating policy. They are hardly ever contiguous. 
For example, a prisoner management strategy will be based on control if the 
correctional philosophy dictates prisoner obedience, prison labour, and 
education. 58 However, if the operating philosophy changes to allow prisoners 
some freedom of choice yet the prisoner management strategy remains 
unchanged there will undoubtedly be prisoner/prison officer conflict. This is 
why Victoria's prisons were in a quandry. Victoria's prison officer training and 
standard work practice was directed towards maintaining control. 
56 	There were only 2 Directors' - General: W.J. Kidston 1983-87, and 
P.B. Harmsworth, 1987-92. The post of Deputy Director-General was abolished after 
the incumbent became Director-General in 1987. 
57 	Interview with former prison Governor Grade III. Jim Armstrong, 24 June 1996. 
53 	Dillluio, Goyerning.Prisons, 105. 
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Yet, prisoner control appeared secondary to prisoner placation. This approach 
was never explained to front-line officers. They were never informed if this was 
policy. Perhaps in retrospect it should have been disseminated - at least 
informally. 59 A majority of Victoria's prison officers—believed -- -that- inmate 
insurrection was the impetus for both informal and formal policy change. 
Officers wholeheartedly agreed with building new prisons. Their anxieties 
centred on proposed changes in work practice. Their views had probably been 
coloured by government statements. It appeared the sole interest was the 
welfare and conditions of prisoners. Nobody could or would explain what the 
changes would mean.° 
In 1984 Victoria's prison system consisted of an eclectic range of institutions 
(see Fig.5:3). Most were in dire need of funding. The priority was the 
redevelopment of Pentridge Prison. 
Figure 5:3 Victoria's Prisons in 1983 by Type and Accommodation. 
Prison 	 Type 	 Accommodation 
Ararat 	 medium-security 	 215 
Beechworth 
	
medium-security 	 112 
Bendigo 	 ; medium-security 86 
Castlemaine 	 medium-security 
	
95 
Dhurringi le minimum-security 	 72 
Fairlea Female 	 medium-security 30 
Geelong 	 medium-security 
	
120 
Morwell River 	 minimum-security 
	
78 ' 
Pentridge 
	 multi-purpose 	 981 male, 49 female 
Sale 	 medium-security 50 
Won Wron 	 minimum-security 
	 90 
Source: 00C Annual Report. 1983-84. 
The Pentridge complex would be restructured to contain a 250 bed reception 
and classification prison on the site of the Southern Prison, and a 250 bed short-
term facility on the site of the Northern Prison. 
59 	Interview with former prison Governor Grade III. Jim Armstrong, 24 June 1996. 
60 	Ibid. 
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Jika Jika would be used as a 50 bed protection prison. Moreover, funds would 
be available for a new 250 bed prison with an adjacent training college - the 
future Barwon Prison. 61 
Bureaucratic rhetoric and administrative reality. 
Victoria's Government approved a prison construction and redevelopment 
programme by August 1984.62 The new prisons at Pentridge would be known as 
the Metropolitan Reception Prison (MRC) which amalgamated the former 
Southern Sub-Prison and Jika Jika - renamed K Division, and the 'new' 
Pentridge Prison combining the former Northern and Central Sub-Prisons. The 
position of Superintendent of Pentridge was abolished. The restructured prisons 
were administered by a Governor Grade 111• 63 The aims of the 00C were 
intended to be 
Consistent with Government policy that imprisonment should be used as 
a punishment of last resort and that the loss of liberty be its sole punitive 
aspect, the Office of Corrections provides community and prison based 
programs as well as safe and secure facilities for the management of 
prisoners and offenders in a manner which respects the rights of 
individuals, emphasises human interaction, is humane,efficient, effective, 
fair, just, constructive, contemporary and has the confidence of the 
courts and the community. 64 
The proposed operating philosophy and policy of Victoria's prisons was not 
mentioned. But then Kidston's 1982 Report as Director of the WA Prisons 
Department was singularly devoid of any stated prison operational philosophy 
and practice. 65 However, it appears probable that the 1982 WA prison operating 
policy was an extension of the "treatment" model employed in 1972. 66 
61 	News Release. from the Office of the Premier of Victoria, 20 February 1984. 
62 	Minister for Community Welfare Services, Speech at the restructure of Pentridge 
Prison, 16 August 1984. 
63 	Ibid. 
64 	00C Annual Report,1984-85, 1. 
65 	Western Australia Department of Corrections Annual Report, 1981-1982. 
66 	T.A. Williams. Custody and Conflict: An organisational study of role problems and  
related attitudes among prison officers in Western Australia, Ph D diss., 
University of Western Australia, 1974, 30. 
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There is a remarkable similarity between the various administrative functions of 
1972 67 and 1982. 68 Indeed, "There had been a rapid increase in the number of 
non-custodial staff (such as psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, NVelfare 
officers, and training staff) employed by the department." 69 Victoria's Prison 
Minister, however, was still talking in terms of the Medical Model. "The 
Government aims to have a just, efficient prison system - a system where 
prisoners can be rehabilitated - a system in which officers are proud to work." 7° 
Furthermore, the philosophy behind prisoner programmes was questioned. "The 
programs that allegedly give rehabilitation meaning, must cease to be the 
claimed purpose of a correctional sanction ... programs are not the primary 
purpose of corrections." 71 
The building programme progressed with the new Remand Centre nearing 
completion, the proposed Barwon Prison and Staff Training College at the 
design stage, and an announcement by the Minister that Castlemaine would be 
the site for a new $25 million country prison. 72 The State Opposition was 
unhappy about some of the proposed changes and hinted at what would become 
a major prison policy platform in 1992 - the privatisation of some prisons. The 
Minister responded claiming "To introduce a single American concept vastly 
different from current Australian practice without any homework is grossly 
irresponsible."73 Responsibility for corrections, however, transferred from 
Pauline Toner to the Attorney-General, Jim Kennan, in March 1985, 74 and the 
00C issued a 2-year strategic plan designed to formalise correctional 
operational policies. 75 
67 	Williams, Custody and Control, 29. 
68 	Western Australia Department of Corrections Annual Report, 1981-1982, 61. 
69 	Williams, Custody and_control, 30. 
70 	News Release, Minister for Community Welfare Services, 6 June 1983. 
71 	W. Clifford. Penal Philosophies and Practice in the 1970's, (Canberra: Australian 
Institute of Criminology, 1976) 7. 
72 	News Release, Minister for Community Welfare Services, 19 January 1985. 
73 	Ibid. 
74 	00C Annual Report 1985-86, 1. 
75 	Victorian Office of Corrections Strategic Plan 1985/86 to 1987/88, 
00C Resource Centre, 1985. 
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Prison officers were now aware of intended operational policies. The newly 
framed policies detailed both prison philosophical and operational aims. 76 While 
the immediate ramifications of- these policies would not be clear, the 
organisation could no longer be accused of subterfuge. The policies were a clear 
mandate of future operational direction. Prisoner management practice was 
explicit, but the philosophical base was unclear. The 00C Mission Statement 
stated the 00C "emphasises human interaction, [and] is humane." 77 It appeared 
that the operating philosophy would be a variation on the Dutch concept of 
Humane Containment. 
While 00C administrators were grappling with policy and procedure, prison 
security was still flawed. On 16 June 1985 prison officers discovered hacksaw 
blades, knives and a six metre length of cord in K Division. This is a normal find 
in any prison but to the embarrassment of Victoria's authorities it was found in 
the ultra-maximum security section formerly known as Jika - Jika. 78 The unit, 
which opened at a cost of $7 million dollars in July 1980, 79 and was used to 
house "high risk, long term prisoners," had been described as "one of the most 
modern buildings of its type in the world." 89 It was becoming an embarrassment 
to the prison authorities. Several prisoners had already escaped from the so-
called `unescapable unit' in 1983." The former Minister, Pauline Toner, 
acknowledged the unit's defects when opening a National Conference on 
Technology and Design in prisons in August 1984: She detailed design faults 
and faulty technology in prisons which cost the Australian tax payer millions of 
dollars each year. 
76 	Victorian Office of Corrections Strategic Plan 1985/86 to 1987/88, 
00C Resource Centre, 1985, 4-9. 
77 	[bid, 3. 
73 	News Release issued by the Attorney-General. 17 June 1985. 
79 	Jika-Jika High Security Unit, H.M.Prison Pentridge, 
Department of Community Welfare Services, 1980, 1. 
80 	Ibid. 
81 	Ministerial Statement by the Honourable Pauline Toner, M.P. Minister for  
Community Welfare Services 9 Au• St 1983: Esca es from Pentrid e Prison and 
events leading up to the Proclamation of a State of Emergency, 1. 
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Toner claimed Victoria made less costly mistakes over the past two decades 
simply because 
We haven't built anything worth talking about. The one grand gesture 
was Jika-Jika High Security Unit, now called 'K' Division. It is 
interesting that, in order to be absolutely sure of containing some of our 
bad lads, we march our escapees from our modern High Security Unit 
over to the 120 year-old 'H' Division where the key-in-the-door and 
close contact between officers and prisoners provides infinitely better 
security than the new technology. 82 
However worse was to come. One prisoner took on the identity of another and 
walked to freedom from the MRP. The Attorney-General claimed "prison staff 
are often not provided with sufficient documentation to enable them to carry 
out the proper identification of prisoners after they are delivered to the jail by 
police officers." 83 In the rush to implement prisoner programmes and 
management strategies the primary task of imprisonment, security and custody, 
appeared to have been forgotten. 
Kidston sent the Director of Strategic Services, Foley-Jones, on a tour of 
American and Canadian prisons to "obtain information on prison design, 
perimeter security technology and prison management techniques" in late 
September 1985. 84 Foley-Jones's was given responsibility for "Building 
Development Work." 85 The decision to send the Director of Strategic Services 
and not the Director of Prisons seems strange. While the Director of Strategic 
Services was "to oversee the construction of new facilities and the maintenance 
of existing facilities . ' 86 the Director of Prisons should have been the logical 
person to seek information - particularly with the Government building three 
new prisons. However, it appears, the incumbent was "not sufficiently regarded 
by the Director-General to seek the necessary new prison input." 87 
82 	Minister for Community  Welfare Services, opening speech at National Conference: 
Review of Technological and Design Developments in Prisons, STC, Watsonia. 
22 August 1984. 1. 
83 	News Release issued by the Attorney-General, 28 June 1985. 
84 	00C Annual Report, 1985-86, 35. 
85 	Ibid, 1983-84. 6. 
86 	Ibid, 1985-86. 28. 
87 	Interview with Jim Armstrong, 6 August 1996. 
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Long-term prison policy and management practice decisions were made without 
benefit of expertise. 88 Again, the organisation procrastinated instead of acting. It 
took a series of rapes before a decision was made to shut the four Division 
dormitories in MRP. Announcing the closure, the Attorney-General said he was 
shocked! 
The conditions in the dormitories are unacceptable in this day and age. 
They are intolerable for both inmates and staff and the sooner they are 
closed the better. They are widely recognised as a fire hazard and can 
only be described as Dickensian. 89 
However, there was still dormitory accommodation in D Division (30 beds), E 
Division (138 beds), and J Division (120 beds). Moreover, prisons at Ararat, 
Bendigo, Castlemaine, Dhurringle, Sale and Won Wron all contained dormitory 
accommodation." Double bunks were installed in 150 single cells in D Division 
to replace the lost bedspace in F Division. 91 
The Director of Prisons, Barry Apsey, resigned in February 1986 and was 
replaced by David Grant - the Chief Probation and Parole Officer. 92 Kidston 
"had needed someone who knew the prison ropes" and appointed Apsey until 
he was aware of the Victorian prison climate." Apsey had been the Director of 
Corrective Services in DCWS. Moreover, Kidston's Deputy Director-General 
transferred to the Public Works Department in May. 94 The Attorney-General 
announced that $150 million had been earmarked for new prison construction 
over the following three years. The money was to be spent on 25 major building 
projects which would include, 
• Castlemaine: $20 million medium security jail to accommodate 250 
prisoners. Work to begin on perimeter wall in September this year with 
work on the jail to begin January 1987. To be partly occupied by June 
1988 and completed by April 1989; 
88 	Foley-Jones had been recruited by from WA by Kidston and had "a background in 
social work, - interview with Jim Armstrong, 6 August 1996. 
89 	News Release issued by the Attorney-General. 17 December 1985. 
90 	Information supplied by former Governor. Jim Armstrong. 
91 	News Release issued by the Attorney-General.  17 December 1985. 
92 	00C Annual Report, 1985-86, 30. 
93 	Interview with Jim Armstrong, 6 August 1996. 
94 	00C Annual Report, 1985-86, 30. 
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• Barwon: High security prison worth $45 million to house 250 
prisoners. Earth works complete and work to begin on 
perimeter wall in August this year. To be partly occupied by 
June 1988 and completed by March 1989; - 
• Melbourne Remand Centre: Work to resume in the near 
future on the high security remand centre which will house 
240 prisoners. Construction of the- rernand will enable 
refurbishment of Pentridge remand division; and 
• Staff Training College, Barwon: New $10 million training 
facility to be built adjacent to new Barwon Prison. 95 
Industrial disruption stopped the building of the Melbourne Remand Centre 
(MRC) at the end of 1985. The Government mothballed the project indefinitely. 
The original costs had blown out to $65 million. 96 Imprisonment numbers had 
been rising steadily since 1983 (see Fig.5:4). The only way to cope with prison 
overcrowding had been the liberal interpretation of prison release administrative 
discretion. Prisoners sentenced to a month's imprisonment or less spent the day 
in prison while admission procedures and prisoner information was collated. 97 
The new Corrections Bill, 1986 would close all the anomalies in discretionary 
leave given to prisoners by Governors. 98 
Fig. 5:4 Number of Prison Beds and Daily Average Male Population, 
1983-1992. 
Year Number of beds DAP 
1983-84 
19 84-8 5 "1- 	  
1899 
1912 
1.900 
1579 
1985-86 1931 1819 
1986-87 1934 1834 
1987-88 
1988-89 -r 	  
2058 
2247 
1906 
2006 
1989-90 2486 2192 
1990-91 2481 2204 
1992-92 2355 2156 
Source: 00C Annual Reports. 1983-1992. 
95 	News Release issued by the Attorney-General. 29 April 1986. 
96 	Media Release Minister of Employment and Industrial Affairs, 19 December 1985. 
97 	Ammendments to the Penalties and Sentences Act on 1 June, 1986 curtailed this 
practice. 
98 	News Release issued by the Attorney-General, 18 September 1986. 
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When the 00C commenced operation, there were 1,427 permanent, temporary 
and part-time staff operating on a budget of 544,829,511. 9° By June 1987 the 
total was 1,971 full and part-time staff operating on a budget of 
5101,974,394. 100  In its last full year of operation the 00C had 2,290 employees 
with a budget of $149,541,076. 1°1 The largest appropriation had been in 1990 
when 00C had a budget of $157,369,727 and had 2,435 employees. 102 Coyle, 
commenting on the Scottish Prison Service, noted, 
There is a tendency in any bureaucracy to feed off itself. One 
danger for any headquarters' structure is that it creates a 
raison d'etre of its own, divorced from the substructure which it was set 
up to serve. The Prison Service exists because there are prisoners; 
prisoners are held in prisons by prison staff These are the only essential 
elements in the system. All other elements, including the headquarters'  
structure, are useful but have no separate risht of existence. 1°' 
Funding was made available for programmes, and policies and procedures were 
developed for the 'high profile' soft-sell programmes such as Pre-Release 
Programmes, 104 new Community Based Sentencing Alternatives 105  mentally ill 
prisoners, 106 Official Prison Visitor scheme, 1°7 suicide prevention,'" and prison 
education, among others. 1°9 However, the 00C tried to reduce prison officer 
overtime which had cost $7.7 million in 1985. 11° Kidston's original senior 
management personnel began to leave. The Deputy Director-General had 
transferred in 1985. In February 1987, the Director of Prisons, David Grant, the 
Director of Strategic Services, Chris Foley-Jones, and the Director of Policy 
and Research, Rob Eldridge, resigned." Fifty per cent of Kidston's senior staff 
had now left. 
99 	00C Annual Report, 1983-84. 
loo 	Mid, 1986-87. 
101 	Mid, 1991-92. 
102 	[bid, 1990-91. 
103 	A.G. Coyle, A Comparative Examination Of The Prison Services In North America. 
Winston Churchill Memorial Fellowship, 1984. 95 (underlining in original). 
104 	News Release Minister for Community Welfare services 7 March, 1984. 
105 	Mid, 7 February 1985. 
106 	News Release issued by the Attorney-General, 11 March 1986. 
107 	[bid, 24 April 1985. 
108 	Mid, 30 September 1986. 
109 	Ibid, 11 October 1986. 
110 	Ibid, 20 November, 1986. 
fl 	00C Annual Report, 1986-87, 45. 
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Foley-Jones, the Director of Strategic Services, had been the 'architect' of new 
prison building policy and prisoner management practice. The position had been 
regarded as second only to the Director-General. Interestingly, Kidston 
abolished the position and upgraded the role of Policy and Research to 
Executive status. The new Director of Policy and Research commenced in the _ 	_ _ _ _ 
April. A new Director of Prisons, Tom Abbott, was recruited from the English 
Prison Service and took up his duties in May. Kidston was still optimistic that 
the organisation was making progress. The 1987 Report highlighted the year's 
achievements. These included the passing of the 
Con-ections Act 1986 and finalising work on the accompanying 
Corrections Regulations, Director-General's Rules and Operational 
Orders, [the opening of the redeveloped Fairlea Women's Prison, and] 
piloting innovative unit management techniques at Castlemaine Prison in 
an attempt to improve the quality of the prison environment for both 
staff and prisoners. ' 12 
There was a hostage incident at Bendigo Prison on 20 August which received a 
great deal of publicity at local, state, and national level. A prisoner had taken ten 
hostages (four prisoners and six teaching staff). The siege lasted two days prior 
to resolution." 3 This incident should have warned administrators that the system 
was potentially volatile. But the siege was, probably, pased off as an 
aberration. Indeed, at a conference at the Australian Institute of Criminology in 
Canberra in September, both Kidston and Kennan, the Attorney-General, 
maintained that change to Victoria's prison system was being smoothly 
implemented. Kidston outlined his strategic plan which was to take place from 
1984-1991. 
The first period [1984-86] was characterised by the development of 
the Office, the establishment of the Staff Training College, preparation 
of legislation, designing and planning new facilities, establishing 
a community based corrections division, planning experimental and 
training programs in unit management in preparation for the new 
facilities, and to develop close co-operation with the other arms of the 
criminal justice system. 
00C Annual Report, 1986-87, i-i. 
113 	[bid, 1987-88. 31. 
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The second and most difficult period, 1987-88, was intended to be and 
is a period of consolidation, that is, a period for operational planning of 
three new maximum security institutions, to formulate new staff 
attitudes, to eliminate inefficient work practices, and to introduce 
subordinate legislation and policy directions. The third phase, 1989-91, 
will see the opening of the new and the closing of the old facilities and 
the further development and consolidation of viable community 
corrections progtams. 
Has the 3-Phase Plan Worked? 
The answer is yes, to date. 114 
On 29 October 1987 prisoners in Unit 4 'K' Division (the former Jika-Jika) in 
MRP 
Barricaded the two doors leading to the two sides of the Unit, and the 
barricade of the door leading to Side one was set alight. Despite the 
efforts of prison officers, access to the two sides of the Unit could not 
be gained for some time and, in the result, the four prisoners present in 
side 2 of the Unit were badly affected by smoke and toxic fumes, and the 
five prisoners housed in Side 1 were asphyxiated. 115 
The adverse publicity questioned 00C policies and practices. The Attorney-
General closed `K' Division, and subsequently blamed the previous Liberal 
administration for the tragedy. 116 Walter Jona was Minister when Jika-Jika 
opened. When the Division opened it was "publicly acclaimed." Jona claimed 
that he called in the Opposition (including the future Minister, Pauline Toner) to 
explain the need and purpose of the place prior to its commissioning and that 
They understood the need for that sort of protective security. Victoria, 
in the late 1970s, had perhaps 40 prisoners for whom any normal 
maximum security was grossly inadequate, and 'H' Division [in 
Pentridge Prison] was totally inadequate in terms of security. 117 
114 	W.J. Kidston, "Practical Aspects of Victoria's Approach," in J Vernon, (Ed) 
Developments in Correctional Policy: More Prisons?, Canberra: Seminar 
Proceedings No. 22, 29-30 September 1987. Australian Institute of Criminology. 
B.L. Murray, Report on the Behaviour of the Office of Corrections, 27 December 
1989, 1. 
116 	Interview with the former Minister for Community Welfare Services, The Hon. 
Walter Jona, AM, 6 August 1996. 
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The Liberal Government had sent 
People round the world to view facilities with clear instructions from the 
Government through the Minister to the Department that they were to 
avoid anything inhumane like Katingal [in the NSW Prison System]. 
There was to be nothing underground and the [cell] windows were to be 
at eye-level height for the first time in a Victorian Prison."' 
The "metallic electronic operation" of the Unit should have been different. 
"That's where there were grounds for some criticism, where there was room for 
a lot of adjustment." Jona felt Jika-Jika was "totally misrepresented" and was 
portrayed "as a cruel place." Prisoners "were never intended to be there for the 
whole part of their prison life." Again, "we were not building a unit for the 
average murderer." Jona claimed that when Toner took office, 
She changed all the rules in Jika-Jika and operated it in a way which 
it was never intended. For example, she took away the interior 
security cameras [and] she took away some of the outside spotlights. 
They were considered to be intimidating [to the prisoners]. She changed 
the mechanical operation of the doors. 
Jona believes that "the terrible tragedy was brought about by the changes in 
[Jika-Jika's] system that they [the ALP] made." Moreover, "I got the blame for 
it, although it happened years after I had gone, because they said this is what 
Jika-Jika was destined to lead to." 119 The Attorney-General noted 
Prison management will continue to be a difficult job. In our prison 
system, just as in any other prison system, there will be problems from 
time to time. Prisons are by their nature very difficult places to work in, 
to live in and to manage, and in political terms the news about prisons 
invariably concentrates on bad news and good news is in fact 
represented by there being media silence about the issue rather than 
positive stories. I had also said that it was the intention of the 
Government to close Jika Jika in its existing form once the new high 
security gaol at Barwon was completed. However, the recent a fire 
made it impossible to persist with Jika Jika in that form, particularly 
having regard to the design weaknesses which led to the doors being 
able to be jammed and fire started. To suggest that it would have been 
responsible to keep the Jika Jika unit open in its then form is not 
realistic.'" 
117 	Ibid. 
118 	Ibid. 
119 	Ibid. 
120 	Speech by the Attorney-General for Victoria. The Hon. Jim Kennan, MLC, to the 
Eltham ALP Branch Meeting, Wednesday, 18 November 1987. 
227 
While the Attorney General maintained the fiction of a liberalised regime and 
new prisoner management strategy, the reality, particularly at Pentridge, was 
quite different.The Attorney-General announced a number of security measures 
• the commencement for the first time of dog patrols between 7pm and 	 
7am; 
• increased staffing in "H" Division; 
• installation of new fences, together with increased razor ribbon wire; 
• the installation of cameras for "A" Division, "H" Division and "B" 
Division; 
• the fitting of high tensile steel grilles to "H" Division windows; 
• the installation of the electronic surveillance systems for "H" 
Division windows; and 
• the installation of a central television monitoring point in the 
security office to have dedicated staffing for two shifts a day to 
monitor all existing and new cameras in the Pentridge Prison. 121 
The 00C became the responsibility of the Minister for Police and Emergency 
Services, Steve Crabb in December 1987. The prison system was contivally 
undergoing change. Indeed, it seemed that the major part of Kidston's 
'correctional change platform' focused on alternatives to imprisonment 
including the use of Community Based Corrections. In one of his final speeches 
as Director-General, Kidston criticised the notion of prison rehabilitation and 
lauded the use of the sentencing alternative. He claimed, "Our greatest chance 
to "rehabilitate rehabilitation" ... was through community based corrections 
programs. I22 Kidston did not complete the task for which Pauline Toner had 
recruited him. He accepted a promotion to Director of Housing and 
Construction in March, 1988. His successor was Peter Harmsworth. 123 
121 	Ibid. 
122 	W.J. Kidston, Corrections Policy & Management Issues for the 1990's, paper 
delivered to the Australian Bicentennial Congress on Corrective Services, 24-27 
January 1988, Sydney, NSW. 
123 	00C Annual Report, 1987-88, 54. 
228 
Towards the 1990s. 
Kidston left the 00C with three new prisons either partially constructed or on 
the drawing board: - These new prisons were designed to manage prisoners in 
small groups using the _concept of unit management. A pilot_programme_ had 	 
been attempted at the old Castlemaine Prison but had yet to be evaluated. 
Prison officers were unsure of the changes. They believed that most of the 
available finance was being diverted to Community Based Corrections (CBC). 
Official statements verified their fears. Comments on the use of imprisonment as 
a last resort, and of the first class CBC which had been developed were 
commonplace. As Kidston noted, "the most exciting aspect of the 
implementation of the [strategic] plan has been the establishment of a highly 
professional and acceptable community based corrections program." 124 Prison 
officers could be forgiven if they thought that they had been disregarded. The 
difficulty they faced was both lack of information and misinformation. Brown-
Grieves blames poor marketing and lack of communication for most of these 
problems. He claims there is an important by-product associated with this. 
If an officer feels that he is not being fully informed, or that some of 
the programs run by his department contravene his personal 
correctional philosophies, then his morale will suffer. When there is a 
general feeling of low morale, the likelihood of industrial disputation 
increases, and the ability of the prison to provide effective programs 
decreases accordingly. 125 
Indeed Victoria's prison officers were mystified. Kidston, the change agent for 
Victoria's prisons, had gone without completing his task. What tack would 
Kidston's successor take? Harmsworth first move was to transfer the Director 
of Prisons, Tom Abbott, into a 'new' Inspector-General's position. This role 
was to inspect and provide advice on prisons and reported directly to the 
Director-General. While this was a high profile role Harmsworth's motives 
could be questioned. Abbott had been Kidston's appointee and was on contract 
from the English Prison System for another two years. 
124 	Kidston, "Practical Aspects of Victoria's Approach," 29. 
125 	S. Brown-Greaves, "Overcrowding-Police and Prisons" in Vernon, 
Developments in Correctional Policy: More Prisons?, 58. 
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Harmsworth appointed a CBC senior manager from NSW as Director of 
Prisons. John Griffin commenced duties in August 1988. 126 What the constant 
change of Director of Prisons meant to uniformed staff is unknown. Prison 
officers were probably less than impressed. They had been informed that prison 
direction was changing yet all that appeared to be changing was the person in _ _ 
charge of prisons. Harmsworth abolished the Deputy Director-General's 
position, and the Director of Policy and Research transferred to the Health 
Department. The position of Director of Building Projects was upgraded to 
Executive status. However, the incumbent was promoted to Housing and 
Construction. In 12 months the only people to keep the same positions on the 
Executive were the Directors of CBC and Management Services respectively. 
Eldridge returned to the Policy and Research directorship, a position that he had 
resigned from in February of the previous year. 127 In August 1988 the 
Government launched a comprehensive strategy to cover "prevention, 
apprehension and punishment of criminals, rehabilitation of offenders and care 
of victims." The strategy was known as BLAST 128 
Government policy appeared to directed toward rehabilitation of offenders. The 
Minister for Corrections, Steve Crabb, noted that most of the' initiatives were 
"already up and running." 129 Prison officers had not been informed. They were 
still confused. A uniformed member of the 00C Executive Development 
Program wrote, 
Having reached a state of affairs where it would seem that the 
rehabilitative ideal has been discredited by the theorists and abandoned 
by the community it could be forgiven if one were to wonder why 
Victorian correctional administrators appear to persist in promoting the 
ideal. It would even seem that in recent years the ideology has 
undergone a resurgence in this state (sic) through the emphasis placed 
upon the Unit Management concept and a number of alternatives to 
imprisonment.'" 
126 	00C Annual Report, 1988-89, 47. 
127 	Ibid. 
128 	Building a Law-Abiding Society-Together, (BLAST), August, 1988, 
Victorian Government Publication, 49320/88, 2. 
129 	News Release from the Minister for Police and Emergency Services, 
18 September 1988. 
130 	T. Rodgers, 00C Executive Development Program October, 1989, 11. 
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Indeed, it seemed as if Crabb and the 00C were taking the 'soft' option when 
selling Government policy. The publication of BLAST was meant to assure the 
public. As a public relations exercise it might have achieved its aim. However, 
as a policy document it was fronti flu/la fides. 131 Whether-the Government was 
selling the public tried and tired policies is a moot point. BLAST was more of 
the same, but came differently packaged. The difficulty about implementing new 
policies was neither the time nor effort that it took to research. It was mainly 
convincing Cabinet colleagues that the policy was sound politically. According 
to Jona, before considering implementing a policy a Minister must ask three 
questions: 
1 	Where does it fall in line with the policy of the party? 
2 	How much will it cost? and, 
3 	Community tolerance - how will the public accept it?' 32 
Moreover, "the Premier did not want to be continually answering questions if 
the policy was negatively perceived." 133 Again, 
As prisons were a pretty poor relative [when negotiating for funds from 
Cabinet], you had to undertake a [public relations] campaign to sell to 
the public. A backlash from the public can set you back ten years. 134 
The Melbourne Remand Centre (MRC) opened on 6 April 1989. It was 
expected to house 240 prisoners in 13 'units' with between 4 and 30 prisoners 
in each unit. The Minister, Steve Crabb, noted, 
This opening not only fulfils an outstanding pledge, it also marks the 
beginning of the most comprehensive prison development program that 
has been undertaken in more than a century. It is also an important 
element in the Government's comprehensive criminal justice strategy 
released last year, with the purpose of 'Building a Law Abiding Society 
Together.' 135 
The difficulties in changing prison management philosophy have been aptly 
described by Dllullio. 
131 Literal translation, 'never judge a book by its cover', Ehrlich, A Dictionary of Latin 
Tags and Phrases, 112. 
132 	Interview with Walter Jona, 6 August 1996. 
133 	Ibid. 
134 	Ibid. 
135 	News Release from the Premier of Victoria, 6 April 1989. 
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The California Department of Corrections had the mandate until 1978 to 
"rehabilitate offenders." 136 However, "the law was changed, and the 
department's chief duties became public protection and punishment." 137 DiIullio 
asks, "how is that to_be_implementedr 138 Victoria's prison officers were asking 
the same question. In May 1989 the 00C published a set of corporate 
directions which would take the Department through until 1994.' 39 An 
organisational priority was "To develop and implement the concepts of unit 
management in new prisons and to progressively introduce unit management 
concepts to all prisons." 140 Apparently the implementation of unit management 
did not have unqualified support. There were 
Guidelines to be reviewed and published, Training to be further 
developed, Evaluation of program to be undertaken, Other forms of 
management of prisoners in small groups needs to be explored."' 
Unit management implementation was nowhere near readiness. Perhaps the 
state of unreadiness was in part due to the continuing changes in the 
organisation's structure and Executive personnel. Harmsworth changed the 
organisation almost annually (see Figs 5:5 and 5:6). The Minister inspected the 
new $58.7 million Barwon Prison at Lara in June 1989. He noted that the prison 
would house 250 prisoners "in a campus arrangement of 15 buildings with the 
living units grouped around enclosed courtyards." 42 Crabb commented that the 
prison would be used as "Victoria's main high security jail." 143 This was a far 
cry from Toner's proposed 'Correctional Centre.' Moreover, the proposed 
adjacent new Staff Training College did not rate a mention. It has yet to be 
built. 
136 	Difulio, Governing Prisons, 134. 
137 	Ibid. 
138 	Ibid. 
139 	"The Way_Ahead - The Next Five Years, Comorate  Directions: 1989-94, 
00C, May, 1989. 
140 	Ibid, 17-18. 
141 	1989 Audit of Corrections Master Plan (1983) High Priority Recommendations, 
00C, Recommendation 31, 3. 
142 	Media Release, 00C, 16 June 1989. 
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Figure 5:5 00C Organisational Structure at 30 June 1989. 
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Source: 00C Annual Report 1988-90. 
In July 1989 the State Government announced that it would set up an 
Independent Board of Inquiry into specific matters raised by the Coroner about 
the behaviour of the 00C during the Jika-Jika inquest.'" The Coroner found 
that, 
If one looks at prison administration, by looking at the performance 
of prison administration with respect to this fire, one finds ineptitude, 
failure and non-performance in almost every aspect of the events 
examined. In this case, the prison administration is seen to be in a state 
of general collapse. 145 
The Barwon Prison was officially opened on 23 January 1990.' 46 
143 	Ibid. 
144 	Media Release. 00C, 31 July 1989. 
145 	Ibid. 
146 	News Release from the Office of the Premier of Victoria. 23 January 1990. 
The Government's reforms to prisons were "part of a widespread strategy on 
law and order that dealt with penalties, crime prevention, rehabilitation of 
offenders, and care and protection for crime victims." 147 The Premier -restated 
the Government position, "We want a system in which the public-can - have 
confidence, but which offers offenders the best possible prospect of 
rehabilitation." 148 
Barwon Prison's opening meant that Pentridge's E Division could be closed in 
March. The Castlemaine Prison closed its doors on 22 June. The majority of 
staff at the old prison were transferred to the Loddon Prison on the outskirts of 
Castlemaine. However, the experiment of unit management at Castlemaine 
Prison was never properly evaluated. Authorities would find it difficult to use 
this information as a basis for prisoner management at Loddon. 
There were no changes to CBC, DMS, DPP, or DBP (See Fig. 5:6) in 
Harmsworth's next organisation reshuffle. Prisons Directorate gained the 
former Directorate of Strategic Services and Operations and Emergency 
services. However, Griffin lost supervision of the three Assistant directors of 
Prisons. They would now report direct to the Director-General. In addition, a 
new Directorate was created - Operations Review and Inspections. This 
Directorate would be charged with management review, inspections of all 
prisons, and would assume responsibility for the now demoted rank of 
Inspector-General. The new Minister for Corrections, Mal Sandon, announced 
at the opening of the redeveloped forensic psychiatric unit in "G" Division in 
MRP on 28 June that "Unit management is a major new initiative being 
progressively introduced into all prisons and the 00C is providing officer 
training to develop the skills necessary for any officer to perform unit 
management duties." 149 This was exposed as a fallacy in July 1990. 1 " 
147 	Ibid. 
148 	Ibid. 
149 	Media Release from the Minister for Police and Emergency Services, 28 June 1990. 
150 	Report on the Accountability of the Office of Corrections, 
The Ombudsman Victoria, July 1990. 
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Figure 5:6 00C Or2anisational Structure at 30 June 1990. 
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The Ombudsman found, inter alia, that there were "differing philosophies 
between the 00C and prison officers." Moreover, there appeared to be "an 
atmosphere of mistrust" existing between officers at prison and head office. The 
prison officers felt that the 00C "fails to understand the problems and needs of 
officers "at the coal face" and that decisions are made without paying heed to 
the difficulties of implementation within prison." 151 The Ombudsman noted, 
The Director-General has agreed that this has been a long standing 
problem. He has advised that a number of initiatives have been 
implemented to deal with the problem including the publication of an 
in-house magazine (Keypoints), the establishment of regular staff 
meetings and the development and implementation of a planning process 
in prisons. 152 
151 	Report on the Accountability of the Office of Corrections, 
The Ombudsman Victoria, July 1990, 13. 
152 	Ibid. 
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The Ombudsman commented on the differing attitudes held towards the concept 
of unit management between Head Office and the prison officers. 
It is also considered that there is a general feeling in relation to the 
attitude of prison officers to new developments in correctional 
matters. When the unit management system was first trialed in H _ 
division it was met with resistance from both officers and prisoners and 
eventually failed. This system is now in use at the Melbourne Remand 
Centre, Barwon Prison, Tarrengower [the new minimum-security female 
prison at Malden] and K Division and, whilst it appears to be operating 
satisfactorily, its major tests will be at Barwon and Loddon prisons when 
those prisons are fully operational. It is often apparent that the policies 
of the 00C are not reflected in the actions of officers as detected in 
investigating complaints and in the views of officers expressed during 
visits to prisons, discussions with training groups, etc. by the 
Ombudsman and his staff.'" 
The Director-General agreed that there had been much confusion about the 
introduction of the concept. He, however, was confident of success. 
The Director-General conceded that the initial introduction of unit 
management into H Division was not successful but he considered that 
this had much to do with the complexities associated with trying to 
manage five different groups of prisoners in one unit. He has referred to 
the success of unit management in the prisons where it is in operation 
now. He has stated that the principles of unit management are based on 
extensive research into developments overseas and interstate and that 
the introduction of unit management is also linked to the implementation 
of Structural Efficiency Principles for custodial officers. Unit 
management is intended to lead to the multi-skilling of prison officers 
particularly in the area of developing more professional prison 
management and human relationship slcills. 154 
It appeared the Director-General was trying to justify the new prisoner 
management practice. His fiction that the the concept had been subject to 
'extensive' research overseas could easily be disproved. There was lingering 
doubt in the American jurisdiction as to the concept's usefulness. And, the 
decision to introduce the concept into H Division has to be examined in light of 
the purpose of the Division. Most prisoners who were sent to H Division were 
regarded as the system's 'heavies.' Apart from being a constant management 
problem in the general prison population, this group of prisoners were a source 
of `standover' tactics. 
153 	Ibid, 13-14. 
154 	Ibid, 14. 
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The system had a duty of care to other prisoners and one way of protecting 
them was to segregate the 'heavies.' Moreover, the type of officer who worked 
in this Division was used to constant verbal and -- physical abuse. Indeed, the 
Division's regime could be compared to a militaryglasshouse.Llo introduce 
such a concept in this Division with these types of protagonists was 
questionable. The underlying ' factor in the Director-General's defence of the 
concept - that of prison officer multi-skilling - is fallacious. The simple fact is 
there are less staff working in the unit management regime. The prison officer 
was expected to become a para-professional overnight on the basis of a week-
long course. The American experience has suggested that recruitment of staff to 
work in 'new generation' prisons is entirely different from that for custodial 
institutions. The critical dimensions for working in unit management are based 
on: 
1 	Managing the living unit to assure a safe and humane 
environment; 
2 	Handling inmate discipline; 
3 	Responding to inmate requests; 
4 	Building positive rapport and personal credibility with 
inmates; 
5 	Supervising in a clear, well-organized, and attention-getting 
manner; 
6 	Resolving inmate problems and conflicts; and 
7 	Maintaining effective administration and staff relations 
These dimensions require very different employee skills from those 
traditionally recruited for correctional work. Such dimensions 
present a different list of desired skills, knowledge, and abilities of staff 
and dramatically change the applicant pool to be targeted. This new 
targeted recruitment includes social workers, counselors, and others 
involved in the human service delivery field.'" 
When a fundamentally different prisoner management regime is implemented the 
ramifications for staff and prisoners are immeasurable. For example, the 
Michigan Responsibility Model "placed a premium on measures that maximized 
inmates' responsibility for their own actions." 156 But in order to accomplish 
this, the staff have to change their operational practice. 
155 	
S.W. McCampbell, "Direct Supervision: Looking for the Right People - 
American Jails, Vol.IV/number 4 (November/December, 1990): 68-69, 68. 
U6 	DiIullio, Governing Prisons, 118. 
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Tight security is "counterproductive" because inmates ought to be given 
a chance to behave in acceptable ways. Rather than having their every 
move monitored inmates ought to be given the greatest measure of 
freedom consistent with basic security requirements. 157 
Victoria's prison system was trying to implement a new prisoner management 
• 
concept with very -little -support mechanism§ - arid—e-ven less training for change. 
As the Ombudsman noted, 
It seems that one inhibiting factor on progress in this area could be the 
maintenance of a disciplined service environment. This tends to 
perpetuate the militaristic trappings of the service and resists progress 
towards greater involvement with the prisoners. It also appears that the 
current system of rotating officers through various posts leads to 
officers with special skills in some areas of work spending considerable 
amounts of time in areas of work in which they have few skills. For 
instance, officers with limited inter -personal skills can be required to 
deal directly with prisoners or members of the public. Consideration 
should be given to possible changes in the organisation of prison officers 
to bring the system more into line with modern developments in 
penology. 138 
The Ombudsman's solution was to separate the prison service into two parts. 
One section was to look after security and the other was to deal with 
management of prisoners and visitors." 9 
Loddon Prison at Castlemaine opened on 2 August 1990. The $29.4 million 
medium and minimum security institution would house 64 minimum security 
prisoners in eight small units and 186 medium security prisoners in three larger 
units. The Minister, Mal Sandon, said the opening of the prison was the 
"culmination of the unprecedented corrections master plan embarked upon by 
the Government in 1983." 16° With Tom Abbott's secondment from the English 
Prison Service completed, the Director-General abolished his unit and 
established the Operational Review and Inspections Division in March 1990. 
157 Ibid. 119. 
158 	Report on the Accountability of the Office of Corrections,  14. 
159 	Ibid. 
160 	Media Release from the Minister for Police and Emergency Services, 2 August 1990. 
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The main purpose of this unit, unlike Abbott's Inspector-General Unit which 
focused on prisons, was organisation-wide inspection and management 
review. 161 The specialisation required for prison inspection, particularly in light 
of the introduction of new management techniques, was now be in the hands of 
a mixture of prison and CBC personnel. Prison officers had little time for the 
• 	 -• 
other half of the 00C whom they perceived as 'do-gooders' and 'prisoners 
friends.' Prison officers believed that the introduction of CBC staff in a prison 
review team highlighted the focus of the Director-General and the organisation 
per se. Prisons were the poor cousins in the 00C relationship. 
Indeed, prison officers were subject to rank restructure in line with structural 
efficiency principles. This restructure came into effect in November 1990. 162 A 
new six-level rank structure gave the staff a new title. They were to be known 
as Prison Correctional Officers. 163 The warders and turnkeys of Barrow's era 
had progressed from being wardens but what had changed? 
The 00C continued to release policies and programmes on many diverse 
prisoner and offender areas.'" Three new Acts with major implications for the 
00C were passed during the Autumn 1991 Session of Parliament. These were, 
Corrections (Prison Management and Prisoners) Act 1991  
Corrections (Remissions) Act 1991, and 
Sentencing Act, 1991 
161 	00C Annual Report, 1990-9 I, 17. 
162 	Ibid, 15. 
163 	Ibid. 
164 	There were statements on: Education and Vocational Training Programs; Prison 
Industries and Employment; Long-Term Unemployed Offenders; Health Programs; 
Alcohol and Drug Treatment Programs; HIV Positive Prisoners; Psychiatrically 
Disturbed Prisoners; Sex Offenders; Violent Offenders; Drink Driving Offenders: 
Community Based Orders; Personal Development Condition; Women Offenders; 
Aboriginal Offenders; Young Adult Offenders: Melbourne Remand Centre Youth 
Unit; Day in Prison Program; Adventure Based Challenge Program; Offenders from 
a Non-English Speaking Background; Intellectually Disabled Offenders; Community 
Integration Program; and the Custodial Community Permit Program, 00C Annual  
Report, 1990-91. 20-31. 
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The first Act was designed to improve the security of prisons and the 
management of prisoners. The second Act to abolish prisoner remissions and 
the Pre-Release Program for prisoners sentenced after the commencement of 
the Act. The Sentencing Act, 199J replaced the Penalties and Sentences Act, 
1985 and covered all general provisions relating to the sentencing of 
offenders. 165 The 00C now had enabling legislation to cover the anomalies 
found in the various former Acts. The 00C continued the implementation of 
unit management. A review of practices in K Division in early 1990, 166 found 
that a number of issues needed to be addressed "including clarification of the 
philosophy and purpose of the unit." 167 To overcome the perceived deficiencies, 
Schwartz recommended that the unit, 
Redefine philosophy, objectives and organisational design; 
Redefine regimes, prisoner management, program unit operations; 
Revise operational procedures; 
Revise staff delegations; 
Revise staff profile, duty statements for uniform and program 
staff, and rostering practices; 
Develop human resource guide; 
Translation of staff, and 
Staff Training 168 
The initial experiment with unit management had been beset by teething 
problems. Ironically, the unit management co-ordinator commented "No doubt, 
given the enthusiasm staff have already shown, K Division will surpass the 
standard it previously achieved as a unit managed division." 169 The NSW system 
also had problems with unit management implementation. For example, the 
Minister for Corrective Services noted 
In the past affirmed my belief in the method of unit management as a 
desirable model of prisoner management. The attempted implementation 
of this strategy was made untenable due to prisoners possessing freedom 
to roam the gaols as they wished, to spend their time intoxicated, 
listening to cassettes, watching television or just 'doing their own 
thing.' 170 
165 	00C Annual Report, 1990-91, 1. 
166 	Dr David Schwartz had managed a similar unit on unit management practices in 
Long Bay Prison in Sydney. 
167 	Unit Management in Victorian Prisons, Information for officers 20 September 1990. 
168 	Ibid. 
169 	Ibid. 
170 	Ibid, 9. 
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The major problem with Victoria's implementation was that each prison and 
individual units within prisons began to practice 'their version' of unit 
management.' 71 This pattern had also been noted in California where "the 
system was more than ever the sum of what individual wardens happened to be 
doing at their prisons." 172 By December 1991 the Director-General noted that, 
Work on the progressive implementation of unit management into 
Victoria's prisons continued during the year. Unit management is 
already operating in all of our new prisons, and Robert Eldridge, 
assisted by a small team of implementers (sic), will be responsible for 
the development and implementation of unit management across all 
prisons.Unfortunately, implementation has been slowed because its 
development is linked to award restructuring which is not progressing as 
fast as I would like. 173 
Eldridge, the former Director of Policy and Research was now given the 
mandate to implement the strategy. It appeared that the task force originally 
charged with implementation did not achieve and was replaced by a higher 
profile, and more senior, figure. In April 1992, Harmsworth announced the 
departure of the Director of Prisons, John Griffin. Harmsworth commented that 
a number of changes in Prisons Division had brought about: 
• the focussing of the role of the ADOP (Strategic Services) [Assistant 
Director of Prisons] on the planning, development, implementation and 
training development relating to Unit Management; 
• the establishment, on temporary basis, the position of ADOP 
(Program Development and Implementation) to co-ordinate priority 
prisoner programs across prisons; 
• the greater emphasis on assigning senior staff key projects consistent 
with the "Acting Strategically" development program. 
During the "Acting Strategically" program, I indicated my intention 
to move away in Head Office from fixed organisational structures and 
the adoption of more flexible structures that assigned key staff to 
priority project areas. 
171 	From conversations by the author with various prison personnel , and from personal 
experience visiting all Victorian Prisons as part of then duties. See also J.R. Beeden. 
Report on validation of SPO/CPO Promotional Courses 1989 to 1991, 
internal report to the Co-ordinator of Training Services, Bill Paterson, October 1991. 
172 	DiIullio, Governing Prisons, 133. 
173 	Newsbreak,Vol.6 No. 9, (December 1991). 
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• 	I have discussed these changes with John Griffin, the Director of 
Prisons, and he sees it as an appropriate time to step aside to enable 
the new arrangements to achieve their full potentia1. 174 
Harmsworth maintained that he would not replace Griffin but would allocate his 	 
dutiesto four ADOPs who would report directly to Harmsworth. 175 On 17 _ 
August Harmsworth appointed Mike Harrington to the position of Director of 
Prisons. 176 Harrington was a career bureaucrat. There was little evidence that he 
would be an asset to prison officers.'" It would not matter. On 6 October 
Harmsworth was called to a meeting with the newly elected Liberal Government 
and told that "The Office of Corrections has now been absorbed within the new 
Justice Department together with the Attorney-General's Department and the 
Ministry for Police and Emergency services." 178 The 00C had fallen to new 
Government restructure and changes. 
Victoria's 'Prison Departmenehad survived for approximately 140 years. In that 
time its administrative arm had grown exponentially. It had continued to provide 
bed spaces for a burgeoning prison population though lack of finance prevented 
it supplying contemporary penal standard accomodation. It survived successive 
governmentmental apathy. It was never been considered to be more than the 
"poor cousin of the public service." 179 
Its management structures suffered through successive administrators trying to 
find the 'right' combination. In the last twenty years of operation from 1970 to 
1990 the Head Office arm of the organisation appeared to be in competition 
with its prison system. It may have been that it was more politically feasible for 
Head Office to focus on the 'soft options' of alternatives to imprisonment rather 
than face the difficulties of trying to administer a system that had been 
irrevocably changed through philosophical edict. 
	
' 174 	Internal memorandum from the Director-General to Prisons Division staff, 
8 April 1992. 
175 	Ibid. 
176 	Kevpoints. vol. 4. no. 1, (September, 1992) 24. 
177 	Ibid. 
178 	Nel,vsbrealc  Director-General's farewell message. October 1992. 
179 	Interview with Jim Armstrong, 6 August 1996. 
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The prison system suffered from the competing influences of order and 
accountability. Its primary function was containment and control of prisoners. 
The movement to make prison 'open' and accountable in the 1970s drew 
attention _to the_fact _that_prison operation depended on the aquiescence of 
prisoners. _ 
When public attention focussed on prisoners rights and changed prisoner 
management practices, the resulting changes in operational procedures created a 
volatile prison environment. Prisoners questioned procedures. Prison officers 
did not have the requisite skills to cope with the change. Their training reflected 
a by-gone practice - order and obedience. The change of goverment in the early 
1980s found an unprecedented financial commitment. New prisons were 
designed and constructed. The organisation again attained departmental status. 
Recruitment was at an all-time high. A new prisoner management strategy was 
to be implemented. Morale was excellent' s° Yet the organisation failed to 
deliver. While it is simple to blame the organisation's demise on poor 
management practices, the realities can be quite different. The 00C foundered 
as a result of the classical penal dilemma - failure to address the competing 
mixture of policy, practice, and prison officer training. 
This chapter has dealt with the Government's decision in 1983 to create a 
separate department of corrections - the 00C. There is no question that the 
government committed massive funding to change and upgrade the prison 
system. Yet, in retrospect, providing funding was never going to be enough. If 
Victoria's prison system was going to meet the State's requirements through to 
the new Millenium, it required detailed research into the changing focus on 
prisons and prisoners. 
180 	CPO Sandra Moore, one of the original CPOs at the new Barwon Prison, 
described the motivation of the new staff as "kind of euphoric." She claims that 
she felt part of a new era in prison operation. The feeling quickly dissipated when 
old operational practices soon became commonplace. 
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The fact that the old custody and control practices were still being practiced 
should have alerted authorities that a fundamental change to prison officers' 
roles also required a massive change to traditional prison officer training 
practices. It appears, however, that prison officer training was never regarded as 
a major priority. 
The following two chapters deal with the 00C's decision to introduce a new 
prisoner management concept into Victoria's prisons. That the concept was in 
its infancy and had yet to be scientifically evaluated was inconsequential. 
Change had to be made to Victoria's prison system. The ramifications of the 
proposed changes, again, were never given serious consideration. It appears 
that authorities thought that building new prisons and changing traditional 
operating practices would be sufficient to ensure success. 
Chapter 6 examines the concept of unit management. It deals with its 
introduction into the American Federal Prison system and the attempts by other 
American local and state jurisdictions to implement the concept and build "new 
generation" jails to accomodate the practice.'" The American practitioners very 
quickly found that staff had to be retrained to not only accept the new practice 
but also to implement it in a satisfactory manner. Again, it quickly becomes 
apparent that each locale had variations in unit management practice The 
visiting Victorian authorities may not have considered this during their 
investigations. Chapter 7 considers the 1980s prison officer training and the 
recurring theme is that of custody and control. 
181 	L.L. Zupan. Jails: Reform and the New Generation Philosophy, 
(Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1991). 
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Chapter 6 
Unit Management: The new Panacea? 
--The--authorities when- announcing a policy tend not to emphasize its gaps, 
difficulties and inconsistencies and therefore make it appear more unified, 
- simple and attractive_thanitreally turns out ta be in-practice.—I 	_ _ 
In the early 1980s two Australian prison systems were re-assessing their 
prisoner management strategies. New South Wales (NSW) and Western 
Australia (WA) had committed millions of dollars to fabricate purpose-built 
institutions to replace outdated and decaying edifices. Along with government 
building approvals came decisions to change traditional prisoner management 
practices. Each system had received reports from the USA on American 
correctional trends. 2 Australian administrators praised the relatively new 
prisoner management strategy being used in the recently termed 'direct 
supervision facilities.' This prisoner management strategy was also known as 
unit management. 
Unit management is an inmate management concept developed by the 
Federal Prison System to reduce the size of inmate management units 
and housing groups to approximately fifty inmates.' 
But direct supervision was literally in its infancy with less than a dozen 
institutions implementing the concept prior to 1984. 4 What was direct 
supervision? Why had it arisen? And why were Australian prison administrators 
so keen to fundamentally change prison architecture and prisoner management 
operation? After all, the traditional Australian prison edifice and prisoner 
management strategy had survived nearly 200 years of white settlement. 
However, in the 1980s Australian State prison systems were archaic, run-down, 
and moribund. 
R. Forward. (Ed) Public Policy in Australia. (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1974) 12. 
2 	P.M. Egge. The United States Prison System. NSW Churchill Fellowship, 19. 
October. 1983, and I.C. Hill, Development of the professional role of prison officers. 
paper presented at the Australian Bicenteenial International Congress on Corrective 
Services, Sydney. January 1988. 2. 
3 	W.R. Nelson. "The Origins of the Podular Direct Supervision Concept: 
An Eyewitness Account - American Jails. (Spring, 1988): 8-16, 8. 
W.R. Nelson and M.D. Davis. "Podular Direct Supervision: The First Twenty 
Years- American Jails. (July/August. 1995): 11-22. 16. 
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Prison conditions had been the cause of riots and insurrection in the 1970s. ) 
Little had been done to remedy the situation in the interim. The burgeoning 
prison population forced both the NSW and WA governments to address these 
problems. The decision to build new prisons was complimented by the 
  recommendations to implement a different type of prisoner management 
practice. 6 Australian prison operation is, however, replete with examples of 
operational and prisoner programme plagiarism. Administrators return from 
annual conferences with other system's ideas or innovations.' But why would 
Australian prison heads accept international prison concepts without intense 
analysis of operational practices? Prison administrators are generally reluctant 
to discuss prisoner management models or operating policy. It may be that 
many are less than knowledgeable about either previous or contemporary prison 
philosophy, and mask their shortcomings behind standards phrases as 
"Protecting the Community and Rehabilitating Offenders" 9 or, 
To contribute to the administration of justice and to the protection of 
society by exercising safe, secure and humane control of all persons 
referred to the department, while providing opportunities to assist 
offenders to become law-abiding members of the community. 19 
Australian prison systems had been operating on a mixture of the Medical and 
Justice philosophical models inherited from the USA (see Fig 6:1). These 
models determined prison practice for five decades. 
See M. Findlay. The State of the Prison. (Bathurst, NSW: Mitchellsearch. 1982): 
G. Zdenkowski and D. Brown. The Prison Struggle, 
(Ringwood. Vic: Penguin. 1982): T. Vinson. Wilful Obstruction. 
(North Ryde. NSW: Methuen. 1982): 
R. Tomasic and I. Dobinson. The Failure of Imprisonment, 
( Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1979): Report of the Board of Inquiry into several  
matters concerning HM Prison Pentridge and the maintenance of discipline in  
prisons. 25 September. 1973. Victorian Government Printer (The Jenkinson 
Report): Controller of Prisons Report for Year ended 30 June 1975, 
Parliament of Tasmania. 
6 	Hill. Development of the professional role of prison officers. 2. 
Heads of prison operation meet at a yearly conference where information on 
programmes and current operation is disseminated. 
Type of institution, classification of and type of prisoners, operating correctional 
philosophy, and prisoner supervision or management model. 
9 	Statement of Purpose. Objectives and Priorities. Correctional services Division. 
Department of Justice. Victoria. 1993. 
Department of Correctional Services. Charter. South Australia, 1992. 
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The Medical Model portrayed crime as a disease and the criminal as a patient 
who could be treated and cured." The Justice Model, on the other hand, put the 
onus on the prisoner to participate in and take charge of his 'rehabilitation.' 
MacNamara noted, 
The new penologists posit a basic conflict between the medical 
model maintaining that crime is the product of individual defects and 
disorders that can be corrected in a program of medical, psychiatric, and 
social rehabilitation and a readjusted or reformed returned to his rightful 
place in society versus a justice model based on the more classic 
doctrine of the free moral agent and of individual responsibility for one's 
criminal behavior. 12 
Australian public opinion, however, tended to view prisons as "rehabilitation 
centres and has conceived prison sentences as general deterrents to crime." 3 
Some systems continued the practice of custody and control with minimal 
interruption by the introduction of the Medical Model. Indeed, Tasmania had 
yet to introduce the Justice Model by the late 1980s.' 4 Moreover, the use of 
prisoner treatment models had created a prison industry for both professional 
and para-professional specialists. The demise of the Medical Model did not 
change the prison professional structure. The basic difference in the models was 
that the Medical Model assumed that the prisoner could be cured through the 
application of "appropriate diagnostic and counseling techniques. The treatment 
includes psychiatry, psychology, social work, and whatever may pass for the 
'healing' sciences." The Justice model assumed the prisoner should account 
for his actions. The question that both the NSW and WA systems had to 
address was what unit management practice should their organisation's 
implement. As noted, there were two main types of unit management practice: 
that originated in America and the model that three European systems utilised. 
For a good evaluation of the problems with the medical model analogy. 
see G. Hawkins. The Prison : Policy and Practice. 
(Chicago:Uni. of Chicago Press. 1976) 180-185. 
12 	D.E.J. MacNamara, The Medical Model in Corrections: Requiescat in Pace. - 
Criminology. 14 (1977). 446. 
13 	F. Rinaldi. Australian Prisons, (Fvshwick. ACT: F&M. 1977) 2-3. 
Tasmania Service was still operating the Medical Model philosophy in 1988. 
T.O. Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 
(New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. 1976) 27. 
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The concept of direct supervision (unit management) began when the American 
Government commenced building facilities for federal detainees in New York, 
Chicago and San Diego in the mid 1960s. Termed Metropolitan Correctional 
Centers (MCCs), these were to provide an environment "wherein safe and 
secure detention would be assured." The institutions were designed for _ 	_ 	_ 
"detainment rather than punishment." Inmates were to be divided into "small 
groups of approximately 40-50 for housing purposes," 16 with cells "clustered 
around a common dayroom." 17 
The living units were to be arranged to ensure that corrections officers 
could observe all areas within the unit; "blind spots" or obstructions to 
staff observation of the unit were to be minimized. In addition, no office, 
,desk, or station for corrections officers was to be included in the living 
so that officers would interact with inmates rather than spend their shift 
locked in an office or ensconced behind a desk." 
The federal administrators made single cell accommodation mandatory in the 
design specifications. There was "direct staff supervision," and "functional 
inmate living units." 19 This arrangement became known as Podular Direct 
Supervision. 20 The approach was "based on the belief that inmates are rational 
human beings who will always manipulate an environment to their best 
advantage." 21 Again, direct supervision facilities would "create a•rnore normative 
humane environment for inmates and staff." 22 Apart from the direct interaction 
between staff and inmates, it appeared that the primary difference was that of 
"minimizing the number of staff to run the facility." 23 The staffing ratios had yet 
to be determined as various institutions implemented the concept, but the 
officer/inmate ratio would never compare with those used in small units in 
Scotland, Holland and Sweden (see chapter 1). 
16 	L.L. Zupan. Jails: Reform and the New Generation Philosophy. (Cincinnati. OH: 
Anderson 1991) 66. 
17 	Nelson. and Davis. "Podular Direct Supervision - 16. 
18 	Zupan. Jails. 67. 
19 	Ibid. 
2n Nelson. and Davis. "Podular Direct Supervision... 11. 
21 	B. Johnson. "Exploring Direct Supervision: A research Note - American Jails. 
(March/April. 1994): 63-64. 63. 
22 	B. Berger and J. Cali. -Hudson County. New Jersey, Jail from Old to New- American 
Jails.(Winter. 1988): 60-62. 61. 
23 	A. Beck. The Shawnee COunty. Kansas Adult Detention Facility - American Jails. 
(Winter. 1988): 18-22. 19. 
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Figure 6:1 The Medical and Justice Models for Corrections. 
Issue Medical Model 
(1930-1974) 
--Justice Model 
(1974-onwards) 
I Cause of crime Disease of society or of the individual 
offender 
Form 	of 	rational 	adaptation 	to 
conditions of society 
2 Image oloffender Sick, the product of social-economic or 
psychological lorces beyond_rational 
control 
Capable 	of 	exercising 
"constrained - 	free _ 	will 	of 
rationally surviving through crime 
3 Objective of corrections To cure the offender and, or society. to 
return both to a state of health: goals of 
rehabilitation and reintegration 
To 	humanely 	control 	offender 
under conditions of sentence, 	to 
offer voluntary treatment services 
4 Agency and institution accountability To 	change 	the 	offender 	and 	to 
reintegrate 	the 	offender 	back 	into 
society 
To legally and humanely control 
offender, to provide adequate care 
and/or custody, to offer voluntary 
treatment services, to protect 
society 
5 	Role 	of 	treatment 	and 	role 	of 
punishment 
Treatment, 	whether 	voluntary 	or 
involuntary, 	is 	the 	means 	to 	change 
offender: treatment is mandatory, 
punishment is used to coerce offenders 
into treatment: punishment and 
treatment are viewed as extensions of 
same thing: change does not require 
consent 
To 	offer 	voluntary 	treatment 
services through which an offender 
mat enter or exit without reprisal: 
change requires consent: 
punishment and treatment not the 
same thing: punishment is for good 
of society, treatment for good of 
offender 
6 Object of legal sanctions To 	detemiine conditions 	of sentence 
which 	are 	most 	conducive 	to 
rehabilitation of offender 
To 	determine the 	conditions 	of 
sentence that just, in proportion to 
wrong done, equitable with other 
sentences, 	and 	will 	best 	protect 
society 	and deter 	offender 	from 
future crime 
7 Type of sentence Indeterminate, 	flexible 	to 	adjust 	to 
offender changes 
Flat 	time 	(minus 	gain 	time): 
determinant 
8 Who determines when an offender is 
to be released 
A "body of experts": parole board for 
adults, institutional staff for juveniles 
The 	conditions 	of the 	sentence 
itself.as interpreted through some 
presumptive release date (PRD) 
formula 
Source: Archambeault and Archambeault. Correctional Supervisory Management. 
Direct supervision appeared premised on the staffing allocation of one officer 
within each functional unit. Wells claims, however, there is no evidence to 
support the ratio of one officer to fifty inmates. Moreover, he pointed out that 
If direct supervision is the best method of supervision for a housing unit 
designed to accommodate 30 to 50 inmates, the question is raised of 
whether it is still appropriate when overcrowded conditions mandated 
double occupancy, thereby increasing the unit population by up to 
100%. 24 
Again, if there is constant interaction between the officer and inmates, then the 
officer "must always be unquestionably in control." 25 
2-1 	J.B. Wells. -Direct Supervision: Panacea or Fad'? Does it Warrant Full Acceptance'?“ 
American Jails. Vol. 1/No. 1. (Spring. 1987): 46-49, 46-48. 
J.T. Potter. -Designing tomorrow's Jails - American Jails, 
(September/October. 1990): 42-48, 46. 
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Direct supervision officers required skills in 
• Resolving Inmate Problems and Conflicts, 
• Building Positive Rapport and Personal Credibility With Inmates, 
• Maintaining Effective Administrative and staff relations, 
• Managing -the Living Unit-to Assure a Safe and Humane Environment, 
• Responding to Inmate Requests, 
• Handling Inmate Discipline, and 
• Supervising in a Clear, Well-Organized and Attention-Getting Manner. 26 
Podular direct supervision puts "much responsibility" on the officer and requires 
"a higher degree of training in interpersonal relationships and management than 
[other types of prisons]." 27 Indeed, "the lack of or the improper training of 
correctional officers is precarious since inmates must be professionally handled 
with care, not by trial and error." 28 Yet some locations were only giving their 
staff "at least 24 hours' training in direct supervision skills, followed by an 
additional 8- 12 hours in interpersonal communication skills." 29 Moreover, as 
Zupan points out, "it is important to note that architecture and inmate 
management style do not miraculously transform inmates into compliant and 
obedient individuals." 39 Indeed, there was still provision for a 
well constructed behavior adjustment or restricted housing unit so that 
those who do not respond or choose to violate the norms of the modules 
can be removed immediately to disciplinary confinement."' 
Others made sure that the interaction between staff and inmates was positive, 
our direct supervision facility is a success because of two critical factors: 
(1) Zero tolerance of inmate misbehavior, [and] (2) The threat to an 
inmate of having to return to the [traditional] linear jail if he or she 
misbehaves or chooses not to follow pod rules: 2 
It took a number of years of direct supervision operation before an attempt was 
made to codify operating principles. 
26 	Zupan. Jails . 107-128. 
27 	Potter. "Designing tomorrow's Jails- 46. 
.2s 	Wells. "Direct Supervision: Panacea or Fad?" 48. 
29 	P. Perroncello. "The Awakening of the Wake County Detention Center" 
American Jails. (May/June. 1993): 34-38. 35. 
31) Zupan. Jails, 95. 
31 	A.M. Wallenstein. "New Generation/Direct Supervision Correctional Operations In 
Bucks County. Pennsylvania- American Jails. (Spring, 1987): 34-36. 35. 
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The National Institute of Corrections developed these in 1982. These principles 
were,"(1) effective control, (2) effective supervision, (3) competent staff, (4) 
safety of staff and inmates, (5) manageable and cost-effective operations, (6) 
effective communication, (7) classification and orientation, and (8) justice and 
fairness." these principles would assist correctional officers understand 
the concept and aid their daily operation, the same understanding was less 
apparent elsewhere. 
Many prisons describe themselves as direct supervision, even 
though they have enclosed control booths at the housing units with at 
least some of their staff stationed in them. This makes it difficult to 
classify prisons and to identify ones that are truly limited to indirect 
supervision. The indirect supervision prisons in our study actually best 
represented the "hybrid" direct/indirect supervision model, with some 
aspects of each mode. Jails, by contrast, appear to more closely follow 
the direct/indirect dichotomy, though some direct supervision jails are 
provided with enclosed control booths, either because the system 
committed to direct supervision after plans were finalized, or as a fall 
back or failsafe measure. 34 
Indeed, some institutions opened where the manager had "little more than a 
three-day orientation course in direct supervision." 35 However, in 1982 visiting 
Australian prison administrators were impressed with the concept particularly as 
it was "designed to improve control and relationships by dividing the 
institutional population into smaller, more manageable, groups." 36 But changing 
prison architecture and prisoner management practice was no guarantee of 
success. Simply putting the two variables together would not resolve problems. 
However, it appears that their American peers perhaps, unduly influenced 
Australian administrators. Again, at this stage there was just a trickle of 
information becoming available on a changing European prison environment 
32 	W.G. Lucas. "Direct Supervision Works in Denton County, Texas!: The mandate 
from the public is clear: Society is tired of being victimized." American Jails. 
(March/April. 1995): 92-94. 93. 
33 	Nelson, and Davis. "Podular Direct Supervision: The First Twenty Years - 12. 
34 	J. Farbstein. & Associates. Inc. with R. Wener. A Comparison of "Direct" and  
"Indirect-  Supervision Correctional Facilities. Final Report, Washington. DC: 1989. 
National Institute of Corrections-Prisons Division ,United States Department of 
Justice. 1.1-6. 
35 	Nelson and Davis. "Podular Direct Supervision: The First Twenty Years" 17. 
36 	D. Lansing. J.B. Bogan. L. Karaki, "Unit Management: Implementing a 
Different Correctional Approach - Federal Probation, vol. 41. (1977): 43-49. 43. 
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Meanwhile, despite the approval given to direct supervision by inter ctlia the 
American Jail Association (AJA), the American Correctional Association, the 
American Institute of Architect's Committee on Architecture for Justice ; and 
The Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, some concerns  were being 
raised. 37 Wells claimed 
research supporting the wide-spread acceptance of direct supervision 
models by professional correctional organizations has consisted 
primarily of ex post facto situations utilizing postoccupancy evaluations 
involving the analysis of data already existent.... it does not prove that 
direct supervision models are more preferable over other models in most 
correctional settings. [Moreover] Before any management concept is 
accepted for general practice in corrections, it seems essential that 
reliable and valid research be conducted to substantiate the claims that 
one method is preferable over another. Over the past 50 years, 
correctional professionals have been consistently vulnerable to 
accepting, without first examining any type of empirical data, the latest 
fad or "innovation."' s 
Significantly, at the 1990 AJA conference some of these concerns were 
addressed. More importantly, it was clearly indicated that the concept could not 
stand-alone. 
The principles of direct supervision were first drafted in 1982 for the 
purpose of explaining the content of the concept. The term "direct 
supervision" was easily misinterpreted to simply mean that officers 
were to be in direct contact with inmates, and that this contact, by itself, 
would produce the desired behavioral objectives. While certain benefits 
are realised from merely placing officers in contact with the inmates they 
are supervising, the full potential of this practice is not realized until it is 
integrated into a comprehensive system of inmate management.' 9 
Kerte argued that direct supervision/unit management should be run in tandem 
with a reciprocal operational philosophy. The institution must change its 
philosophical base to, for example, the Justice Model for the concept to work. 4° 
The difficulty for Australian administrators was that most of their institutions 
were still modelled on a custody and control philosophy, and concomitant 
prisoner management strategy. 
37 	Nelson. and Davis. "Podular Direct Supervision: The First Twenty Years - 14. 
3s 	Wells. "Direct Supervision: Panacea or Fad'? Does it Warrant Full Acceptance?" 
46-48. 
39 	K. Kerle. (Ed). "Revisiting the Principles of Direct Supervision - NIC 5th Annual 
Symposium on Direct Supervision. MA Conference. Reno. Nevada: 2-24. 3. 
Ibid. 
252 
Prior to offering recommendations to their particular jurisdictions, it perhaps 
would have behoved the Australian administrators to undertake some 
-preliminary research. They would then have discovered that a similar type of 
-prisoner management strategy had been tried and failed. Correctional Services 
Canada (CSC) devised a prisoner management strategy based upon the notion 
of the therapeutic community. The Living Unit concept 
involves the assignment of each inmate to a residential unit within the 
institution and to a Case Management Team which monitors his 
progress and insures that the programmatic and security needs of the 
offender are being met. To facilitate the development of positive 
patterns of interaction between the staff and the inmates, Living Unit 
Officers, attired in civilian clothing, replaced uniformed security 
personnel in the residential units and assumed the dual role of counceling 
inmates and providing security. Initiated during the early 1970's, the 
Living Unit Program was subsequently adopted in nearly all federal 
correctional facilities.'" 
While the Living Unit concept was philosophically sound - being based on the 
Medical Model, the strategy had also introduced a change in normal prison 
officer/prisoner dynamics. Economics, however, determined the concept's fate. 
Citing the need to downsize its operations, CSC reduced the number of Living 
Unit officers and reintroduced uniformed staff. The units simply became other 
prison divisions. CSC then embarked on unit management implementation in 
1987. Uniformed officers were now expected to be caseworkers or pseudo 
social welfare staff. 42 
By attempting to change the uniformed officers' task, CSC administrators and 
policy-makers took a calculated risk. Any positive change in prison 
officer/prisoner interaction is for better management. However, 
There is little scientific knowledge about handling offender populations, 
few principles for consistent practice, and almost no provision for 
assessing the value of particular measures in various situations±' 
•ii Unit Management Standards for all Correctional Service of Canada Institutions. 
set of guidelines issued by CSC. 1987. 54-58. 
-12 	Unit Management Standards for all Correctional Service of Canada Institutions. 
54-58. 
•13 Hawkins. The Prison, 101. 
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If the prison officer cannot perform the task due to, for example, attitude, ability 
or lack of education:" then any hoped for change will be purely cosmetic and a 
resumption of customary jejune interaction commences. Moreover, "a 
cooperative effort by all staff is critical and teamwork is an essential element of 
Unit Management." 45 One of the principles of contemporary management - _ 	 . 
practice is building successful teams. 46 The 'successful team' has been the 
fulcrum of unit management operation. 47 Paradoxically, it may also be a major 
reason for the concept's perceived lack of success. Not everyone wants to be a 
'team player' - particularly if the team leader or supervisor does not command 
respect from subordinates. Again many prison managers have specific 
inclinations, "unit management was bastardized by the individual Governor's 
views of how 'their' prison would adapt. Rightly so due to the type of prison 
and prisoner to be managed and staff employed and attitudes."" 
The myth abounds that a number of separate identities can be readily coalesced 
into a 'team.' Team members, particularly in the prison system, are usually 
arbitrarily selected either by experience, skill, qualification, or a combination of 
factors. Membership stability has never been a priority particularly given the 
nature of the prison roster. Replacements are drafted in and any harmony and 
reciprocity between permanent unit staff and prisoners soon becomes victim to 
the changing dynamics. Again, there are "many inconsistencies between teams 
or shifts and among officers on the same team."49 Furthermore, staff may not 
wish to interact, but 
In order for an accountability framework to be effective all staff 
members, starting with the correctional officers, must be involved in 
the decision-making process. All correctional officers will be involved in 
dynamic interaction with inmates and various aspects of the case 
management process. 
44 	J. Braithwaite and M. Cass. "Note on the demographic composition of Australian 
police forces and prison services - in ANZ J Crim. 12 (1979): 132-138. 
45 
	
	Unit Management Standards for all Correctional Service of Canada Institutions. 5. 
R. Meredith Belbin. Management Teams: Why They Succeed or Fail, 
(Oxford: Heinemann. 1981). 
47 	For example. Unit Management Standards for all Correctional Service of Canada  
Institutions. and Banvon, Introductory Staff Handbook, 1989-1990, 00C handout. 
Correspondence from former Victorian Governor Helen Holland. 17 April 1997. 
49 	R.W. Conroy. "Santa Clara County Direct supervision Jail -  American Jails. 
(Fall. 1989): 59-67, 67. 
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A Unit Management process is premised on teamwork and 
communications. Staff members within the institution must focus their 
efforts and continuously share information with others.''' 
Trying to get staff to change attitudes and acptnew _strategies are manifest 
difficulties, and "it makes sense that correctional officers with a number of years 
of experience would be less than positive about the changes required of them in 
a direct supervision facility." 5 ' However, their views on operating procedures 
and new management strategies can colour the new recruit's expectations. As 
Holland notes, - there is a need for new staff to come to a united basic 
understanding of the views put to them and to feel they belong to the system' 
and not an isolated section."52 Furthermore, the thinking behind building new 
facilities and introducing new concepts while retaining a similar infrastructure 
has been questioned. Murton claims, "reform programs grafted onto existing 
prison structures consistently fail to survive because they are rejected as foreign 
organisms." 53 Again, "there is nothing about spending more money, hiring more 
staff, erecting modern buildings, increasing hours of formal training, or reducing 
inmate populations that makes better prisons inevitable." 54 
The Direct Supervision concept, however, was accepted as a panacea. Many 
American administrators converted their institutions in a type of religious 
fervour. There appeared to be very little consideration given to concept's 
weaknesses. However, as Murton claims, many administrators were blinkered 
and acted accordingly. There was the perception that "success is assured as long 
as failure is not considered a possible alternative."" Murton also argues that in 
order for prison change to be effective personnel must "really believe in and 
practice the religious ethic of service to others." 56 Anything less is desultory. 
But some managers still questioned the validity of direct supervision. 
51) 	Unit Management Standards for all Correctional Service of Canada Institutions. 
14-16. 
Si 	 Johnson. "Exploring Direct Supervision: A Research Note - 64. 
52 	Correspondence from former Governor Helen Holland. 17 April 1997. 
Murton The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 131. 
J.J. Dilulio. Jr. Governing Prisons A Comparative Study of Correctional  
Management. (New York: The Free Press. 1987) 235. 
Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 231. 
56 	 Ibid. 
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After all, some managers were really pseudo-policemen. They were 
more interested in playing mind-games with staff and prisoners rather 
than focussing on programmes. )7 
Without management commitment the concept had little chance for success. 58 
Moreover, there was still a perception by some American prison administrators _  
that old prison officer/prisoner practices would come to the fore - even with the 
benefit of new surroundings. However, Murton argues, "It does not necessarily 
follow that moving a program into a 'better' structure will enhance it 
potency." 59 Senior managers were also concerned that prisoners would still be 
de .facto running prisons. Farbstein et al, however, found the reverse. 60 
A major problem faced by many of the original direct supervision practitioners 
was adapting or modifying the concept to fit their environment. While there are 
a set of fundamental guidelines that can be utilised to enable implementation, 
many systems allowed individual institutions to set procedures for daily 
supervision practice. Moreover, there were differences within units in individual 
institutions. 6 ' But is it realistic to expect an entire system to modify? As Holland 
notes about the introduction of unit management into Victoria's prison system 
Common sense should have applied to the varied structure of the 
Victorian Prison System. A blanket view of expectation was 
doomed before it even started. One cannot take 'all' prisoners and 'all' 
prison staff emeshed (sic) in century old traditions and magically make 
an ideal materialize unless all Governors embraced the ideal put forward 
as sound, and not as a token acceptance to please H.Q. then do their 
own thing. The 'old school' still did their own thing and played H Q 
against the [operating] reality of the 'prison' staff were employed in. 62 
Direct supervision, however, had not been scientifically evaluated 
57 	Former Governor Helen Holland's comments on her contemporary fellow Governors. 
17 April 1997. 
5;4 	Farbstein et al. A Comparison of "Direct - and "Indirect- Supervision Correctional  
Facilities, 1.1-7-1.1.8. 
59 	Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform. 231. 
Farbstein et al. A Comparison of "Direct" and "Indirect" Supervision Correctional  
Facilities lv.1.4. 
6i 	Ibid. 
62 	Correspondence from former Governor Helen Holland, 17 April 1997. 
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A 1989 report noted the concept had not been universally accepted within the 
Continental USA. 6  Direct supervision had so little practitioners, and the 
supportive evidence on concept success was, at the best, anecdotal 64  However, 
the period from 1984 to 1994 saw an "explosion in the utilization of direct 
supervision - a quantum leap from fewer than a dozen direct supervision jails to 
over 120 operational facilities today." 65 
Unit management: the Australian experience. 
At the time Victoria's Government decided to implement unit management, 
Victoria's prisons had been described as archaic, an affront to society, and 
"certainly infringing on the minimum standards of the United Nations." 66 Two 
other Australian prison systems intended implementing the concept. But there 
was nothing in Australia to provide evidence of the concept's viability. And 
many of the supporting arguments to introduce the practice centred on the 
perceived success of the Scottish Barlinnie Special Unit which was housed in 
the former women's section of the main Barlinnie Prison. Indeed, as Coyle, a 
then Scottish prison governor, noted, 
One of the embarrassments of my visit to North America was the 
number of times I was asked by prison administrators to describe our 
assessment of the experiment of the Special Unit and where this 
assessment could be studied. The "experiment" of the Special Unit has 
never been assessed, far less have the results of any such assessment 
being published. 67 
As with the Special Unit, the myth of the success of direct supervision became 
international. However, an early Australian visitor to the USA was less than 
convinced. The Director of Victoria's Correctional Services, John Dawes, had 
visited the Butner USA Federal Correctional Institution in 1979. 
6 3 	Farbstein et al. A Comparison of -Direct - and - Indirect- Supervision Correctional  
Facilities, 1.1-7. 
64 	Ibid. 1.1-2. 
63 	Nelson, and Davis. -Podular Direct supervision: The First Twenty Years - 16. 
66 	The Neilson Report. 33. 
67 	A.G. Coyle. A Comparative Examination Of The Prison Services In North America. 
Winston Churchill Memorial Fellowship. 1984. 35. 
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While Dawes criticised the operational practice, he appeared to agree with the 
size and design of the institution. 68 On his return to Victoria, he recommended 
that the proposed security prison complex at Castlemaine be built "to house at 
least two hundred inmates in _small living units, each of forty prisoners, to 
facilitate good management." 69 He did not recommend direct supervision 
practices. 79 
The Victorian Government did not appear concerned that there was very little 
scientific data about unit management. They had made a decision to implement. 
Perhaps, as the Neilson consultants had suggested, there should have been an 
evaluation period. After all, the Master Plan had recommended that the unit 
management concept be tried in one or two existing small institutions. 71 But the 
Government was under pressure to build new facilities or provide more places 
in existing institutions. Peripheral details such as unit management practice 
could be considered later. Prison numbers rose exponentially from 
approximately 1900 DAPS in 1983 to 2300 plus in 1990. 72 No attempt was 
made to trialing the unit management concept. Again, there appears to be only a 
cursory attempt to understand the implications arising. 
While the prison hierarchy may have thought otherwise, unit management was 
never intended to be a penal philosophy. It is a prisoner management process, 
and needs to be linked with a prison philosophy. Many of the early criticisms by 
Victoria's prison officers were based on the mistaken assumption that they were 
already practicing the strategy. 73 The NSW system, however, had combined unit 
management with the Justice Model philosophy. 74 
M.J. Dawes. Overseas Study Tour Of Correctional Institutions, July/ August 1979. 
Report for the Department of Community Welfare Services. 1. 
69 	Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
7i 	The Neilson Report. 38. 
72 	Figures from 00C Annual Reports. 1983-1991. 
73 The author heard this claim on many occasions at the STC. This stemmed from the 
belief that prison officers were rostered to a particular Division on a semi-permanent 
basis and, therefore, knew the inmates, and vice versa. 
74 J. Gorta. Unit Prisoner Accommodation -The Bathurst Gaol Experience. 1983-1987. 
NSW Department of Corrective Services memorandum, 1988. 
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As Gorta noted, 
The philosophy of the Bathurst Gaol Management Plan is based on the 
Justice Model of Imprisonment. In this model the primary aim of 
imprisonment is not the rehabilitation of the offender. The purpose of 
imprisonment in terms of this model is the enforcement of a loss of 
liberty by ensuring custody of prisoners is maintained without placing 
Surther_restrictions up_on_them._This philosophy _also involves a 	__ 
conception of the nature of prisoners that recognizes that prisoners are 
no different from other people in the community] ) 
Problems arise when the operating philosophy is the antithesis of the supervision 
policy. Victoria's prisons in 1983 were arguably still operating on a variation of 
the custody and control policy. 76 But prison administrators thought they were 
operating under a "humane containment" policy. 77 This policy had originated in 
Holland in the early 1980s. 78 
The principle of rehabilitation was accorded less prominence, and the 
emphasis was placed instead upon carrying out imprisonments in as 
humane a manner as possible, with a minimalization of possible injurious 
effects. Consequently, certain programmes were created, which were 
aimed at a better adaptation of the detention to the prisoners' own needs 
and interests. 79 
Prison labour was reduced while study, creative and sports programmes were 
introduced. Prison officers were expected to interact not simply to guard. 8' 
Dutch prison policy-makers believed that changing operating practices would 
guarantee a change in prisoner attitude. However, funding was later severely 
cut. Nijboer and Ploeg report that, 
The number of officers decreased while the number of prisoners 
increased, necessarily leading to longer periods of cell confinement. 
The personal contacts between prisoners and officers have been 
reduced. An increase of tensions within the institutions has resulted, 
demonstrated in conflicts between staff and inmates, but also in 
demonstrations by the former of their dissatisfaction with the situation. 8 ' 
75 	Ibid. 4. 
76 	See Ditullio. Governing Prisons. 110-111. 
77 	Interview with former Governor Grade III. Jim Armstrong, 14 August 1995. 
Tony Vinson. the then Chairman of the Corrective Services Commission of NSW. 
visited Holland in 1980 and was impressed with the Dutch approach. Vinson. 
Wilful Obstruction. 85-88. 
79 	J.A. Nijboer and G.J. Ploeg, -Grievance procedures in The Netherlands' . 
M. Maguire. J. Vagg. R. Morgan, (Eds) Accountability and Prisons, 
(London: Tavistock. 1985) 231. 
Nijboer and Ploeg. -Grievance Procedures in the Netherlands . ' 231. 
Ibid. 231-232. 
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Like their counterparts in Canada, Victoria's prison administrators were risking 
a backlash without explaining the change-process to prison officers. Again, 
there was little thought given to changing the operational philosophy. Prison 
officers thought prisons were practicing custody and control. New institutions 
did not necessarily equate with change. New might not mean better. 82 With only 
limited concept knowledge authorities were increasing the risk of failure. 
Moreover, there are always problems associated with transplanting programmes 
and practices. 83 A number of executives making the decisions in Victoria were 
bureaucrats with little actual prison acumen. As Pini notes, 
I think one of the main regrets I have of my time in [Victorian] 
corrections is the organisation's continuing inability to get quality 
managers into its key management positions. To a large extent 
(with a few glowing exceptions) the organisation seemed to have an 
enormous ability to get mediocre or inappropriate people into its key 
management positions. 84 
Estelle, a former American prison warden, has described the difficulties 
associated with sudden prison operation change. 
We had self-proclaimed prison reformers telling us how horrible we 
were at doing our jobs. Of course, what these people knew about 
prisons you could fit into a tiny thimble with room to spare. 
They wanted to effect changes and baptize every change , a reform 
Well, every change in a prison setting is not a reform and correctional 
institutions are ill-equipped to handle sudden administrative changes. 8) 
If Victoria's prison authorities had undertaken detailed research on unit 
management before new prison commissioning they may have been aware of 
some of the associated problems with prison officer acceptance. A similar 
situation had occurred in California, 
Zt2 	Murton. The Dilemma of Prison reform. 231. 
A. Dunsire. Implementation in a Bureaucracy. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1978): 
F. Munson and D. Pelz, Innovating in Organizations: A Conceptual Framework. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1980): D. Palumbo, S. Maynard-Moody. and 
P. Wright. "Measuring Degrees of Successful Implementation: Achieving Policy 
versus Statutory Goals. - Evaluation Review.  Vol. 8. No. I, (February. 1984): 
45-74; and D.J. Palumbo, "Evaluating Policy Implementation: Central Issues in 
Comparative Analysis, - Paper presented at the International Political Science 
Associations Meetings, Paris, France. July. 1985. 1. 
Correspondence with John Pini, former Manager of STC, 27 July 1996. 
W.J. Estelle, former Warden in the Texas Department of Corrections, quoted in 
DiIullio. Governing Prisons. 218-219. 
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HQ is bringing in people who don't know anything about prisons. 
These people managed the department of birds and bees or have 
know-it-all degrees. They're making a mess and putting more 
pressure on those of us who know what the hell is going on. We have 
to compensate for their well-intentioned (sic) stupid decisions. 86 
However, it appears there was only minor criticism of implementing unit__ 
management in Victoria, and this was on economic grounds. Foley-Jones, the 
Director of the Strategic Services Division of 00C noted, "a small living unit is 
taken to be around about 32 prisoners within a given area. This arrangement of 
course leads to a fairly expensive system in terms of recurrent expenditure." 87 
Victoria's authorities disregarded a key Neilson Report recommendation. They 
did not validate unit management. An attempt at unit management 
implementation was made at the Castlemaine Prison." The purpose of the 
Castlemaine experiment did not however appear to have been explained to the 
prison staff. "The new management style will still be based on the 'line 
authority' model, however there will be a shift of responsibility for some 
tasks/duties from the Governor to the lower ranks.""' Whereas prisoners had 
previously attended 'Governor's requests' to obtain information or make 
requests they would now see junior staff. Moreover, staff were "encouraged to 
'get to know' the prisoners under his/her care, control, supervision and obtain 
information regarding the 'health' of the prison." 90 The Co-ordinator of Unit 
Management and the Governor of Castlemaine Prison had travelled to view the 
NSW experiment. Their report was less than favourable. 
Judging from the prisoners' demeanour, staff comments and reactions it 
appears that the prisoners run the prison. One senior staff member 
apologised to prisoners every time they moved past him despite the fact 
there was plenty room for passing. Another said the staff were allowed 
out into the unit when the prisoners trusted you. 
86 	A veteran Californian Corrections officer quoted in Dilullio. Governing Prisons. 
191. 
87 	C. Foley-Jones, speech made to the National Conference on Prison design and 
Technlogy. Melbourne. 1984. 1. 
R. Moore and W. Higgins. Castlemaine Prison Pilot Unit Management Program 
Phase 1. 00C document. 1986. 
89 	Ibid. No. 28. 
9(1 Ibid, No. 29. 
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On another occasion a prisoner walked into the staff office without 
knocking while we were in conversation with the staff The officer 
excused himself and attended to the prisoner who asked the officer if he 
had done anything to arrange his phone call. The overall impression was 
that the officers were afraid. The officers in one unit indicated that they 
were not happy with the arrangements. 91 
While these views were anecdotal and based on subjective values rather than on 
any rigorous evaluation criteria, they would have carried substantial weight 
particularly when presented informally by the Governor of Castlemaine Prison at 
the Governors' monthly conferences. In 1989, the Senior Assistant 
Superintendent of Bathurst Gaol NSW, claimed 
Bathurst has shown the way in unit management in N.S.W. and two 
new prisons planned for the 1990s will be based on unit living and unit 
management. The new Barwon prison and the redeveloped prison at 
Castlemaine, both in Victoria are also based on unit management and 
living principles. It would appear that the future for unit living in 
Australia is optimistic. 92 
Robson's claim of an Australian innovation in unit management is, perhaps, 
debateable. The simple fact was that by 1989, in over two years of unit 
management operation, the NSW system still had implementation problems. 93 
Victoria's authorities had been alerted to the situation in 1987 but took little 
heed. The on-going rivalry between NSW and Victoria continued with the 
comparison of prison management approaches. There was a smug feeling that 
Victoria would not repeat the NSW mistakes. 94 But there was little, if any, 
analysis undertaken. While the prison authorities in Victoria were vacillating, 
the WA system was quite definite about differences in concept and procedures 
between traditional and unit management (see Fig.6:2). 
91 	W. Higgins and M. Naylor. Report of Visit to New South Wales, 00C 1986. 6. 
92 	R. Robson. -Managing the Long Term Prisoner: A Report on an Australian 
Innovation in Unit Management - in The Howard Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3 
(August 1989): 187-203, 201. 
93 	NSW, however, operated a very successful Special Care Unit for psychiatrically 
disturbed prisoners at the Malabar complex of prisons. Dr D.M. Schwartz, "Special 
Care Unit: from caring philosophy to therapeutic reality- Paper presented at 
ANZAAS Congress. ACT. 15 May 1984. 
94 	This was the perception when the author joined the 00C from Tasmania in March. 
1989. 
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But there were ominous signs in Victoria's system. It appeared that prison 
officers applying for promotion to the new prisons were rote-learning unit 
management concepts for panels who, in turn, had probably - rote-learned the 
principles themselves. 95 Most promotion-seeking officers would have had no 
actual unit management experience. However, they may have attended training 
conducted by Strategic Services personnel. Moreover, the 00C had given every 
officer in the system a small book of unit management guidelines. 96 The 
system's administrators thought that it was good public relations. As a vehicle 
intended to inform the prison officer staff of the change of prisoner management 
direction, it was less than successful. The booklet probably did more harm by 
presenting a one-sided positive observation. Officers were informed inter al/a, 
By now you'll have realised that the introduction of unit 
management will have important and practical consequences for you. 
You'll also find - should you be working in a unit managed 
environment - that you'll be doing work that is far different from 
anything you've done before. You'll be expected to attend team 
meetings, make decisions, design and run programs, deal directly with 
prisoners, prepare reports and give advice on prisoners. As you become 
more familiar with these duties, you'll also find that management will 
increasingly seek you out and listen to your ideas and opinions. You will 
have noticed by then that you are a professional - one with management 
skills that are valued far beyond the confines of a prison 97 
Officers were later advised that these 'transferable skills' could be used in 
"Security, Crowd Control, Ambulance (sic), Casino (sic), Store Detective, 
Private Investigating (eg: insurance, TAC. Workcover), Police Force, Parking 
Attendant, [and] Gaming Staff." 98 
The Victorian prison officer can hardly have been expected to be enthused 
about the change when his managers seemed uncertain about the future. But 
perhaps the manager's focus is completely different than that of the prison staff 
Interviews for Loddon CPO positions were held at the STC while the author was 
Senior Training Officer. 
96 Unit Management in Victorian Prisons, an introduction, 00C. Victoria, 1989. 
97 	Ibid. 15. 
98 	Message. No 5 Vol 2 (March 1997). 
263 
Figure 6:2 Summary Comparison of the Main Components of Traditional 
and Unit Management. 
Traditional Unit Management 
Cohesiveness Groups to (sic) large to develop 
common identity_ 	 
- Common identity 
__. 	_ 
Decision-making Central Mainly local 
Dynamic security More distant observation. rely on 
grape-vine 
Early detection of problems 
through closer observation and 
interaction 
Environmental incentives to prisoner 
self-restraint 
Low High 
Individual prisoner programming More difficult to achieve Easy to achieve 
Involvement of prison officers in 
decision making 
Limited Direct 
Level of prisoner/staff interaction i Low High 
Living environment Institutional Residential groups 
Nlanagement structure Hierarchical / bureaucratic Flat pyramid! 
dispersed 
Prison officer training requirements Standard custodial emphasis Intensive training to develop 
multi-faceted skills 
Prisoner involvement Little or none Variable 
Prisoner movement Strictly controlled Free within set limits 
Programme flexibility Moderate - low Fairly high 
Relationship between staff and 
prisoners 
Distant Closer 
Role of prison officer Custodial - cut and dried Custodial, advisory - more 
complex 
Rosters More flexible Aim to achieve stability of 
staffing on units 
Size of prisoner groups Large Small 
Speed of decision-making Relatively slow Fast 
Stability of prisoner groups May vary Stable 
Staff teams No Yes 
Source:  Canning Vale Prison Management Document, 1989. 
Prison officers and management often have different perceptions as to operating 
practice, "Most correctional officials attributed the operational differences 
among prisons to differences in correctional philosophy." 99 However, Holland 
notes differences in perceptions between senior prison administrators and prison 
officers as arising from different work patterns, 
99 	Dilullio. Governing Prisons. 166. 
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It's one thing sitting in an air-conditioned car and attending the prison 
for two hours for a meeting, having lunch on the way back, then 
popping into the office for a few minutes. It's another thing when you 
are there [in the prison] on an almost constant basis. ' 00 
The role of the prison officer in the unit management process. 
Most commentators agree that the single most important variable affecting the 
success of unit management is the unit officer. 
The task of supervising and guiding prisoners is no job for amateurs ... 
It is necessary to look for skills, talents, and unusual capabilities in 
persons recruited for this work. This means not only the necessary skill 
and capacity for doing a particular job, but also the ability to instil the 
same skill and capacity in untrained and frequently hostile inmates. 
There is no substitute for personality, genuine interest, judgement, and 
understanding in personal relationships between workers and inmates. l01 
Hawkins argues that it may prove impossible to recruit such "professional 
paragons." 102 It is through this role that any prisoner management policy will 
succeed or fail. -to;  Moreover, according to Victoria's senior administrator, "the 
role of the uniformed officer needs to be accepted as a 'key' one in the 
correctional process." 104 
However, there are many variables working against the officer such as prisoner 
rights, prison administrators agendas, prisoner attitudes, 'double messages' 
from prison administrators, prison officer attitudes to the 'rehabilitative' 
process,' and correctional philosophical ideals. While prison administrators can, 
in theory, control the actions of prison officers, it is difficult to forecast and 
control the actions of prisoners. The cementing of prisoners' rights 105 has 
manifested in a perceived gain by prisoners and the perceived loss by officers. 
Correspondence with former Governor Helen Holland, 30 April 1997. 
lot 	J.V. Bennet. -The selection and Training of Correctional Personnel with Special 
reference to the Federal Prison System of the United States of America - . quoted in 
Hawkins. The Prison. 100. 
Hawkins, The Prison. 100. 
103 Ibid. 
1..1 J. Van Groningen. -The Job Expectations of Prison Officers: A Profile of Victorian 
Recruits- ANZ J Crim., Vol 14 No. l(March 1981): 40-48, 47. 
Ii)5 For an excellent account of the problems associated with prisoners gaining 'rights' 
see Vinson. Wilful Obstruction. chill. 
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And it has been suggested that authority has eroded because administrators have 
formed a 'kind of alliance' with the prisoners. 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that administrators and 
professional treatment personnel feel more respect and greater affinity 
for the inmate than they do—fo—r----tlie- gUar-d7 1°6-- 
Moreover, it has been argued that prisoners take advantage of any perceived -- — 
softening of attitudes by administrators. "Yesterday's [prisoner] privileges 
become today's rights." 007 The contemporary prisoner uses this newfound 
power to control and direct what happens to him within the prison confines. 
Prison administrators know that their positions depend on maintaining order and 
stability within their institutions.'" But order 
is nothing more than a temporary condition of functional operation 
created by administrative placation and characterized by inconsistent 
policy decisions, weak philosophical principles, and the absence of a 
long range plan for implementation.'" 
To avoid serious prison disturbances, "inmates must be somewhat placated. 
Their demands must be taken, to some degree, into account." ° Prison stability 
has become subordinate "to a stagnating form of order in which placation rather 
than reformation is the guiding policy in reform of correctional instability." 
The focus of prison administrators' attention is, therefore, simply "on the 
process of inmate placation, the means by which superficial stability is 
achieved." 112 The prison officer soon then realises that correctional reform 
appears to be shaped by prisoner action not by society's demands. The 
American administrators presumed that unit management would be the process 
whereby prison officers regained control of the prisons and helped rehabilitate 
prisoners.''' 
106 J.B. Jacobs and I-1.G. Retslcy, -Prison Guard." Urban Life. Vol. 4 No. 1. (1975): 
5-29. 13. 
107 W. Clifford. Rights and Obligations in a Prison. 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 1982,) 3-4. 
los 	Jacobs and Retsky. -Prison Guard" 13. 
S. Cerrato. -Reform of Correctional Instability: Order or Stability." 
Crime and Justice. Vol. VII. (1984): 87-99. 87. 
Jacobs and Retsky. ''Prison Guard" 13. 
Cerrato. -Reform of Correctional Instability: Order or Stability." 87. 
112 	Ibid. 
113 	Farbstein et al. A Comparison of -Direct" and - Indirect" Supervision Correctional  
Facilities. 1.1-7-1.1.8. 
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Fogel argued that prison officers were being given "double-messages" which 
cannot possibly be accomplished: 14  Prison officers are asked to control 
prisoners and their functional training reflects - this. To ask prison officers to 
assist in prisoner rehabilitation without providing the necessary training is totally 
unrealistic. 115  However, American rhetoric is not always congruent with 
practice. 
A number of direct supervision facilities have opened without 
personnel's having a thorough understanding of direct supervision. 
Often the manager has had little more than a three-day orientation 
course in direct supervision. Training staff, who are responsible for 
training all officers, frequently have had even less exposure to direct 
supervision. The transition training programs often reflect the 
limited knowledge base and expertise of the training staff rather than 
the needs of the organization. As a result, it is not uncommon to find 
transition training programs in which five times as many training hours 
are allocated to operation of the jail computer system as are allocated to 
managing and controlling inmate behavior through direct supervision. II6 
Again, there is no evidence to suggest that prisoners wish prison officers to be 
involved in any treatment process. Jacobs and Retsky claim the prisoners 
themselves believe that any differential treatment based on individual needs has 
to be undertaken by a person with professional competence. The authors argue 
that while psychologists and social workers may obtain the prisoners trust and 
co-operation, no such discretion will be given to "screws." 7 Jacobs and Retsky 
note, "The very essence of the professionals' authority lies in his claim to 
charisma while the guard's only basis for authority is his rank within the caste 
system." 118 Indeed, the evidence suggests that most prison officers would prefer 
to be left doing what is their primary task - custody and containment of 
prisoners. After all, according to Jacobs and Retsky, the prison has but one 
primary task, which is to "contain securely those convicted men assigned to its 
charge." 119  Prison officers are employed to manage that task. 
114 	D. Fogel, "We are the living proof. - The Justice Model for Corrections, 2nd edition 
(Cincinnat: Anderson, 1979) 74. 
115 	T.E. Reed, D.D. Goodrick and P.T. Quinlan. "Correctional Management of 
Offenders by Line Staff: Implications of a Behavioral Model. - 
Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 6 No. 2 (1982): 47-53, 48. 
Nelson, and Davis, "Podular Direct Supervision: The First Twenty Years - 1. 
117 	Jacobs and Retsky. "Prison Guard - 8. 
Ibid. 
119 	Ibid. 6. 
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For many years the secondary goal of prisoner rehabilitation has been added to 
the prison's raison cletre. Indeed, it would appear that the public and 
government perception is that the prison's primary aim is rehabilitation. But the 
primary goal of custody and control and the secondary goal of prisoner 
rehabilitation are "fundamentally incompatible." 120 And prison officers have 
voiced the futileness of rehabilitation for over 50 years. 
Convicts are considered "born bad," as mentally, emotionally, or 
morale deficient. Their only language, "the language they understand 
is punishment." Attempts at rehabilitation usually are considered as 
futile. In exceptional cases, only in cases where the inmates are "not 
really convicts," reform does occur. 121 
Thirty years later the sentiments had not fundamentally changed. 
In general, prison guards are cynical about rehabilitation and the 
work of treatment agents within the prison. They feel that they see 
prisoners 24 hours a day and are in a better position to judge the 
man's sincerity and true commitment to group therapy and other 
treatment programs. Inmates cannot be rehabilitated if that means that 
something is to be done to them by outside agents. Instead, they believe 
that a man can only change if he is motivated to do so and this appears 
to be characteristic of the individual and have nothing to do with the 
organization and its therapists. Like the policeman and all those who 
must assume the capacity of clients to carry out their tasks, the guard 
adheres to a radical free-will theory of man and human behavior. 122 
The nature and design of some institutions catered more for one particular 
philosophy than others. Prison officers had to adapt to each changing situation. 
Inmates had little choice. For to give choice was "tantamount to giving people 
who had abused freedom and shirked responsibilities when free an invitation to 
do likewise in prison." 12  As Cerrato notes, 
Correctional structures are seldom transferred to change their 
traditional function-punishment. Social change can affect parts of an 
institution at differential rates. Old and new philosophies can exist side 
by side, for example, punitive and rehabilitative ideas can exist as 
coterminous and coequal objectives within a given institution at any 
given time. 124 
121, 	Ibid. 7. 
12.1 	S.K. Weinberg. "Aspects of the Prison's Social Structure," 
Amer. J. Soc. Vol. 47. (1942): 717-726. 721. 
122 	Jacobs and Retsky. "Prison Guard- . 27. 
123 	DiIullio. Governing Prisons. 178. 
12.1 	Cerrato. "Reform of Correctional Instability Order or Stability. - 92. 
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Many systems have trialed a particular philosophy at one location and evaluated 
prior to rejecting or implementing elsewhere. According to Cerrato, 
There is a tendency to discuss the effects of social change in 
corrections, at least implicitly, in very holistic terms. Utilizing this 
approach;rsocial change is depicted as the replacement of the entire 
traditional correctional structure and philosophy - one that is 
essentially punitive and custodial in natti-re --, arid Which -guides all 
spheres of activity within a particular system - by a new innovative 
and modern correctional structure and philosophy. The problem of 
stability in this view is the construction of new and modern correctional 
institutions. Such a depiction of change tends to gloss over its 
unpredictable nature. Correctional institutions are affected by change 
at different rates. 125 
In retrospect, Victoria's decision to implement unit management throughout its 
new as well as existing institutions without benefit of research, experimentation, 
or trialing was remarkable. Decisions had been taken which would have direct, 
but unknown, effects on the State's prison system. Victoria's prison officers in 
1983 had little idea of what lay ahead. The grapevine had spread unfounded 
rumours. The Governors fuelled prison officer concern by failing to provide 
answers. It may have been that they had little information, to impart. But this 
was not an unusual occurrence. Many prison managers would be uncertain of 
current prison philosophy. In 1981 Joplin and Hendricks posed the question to 
correctional managers, "What is the philosophy of this prison? " The authors 
report that the replies ranged from "uncertainty to apathy." 126 Victoria's prison 
Governors may have responded similarly in 1983. 
For example, Jim Armstrong thought the system was running on "humane 
containment" prior to the separation of the system from the Department of 
Community Welfare Services. 127 While Armstrong may have believed this, there 
is no evidence to suggest that Victoria's prison system had dramatically changed 
its philosophy from the Whatmore era which emphasised prisoner change 
through treatment. Changes in operational philosophy had probably been made 
at the local level where the Governors had a modicum of self-control. 
125 	Ibid. 91. 
126 	J.W. Joplin and J.E. Hendricks. -Correctional Management: A Philosophical 
Perspective. - Corrections Today. Vol. 43 No. 6 (1981): 85-88, 85 
12- 	Interview with Jim Armstrong, 24 June. 1996. 
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Moreover, it is very difficult to maintain the fiction that an open prison camp 
has an operating philosophy. The philosophy speaks for itself If the prisoner is 
at the lowest security classification, he will probably transfer to an open 
institution. Two of Victoria's open prison camps at Cooriemungle and French 
Island closed because the camps could not attract either prisoners - because of 
the travel involved by their visitors, or staff - because they lived away from their 
family on station for at least nine days in every two weeks. 128  Even if the prison 
system has a philosophical grounding, the various institutional managers may 
use the ideological framework but stamp their individuality on the prison. This 
can result in many variations on a theme. Again, managers may not have given 
much thought to the operating philosophy and instead have relied on 
"managerial techniques to compensate for the consistency a philosophical 
perspective offers." m 
However, with the oncoming advent of unit management, Victoria's prison 
officers were advised that the traditional role was to be irreversibly altered. The 
'how, why, where and when' was never quite spelled out. Indeed, by 1989 
prison authorities were still trying to alleviate concerns, "it is probably true to 
say that prison staff have been given and have adopted many differing views on 
the exact nature of unit management, how it should function and how it affects 
them and their jobs." 13° Furthermore, American 'experts' were still unsure about 
the concept of direct supervision. 
Because of the lack of research, suppositions and rumours about the 
effectiveness of direct supervision have taken on the force of truth. A 
common tendency is for people to believe what is offtimes repeated, 
even if what is repeated is inaccurate or downright false. This is what 
has happened in regard to the effectiveness of direct supervision. 
At first it was claimed that direct supervision jails were safer and 
more humane for inmates and staff than were traditional jails. These 
claims were primarily based on the anecdotes, personal experiences, 
and opinions of those who worked in direct supervision facilities. 
Next came a handful of studies that seemed to substantiate the 
claims but were, in fact, so seriously flawed in their methodology as 
to make their findings unreliable. 
Ibid. 
Joplin and Hendricks. "Correctional Management: A Philosophical Perspective. - 85. 
Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. 2. 
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Finally came the assumption that direct supervision jails were indeed 
safer and more humane than traditional jails. The initial unsubstantiated 
claim that direct supervision jails were safer and more humane was 
repeated often and vigorously enough that it transcended the realm of 
mere supposition and became an indisputable FACT. In time, the 
ASSUMPTION became the TRUTH. The TRUTH of the matter is that 
effectiveness of direct supervision has yet to be either proved or 
- disproved ... Until such investigations have been completed, the 
claims about direct supervision are no more than simply conjecture" 
By the time that Zupan's research had been published in 1993, the 00C had 
been confined to the annals of Victoria's prison history. To suggest that unit 
management implementation was the death knell of the organisation is trite. 
Yet, it is possible that the failure to consider the ramifications of implementing 
the concept contributed to the organisation's demise. The Liberal Government 
progressively moved to privatisation. The prison system has been systematically 
downsized. Castlemaine, Geelong, Fairlea, Sale, Morwell River, Pentridge, and 
MRP prisons were closed in a seven-year period. 132 Three new privately 
operated prisons took their place. The only gain was the former Youth training 
Centre, Langi Kal Kal, which, ironically had been Whatmore's flagship for 
prisoner treatment change over four decades previously. The prison system in 
Victoria was irrevocably changed. The vision of 1983 did not eventuate. The 
traditional prison system had disappeared by 1997. 
Unit management: the effects on the goverment prison system. 
Morris and Zimring refer to the "four horsemen of political inaction: inertia, 
irresponsibility, ignorance, and cost." 133 In essence, these 'four horsemen' sum 
up Victoria's attempt to implement unit management. The decision-makers had 
found a prisoner management strategy, which they assumed, would complement 
the intended purpose-built facilities. The strategy required a different operating 
philosophy than the one in current use if it was to effect change in the system. 
131 	L.L Zupan, The need for research on Direct Inmate Supervision - American Jails. 
(March/April. 1993): 21-22. 22 (High case in original work). 
13' 	The Castlemaine Prison closed in 1990 and the Pentridge Prison complex- 
comprising 1-IMP Pentridge and MRP in November 1997. 
133 	N. Morris and F.E. Zimring. "Deterence and Corrections - Annals of the American  
Academy of Political and Social Science. 381. (1969): 137-146, 138. 
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Prison officers were trained purely in custody and control. It did not matter 
whether the government procrastinated about prisoner rehabilitation, public 
perception was another matter, 
There can be no question either that one of the principal measures of the 
success or failure of the prison system in the eyes of the public is the 
degree to which it achieves simple_containment. 
Victoria's prison administrators believed building new prisons and the introduction 
of unit management would satisfy the Labor Government's commitment to change. 
They had the knowledge, infrastructure, and training capacity to achieve their goals. 
What they apparently failed to consider was the pivotal role of the prison officer. 
For the prison officer role is crucial in determining whether unit management will 
succeed or fail. 135 Furthermore, 
Direct supervision inmate management, with its explicit link between 
philosophy, operations and architectural design represents ... a change in the 
mission of the organization, a change in the operating principles and a 
change in the nature of the corrections officers' job. I36 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle faced by Victoria's prison officers was conceptualising 
the fact that unit management could still be implemented without officers losing 
control. Many officers believed that unit management and control were 
incompatible. Why this myth was perpetuated is a moot point. The reality was that 
there were mechanisms within the concept to safeguard both staff and prisoners. 
Unruly or inappropriate behaviour could just as easily be dealt with under unit 
management as had been under the old regime. Indeed, it has been argued that the 
officers' role appears, or is, less stressful in a unit regime. 137 The simple fact is that 
the myth would probably not have continued if the concept had been fully explained 
to Victoria's staff by experienced unit management practitioners, such as officers 
from NSW and WA, or even overseas. 138 
134 	Hawkins, The Prison, 33. 
133 	Zupans. Jails. chapter 7. 
136 	Ibid. 147. 
137 	Apsey. B. Wockel M. and Johnson. S.. Report of Visit to Correctional Jurisdictions 
in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden. Finland and the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Department of Correctional Services. South Australia, 1989; and T. 
Vinson in Brand-Koolen. M.J.M. (Ed) Studies on the Dutch Prison System. The 
Hague: Kugler. 1987. 
13X 	Officers could have been seconded from unit managed jurisdictions to the STC. 
In the early 1980s Western Australia commissioned a new prison built specifically 
for unit management. The Prisons Executive Director, Ian Hill, acknowledged that 
the only way in which the new Institution would prove successful was to enhance 
and broadband current prison officer duties. Hill's view was that prison officers 
should play "an integral role" in all aspects of the management of prisoners.'" The 
suggested new prison officer role spanned four main areas: 
Maintenance of custody; attending to the welfare needs of prisoners; 
assistance in the provision of constructive activities for prisoners (work and 
recreation), and, contributing, to a more limited extent, to the provision of 
developmental opportunities for prisoners (counselling, skills development, 
education). 140 
According to Hill, 
Prison officers need to utilise a variety of "professional skills" in 
particular those dealing with people situations in a dynamic, pro-active way 
with the emphasis on identifying and defusing situations before they develop 
into problems rather than reacting to situations as they occur. They must 
develop flexible attitudes and adopt a problem solving approach rather than, 
as in the past, undertaking a narrow range of tasks "strictly by the 
book" in a mechanical repetitive manner. 141 
Hill envisaged adopting four key strategies could make the changes. 
• assigning primary responsibility for the delivery of welfare , 
services from specialist welfare staff (welfare officers) to 
prison officers; 
• the introduction where appropriate of "unit management" 
procedures; 
• the implementation of "case management" procedures, and, 
• the development and training of prison officers in their new 
roles. "2 
The approach described by Hill had striking similarities to a study conducted in the 
mid 1970s to investigate whether correctional officers could become 'behavioural 
technicians.' Simply, staffs were taught techniques to enable them to become 
involved in prisoner behavioural change procedures. 
139 	Hill. Development of the Professional Role of Prison Officers,  6. 
149 Ibid. 6-7. 
141 Ibid. 7. 
142 Ibid. 8. 
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The emphasis of the course was to get the officers to 
Become involved with the inmates for whom you are responsible, set goals 
for each, assist them in attaining those goals, provide feedback on their 
progress, and reinforce each successive approximation with praise, approval, 
and tangible positive consequences whenever necessary and appropriate. I4' 
The-results of the study found those trained officers, 
increased the number of interactions they had wilh inmates, and that a 
greater portion of these interactions were positive in nature. Finally, the 
trained officers themselves indicated that the techniques they learned were 
of benefit in their work with inmates, and the inmates indicted that officers 
who had received training appeared to them to have improved in their 
general calibre as well as become less punitive and more concerned with 
the welfare of inmates. 144 
Although this American study was conducted in the 'rehabilitation' era it provides 
confirmation that authorities still envisaged that the prison officer was the mode to 
implement change in prisoner management procedures. As the authors note, 
Until the efforts of the counselor, social worker, classification officer, 
vocational training instructor, and remedial education teacher are 
integrated in the form of a comprehensive, coherent, and continuous 
program, it is unlikely that correction's rehabilitative efforts will 
encounter any more success than they have to date; the correctional officer 
by virtue of his continuous contact with the inmates, is the individual within 
the institution who can best provide the continuity necessary if these 
traditionally independent efforts are to be interrelated. 145 
Hill's comments may simply have been a reiteration of the principles from the 
American investigation of the 1970s. This study demonstrated that, given a certain 
set of circumstances and training, positive interactions could result between officers 
and prisoners. There is little evidence, however, to suggest the American training 
programme was ever given serious consideration by other prison authorities. Indeed, 
the focus changed from investigating the role of prison officers to the study of the 
prisoner and his environs. Authorities now built prisons based on the small unit 
system instead of the traditional edifices designed for custody and containment. 
143 	R.R. Smith. M.A. Milan. L.F. Wood. and J.M. McKee, "The Correctional Officer as 
a 	Behavioral Technician- , Criminal Justice and Behavior. Vol. 3 No. 4, 
(December 1976): 345-369. 357. 
14-1 	Ibid, 357. 
143 	Smith et al. "The Correctional Officer as a Behavioral Technician - 358-359. 
The NSW prison system decided to implement the unit management regime based 
on "four clean guiding principles, "Reality, Responsibility, Predicability and 
Accountability." 146 The strategy was implemented in an old prison. 
A new style of management has been introduced at Bathurst Gaol 
which affects prisoners as well as officers. Unit Management 
houses prisoners_in_a_more_humane environment,-while team 
management gives professional and custodial staff an opportunity to 
participate in running the gaol. Instead of being housed in large 
impersonal cell blocks, prisoners in some wings live in eight smaller 
units, each accommodating between twelve and sixteen prisoners with 
two Prison Officers supervising each unit. Inmates cook and eat in their 
units. This style of accommodation creates a more relaxed and informal 
atmosphere, encourages closer relationships among the inmates and 
between inmates and staff. By resembling a normal environment it 
helps to prepare prisoners for their life after release. I47 
Prison officers were not sure of the concept and some felt that the 'experiment' 
was not a qualified success. Indeed one study highlighted some decidedly 
negative comments. The study examined officers' awareness of and the attitudes 
towards the Bathurst Management Programme. The main findings were: 
• Most officers expressed positive attitudes toward the 
Programme. When speaking of the positive points of the 
Programme, officers generally referred to a better working 
environment for themselves; 
• It is seen that Bathurst still offers a more relaxed working environment. 
Officers felt less inhibited about starting a conversation with prisoners, 
gave them instructions rather than orders, and felt that prisoners 
approached officers more; 
• "rehabilitation/reduce recidivism" remains the most important perceived 
aim of the Programme; 
• Half the staff interviewed had not attended either a Programme 
or Unit Orientation. 
146 G. Hay and M. Hart. Unit Management Discussion Document: Philosophy & Basic  
Programme Outline. Discussion Document prepared for Bathurst Gaol. 15 April 
1980, 2. 
147 	N.S.W. Department of Corrective Services. Annual Report, 1983, 15. 
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The last Orientation courses were held eighteen months ago; 
only one third of officers saw any difference in the way they 
related to prisoners at Bathurst, to the way they related to 
prisoners in other gaols. In December 1983, half the officers 
saw a difference; 
• Over half the officers felt that team management had broken down at 
Bathurst Gaol, even though they saw team management as a good idea. 
Fewer officers, than in December 1983, stated that they had a "say" in 
the running of the gaol, and that working at Bathurst was any different 
to other gaols; 
• Officers attitudes to prisoner management have 
become less liberal since the December 1983 study. It was felt 
that controls concerning inmate movement around the gaol, 
perimeter security and enforcement of rules should be 
increased; 
• When asked what assisted them in their jobs, most officers cited personal 
attributes, rather than aspects of the programme; the most difficulties 
experienced by others came from other officers or from the gaol 
administration; 
• There were few difficulties with prisoners, although officers saw 
that prisoners challenging their authority was the most important 
problem they faced. Officers were also concerned about their 
control over their jobs, knowing what was expected of them, 
and unsympathetic executive officers; [and] in comparison, 
junior officers expressed more negative attitudes than senior 
officers. 148 
The NSW prison authorities had gambled on introducing a new prisoner 
management concept into an environment that had been wholly custodial. But 
more importantly they had given cursory consideration to staff training. They 
recognised that, 
This form of management requires a far greater degree of 
communication between staff and management than used to occur, but 
it is being successfully, if gradually, introduced into Bathurst 
Gaol. To help, staff have undergone orientation programmes, while 
Prison Officers working in the units have received two days training 
in this type of work 149 
	
1-1N 	K. McLennan and D. Simmons. Prison Officers At Bathurst Gaol: Attitudes To The  
Management Plan. May, 1985. Internal report for comment only, 
N.S.W. Department of Corrective Services. 2. 
1-19 	N.S.W. Department of Corrective Services. Annual Report, 1983, 16. 
276 
Those charged with prison officer training in Victoria during the mid-1980s did 
not learn from the NSW experience. Although some reference had been made 
toward assessing participants for promotion as potential unit managers, and 
requiring participants to complete "An  Essay on Unit Management as it applies 
to a prison," 15° little consideration had been given to fully developing a unit 
management module. CPO course participants were given a six hour session on 
the principles, philosophy, and application of the concept and followed this by 
visiting the Castlemaine Prison for a "Unit Management Exercise." 151 Indeed, by 
the following year, the segment now lasted less than two hours and the 
requirement to complete an assignment on unit management had disappeared. 152 
Implementation of unit management was still in a state of flux. There was most 
certainly a breakdown between what senior management viewed as unit 
management training and what participants were receiving. And there was little 
indication of a standardised system of unit management practice in Victoria's 
prisons, each operating their version of the concept. This certainly was reflected by 
the absence of a specific unit management-training package. The most information 
that CP0s, and to a certain extent SPOs, received was 'guidelines and principles' 
taken from an address given during each promotion course by the Director-General. 
The 00C tried to address this deficiency by producing a manual which 
provides a comprehensive and concise reference for all staff involved in 
the unit management system, and is the primary reference document for 
the operation of the unit management system in Victoria's prisons. The 
manual has already become a leading text on unit management, 
being widely used in other Australian jurisdictions and also 
attracting considerable interest from overseas. 153 
The turgid manual was grossly overstated as a 'leading text' and was universally 
rejected by prison officers as being largely unreadable, and a waste of time and 
effort. As a vehicle for unit management operation, it failed dismally. 
15u 	00C, STC, Chief Prison Officer Squad 2/1986. 6-7. 
151 	Ibid. 11. 
152 	00C, STC. Chief Prison Officer Course, 1/1987. 29. 
153 00C Annual Report. 1990-1991. 15. 
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Moreover, the two-fold attempt at 'training' course participants in the concept 
of unit management by having Strategic Services address promotional courses, 
and instructing participants to research and present a unit management 
assignment, met with mixed success. Beeden's report noted inter alia, 
• Unit Management principles appear to detract from the teaching of 
- 	- - - prison securitylArarat] 
• Not enough emphasis on Security of Prisons, mostly unit 
management being taught and officers forgetting their security role is 
first; [Barwon] 
• Country prisons appear to be forgotten on promotional courses with 
the training_ emphasis on Unit Management; [Dhurringile] 
• Unit Management is all very well but hard to write a 1500 essay on the 
subject from material in library and you don't come from a Unit 
Management prison; [and] [instructor] self centred and only 
interested in feedback from Loddon and Barwon Prisons on Unit 
Management. Participants felt left out unless they were from a Unit 
Management Prison; [Geelong] 
• Unit Management essays were difficult for people coming from non-
unit management areas, as they had no experience of this regime. If this 
requirement stays as part of course content, more time should be spent 
at Unit Management Prison to do a comparison study; [and] Training in 
Unit Management should be more in depth, for the benefit of those 
participants working in a Unit Management regime but likely to do so in 
the future; [and] No training in Welfare/Counselling but SPOs in Unit 
Management prisons required to carry out this role with prisoners; 
[Loddon] 
• CP0s/SPOs with experience of Unit Management Prisons should be 
used to give input into promotional courses ie. teaching their peer 
group; [Pentridge] 
• Course content on Unit Management was up to date; [MRC][and] 
• More time should be spent on Unit Management. MRCV 54 
15.1 	J.R. Beeden. Report on validation of SPO/CPO Promotional Courses 1989 to 1991. 
Internal report to the Co-ordinator of Training Services. Bill Paterson, October 1991. 
3-18. 
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Prison officers and prison governors generally ignored the promotion of the 
'Unit Management Principles' handbook as the operational bible. I55 Although 
the decision to build and operate unit management prisons had been made early 
in the 1980s, little thought appears to be given to the training implications,—The 
relative importance Oven the concept can be determined by reference to 
promotional course content prior to 1988. 
By 1989 an embryonic semblance of the unit management strategy began to 
appear. The agreed upon implementation strategy was "a seven stage process 
which involves a range of personnel from each prison, both uniformed and non-
uniformed, and from all ranks." 156 The major components of the strategy were, 
Stage 1 	Senior Management briefing; 
Stage 2 	SMART; 157 
Stage 3 	Management of Change; 
Stage 4 	Planning; 
Stage 5 	Trainer Training; 
Stage 6 	Simulation Planning; and 
Stage 7 	Implementation. 158 
The first four stages covered training programmes and implementation 
techniques for senior management - the SMART programme being used to give 
Governors from non-unit management prisons experience in new concept 
prisons. The strategy also determined that unit management prison officer 
training would take place in situ, and Stages 5 and 6 had been designed with 
that in mind. 
155 	The author met all of Victoria's Governors at the Governors' Conferences held 
normally at the SIC. Most agreed that it was of little practical use. A few had not 
even read it. 
Kevpoints. Vol 4 No 3 (March 1993) 13. 
Senior Management Assessment and Review Team. 
Kevpoints, Vol 4 No 3 (March 1993) 13-14. 
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It was noted that 
in addition to unit management training modules being included in 
promotional training courses conducted at the Staff Training College, some 
400 staff at the new Barwon and Loddon Prisons also received skills 
training in unit management techniques on site. 159 
The unit management `mOdule' at the STC fo-r SPOs was a period of 3 hôüëe 
 officer from Strategic Services dealt with "00C Management Philosophies of 
Unit Management roles, goals and objectives." 160 What was extremely interesting 
was that Strategic Services personnel only addressed the SPO participants. 161 
Staff who were sent to train or explain Unit Management to prisons did 
not have the credibility or experience of Unit management to effectively 
win old staff over. Once again it was H.Q. related ideal and did not 
present a realistic overview to staff who had followed the same pattern for 
20 years or so. [It was] Just another change which would disappear like all 
the others before. [Furthermore] On job training in individual prisons took 
away H.Q. policy and destroyed continuity of basic ideals. 162 
It appears paradoxical that the biggest change in Victoria's prisoner management 
systems in over 140 years of prison functioning, including the training and retraining 
of the entire prison officer category was being entrusted to a 'core team' which had 
little, if any, background in either training or development. 163 Nelson and Davis, 
reviewing the first twenty years of direct supervision operation in 1995, claimed 
inadequate funding had weakened the concept. 164 This resulted in 
Inadequate training and orientation for staff, but also in inadequate staffing, 
inadequate transition planning, and pressure to open facilities before the 
building, staff, and inmates are ready for the move. 16 ' 
Nelson and Davis also noted that a number of institutions had opened without staff 
having a "thorough understanding" of the concept. 166 
159 	00C Annual Report. 1989-90. 34. 
160 	Senior Prison Officer Course. CPO David Sheridan, SPO 3/91. 
161 	From author's experience as STC Co-ordinator of Training Services, 1990-92. 
162 	Correspondence from former Governor Helen Holland, 17 April 1997. 
163 	The team consisted of the author of the unit management guidelines manual - a 
former base grade officer. a CPO. the former executive officer of the director of 
Prisons, a former social worker who had experience in classifications, and the 
Assistant Director who had been supervisor of classifications and Deputy Director of 
Programs in Prisons Division. Kevpoints, Vol 3 No 4, June, 1992, 14. 
164 	Nelson and Davis. -Podular Direct Supervision: The First Twenty Years - 17. 
165 	Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
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Training staff, who are responsible for training all officers, frequently have 
had even less exposure to direct supervision. The transition training 
programs often reflect the limited knowledge base and experience of the 
training staff rather than the needs of the organization. 167 
While the concept of unit management or direct supervision may have been 
_ philosophically sound, prison officers will only regard it as another strategy, which.-. 
will come and go. 168 Most have little choice in the current climate but to operate 
under sufferance. 169 Most expect that the process will cost prison officer 
positions."6 It also appears that prison managers had "rote-learned unit 
management principles" and had been "coached into giving answers to unit 
management questions" in order to gain promotion."' However, some found 
the concept to their liking, 
I was never comfortable with the old confrontation style of prisoner 
management operation. Unit management allowed me to interact with 
prisoners in a fashion that suited my style. But I accept that others did 
not like 4.' 72 
That unit management contributed to the 00C's demise is speculative. There is no 
doubt that the strategy was never the anticipated success. A decision was made to 
introduce the concept without proper investigation as to whether it was a successful 
practice. In 1997 its validity is still questioned. As the then Director-General noted 
in the foreword to Unit Management Guidelines, 
we have chosen the concept of unit management as our future approach. 
Unit management has not been opted for because it is new and trendy, but 
because it is a proven way of managing prisoners effectively and can be 
tailored to suit our own culture, abilities and needs. This manual outlines 
Victoria's approach to unit management. It is not a replica of any other 
system's approach, nor is it completely new. It is a collection of concepts 
and ideas that have been taken from the best of our past, what we consider 
to be the best and most workable from other systems, and the best of our 
own fresh ideas-ideas contributed by a number of Office of Correction's 
staff. Having drawn these ideas together, the manual proposes a model of 
prisoner management that is unique to Victoria. 173 
167 	Ibid. 
168 	Correspondence from former Governor Helen Holland. 17 April 1997. 
169 	Conversations with current serving metropolitan prison staff. 
17u Realised by the closing of a number of state-operated institutions. 
171 	Interview with former Pentridge Governor. Peter Hannay, 30 May 1996. 
172 	Conversation with Prison Supervisor. Sandra Paterson. 25 April 1997. 
173 	P. Harmsworth. Unit Management Guidelines: Achieving Leadership Excellence  
in Victorian Prisons. (Melbourne: 00C. 1990) .3. 
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The major problem was that staff unilaterally ignored the 'guidelines' and continued 
operating under the custody and control function. Victoria's authorities had a 
considerable period prior to the opening of the new institutions to validate the 
concept in an existing prison. Apart from the desultory_attempt at _the_ Castlemaine 
Prison, nothing was ever attempted except for some in-house training prior to new 
prisons being opened. I74 Staff training was never given the importance it should 
have. Politics intervened. Bill Kidston's famous "buckets of money" quickly dried 
up.' 75 Re-organisation became Harmsworth's priority - a concept that very rarely 
works in the prison setting. 176 When the 00C was subsumed into a new 
organisation its successor, the Department of Justice Corrective Services Division, 
carried on as if nothing had ever changed. 
The following chapter will detail prison officer training practices from 1960. Prison 
officer training had been conducted on site until the prison system was transferred 
into the new Social Welfare Department. The new department purchased a facility 
to conduct training. Whatmore and Shade had upgraded prison officer training and 
the purchase of training facilities should have been the •harbinger to re-skill 
contemporary prison officers and change their role to match the new operational 
practices. There are many reasons why this did not happen. It may have been that 
prisons were less regarded in the new divisional structure. Again, other divisions had 
a higher public profile. Indeed, departmental training, by its very nature, became 
eclectic. Prison officer training continued unabated, but a significant opportunity to 
upgrade and improve contemporary prison staff was lost. 
174 	Banvon unit managers were instructed by their governor to sec the Australian Min 
-Ghosts of the Civil Dead" which deals with a futuristic prison as part of their unit 
management induction. 
175 Conversation with Helen Holland, 30 April 1997. Mrs Holland said Kidston was 
famous for saying "there is a bucket of money for this and a bucket of money for that. 
If one bucket runs empty we'll take some from the other." 
176 Dilullio, Governing Prisons. 236-237. 
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Chapter 7 
Prison Officer Training 1960-1992. 
The.lack ofor_theimproper training of correctional officers is precarious since 
inmates must be professionally handled with care, not by trial and error' - 
It has been argued that the successful implementation of prison policy is subject 
to the will and understanding of the prison officer. 2 And the prison officer's role 
is clearly of critical importance. 3 "Within penal institutions their influence is 
inevitably predominant." 4 In 1967 the Task Force Report on Corrections wrote 
They may be the most influential persons in institutions simply by 
virtue of their numbers and their daily intimate contact with offenders. It 
is a mistake to define them as persons responsible only for control and 
maintenance. They can, by their attitude and understanding, reinforce or 
destroy the effectiveness of almost any correctional program. They can 
act as effective intermediaries or become insurmountable barriers 
between the inmates' world and the institution's administrative and 
treatment personnel 5 
If prison officers are to be the link between policy and operation, why is so little 
importance placed on their training? One answer may be that the primary 
emphasis of the prison officer's task in the 1990s has remained custody and 
control. Prison officers, simply, are judged on their capacity to keep order, obey 
commands, and carry out prison duties as required. Indeed, for many prison 
officers the basic task is the secure custody of the prisoner.' In Victoria's prison 
system it would appear that Headquarters implicitly agree. For example, the 
format of the 1991 Victorian prison officer evaluation instruments was 
significantly shaped towards the custodial aspects of the role. 2 
J.B. Wells, "Direct Supervision: Panacea or Fad?" American Jails, 
(Spring, 1987): 46-49, 48. 
2 	J.E. Thomas. The English Prison Officer Since 1850:  A Study in Conflict, 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). 
3 	G. Hawkins. The Prison : Policy and Practice. 
(Chicago: Uni. of Chicago Press, 1976), 85. 
4 	Ibid. 
5 	The Task Force Report on Corrections,  quoted in, Hawkins, The Prison, 85. 
6 	A. Coyle, Inside: Rethinking Scotland's Prisons, 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Child, 1991) 211. 
7 	Procedure Manual, Office of Corrections. Victoria, Ch.3, Attachment 1. 
283 
This chapter describes the training which Victoria's prison officers have 
undertaken for nearly three decades. A recurring theme is the emphasis on 
custodial training - for prison officers. The central prison officer training 
establishment was closed by 1993. Unit management consultants still facilitated 
unit management implementation and training. The new prison regime, headed 
by John Van Groningen s and the newly reinstated Director of Prisons, John 
Griffin, did not change training policy. Training practices reverted to those of 
nearly 40 years ago. It is argued that some of the decisions made in 1990 
already have a profound effect on the method and practice of training. With 
privatisation 9 and corporatisation 10 for the remainder of Victoria's prison 
system a reality, there is the distinct probability that many Senior and Chief 
Prison Officers will never receive purpose-designed training - if indeed their 
positions remain." 
The Training Division, 1960-1978. 
Prison officer training changed from being purely prison-based to external 
participation with the advent of the new Social Welfare Department. The 
Training Division began life in July, 1960, in the leafy Melbo. urne suburb of 
Hawthorn. Among its functions, the Division had to "carry out such duties in 
relation to training officers of the Social Welfare Department." 12 The foundation 
Director of Training was George Smale, formerly the prison system's Chief 
Training and Education Officer. Smale, like most other Directors of Divisions of 
Social Welfare was answerable to a committee. In Smale's case it was the 
Social Welfare Training Council, which had 12 members, including the 
Superintendent of Training, the Director of Family Welfare, and the Director of 
Prisons. 
The former Superintendent of Pentridge who was the Liberal Government choice to 
head the new Corrective Services Division in place of Peter Harmsworth. 
9 
	
	Three private prisons have opened. Two 600 bed male institutions, and a 100 bed 
female prison. 
o 	Message, No 8, Vol 2. (April, 1997). 
CPOs are now known as Prison Supervisors. The rank of SPO is currently under 
evaluation. 
12 	Social Welfare Report. 1962. 65. 
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Smale had an extremely difficult task. Among others, he had to, 
Advise the director-general on matters of general policy relating to the 
training of persons in matters pertaining to social welfare. Plan, co-
ordinate and supervise the training of persons under the Act. Promote, 
foster and encourage public interest in social _welfare. Supervise the 
training of all children, young persons and adults in any institution 
controlled by the social welfare branch. 
It was to be hoped that he would have sufficient help from the training council, 
whose functions were, 
To exercise a general supervision over theoretical and practical training; 
To prescribe courses of instruction and training in social welfare; 
To conduct written, practical or oral examinations; and 
To issue certificates of qualification." 
Prison officer training in 1960 prior to the establishment of the Social Welfare 
Department was perfunctory. Prospective prison officers were given an 
examination in both English and Arithmetic. They were subject to an 
intelligence test and a personal interview before a panel consisting of Smale, the 
Chief Training Officer, and both Governor and Deputy Governor of Pentridge 
Prison. Recruits were placed in an initial training class lasting 6 weeks after 
which they were examined in; 
1. English Expression. 
2. Arithmetic. 
3. Rules and Regulations and Procedures. 
4. Penology Part 1. 
5. Firearms. 
They must pass all these subjects before they may become permanent. 
If they fail in any one they are given another chance. If they fail the 
second time they are advised to seek other employment' s 
Before promotion to Senior Penal Officer, the officer had to pass 
I. 	Acts and Regulations. 
2. Prison Accounting. 
3. Penology Part 11. 16 
13 	S.W. Johnston and R.G. Fox, Correction Handbook of Victoria, 
(Melbourne: Commando, 1965) 113. 
14 	Ibid. 
15 	G. Smale. First Australian Conference of Prison Administrators Notes and  
Resolutions. Melbourne, June 6-10, 1960. 11. 
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The eager officer could sit for this examination as soon as he had passed recruit 
examination. He could then sit for "Institutional Administration [and] Penology 
Part III." Successful completion of this examination would qualify him for the 
_ position of Chief Penal Officer. 17 
The first conference of Australasian prison administrators was held in 1960. 
Representatives came from all Australian States plus the Northern Territory, 18 
Papua-New Guinea and New Zealand. 19 Their ideas and practices on prison 
officer training were eclectic. Programmes ranged from no formal training in 
Western Australia, to the Northern Territory contracting South Australia to 
train staff. NSW and Victoria held similar types of custodial training 
programmes. The New Guinea emphasis was on foot drill and elements of 
ceremonial marching. Tasmania had a two week induction course, Queensland a 
month's trial without training. South Australia had a sophisticated (at least on 
paper) and graduated training schedule. This consisted of: 
1. Recruit Training, 
2. Refresher Courses, 
3. Advance Training, 
4. Promotion Training, and 
5. Specialist Courses. 2° 
Victoria's Training Division realised that prison officer standards were low. 
• Applicants were of a similar low calibre. Smale noted, "It is rare that suitable, 
well-educated, experienced people apply." 21 He classified potential employees 
into four categories: - 
16 	Smale, First Australian Conference of Prison Administrators Notes and  
Resolutions. 11. 
17 	Ibid. 
18 	The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) did not have a prison system. All remandees 
or sentenced prisoners went to NSW. 
19 	First Australian Conference of Prison Administrators Notes and Resolutions, 1. 
20 	Ibid, 11-18. 
21 	Social Welfare Report. 1962, 65. 
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(a) The unemployed; 
(b) Those persons who have failed to obtain a secure job and are 
reaching the age and family responsibility where security means a 
great deal to them; 
(c) Younger people with a burning desire to assist inmates. Of these, 
many are too immature and others too emotionally involved with 
the problem of desire to assist the socially under-privileged to be 
of much value; 
(d) Migrants to Australia who are seeking fresh work in a new 
country. These are frequently very intelligent people. 22 
Smale proclaimed, in a covert reference to the quality of senior staff, that: 
While the unqualified institutional worker should not reach 
superintendent status, it seems clear that education without institutional 
experience is equally hazardous. Control and care of human beings 
cannot all be learned in the field of theoretical training, nor can it all be 
learned by sheer experience without training. 23 
Smale announced that initial training for prison officers would be extended from 
six to eight weeks. First aid was introduced and Penology I had been enlarged 
to include 'human development.' 24 The most controversial of Smale's mooted 
changes was the decision to combine initial courses for all new 'employees in the 
Family Welfare, Youth Welfare and Prison Divisions. There would be 'core' 
subjects that were applicable to all such as English Expression, Arithmetic, and 
First Aid. Participants would then take 'specialist' subjects suited to meet their 
particular divisional needs. It appears that prison officers were taught to change 
nappies in core elements. 25 Topics in the 'Seniors course' included 
Institutional Bookkeeping and Storekeeping Procedures (designed to 
equip officers who may undertake these responsibilities in prisons at 
some future date), the study of Penology II (offering specialized study 
of modern methods and techniques recommended for the development 
of improved attitude and skills essential to the rehabilitation of these 
committed to the care of institutions), as well as the study of 
appropriate Acts and Regulations of which prison officers must have a 
thorough knowledge. 26 
22 	Social Welfare Report. 1962, 65. 
23 	Ibid. 
24 	Ibid. 
25 	Interview \vith Jim Armstrong, retired Prison Governor Grade III, 28 May 1996. 
26 	Social Welfare Report, 1962, 66-67. 
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Chief Prison Officers had to submit a 3,000-word assignment on a topic 
approved by the Board of Examiners. "In addition they must pass in the subject 
Institutional Manag..ement." 27 Smale felt that Victoria's prison officer training 
had been restructured to meet_organisational needs. However, _the uniformed 
people he chose to train the prison personnel had little training experience. They 
were limited to practical prison work, marching and firearms training. 28 The 
other non-uniformed trainers were 
highly qualified academically and are specialists in their various 
fields. It may be of interest to note that, of the six professional 
officers, four hold university degrees and diplomas and two hold 
university diplomas. Again, four of these staff members are qualified 
teachers, whilst two are experienced social welfare workers. 29 
Recruiting standards were at an all time low. According to Armstrong, "the 
result of full employment meant a dearth of prospective applicants. The system 
literally had to take anyone off the street." 3° Applicants had little formal 
education. Their attitude towards non-uniformed training professionals would 
be shaped by uniformed instructors' observations. Trainee prison officers were 
conditioned towards a custodial mentality. It is highly unlikely that the average 
recruit had either the ability or the motivation to view training in a social 
welfare framework - Smale's aim. The dominant advice was "forget bullshit 
castle" and concentrate on prison officer duties. 31 With a little application even 
the dimmest recruit could pass the course. The measure of how difficult it was 
to fail the new combined training courses can be demonstrated by the fact that 
of 59 officers who sat English, Arithmetic, First Aid, Rules and Regulations, 
Penology Part I, and Firearms, only one failure was found in each of Arithmetic, 
First Aid, and Penology Part I. All other subjects were passed. 32 Courses above 
Part I were to be run on a part-time basis with officers expected to undertake 
advanced training in their own time. 
27 	'bid, 67. 
28 	Jim Armstrong interview, 28 May 1996. 
29 	Social Welfare Report, 1964, 58. 
30 	Jim Armstrong interview, 28 May 1996. 
31 	Ibid. 
32 	Social Welfare Report, 1964, 64. 
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There was a marked drop from formal applications to the number who actually 
sat examinations. s ' Smale, however, defended the courses and claimed that the 
demand for places was consistent 
These courses are comparable with the Child Care and Youth 
Welfare Work Courses Part II and Part III respectively. The Senior and 
	 Chief-Prison Officers Courses have been-in existence for some years and- 
little variation has been made in their content. There has been a 
pleasing increase in the number of officers attending these courses or 
undertaking.: the prescribed studies. In 1962, 58 officers enrolled for 
the Senior Prison Officers Courses; this figure remained fairly constant 
in 1963, but in the course recently began there is an enrolment of 79 
officers. Smaller increases have occurred in the number of officers 
offering for the Chief Prison Officer examinations. Whereas 12 officers 
commenced the course in 1962, the 1963 number was 21; already 25 
officers have indicated their intention to attend lectures for these 
examinations to be held later this year. Whilst there is always a high 
enrolment, the fall-out is also high. 34 
Smale had to provide training for country prison officers wishing promotion. 
Applicants undertook correspondence courses. Smale admitted this was inferior 
to the teaching techniques used by Training Division for participants in Child 
Care and Youth Welfare at similar levels. 35 Country officers had to undertake 
correspondence courses because there was no provision for officers to be 
released on pay to attend theoretical training. Moreover, 
Accommodation at Training Division is severely taxed on occasions. 
When all groups are attending lectures at the Division, rooms are 
found by the simple, but organizationally unsatisfactory, expedient of 
arranging group visits. This situation is hardly conducive to the 
smoothly flowing organization so necessary for an institution of the 
nature of Training Division which should be regarded more in the 
nature of a training college. Frustrations ensuing from such a situation 
affect not only the students but the permanent staff. 36 
By 1968 Smale was struggling providing training and accommodation for all 
groups who wished to use Training Division. He recommended obtaining a 
"completely new site and accommodation adequate for the number of students 
seeking training."" 
33 Ibid, 60-61. 
34 	Ibid, 60. 
35 Ibid, 1965, 41. 
36 Ibid, 1967, 50. 
37 [bid, 1968, 53. 
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Another major problem was the turnover in training staff. A direct result of 
staffing shortages was the deferment of the correspondence courses for SPOs 
and CP0s. 38 They were deferred again in 1969.' 9 The recruit prison officer - 
course, which had remained unchanged for a number of years, was revamped in 
1970. The syllabus included "Social Organisation, Psychology, Prison Method, 
and Practical Work." 49 There was, however, a resumption of correspondence 
courses for promotional aspirants. Moreover, a committee had been established 
to consider improvements in the SPO (Part II) and CPO (Part III) courses. 4 ' 
The focus on promotional training did not last long. By 1972 Smale retired and 
was replaced by E.V. Rogers who cancelled correspondence courses, again 
because of staff shortages. 42 
Whatmore had envisaged a changing role for the officer when he implemented 
his training prison strategy. Shade had carried on his work. Yet the officers role 
by the mid-1960s was seen by many as purely custodial and not treatment-
oriented. According to Johnston and Fox, 
The re-training of persons while in prison actually passed to the Training 
Division on its establishment, and parole has fallen to the Probation & 
Parole Division, so that Prisons staff are now mainly guards.'" 
The authors were members of the Criminology Department of the University of 
Melbourne and their comments on Victoria's prison officers carried substantial 
weight. And there was no rebuttal by Whatmore as Director-General or Shade 
as Director of Prisons. Moreover, the content of all prison officer courses 
conducted by Training Division was still custodial. Training Division had a 
difficult task because of the range of duties it had to perform. Many of its tasks 
were high profile and were politically sensitive. Prison officer training had to be 
conducted, but was mainly induction training several times per annum. 
38 	Ibid, 3 
39 	Ibid, 1969, 53. 
4o 	Ibid, 1970, 91. 
41 	Ibid, 53-59. 
42 	Ibid, 1972, 33. 
43 	Johnston and Fox, Correction Handbook of Victoria,  165. 
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As noted, it was extremely simple to cancel promotional training even though 
Training Division had genuine reason through staff shortages. Prison officers 
were being advised that the promotion be based on merit instead of seniority. 
However, they had little opportunity to attend promotion courses. In 1973 the 
major problem was obtaining participant accommodation. Recruit prison officer _ 
courses were being conducted at the Mont Park Psychiatric Centre while other 
courses were spread throughout metropolitan Melbourne." The Part I induction 
course was now of three months duration. 
Part I of the course provides preliminary training for newly recruited 
prison officers before they take their places of the staff of the various 
prisons. In 1972, 38 POs completed the theory section of the course; of 
these, 33 have now completed the practical work. A special POs 
course Part I was held at the end of last year to help alleviate the staff 
shortages at Pentridge. The course was completed early this year. 
Seventeen (17) took part and all were successful in completing it. 45 
Why the course length had been increased was debateable. The content had 
hardly changed and the prison officer role was still custodial. It may have been 
that recruiting standards were low and that a longer period was required to 
enable tuition to take place. There remains, however, the problem of exposing 
recruits to a long period of training when their task would be better suited to 
on-the-job training. 
The wisdom of having any sort of prolonged training has been questioned by 
Sykes. It is his contention that "A brief period of schooling can familiarize the 
new guard with the routines of the institution, but to prepare the guard for the 
realities of his assigned role with lectures and discussions is quite another 
matter. ,,46 In January 1974, the Government purchased Loyola College, the 
former Jesuit Seminary, in the northern suburbs of Melbourne - the future STC. 
This purchase gave the Training Division and the Department a facility that 
would provide residential accommodation for students and staff. 47 
44 	Social Welfare Report, 1973, 39. 
45 
 
[bid, 41. 
46 	G.M. Sykes, The Society of Captives, (Princeton. N.J.: Random House, 1956) 61. 
47 	Social Welfare Report, 1974, 6. 
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Prison officer recruitment was still conducted but the dropout rate was high. Of 
the 75 accepted in 1973, only 57 completed all course requirements. 48 Another 
revision in 1975 doubled the course to 24 weeks. The first 12 was spent at the 
College being instructed in theory followed by 9 weeks on-the-job training in 
various prisons. The final 3 weeks of the course were spent back at Loyola for 
revision and examinations. Successful completion of the course was mandatory 
for permanent appointment in the Victorian Public Service as a prison officer. 49 
There was, however, still a high attrition rate. Of the 131 original participants, 
only 67 completed all course requirements. At least those interested in 
furthering a career were being catered for. Both Part II and Part III, SPO and 
CPO, courses were now 6 weeks of full-time in-service participation. 5° 
After Rodgers retired JME Sutton, the new director announced that 3 prison 
officers would be seconded to the College to "organize the prison officer 
courses under direction of the training division's course coordinator." 51 They 
were the first uniformed prison officers seconded to the College on a full-time 
basis. 
The acquisition of the College doubled the cost of Departmental training from 
$312,748 in 1974, 52 to $672,244 by 1976. 53 The College employed a training 
staff of 23 including graduates in psychology, sociology, social work, law, 
commerce, education, youth work, management, and group work. 54 
Governmental approval had been granted to the Social Welfare Department to 
use the title of 'Institute of Social Welfare' for the headquarters of Training 
Division in 1968. When Loyola was purchased it became the new Institute of 
Social Welfare. 55 
48 	Ibid, 43. 
49 	Ibid, 1975, 43. 
50 	Ibid. 
51 	Ibid, 1976, 37. 
52 	Ibid, 1974, 14. 
53 	Ibid, 1976, 11. 
54 	Ibid, 36. 
55 	Ibid. 1968. 4. 
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By 1976 it offered three main groups of courses: in-service for departmental 
officers from prisons, youth, and family divisions; pre-service courses providing 
training for students who would later seek positions with the department or in 
the Victorian welfare community; and, training for volunteer programmes. 56 The 
Social Welfare Training Council decided in 1976 that prison officer promotion 
courses be revamped. 57 SPO and CPO courses would be extended by four 
weeks. There would now be 
5 weeks' academic work, 4 weeks' practical training of which one 
week is at a country prison and 1 week revision and examinations in 
three subjects. Success at this stage enables an officer to be promoted 
to Senior Prison Officer. Of the 32 officers who enrolled, 26 were 
successful. Part III of the course is also 10 weeks' full-time training, in 
advanced Penology and Institutional Management. Students must 
research and prepare a 3,000 word paper and deliver to a seminar 
audience. Successful completion of the Certificate in Penology 
enables an officer to be promoted to Chief Prison Officer, or 
appointed to the position of a Chief Work Release Officer or a 
Welfare Officer within the Prisons Division. Fourteen graduated in 
1975. 58 
That the new Part II and III sections of the Certificate in Penology were 
intellectually demanding can be gauged by the 100 per cent pass record for the 
1976 courses. 59 These results can be interpreted three ways: , the participants 
were of such high quality; the course was of such a standard that participation 
was the major criteria; or, the professional staff did not properly assess 
participants. Moreover, the next few years displayed similar results with a total 
of 24 SPOs and 18 CPOs successful in 1977; 60 11 of 12 SPOs and 8 CPOs in 
1978;61 35 SPOs and 8 CPOs in 1979; 62 16 SPOs and 13 CPOs in 1981; 63 and 
24 SPOs with 10 CPOs successful in 1982. 64 
56 	Ibid, 1976, 36. 
57 	Ibid, 37. 
58 	Ibid. 
59 	Ibid, 1977, 35. 
60 	Ibid, 1978, 89. 
61 Ibid, 1979, 63. 
62 	Ibid, 1980, 63. 
63 	Community Welfare Services Report, 1982, 15. 
64 	Ibid, 1983, 47. 
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Officers applied to undertake a promotional course after a certain period of 
service. 65 When the course was successfully completed, they could apply for 
promotion. The system later changed because of the necessity - to staff new 
prisons. Officers now could apply for promotion without having completed a 
promotional course. However, there was a caveat. Base grade officers must first 
undergo a written examination in rules and regulations and English 
comprehension. Applicants for CPO positions did not have to undertake this 
test. But there could be a gap of several months between attaining promotion 
and attending a promotional course. In many cases officers were acting in higher 
than substantive positions prior to course attendance. 66 A major problem with 
prison officer training is determining what is relevant for both recruit and 
promotion training. Promotion training is based upon the current prisoner 
management philosophy. Recruit training is usually based on principles of 
security, report writing, self-defence, riot formation, rules and regulations, first 
aid, history of penology and of the particular organisation, and who to salute. 67 
While the former is an example of the 1970s Tasmanian recruit prison officers 
induction programme, a survey of any Western prison recruit training 
programme highlights the security and custodial nature of the training. For 
example, in Alberta Canada, it is acknowledged that 
On completion of the Correctional Officer Basic Training Program, the 
Correctional Officer will be able to effectively demonstrate skills 
related to security practices and procedures; manage and control inmate 
behaviour; achieve competence in fitness and self - defence and 
demonstrate a working knowledge of Departmental Policies and 
Procedures and Institutional Standard Operating Procedures. 68 
This is by no means an isolated example. The tasks of the Victorian prison 
officer of the 1970s simply replicated those of base-grade officers working in 
Alberta's Correctional Services. 
65 	Usually 5 years in Victoria in the 1950s and 1960s. 
66 	The author had to re-write the SPO and CPO promotion course to reflect changing 
practices. 
67 	This was deemed an important part of the author's induction into the Tasmanian 
Prison Service in 1975. Approximately one hour was spent on "recognising senior 
prison staff." The next session on "prison psychology" lasted thirty minutes. 
68 	Department of Correctional services, Alberta. Canada, 4 week recruit course, 1975. 
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As Filan noted in 1978, 
The Prison Officer's role in the Victorian Division of Correctional 
Services is clearly defined by its legal parameters as strictly confined to 
custody, security and control of prisoners. This role is particularly 
emphasised by the specific duties and responsibilities outlined in his 
Standing Orders and apparently (judging from a small sample) his Local 
.Orders; the only_offences legally proscribed are unarguable offences 
directly contrary to this role. Passing reference to a 'rehabilitative' role 
is unspecific, ambiguous and possibly dangerous to the officer's career 
(depending as it does on individual interpretation of the terms 
'rehabilitation' and 'treatment programmes'). 69 
When discussing prison officer training, prison officials always tend to highlight 
the progressive measures they are taking to upgrade the officers' role. They 
fulminate when confronted by accusations of prevarication. What they fail to 
admit, or even to see, is that the rhetoric of training change cannot always be 
matched by the practical reality of a newly skilled prison officer. Some prison 
administrators have acknowledged that there is a disparity in prison officer 
training but accuse contemporaries of politicising the issue. 
Far too often I have heard correctional administrators refer to 
training in the context of rectifying corporate ills or as a device to 
bring about unspecified organisational change. My inevitable 
reaction is that they, the administrators, are the ones who must 
rectify ills and be responsible for the achievement of organisational 
change. Training certainly plays a central role in implementing 
change and in providing feedback to modify these goals and 
implementing strategies, but it cannot be held responsible for 
rectifying the executive's dereliction of its responsibilities. The 
organisation must settle its corporate plan, implementation strategies, 
feedback mechanisms and clearly define the role training will play in the 
total process." 
The reality, of course, is that prison administrators must focus on the custodial 
aspect of training. Their future in the service depends on it. 
69 	M. C. Filan, A Study of the Legal and Sociological Determinants of the Work Role of  
the Victorian Prison Officer, BA diss., Canberra College of Advanced Education, 
1978, 39. 
70 	W. Kidston. Victorial Director- General of Corrections, in J. Mugford, (Ed) 
Correctional Officer Training, (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 
1987), 4. 
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According to Sykes. 
One escape from the maximum security prison is sufficient to 
arouse public opinion to a fever pitch and an organization which 
stands or falls on a single case moves with understandable caution. 
The officials, in short, know on which :side their_bread is buttered. - 
Their continued employment is tied up with the successful 
performance of custody and if society is not sure of the priority to 
be attached to the tasks assigned the prison, the overriding importance 
of custody is perfectly clear to the officials. 71 
It has been argued the recruit can learn just as much about working in prisons 
by undertaking a 2-week short course combined with on-the-job training. 
Compare this with the formal 12-week College instruction, which dominated the 
late 1980s prison officer training. Victoria has tried both approaches and in the 
mid-1990s has settled, at present, for a combination of both. The graduates of 
1994 undertook a 12-week course made up of 6 weeks classroom teaching with 
6 weeks on-the-job. Classroom topics were prisoner management; fire 
awareness; firearms; criminal justice system; and general topics such as report 
writing, first aid and infectious disease control. 72 To many, the crucial part of 
training has always been the on-the-job component. It is this part where recruits 
discover what the actual job entails. And it is this segment that will determine 
whether the recruits can cope with the difficulties of working in a prison system. 
The recruits' initial anxiety will probably be about how they interact with 
prisoners. Once they overcome initial fears and get accustomed to the prison 
setting, they will reach the next, and probably most crucial, stage - how to 
interact with other officers. When undertaking induction training, recruits are 
informed that they are becoming part of a professional cadre that embodies 
esprit de corps. The reality is quite different. What recruits mainly learn from 
the on-the-job placement is the CYA principle, 73 and the how, who, what, and 
where to 'look out for.' Recruits to the prison service have innate worries whether 
they will enjoy the task, and these worries are realised or rejected once they have left 
the College cocoon. 
71 	Sykes, Society of Captives, 18. 
Kevpoints, vol 5 no 4(, June, 1994) 18. 
73 	An acronym for -cover your arse. - This means protect yourself at all times. 
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Homans claims, no one is born to be a prison officer; indeed, "there is little if any 
empirical knowledge of what makes a good correctional officer."74 And there is no 
particular reason to seek employment in the prison environment. Some reasons 
include job security: long term unemployment, 76 betterment of employment, 77 
among others. Thus the type of person who seeks employment in a prison setting 
may be determined in the first instance by job security, rather than some altruistic 
ideal about helping people reform themselves. In his survey of Western Australian 
Prisons, Williams found the decision to become a prison officer is often taken 
"independently of the decision to leave previous employment." 78 In a sample of 60 
officers Williams discussed such forces as "redundancy, financial difficulties and 
dissatisfaction were pushing them out of their previous [employment] before they 
had begun to think about becoming prison officers." 79 Many of the officers sampled 
indicated that they would have never considered this type of work had it not been 
suggested to them by "relatives, friends or acquaintances who were either prison 
officers themselves or who knew prison officers." 8° 
A similar situation was found by Bullard on investigating the New South Wales 
prison system. His conclusions on job seeking patterns among officers highlighted 
the job security aspect, and his profile of the average recruit was one "with only a 
fundamental educational level, married and concerned to provide security for the 
family... ,, ' Moreover, these profiles can be replicated throughout all Western prison 
services. 
74 	R.J. Homans, "Correlates of satisfactory relations between correctional officers and 
prisoners," J of Offender Counselling Services and Rehabilitation,  4(1), (1979): 
53-62, 54. 
75 	L.X. Lombardo, Guards Imprisoned. (New York: Elsevier North Holland, 1981) 21. 
76 	J.B. Jacobs, H.G. Retslcy, "Prison Guard", Urban Life, 4 (1), (1975): 5-28. 
77 	Lombardo, Guards Imprisoned, 21. 
78 	T.A. Williams.  Custody and Conflict: an organisational study of role problems and  
related attitudes among prison officers in Western Australia,  Ph. D diss., Uni of 
Western Australia, 1974, 155. 
79 
 
[bid, 156. 
80 	Ibid. 
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Emery, interviewing officers in Bristol, England, offered the following modal profile: 
Brought up in a working class family; left school at 16 years of age; first 
steady job most likely to have been in unskilled or semi-skilled labouring; 
military service with non-commissioned rank; dissatisfaction with factory or 
millwork and primary concern with lack of economic security; selection of 
the Prison Service after seeking or considering employment in the Police 
Force, Fire Brigade, or the like. 82 
Many prison officers, it is noted, have limited education. The method of classroom 
teaching training is hardly conducive to the majority of participants. Indeed, it can be 
argued, what the system is overtly telling prison officers that the task is not really 
that demanding. It demonstrates this by providing instruction to a large group of 
inductees on a factory-line basis. Indeed, one Australian prison system has 
conducted training programmes for classes of up to 60 recruits at one time "through 
urgent necessity."83 Another difficulty, according to Thomas, is that prison officer 
trainers or staff in charge of prison officer training are rarely innovators. Most 
appear to follow the organisation's direction hardly questioning whether the training 
will make any real impact. This is compounded by the fact that training is expected 
to be miraculous and will solve every problem in the organisation. Again, training is 
always levelled at base or middle level staff 
There also seems to be the perception that those in charge of the prison need little 
training when it can be learned through experience. Furthermore, the training course 
syllabi are usually an amalgam of input depending on the skills and interests of those 
who undertake course development. Moreover, the large body of prison or 
correctional literature used by prison trainers is American in origin and has limited 
application in English or Australian prison settings." Thomas also debunks the myth 
of 'on-the-job' training. While recognising that the concept is necessary, he argues 
that some of the most important aspects of prison work do not get formal 
recognition - such as how to deal with "practical common situations." 
81 	C.G. Bullard, A Sociological Study of Prison Officers in N.S.W. : A Stressful  
Occupation, Ph. D diss., Urn of N.S.W., 1977, 222. 
82 	F.E. Emery, Freedom and Justice within walls,  (London:, Tavistock, 1970) 32. 
83 	Report of Review of the Correctional Officer Induction Training, 1991, 
South Australian Department of Correctional Services, 7. 
84 	J.E. Thomas, "Training Schemes for Prison Staff: An Analysis of Some Problems- 
Aust. & N.Z. J of Crim, 5,4 (Dec., 1972): 199-205. 
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Thomas argues these, normally get confined to the "familiar dustbin category of on-
the-job training." " If these subjects are taught, professional non-prison trainers 
usually conduct them. Most of these people have no practical prison experience as 
prison officers yet try to impart theoretical prison knowledge to a group of new 
recruits - a situation the raw recruit soon recognises, and the subject's credibility is 
soon lost. If the credibility is not lost at this stage, once the recruit enters the prison 
and discusses training with experienced officers, he or she will soon be 
'enlightened.' Again, there is little attempt to give recruits and promotional 
participants useful information in offender management. The reason is that 
there is little scientific knowledge about handling offender populations, few 
principles for consistent practice, and almost no provision for assessing the 
value of particular measures in various situations. Custodial staff generally 
operate on the basis of lore which has made for continued improvements in 
practice in other fields and occupations. Very little has been written on 
group management practices with confined offenders. What there is has 
come mainly from the social scientists and has little relevance for the line 
practitioner. 86 
Training Division 1978-1983. 
The creation of the Department of Community Welfare in 1978 hardly affected the 
nature of prison officer training. The now re-named "Community Welfare Training 
Institute" posited another version of the basic training course for new officers. This 
would now consist of three discrete segments: 
a) induction segment - a 10 day orientation course focussing on 
skills which the recruit prison officer requires to carry out day-
to-day duties; 
b) on-the-job placement for a period of at least 10 weeks in the 
prison environment. At the beginning of 1980 a field supervisor 
section was established to support the officers and assess their 
performance during this part of the program; 
c) final segment - a 12 week course at the Institute. At the 
conclusion of this segment officers are eligible to apply for 
permanency. 87 
35 	Thomas, "Training Schemes for Prison Staff: An Analysis of Some Problems" 202. 
36 	Hawkins, The Prison, 101. 
87 	Community Welfare Services Report. 1980, 63. 
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This new course was not necessarily designed to assist upgrading Victoria's recruit 
prison officer skills. There was perhaps, a more practical reason. Prison numbers 
had been steadily climbing since 1976 from a DAP of 1580 88 to the 1980 DAP 
1788. 89 The reality was that the prison service quickly needed staff. The fact that 
officers would do at least 12 weeks 'on-the-job training' was soon exposed as 
fiction. Many of these 'retreads' 90 did not return to the College for the final 
segment until at least 14 months later. 91 There were some unanticipated 
consequences of this late College return. The 'experienced' recruit prison officers 
had been working in the prison environment for many months. They had 'learned' 
on-the-job. Their 'tutors' or 'mentors' were, by and large, case-hardened as 
Victoria's prison system was going through one of the most violent periods in its 
history. 
There had been a history of turbulence culminating in the Jenkinson Report in the 
early 1970s. 92 There was "a serious riot" in B Division, escapes from H Division, 
fires in F Division in 1978, 9' and a "bomb explosion in A Division on 10 April 1980 
injuring 4 prisoners."94 With prisoner accommodation being critical, a fire at Fairlea 
Women's Prison, in which three prisoners died, necessitated the removal of females 
to Pentridge Prison. 95 The 'recruits' returning to the College. were "less than 
impressed" with the theory being taught. 96 "It was like going to wonderland after 
Pentridge."97 The recruits, however, were rational enough to realise that this 
segment of the course had to be completed to attain permanency - even though the 
group consensus was that the College training content was of little use back in the 
prison. 98 
88 	Social Welfare Report, 1976, 74. 
89 	Community Welfare Services Report, 1981, 49. 
90 	Officers returning to the STC after a long period. 
91 	Interview with CPO Sandra Moore, MRC. 1 June 1996. 
92 	Report of the Board of Inquiry into Several Matters concerning H.M. Prison  
Pentridge and the maintenance of discipline in prisons,  No 73, Government Printer, 
Melbourne, 25 September, 1973. 
93 	Community Welfare Services Report. 1979, 48. 
94 	Ibid, 1980, 51. 
95 	Ibid, 1982, 43. 
96 	CPO Sandra Moore interview, 1 June 1996. 
97 	CPO Sandra Moore spent 14 months at the MRP in Coburg between the 
Induction and the final part of the recruit course. This was not an isolated instance. 
98 	CPO Sandra Moore interview, 1 June 1996. 
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The Institute's management and its Training Council had lost credibility with 
Victoria's prison officers. According to Armstrong, prison officer training did not 
appear to be as fashionable as the high-profile community and social Welfare 
programmes, or indeed received as much attention. 99 What the College management 	 
and the Training Council perhaps had failed to consider was that the worthiness of 
any prison-training programme can easily be evaluated in the prison setting. The 
men who administered Victoria's prisons, the governors, had a vested interest in the 
College training product. After all, they received the product of both recruit and 
promotional training. Their input was not yet as considerable as it would later be, 
but they were still a powerful collegiate. A covert schism developed between the 
College and prison governors leading to governors commencing 'in-service' training 
"to upgrade and extend prison officer skills." 100 The difficulty, however, was that 
prison officers had little input into College prison officer training programmes - all 
changes had to be approved by the Training Council. The council should have 
realised there are a number of issues which must be addressed before any prison 
course can be deemed successful. Among these are: 
• the course content must have validity to the organisation; 
• the course content must have validity to the participant; 
• the presenter must have credibility; 
• the presenter must be able to impart the knowledge; 
• the participant must understand the given information; 
• the participant must feel that the course has been worthwhile; 
• the participant must feel that the course content has some usefulness in the 
prison setting; 
• the participant must be able to use the information in the prison ; 
• the customer (governor) must feel that the course content has some 
usefulness in the prison; and, 
• there must be some procedure to measure course validity after officer 
implementation. 1° ' 
99 	Jim Armstrong interview, 28 August 1995. 
Community Welfare Services Report, 1981, 50. 
101 	From the author's experience as both course participant and course lecturer, 
1975-1995. 
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While these elements are not mutually exclusive, it is argued that failure to address 
any of the above will directly result in wasted human and financial resources. The 
failure to consider these issues would be a major factor in the STC's eventual 
closure: The STC closure was a direct result of the lack of foresight by those 
charged with overseeing training. It has been noted that, 
In many respects, corrections have been slow to recognize the value of 
training and the impact it can have on the total organization. Unfortunately, 
training has frequently been viewed as an avenue to prepare someone to 
assume his or her first correctional assignment, focussing entirely on the 
individual's skills rather than the potential development of the organization. 
Training can have a direct impact on the overall performance of the 
organization, resulting in increased consistency of operations, increased 
appropriate implementation of policies and programs, and an opportunity 
for the communication of organizational values, culture and ethics. 
Historically, staff training functions have been limited both in resources and 
in staffing. They were isolated from top level management in the process of 
policy development. And, as current trends demonstrate, the training 
department is frequently the first hit by budget reductions. Training needs to 
be viewed not as a frill of an organization, but rather an essential component 
that facilitates the effective operation of an agency. 102 
The Staff Training College 1983-1992. 
In March 1983 a commissioned report from the Head of the School of Social Work 
at the Phillip Institute of Technology found that the Community Welfare Training 
Institute 
was not providing an effective and efficient service to the Department and 
that training for Departmental staff would be better performed at C>A>E 
(sic) and TAFE Colleges at far lower cost. She recommended that prison 
officer recruits should spend most of their training period in a prison, to 
allow for on-the-job training, and should attend courses at post-secondary 
education institutes to allow them to mix with a wide range of students. 103 
As a result of this report, the Minister announced the College would be sold and that 
departmental training would be covered by the TAFE system.'" 
102 	D. Carter, -The Status of Education and Training in Corrections" in 
Federal  Probation, (June, 1991): 17-23, 19. 
103 	History of the Office of Corrections Victoria, 1984, Internal document, sec. 5. 
104 	Ibid. 
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It had been noted that 
Staff employed in training prison officers at Watsonia had long considered 
the existing conditions unsatisfactory: prison officers, part of a disciplined, 
uniformed service, were trained in the same facility as welfare staff. Both 
groups wreer (sic) suspicious of each other, and the relative freedom of 
welfare staff during training was resented by the prison officers. 105 
- . m  - With the transfer of prisons  late 1983 into the newly created Office of Corrections 
(00C), an immediate task was to determine whether a training facility for prison 
officers was still required. The newly appointed Director-General, Bill Kidston, 
discussed the situation with senior governors and decided to purchase the former 
Training Institute, as a temporary base for 00C training. 106 "Its ipresent location at 
Watsonia is intended to be temporary and a new Staff Training College will be built 
adjoining the first new prison to be constructed in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Corrections Master Plan." °7 The STC began training 
activities on 20 February 1984. It was to provide "academic and practical training at 
all levels, as well as fostering pride, standards and esprit de corps." 1°8 
The College was to have a staff of 20 in charge of Prison Officer Training, 
Management and Administrative Training, Community Based Corrections Training, 
and an Administrative Section. 1°9 The first Superintendent of the STC supervised all 
aspects of College functioning. Prison officer training, however, was entrusted to a 
uniformed governor. At this stage there was little indication of what the department 
expected of prison officer training. All that was apparent was that there was a 
pressing need for more staff. By February 1984 there were 120 temporary prison 
officers who had to complete the Part I of training. New courses were urgently 
needed to upgrade both recruit and SPO training. The new 12-week recruit course 
was designed with the purpose of creating "a strong bond between officers."' m 
105 	History of the Office of Corrections Victoria,  sec. 5. 
106 	Ibid. 
107 	00C Annual Report, 1983-84, 36. 
108 	Ibid. 
109 	Ibid. 
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The 'new' course now comprised 
orientation, discipline and drill, prison method, the criminal justice 
system, industrial safety and prison hygiene; operational procedures, Acts 
and Regulations, disciplinary hearings and court procedures, report 
writing, self defence and baton training, fire and fire safety training. 
[Moreover], the Director-General wanted prison officers to learn something 
of public sector management and the relationship between the prison service 
and other sectors of the public service." 
Changes had also been made to the existing SPO course. The course now lasted 8 
weeks and officers were "encouraged" to live-in at the STC. The SPO selection 
process had also been upgraded and applicants had "to undertake a pre-course 
examination, a medical/physical fitness test and an interview by a selection panel." 112 
The initial intake for the 3-month residential recruits course commenced on 2 April 
and the SPO course on 30 April. Both courses graduated at a formal ceremony 
attended by the Minister and the Director-General on 22 June. The 'formality' was 
to allow a "spirit of tradition" to develop between all course participants and that the 
College would create "its own identity." 113 
STC training continued at a frantic pace for the next 2 years. During the 1984-85 
financial year 5 recruit courses of 12 weeks duration were conducted for 100 prison 
officers. The backlog of 'retreads' to complete Part I was finalised - a total of 80 
completed an 8 week modified course. Promotion courses continued with 45 
participants completing the 8 week SPO course, and 10 CPOs graduating from the 
solitary CPO 8 week course. ' 14 The 1985-86 training year found another 156 recruit 
prison officers graduate along with 44 SPOs and 13 CP0s. 115 There was a special 
course for 33 Industry Supervisors. 116 But there was little indication of what the 
purpose of prison officer training should be. 
110 	'bid, 37. 
History of the Office of Corrections,  sec. 5. 
112 	00C Annual Report, 1983-84, 37. 
113 	History of the Office of Corrections,  sec. 5. 
114 	Office of Corrections Annual Report. 1984-85. 18. 
115 	Ibid, 1985-86, 16. 
116 	These newly named 'industry overseers' participated in a basic recruit course which 
was modified to suit the vocational nature of the task. 
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Perusal of the duties of the Superintendent of the STC provided little information. 
He had to "provide training courses relating to custodial operations." 7 The 
internecine problems, which had been apparent at the former Community Welfare 
Training Institute, surfaced at the STC. An internal review of STC functioning was 
critical of the administrative arrangements, and a major restructure took place." 8 _  
Three main areas of activity were identified: Training and Development, Training 
Services, and Administration and Resources. At the end of the year the new 
structure was in place and "most appointments to teaching positions had been 
made." 119 The inherent problem of the nature and type of prison officer training to 
meet the organisation's goals was sidestepped. This perennial issue was simply 
addressed by referral to a new "Staff Training Council for the College [which would 
be a] key source of advice on the overall focus and direction of the College. '7120 The 
STC, however, was churning out courses, 92 recruits, 89 SPOs, 10 CP0s, and 10 
Industry Supervisors graduated during the financial year. Of particular interest in the 
1986 CPO course was the introduction of the concept of unit management. 
The latest version of the CPO course included topics on 00C policy, prisoner 
programmes, legislation and regulations, communication and group processes, basic 
management skills, writing skills, public speaking, aggression and stress 
management, emergency procedures, a placement in a prison or a Community 
Based Corrections Centre, and disciplinary hearings/evidence procedures."' 
Participants were also introduced to the concept of unit management. This practice 
had been introduced in some sections of the New South Wales prison system and 
had been trialed in the Victorian prison at Castlemaine. Unit management was to be 
Characterized by the introduction of a more pro-active management and 
normalized living environment with such attributes as extended out of cell 
hours, meal times and industry working hours; and education and other 
programs with more flexible availability outside normal working hours. 
117 	Office of Corrections Annual Report, 1985-86, 29. 
118 	R. W. Harding, Report of the Review of the Objectives and Operational Programs of  
the Office of Corrections Staff Training College (Victoria), 1986, 
Office of Corrections, Melbourne. 
119 00C Annual Report, 1986-87, 12. 
120 	Ibid. 
121 	00C,STC,Chief Prison Officer Squad, 2/1986, 
handbook given to course participants. 
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The project will provide better identification of staff training needs and test 
the operational feasibility of such an approach in prison management. 122 
The CPO course participants were encouraged to research the unit management 
concept and to this end a 6-hour session on the principles, philosophy, and 
application of the model was built in to the course syllabus. The 6-hour session 
included time for participants to discuss the model's application into the Victorian 
system. As part of the course, participants travelled to Castlemaine Prison to view 
unit management in action. 123 In 1987 the CPO course was extended to 9 weeks. 
Senior uniformed STC training staff still viewed their primary task as custodial. 
Courses mirrored this perception. Civilian input was regarded as perfunctory. There 
was, however, a change on the horizon. The 00C had commissioned a planning 
and training evaluation. 124 
The Plan aims to systematically link staff work activities to recruitment, 
selection, appraisal, training and promotion processes. College staff have 
been closely involved in the formulation of the Plan, and throughout the year 
were responsible for the implementation of those key objectives which had 
training implications. 125 
The Plan had been initiated because of the pressure on the organisation to meet 
staffing requirements created by 
increased staff establishment for the three new prisons 
(M.R.C., Barwon, Castlemaine), 
redevelopment of existing facilities, 
introduction of new management philosophies such as unit management, 
normal rates of retirement and resignation. 126 
A new STC prison officer training administrative structure was implemented. The 
uniformed training - both recruit and promotional would be the responsibility of the 
'Co-ordinator of Training Services.' New course design would be the responsibility 
of the 'Co-ordinator of Training Development.' Moreover, tertiary non-uniformed 
training professionals were sought for these positions. The hidden agenda effectively 
was the replacement of the uniformed power elite at STC. 
122 	00C Annual Report, 1985-86, 6. 
123 	00C, STC, Chief Prison Officers Squad, 2/1986. 
124 	Work Force Planning and Training Plan 00C. December 1986 (revised). 
125 	00C Annual Report, 1986-87, 12. 
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A newly appointed College Superintendent broke up the elite by transferring these 
officers back to custodial duties. 127 The STC was still, however, churning out 
graduates. Training courses among others in 1987-88 were held for 111 recruits and 
20 CP0s. 128 The three new prisons also required training for unit management staff 
The Governors, however, insisted that their staff should only be released to attend 
promotional courses at STC for a short period. They argued that the organisation 
could not afford the luxury of having prospective supervisors and managers at the 
STC for prolonged periods. 129 Accordingly, there were 
pressures to rationalise promotion programs for SPOs and CP0s. One is 
the need for improved management skills for all levels in the prisons and two 
is the requirement to decrease the amount of time spent on training without 
losing training effectiveness. [Therefore] The SPO program would be, at 
this stage of program development 4 weeks and that for CPOs 6 weeks. 139 
Recruit prison officer courses were reduced to 10 weeks but were still 
predominantly custodial oriented. The modified recruit course now covered an 
introduction to basic report writing techniques and a two-day supervised placement 
at a prison complex in week 1. During week 2 recruits were introduced to "Humane 
Containment with specific emphasis to the concept of unit management." This was 
followed by another 2-day placement in a prison and a workshop relating to AIDS 
in prisons. Weeks 3-7 was set aside for 4-day sessions on administrative law, 
firearms, management, first aid and emergency procedures. All of these sessions 
were subject to either a written or oral examination, or a combination of both. The 
recruits then undertook a two-week on-the-job placement with both prison and STC 
assessment prior to returning for a final week of "Administration and 
Graduation." 131 It was, perhaps, appropriate that all uniformed courses were 
reduced. The STC was in fill production with 450 recruits and 141 SPOs and 18 
CP0s. "2 
126 	Work Force Planning and Training Plan, 4. 
127 	Most of these uniformed trainer achieved promotion to Governor ranks and 
lambasted the SIC and its training staff at every opportunity. It could be argued that 
their lack of support in the early 1990s was the final 'nail' in the STC 'coffin.' 
128 	00C Annual  Report, 1987-88, 21. 
129 	Interview with a former Governor of Pentridge, Peter Hannay, 30 May 1996. 
130 	Chief Prison Officer Course, 00C,STC, pilot 6 June, 1988, i-iii 
131 00S, STC. Recruit Prison Officer Course, CPO N. Marten Squad 13/90. 
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The newly developed SPO and CPO courses were developed 
After discussions with senior executives in HQ, staff in the prisons and the 
STC. The main aim of these discussions was to identify what SPOs/CPOs 
do, what they ought to do and what they are likely to have to do in the 
future. New management philosophies place greater emphasis on delegation 
of management functions and positive interaction between prison officers 
and prisoners. The effectiveness and the efficiency of the prison system of 
tomorrow will rely to a greater degree than at present on first line managers. 
The roles of individual SPOs and CPOs vary widely across the Victorian 
prison system. This is due, in part, to the architecture and management 
philosophies associated with the new prisons which are soon to be 
commissioned: the Melbourne Remand Centre and the Barwon and Loddon 
prisons. However, these new prisons and their new philosophies only extend 
the range of roles already apparent in existing prisons. The project team 
therefore selected the common training elements for these courses leaving 
the more specialised areas to be covered by on - the - job or prison specific 
training.'" 
The latest 4-week SPO course consisted of supervision, prisoner management, 
report writing and emergencies: 34 while the 6 week CPO course was designed 
around team building, administration, security, and a placement with a Community 
Based Corrections Centre. 135 The organisational strategy may have been to aim the 
module at first line supervisors - the SPOs, and let CPOs -research the concept 
themselves or get on-the-job training. The STC, however, was still extremely busy 
as a large number of staff still had to be trained to furbish new and existing prisons. 
In the 1989-90 financial year courses were conducted for 314 recruits, 72 SPOs, 
and 23 CP0s. 136 By 1990 all three unit management prisons had been commissioned 
and were receiving prisoners. STC prison officer training was winding down. The 
last recruit course held at the STC concluded in July 1990. There were 63 
graduates. In the same financial year 39 SPOs, 15 CP0s, and 22 Industry 
Supervisors completed training. 137 The STC's final year of prison officer training 
ended with the graduation of 18 Industry Supervisors and 59 SPOs: 38 Recruit 
training had ceased in 1990, and there was insufficient untrained CPOs to conduct a 
course. The lobbying to decentralise training had begun. 
132 	00C Annual Report, 1988-89, 27. 
133 	Chief Prison Officer Course, pilot, 6/6/88, i-i. 
134 	Senior Prison Officer Course, Third Edition, January 1990. 
135 	Chief Prison Officer Course, pilot, 6/6/88. 
136 	00C Annual Report, 1989-90, 34. 
137 	Ibid. 1990-91, 44. 
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It is anticipated that there will be greater emphasis on the provision of 
training on-the-job in 1992-93, and this trend will be encouraged by the 
appointment of a field training officer. On-the-job training will be further 
supported by the evaluation and purchase of high quality commercial video 
based training packages relevant to organisational training needs and 
suitable for use by qualified trainers at their work locations. The major 
training task for 1992-93 will be to prepare Prison Officers for the 
successful implementation of the unit management system throughout the 
prison system. The major administrative task will be to negotiate and 
achieve tertiary accreditation for a significant proportion of the training 
being provided through the Staff Training College. 139 
The STC's days were numbered and with it an unsure future for Victorian prison 
officer training. 140  The College had the skills and expertise to develop and manage 
all of the required training. Instead, it became victim to organisational politics. 
Moreover, the lack of support for STC by the prison governors and the decision to 
decentralise training hastened the College's demise. Unit management training was 
given to Strategic Services. The Co-ordinator, New Prisons had to, inter alia, "co-
ordinate marketing, recruitment and general resource management in relation to new 
prisons." 141 In 1990 the incumbent became Assistant Director of Prisons (Strategic 
Services) with a mandate to "co-ordinate planning, staff development, and resource 
management functions; and to manage policy and program development and 
implementation activities." 142 In October 1991 the incumbent left on promotion and 
the Director of Policy and Planning assumed the position.' 43 His new team had a 
specific mandate. 
A Unit Management and Structural Efficiency Implementation Team, 
consisting of the Assistant Director of Prisons (Strategic Services) and a 
core team of four staff, has been established. The implementation team has 
two major responsibilities: 
• co-ordinate the overall implementation of unit management and 
structural efficiency over the next two years; and, 
• work with individual prisons on implementation at their locations.'" 
138 	Ibid, 1991-92, 48. 
139 	00C Annual Report, 1991-92 49. 
140 	At the time of writing, August 1997, there have been no promotion courses since 
1992. 
141 	00C Annual Report, 1987-88, 51. 
142 	Ibid. 1989-90, 41. 
143 	Ibid. 1991-92. 54. 
144 	Ibid. 13. 
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Again, the constant lobbying by governors to conduct on-site training led to a 
downgrading in the College's importance. Cohen has described the inherent 
difficulties of decentralising the training system. 
The_decentrali7ation_of in service training made problematic the 
attainment of the department's initial goal of creating a new "re-
integrative" image for the guard force. Training_was left in .the_control of 
the highly autonomous and parochial local facilities that, for almost 150 
years, had given the New York prison "system" the character of a feudal 
system, with large, powerful, and independent manors, each administered by 
a virtually omnipotent lord. Control of training at the local level 
perpetuated the tradition of institutional autonomy that had resulted in an 
"estrangement between the essentially urban, minority clientele and rural, 
non-minority staff" This also permitted immediate emphasis on custodial 
and security concerns. The department thereby lost all opportunity to 
change the character of the guard force. 14) 
The College was already subject to financial constraints. The Director-General 
announced there would be "a reduction in Staff Training College Staff." 146 The loss 
of training staff was expected. There was still hope that the College would be a 
general service provider. Furthermore, since the failure to build the proposed Staff 
Training College at Barwon Prison, again through financial constraints, the 
organisation needed centralised training facilities. The move to diversify training 
techniques by providing video-based training packages for use by prison-based 
training staff was a constructive move. But to make the practice a cornerstone of the 
STC training strategy indicated the lack of understanding of prison officers needs. 147 
The notion that video-based training would assist prison officer development was 
simplistic. Prison officers traditionally have been wary of 'civilian' concepts arguing 
that they have little relevance in a prison setting. To expect prison officers to sit and 
watch videos was idealistic - no matter their worth. Prison officers require 'hands 
on' material. As a linchpin in future STC direction, the concept was never to get 
beyond the embryonic stage. Without conducting training, its raison detre, the STC 
was a 'white elephant.' 
145 	J. Cohen, "The Correction Academy", Crime and Delinquency, 25, (1979): 
177-199. 
146 	Newsbreak. vol. 6 No. 6, September 1991. 
147 	The manager was on unpaid leave and was replaced by a Community Based 
Corrections manager who had no experience with prison officers and prison officer 
training. 
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The argument about the relative merits between conducting in-service and 
decentralising training_ is spurious. Both have a role to play in any vibrant 
organisation. The advantage of having a training facility has always been obvious. It 
demonstrates the organisation's commitment to staff training. When properly 
_managed, and with suitable qualified staff, the training facility can be the harbinger 
for organisational change. The advantages of in-service courses are obvious. There 
will always be a cross-fertilisation of ideas between staff who might never have the 
chance to meet contemporaries. Many participants enjoy the 'learning atmosphere' 
at in-service courses compared with those conducted on-site. As far as Victoria's 
prison service was concerned, the debate was academic. The STC closed in June 
1993. 148 
Prison officer training 1960-92 - a reprise. 
Given that that prison officer training should reflect the Government's philosophical 
commitment to prisoner management practice, the decision to build and operate 
three unit management prisons should have eventuated in a deliberate training 
policy. That this has yet to be accomplished is due to many factors. It has been 
demonstrated that Victoria's prison officer training since 1960 has been mainly 
custodial. Prison officers always require basic training in custody and control. What 
happened to prison officer training in Victoria is a model in indifference. It directly 
led to the loss of the STC, and with it a detailed training infrastructure. It returned 
training to the decentralised practice which had effectively ended in 1960. It put 
training in the hands of governors who are judged upon their ability to maintain 
order. And it halted promotion training. But more importantly, it has led to the 
government being short changed by prison officer training. Unit management should 
have been the hallmark of proactive training thinking and practice. Instead training 
has been allowed to decline with the result that staff give lip service to the concept. 
148 	Keynotes, Vol 5 No I (September, 1993) 9. 
311 
The reluctance of Victoria's prison administrators to invest in training, and prison 
officers to readily accept and practice the concept of unit management, stems from 
the decision to incorporate prisons - into the Social Welfare Department. Prisons had 
been part of the Chief Secretary's Department since 1870 until transferred to Social 
Welfare in 1960. During that period the Penal Department, as it was known prior to 
incorporation, enjoyed relative autonomy due to the administrative endeavours of 
two charismatic Inspectors' - General; Joseph Akeroyd and Alexander Whatmore. 
Their ideas about prison practice aided the development of modern Victorian prison 
officer training. Training was conducted in-service but was developed primarily to 
assist the officer and benefit the system. Both men insisted there be a mode of 
examination. Whatmore delivered lectures on criminology during promotion courses 
and set high standards. It was not uncommon for participants to sit examinations on 
several occasions before finally passing. Armstrong commented that "the 
examinations would have taxed a university undergraduate." 149 When training 
became the preserve of Training Division examination standards appear to have 
dropped, or were non existent. 
Training Division was required to train all departmental staff as well as those 
institutionalised for various reasons. 15° Prison officers were hardly at the top of the 
list of priorities. Training Division would undergo two decades of empire building 
through two different departments before the edifice crumbled. There was too great 
an expectation by Social Welfare of what Training Division could achieve. Social 
Welfare provided the Division with human and financial resources. From an 
inauspicious beginning until the demise of Social Welfare, Training Division 
received relative funding (see Fig.7: 1 for details of Training Division funding, 1962- 
78). However, the Division's training philosophy was welfare focussed. The seeds 
of prison officer discontent were soon planted. Moreover, the notion that Part I 
training for all recruits in Child Welfare, Family Welfare, and Prisons Division could 
be combined for 'core' topics only added to prison officer anomie. Prison officers 
were the 'bottom rung' of Social Welfare. 
149 	Jim Armstrong interview, 28 May 1996. 
150 	Johnston and Fox. Corrections Handbook of Victoria. 136. 
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This was reinforced by the cancellation of promotional courses due to lack of 
Institute staff. Moreover, promotion courses, when held, were conducted at 
Pentridge Prison "augmented by study assignments" which were sent to the 
Institute: 151 Victoria's prison officers attitude towards training was probably 
reinforced by their background calibre and age. The average Victorian officer was _ _  
unskilled prior to joining the service. In a survey conducted in the late 1970s, 
Braithwaite and Cass found that 82 per cent of officers had no qualifications, 15 per 
cent had a trade background, and just over 1 per cent had technical expertise. 
Moreover, only 12 per cent were under the age of thirty. Over 50 per cent of the 
staff surveyed (378) were between 40 and 50, years of age. Nearly 20 per cent of the 
remainder were aged between 50 and 64 years. 152 Again, their attitudes may not 
have been conducive to training. An American study found prison officer applicants 
tended to be "energetic and ambitious with respect to accomplishing their goals and 
gratifying their own needs, but they have difficulty generating great concern about 
the needs or feelings of others." 153 
Armstrong has already aptly described the perils of recruiting staff in Victoria when 
there is a vibrant economy. He noted that "you had to take what you could get." 154 
This method of recruiting tends to restrict potential for future promotion particularly 
when some form of assessment is required. There may have been adequate scope for 
this type of recruitment when promotion was based on the 'seniority' principle. The 
former Executive Director of the WA Department of Corrective Services 
commented, 
For a long period in corrective services we took our staff more or less for 
granted. Selection procedures were crude (there are still officers in the 
service who were selected on the basis of a military background, spelling a 
few words and performing some simple arithmetic functions). Training was 
next to non-existent. 15) 
151 	Social Welfare Report, 1966, 48. 
152 	J. Braithwaite and M. Cass, "Note on the demographic composition of Australian 
police forces and prison services" ANZ J Crim. 12 (1979): 132-138, see tables 7&9. 
153 
	
	T.R. Holland, R.B. Heim, and N. Holt. "Personality Patterns among Correctional 
Officer Applicants- J. Clin. Psych., Vol. 32, No. 4 (October, 1976): 786-791, 788. 
154 	Jim Amistrong interview, 28 May 1996. 
155 	I.C. Hill. Development of the professional role of prison officers, paper presented 
at the Australian Bicenteenial international congress on corrective services, Sydney. 
January. 1988. 2. 
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Fig. 7:1 Social Welfare Training Division Funding 1962-78. 
Year Salaries General Expences Total Expenditure 
1962 8.697 4,625 13,304* 
1963 19.861 6,459 26,320* 
1964 19.941 9,503 29,444* 
1965 27.803 9,269 - 37,072 	-- 
1966 S 57.475 $ 37,529 $ 95,004 
1967 S64.141 $ 32,204 $ 96,354 
1968 S70.563 $ 44,739 $115,302 
1969 S66.179 $ 57,325 $123,504 
1970 S94.714 $ 64,007 $158,721 
1971 S144.387 $ 56,454 $200,842 
1972 5201.262 S 75.836 $277,098 
1973 S223.670 $ 89,078 5312,748 
1974 S294.805 $130,279 $425,084 
1975 S457.198 5215.046 $672,244 
1976 S541.256 $305,083 $846,339 
1977 S590.311 $299,077 $889,388 
1978 S640.914 $308,110 $949,124 
* pounds sterling 
Source: Penal and Social Welfare Annual Reports, 1962-1978. 
By the time that the newly created 00C had purchased Loyola College for its 
training functions, a whole generation of prison officers had a less than positive view 
about training. Their attitudes would be passed on to further recruits. But the 
organisation had agreed upon a new prisoner management approach. The STC 
prison officer training section was set up to conduct training based on a three-
phased approach for all courses. This three-phased approach consisted of units and 
sub units under the headings of "Administrative, Operational, and Emergency," 156 A 
Governor Grade 1 was in charge of prison officer training. A CPO with an SPO as 
his deputy headed the Administrative section. Both Operational and Emergency 
sections were headed by a Principal Prison Officer (PPO) with a CPO as deputy. 157 
Implicit in this hierarchy is the relative importance given to the operational and 
emergency aspects of prison officer training at that time. 
156 	00C, STC. Organisation Structure Handout, 1984, SPO squad 6/84. 
157 	Ibid. 
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The uniformed training staff at the STC determined content of each prison course 
with very few checks and balances. Each course was a mirror of perceived role of 
each grade of prison officer. Prison officer training should have been subject to the 
approval of Staff Training Council. Its impact, however, was negligible. The Council 
seemed to have an impact by engaging critics in a "moderated" discussion of 
what should be in the particular courses rather than just sitting on the 
[fence] having cheap shots (sic). [Deliberation] really occurred after the key 
decisions had been taken rather than [the Council] being a forum for taking 
the key decisions. I58 
The uniformed staff at the STC was promoted to higher classifications y 1986. This 
was recognition by the 00C of the importance that it attached to training. A 
Governor Grade ifi who was assisted by two Governors Grade II now managed 
uniformed training. 159 Their assistants were PPOs with CPOs as course squad 
managers. 160 The STC Manager, a civilian, to whom the Governor in charge of 
training reported "was nominally in charge" I61 had little input into prison officer 
training. That the training during this era was shaped toward the custodial nature of 
prison operation is not in dispute. 
At least 659 recruits, 178 SPOs, 53 CP0s, and 43 Industry Supervisors were 
conditioned to accept that the purpose and nature of training was custody and 
contro1. 162 The STC had an organisational restructure in 1987. 163 The hierarchical 
arrangements changed to having a 'civilian' in charge of Training Services with two 
Governors Grade I responsible for recruit and promotional training respectively, but 
reporting directly to the Co-ordinator of Training Services. CPOs managed squads, 
and several SPOs were in administrative and support functions. But the power 
balance and decision making had shifted from uniforms to civilian. The most 
important distinction would be the attitude of these STC graduates toward a new 
system of prisoner management. It was an extremely difficult task to convince them 
to accept a fundamental change. 
158 	Correspondence from John Pini, former STC Manager, 11 June 1996. 
159 	Ibid. 
160 	00C, STC, Chief Prisoner Course, 1/1987, 1. 
161 	Information provided by John Pini, 11 June 1996. 
162 	Figures from 00C Annual Reports, from 1983-87. 
163 	00C Annual Report, 1987-88, 21. 
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A decision by the Assistant Director of Prisons in charge of Strategic Services, 
Peter Breadmore, would ultimately prove fatal for the future of promotion 
training and the STC. Applicants had to pass a promotion course prior to 
applying for promotion. Breadmore reversed the order of procedure. Officers 
could apply for and receive promotion then attend the appropriate promotional _ 
course. 164 However, just as the Breadmore decision would have profound 
effects on both promotional training and the STC, a breach of the SPO selection 
process would have severe ramifications for SPO standards and, by fiat, the 
entire service. In hindsight, it would prove to be the final nail in the STC coffin. 
It has been brought to my attention that two staff from the 
Metropolitan Reception Prison have recently been provisionally 
promoted in the Victorian Public Service Notices to the rank of 
senior Prison Officers and they have not passed the appropriate 
selection test. Indeed I understand that one particular officer has 
failed the test twice. You should note that it is still the policy of this 
office that staff successfully pass the test conducted by the Staff Training 
College before being considered for promotion. In the meantime would 
you please ensure that applicants for promotion have passed the test 
before they progress to interviews. 165 
Griffin's edict was challenged. 
In a recent Hearing Process matter, the Office of Merit Protection has 
determined that it is contrary to the Public Service Act to require a pass 
in the Senior Prison officer preselection test as a mandatory qualification 
for promotion, when such a requirement is not formalised by Public 
Service Regulations. Consequently, the provision in the current Staff 
Selection and Promotional Policy that prescribes successfully completion 
of this test prior to provisional promotion to Senior Prison Officer 
positions is withdrawn. The following practices are therefore to be 
discounted. 
I. 
	
	Using the Senior Prison preselection test as a mandatory 
requirement for promotion. 
2. Shortlisting of applicants solely on the basis of not having 
completed or passed the SPO test (Shortlisting should 
continue where appropriate, consistent with the Public 
Service Board Selection Guidelines). 
3. Use of the SPO test as a required qualification for the 
assignment of Higher Duties. 166 
164 	Custodial Staff Selection and Promotion Policy. 6.1 - 6.10, 17 October 1989. 
165 	Staff Qualification, Memorandum sent by the Director of Prisons, 
John Griffin, to the 00C Personel Manager, 24 October 1989. 
166 	00C Memorandum, to all governors on SPO Selection Tests, 
from the Personnel Manager, 27 August 1990. 
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A number of successful SPO applicants with less than adequate comprehension 
or literacy skills participated in promotion courses. Many had already spent a 
considerable period working in the position prior to course attendance. This, 
combined with the Breadmore decision, meant that all promotees were 
attending courses to teach them the skills of a position they already held and 
performed. Moreover, some participants had already been acting in a higher 
capacity, for example SPO to CPO and CPO to Governor. The 1980s euphoria 
of having a centralised training facility had dissipated and prison officers 
questioned the STC's capacity to meet the changing organisational needs. 
Indeed, most course participants questioned the need to undertake such 
courses, and many were of the opinion that the Breadmore decision should be 
reversed. I67 A survey, commissioned by the Co-ordinator of Training services, 
on all SPO and CPO courses held at the STC from 1989-1991, intended for 
course evaluation, gives an insight of what past course participants thought of 
Breadmore's decision. 
• Do not appoint people to an identified promotional position before the 
successful completion of the prescribed course; [Ararat]; 
• Not a good practice to give officers CPO/SPO rank and train them 
later, leads to apathy and the feeling of teaching your grandmother to 
suck eggs situation. Officers in the above situation should be 
studying for the next rank up; [Beechworth]; 
• Officers should attend and pass promotional courses before attaining the 
position; [Bendigo]; 
• Do not promote officers to a position until they have successfully 
passed promotional course; [Dhurringile], 
167 	Beeden, JR.. Report on validation of SPO/CPO Promotional Courses 1989 to 1991. 
internal report to the Co-ordinator of Training Services, Bill Paterson, 
October, 1991. 
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• Not a good idea to give a person a ranking position (sic) eg. CPO/SPO 
and then somewhere down the track send them on a promotional course 
with the intention of training them to fill that same position. They know 
they cannotlail the course_and that leads to apathy; [Pentridge]; 
• Officers wondering why they have to do promotional course when they 
are already gazetted to a position and performing the job requirements 
satisfactorily; [and] Would prefer the Staff Training College went back 
to officers attending promotional courses and then attaining promotion 
on merit; [Morwell River]; 
• Most feel quite strongly that it is wrong to be gazetted to a promotional 
position and then sometime in the future have to undergo training which 
was approached with apathy; [MRC]; 
Officers should pass promotional courses first and then apply for a 
gazetted position; [Sale]; [and] 
• Officers who have acted in the promotional position for 18 months to 
two years, find no relevance on the Staff Training College courses; 
[Won Wron]. 168 
Moreover, future prison officer training was to be left to relatively 
inexperienced prison officer training teams. It was proposed that there should be 
a training team in each prison to deliver both the unit management 
modules as well as the individual management plan training. To 
accomplish this task, each prison will have to identify staff who have 
displayed an aptitude for training, and are good communicators. These 
staff will undertake a recognised "train the trainer" program which has 
formal accreditation. After completion of this program, the trainers will 
undertake a further program that will familiarise them with the unit 
management and individual plan training packages. During the post-
phase, the training team will enable the prison to deliver both general 
training as well as specific location training as required. 
168 	Beeden, Report on validation of SPO/CPO Promotional Courses 1989 to 1991, 
3-15. 
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The prison and its operation will only be as good as the quality of its 
training and the commitment of its training team, therefore the 
establishment of training teams in each prison is a crucial aspect of 
the implementation process. 169 
Victoria's prison officers in 1992 had little to be happy about. The prison 
system--had -lost .its_autonomy_- and appeared to be. thrown on_the pyre of 
correctional indifference. The STC was closed and the system was subject to 
constant threat of privatisation.'" It was still committed to implementing unit 
management in all Victorian prisons by March 1994. 171 To all intent, prison 
officer training had returned to the Pentridge model. Large numbers of officers 
were leaving the service.'" If officers were cynical, they had just cause. They 
still had to be trained. However, others viewed it differently. 
We are now in an era where the saying "the only constant is 
change" has become the axiom of prison management, and we are in a 
position to manage that change through forward planning and 
using the creativity of our own staff. The opportunity to be involved 
in effecting workplace change has never been greater for staff, and all 
staff are encouraged to seek active involvement in determining how their 
prisons will operate in the future. 17.' 
The preceding chapter investigated the prisoner management strategy 
implemented in Victoria's prisons. This chapter detailed prison . officer training 
arguing that since the 1960s training has remained custodial. Despite attempts 
to marry unit management with a concomitant training approach, Victoria's 
prison system remains custodial; irrespective of Ministerial or Administrative 
claims. Prison officers perform their 'unit management' tasks in a similar 
manner to the tasks performed in 'traditionally managed' prisons. And the 
projected aims of 'unit management' have not been realised as yet. Perhaps the 
administration attempted too much. 
169 	B Thorpe, Kevpoints, Vol 4 No 3 (March 1993) 13-14, (italics in original). 
170 	Expressions of interest would be called from the private sector to build three new 
prisons to replace Pentridge, Metropolitan Reception, and Fairlea Prisons. Kevpoints, 
Vol 5 No 2 (December 1993) 3. 
171 	Ibid, 13. 
172 	The Justice Department has recruited on a consistent basis since 1993. 
173 	Thorpe, Kevpoints, (March, 1993) 14. 
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Strategic Services had made a major contribution in drawing up Victoria's 
version of Unit Management Principles. 174 These principles would be the 
fulcrum, on which the success or failure of unit management rested, and would 
be applied throughout the prison system. Each principle would have_ a rationale,  
guidelines, and minimum standards. It was envisaged that 'facilitates' be trained 
in the unit management training package and in turn train the staff in each 
facilitator's institution. These principles, however, were developed in 1992 
when four unit management prisons were operational. 175 The principles were 
intended to be 
short statements that serve as a guide to a particular form of 
management. To get a full sense of what they mean and why each was 
chosen as a principle, each has to be analysed and applied to the 
circumstances in which it is being, or will be used." 6 
This was a tacit admission that, perhaps, the principles may not be uniformly 
applied. This was a very real concern giving the age and type of each prison, 
and the calibre, age and experience of each staff member. 
This will vary from unit to unit and from prison to prison, however these 
variations should occur within certain boundaries. Going beyond those 
boundaries means that the principle has been diluted or ignored. 177 
The major difficulty associated with the implementation of these principles was 
that the new prisons had been operational for at least two years. Moreover, a 
majority of base grade officers had also previously worked under the old 
system, and recent recruits sent to the new prisons did not normally work in the 
prisoner management units.' 78 The attitude of staff toward unit management 
principles may be gauged by reference to the NSW experiment. After six years 
of operation the concept had been the subject of a prison officer strike over 
staffing issues, officers resigned or went sick. Replacements were hard to find. 
Many did not wish to remain in the units for extended periods. 
174 Unit Management Facilitator Training, 00C, 17 August 1992. 
175 	MRC, Loddon. Barwon, and Tarrengower female prison. 
176 	Concise Unit Management Guidelines. 00C. 17 August 1992, 1. 
177 	Ibid. 
178 	From author's experience visiting unit management prisons as part of Co-ordinator 
of Training Services duties. 
320 
It was noted 
The degree of enthusiasm among officers and inmates involved in unit 
management declined in the period immediately following the strike, and 
was never reGained. 179 
There was difficulties relating to interaction between staff and inmates during 
formal unit meetings, but 
Once a unit was established and its local rules agreed, there was often 
little for such meetings to do, unless a specific problem arose." ° [The 
greatest difficulty was] very little Staff Development input to reinforce 
unit philosophy and objectives due to problems maintaining a full-time 
Staff Development Officer.' 81 
It appears that Victoria's prison decision-makers erred in allowing new prisons 
to be opened before staff was fully conversant with unit management operation. 
Staff 'training' for the new regime was less than adequate. The unit 
management training team was inexperienced. Experienced prison officers were 
sceptical about the new prisoner management strategy but accepted promotions 
never the less. The guiding unit management principles had yet to be developed. 
The new prisons relied on trial and error methodology. Each assumed its 
variation of unit management. The only dependent variable between the new 
prisons was that staff and prisoners were not physically separated. 
Victoria's prison system of 1983 had to be changed. It could no longer perform 
its primary task of keeping prisoners incarcerated or even under contro1. 182 The 
impetus began by Akeroyd in the 1920s reached its pinnacle in the mid-1980s. 
Akeroyd lobbied for a change in prisoner management procedure and tried to 
provide a philosophical base on which to operate. Akeroyd realised that the 
prison officer was the fulcrum to make change successful. He tried to address 
this by providing training to effect a change in prison officer attitudes. 183 
179 	Bathurst Gaol Evaluation Study, Research Findings, January 1983-January 1986, 
Department of Corrective Services, Research Publication No 12, 1987, 6. 
180 	Ibid. 
181 	Ibid. 
182 	The current system is still facing similar problems. "Tear gas grenades put end to 
prison stand-off- Sunday Age 10 August 1997. 
183 	Hawkins notes prison officer attitudes can be addressed by training, The Prison, 102. 
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When Kidston assumed the Director - General's position in 1983 he brought a 
wealth of correctional experience with him. The system he had left in WA had 
undertaken a massive rebuilding programme and was in the process of 
implementing unit management. Kidston knew the problems associated with 
rapid change. But his first priority was to rebuild Victoria's system, which was 
totally demoralised: 84 Prison officer training was secondary. Again, the Labor 
Government had questioned the system's primary goal. But the difficulty was 
that nobody in government was sure what the goals of Victoria's prisons were. 
And as Thomas argues, "The debate about the treatment of prisoners is a debate 
about the means of achieving a secondary goal." 35 
The final years. 
Although the decision to build unit management prisons had been made in the 
early 1980s, it appears that little thought had gone into the type of training and 
skills the officer would require to work in this new prisoner management 
system. For a number of years the training of officers had been ancillary to the 
custodial function of prisons. Staffing replacements could easily be found: 86 As 
a result of this new prisoner management strategy there has been an insidious 
downsizing in staff with authorities creating the fiction that "the officer is being 
empowered; that conflict and tension will be considerably reduced; and that 
opportunities exist for job enlargement and job enrichment." 187 In Victoria one 
significant reason why there was a gap between the rhetoric of 1983 prison 
planning and the reality of 1992 prison functioning was a change in the Head of 
Agency. The architect of Victorian prison change -Bill Kidston - did not 
complete his task. He was promoted to another department in March 1988. 1 " 
184 	Interview with Jim Armstrong, 28 August 1995. 
185 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer, 6. 
186 	This was still the predominant approach when the author joined the 00C in March, 
1989. 
137 	Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. Victoria, 1989: Office of Corrections. 6. 
188 	00C Annual Report, 1987-88, 54. 
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Kidston had a great commitment to staff: 89 staff training, 190 and to the STC. 191 
He had commissioned a three year training plan to give the organisation future 
direction. 
In order for the Office of Corrections to_meet.the challenge of such 
future developments, and maintain its current programs it is essential 
that a work force planning and training plan is developed which will 
both address the issue of staffing resources and ensure that staff are 
recruited and trained in such a way that they have the knowledge and 
skills to meet the demands of these new developments with professional 
merit and technical competence. 192 
Less than seven years after the report was written the STC was closed, and 
training of uniformed officers became sporadic. The professional training staff 
were dispersed. Assets, training links, and infrastructure built up over a number 
of years ceased to exist. There had been a number of middle-management 
promotions, but authorities would not give approval for promotion courses to 
be held. Training estimates for the 1991-92 financial year included the provision 
of courses for 100 SPOs and 15 CP0s. Moreover, there were a number of 
Industry Supervisors who had to undertake basic prison officer training. 193 
Recruitment had ceased in 1990 but the organisation still required staff. As the 
00C owned the College the cost of training would be minimal. The 
Correctional Services Division decided to close the STC in June 1993 
"following a major review of training and development requirements throughout 
the Department of Justice." 194 This was entirely a cost-cutting exercise. 
Major savings can be achieved by winding up the Staff Training 
College, Correctional Services which is severely under-utilised and has 
substantial running costs. These costs do not appear to be justified either 
short-term or long-term given the radically changed mode of SD&T 
programs with a focus on divisional/local based programs which do not 
require the use of large residential facilities. In addition, Correctional 
Services have not recruited base grade staff for over two years and are 
unlikely to do so over the next 2-3 years on the basis of staffing 
projections done by the Division. 
189 	Interview with former Prison Governor, Grade III, Jim Armstrong, 29 May 1996. 
190 	Work Force Planning and Training Plan, Office of Corrections, 1986. 
191 	History of the Office of Corrections Victoria, 00C Library, 1984, 
especially Section 5. 
192 	Work Force Planning and Training Plan, 1. 
193 	Initiatives for 00C Training and Development, Internal paper submitted to the 
Director of Corporate Services from the Manager of STC, August 1991. 
194 	Keynotes, Vol 5 No 1 (September, 1993) 9. 
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The College absorbs over $1M in annual running costs (including 
significant non-training staff) which would represent annual recurrent 
savings upon its closure. In addition, its sale would achieve further 
revenue for the Government. Appropriate redeployment and 
outplacement strategies can be provided for the existing staff. 195 
_ 
It is rather ironic that the 1994 training budget to provide consultants and 
facilities was forecast to surpass that provided to the former STC. 196 The fiction 
that no recruitment training was required for at least two years was exposed as 
a fallacy. By September 1994, the fifth squad of the year graduated. 197 It 
appears that 
Training has little if any impact on program performance, it has little 
relationship to cost efficiency, it is not related to staff effectiveness, 
and it has almost no value in assisting an agency in responding to 
future demands. One has only to analyse the number of programs 
started without preparatory training to realize that decision makers 
view it as unrelated to performance. When a state department of 
corrections deletes its jail operations training program as part of a cost 
cut back you realise the relative importance given to staff 
effectiveness. 198 
It has been argued that those charged with funding Victoria's training had a 
different agenda from those actually providing training 
The corporate service area appeared to be very good at looking 
after itself and ensuring that the sun never set on their empire. 199 
There never appeared to be any real concern about quality or safety 
while there appeared to be a fascination with gimmickry and a focus on 
cost minimisation. 29° 
The 00C's primary task was the commissioning of the new 'Unit Management" 
prisons at Melbourne in 1989 and Barwon in 1990. 291 
195 	Department of Justice, Correctional Services Division, Internal memorandum from 
the A/Personnel Manager to the Executive, 30 April 1993, 1.7. 
196 	Department of Justice, Correctional Services Division, Internal memorandum on a 
Prisons Branch 1994-95 Staff Training Plan, from the Superintendent of Staff 
Training, 11 August 1994, 27. 
197 	Kevpoints, Vol 6 No 1 (September, 1994) 18. 
193 	T.C. Neil and P. Katsampes, "Training and Staff Development for Jails: What is and 
What can be- The Prison Journal, vol LXI, (1986): 13-22. 
199 	The STC came under the umbrella of Corporate Services. 
200 	Correspondence with John Pini, the last manager of the STC, 22 May 1995. 
201 	Prison Profiles: Objectives of Victoria's Prisons. December, 1994, 146-147. 
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Central to the concept of unit management - the preferred prisoner management 
strategy in these institutions - was prison staff being in the units along with the 
prisoners instead of being physically divided in the old custodial regime. 202 A 
major difficulty was that there was little information on unit management 
training. Furthermore, there was a clear conflict of interest in who was going to 
develop the courses and run the programmes. The logical choice was the STC 
with its infrastructure and training staff. Strategic Services Division was, 
however, to 
co-ordinate the commissioning of new prisons; to undertake major 
projects with service-wide implications; to co-ordinate planning, staff 
development and resource management functions; and to manage policy 
and program development and implementation activities. 203 
The decision was taken that Strategic Services would develop unit management 
training and 'teach' the topics or programme to all uniformed staff- a decision 
which had support from the Governors. 2" Some Governors were inclined to 
criticise both programmes and teaching staff at STC. What was needed was 
"practical programmes instead of the academic bullshit put together by the 
social welfaries (sic) who run the college."205 Governors wanted prison officers 
who could 'handle' prisoners. Most were of the 'old' school and had many 
years service. Their attitude to training is best summed up by Pini. 
The Governors were a separate group who largely thought that they 
could do the training better and cheaper themselves and some even 
thought why did people need to be trained anyway because it didn't 
happen when they came into the job. Some recognised that they 
needed assistance to get to where they needed to go but they were in 
the minority. 206 
Indeed, most Victorian prison officers held similar views as their Governors. 
The commissioning of three new prisons meant opportunities for promotion. 
202 	J. Farbstein, and Associates, Inc. with R. Wener. A Comparison of "Direct" and  
"Indirect" Supervision Correctional Facilities. Final Report, Washington, DC: 1989. 
National Institute of Corrections - Prison Division. United States 
Department of Justice, 1. 1. 1. 
203 	00C Annual Report, 1989-90, 41. 
204 	The uniformed prison managers. 
205 	Interview with Greg Howden. the Barvvon Prison Governor, March 1992. 
206 	Correspondence with the former manager of STC. John Pini, 22 May 1996. 
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The need for senior prison staff to fill positions in the new prisons had a flow-on 
effect giving others opportunities for promotions and leaving vacancies to be 
filled by recruitment. In 1989 the STC was strained to capacity training 314 
base grade prison staff. Jnaddition, _there were promotional courses for 72 
Senior Prison Officers and 23 Chief Prison Officers. 207 Not all of the 
promotional participants were happy to be there. Most saw the promotional 
courses as a means to an end. Others thought that they did not need to be 
trained as they were already 'doing the job.' The remainder thought that the 
academic aspects of the course would not assist them in their daily task. 2" 
Victoria's prison officer training attitudes are not held in isolation. As Thomas 
and Stewart point out, 
a curiosity of prison-staff training in modern societies is the swift 
onset of a fantasy about what the courses are trying to achieve. It is 
common, throughout the world, for staff undergoing training to see 
the process as an insidious attack on their beliefs. The very creation of 
training seems to prove to uniformed staff that either their attitudes are 
wrong and need 'correcting', or that their knowledge is defective and 
needs increasing. The fact that the courses contain academic subjects, 
notably drawn from the social sciences, confirms the suspicion that 
'brainwashing' - the word most commonly used - is going on. 209 
These attitudes and concerns about training are not new. They are as old as the 
prison system - or at least since training commenced. From a week's training 
over the main gate at Pentridge in 1954, 210 to the final STC 10 week recruit 
training course in July 1990, 211 Victorian prison officers have complained, inter 
alia, about the necessity for training, the type, the length, the quality, and the 
presenter. 212 
207 	00C Annual Report, 1989-90, 34. 
208 	From informal discussions in 1989-1990 with promotional course participants by the 
author when he was a Senior Training Officer and not directly involved in these 
courses. 
209 	J.E. Thomas and A. Stewart, Imprisonment in Western Australia, 
(Perth, W.A.: Urn of W.A., 1978) 177-178. 
210 	Interview with former Governor, Jim Armstrong, 23 August 1995. 
211 	00C Annual Report, 1990-91, 44. Prison officer recruitment was suspended in July 
1990 and never resumed until after the STC's closure in June 1993. 
212 	Invariably if a 'civilian' or non-uniformed officer conducts part of prison officer 
training he or she runs the risk of being labelled irrelevant. 
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Chapter 8 
Victoria's Prison Policy: Expedient or Proactive? 
When the task of an organisation is not clear, or is debateable, training can 
cause more problems than it can solve.' 
Victoria's prison service in 1998 has effectively been halved and private 
corrections companies are operating two male prisons and a female prison. The 
government prison system in Victoria will, most certainly, become a statutory 
authority. 2 The 'new' organisation will be run focussing on "Customers, People 
and Business." 3 This strategy, however, has already attracted criticism. 
Justice Vincent said references to prisoners as customers, for example, - 
were "silly in the extreme." It demonstrates the absurdity of equating 
government and private business activity in this area. When in the 
course of my duty in the court I impose a sentence on an individual, I 
do not negotiate a 'transaction with a customer.' 4 
Although this thesis is particularly concerned with the period from the 
foundation of Victoria's prison system in 1851 to the demise of the Office of 
Corrections (00C) in 1992, reference to previous Western penal practice may 
assist the current prison system in both policy-making and decision-making. It 
can be legitimately argued that everything in penal practice is cyclical. 5 The 
use of a new jargon for example, or the recycling of old strategies - albeit 
couched in contemporary terminology does not solve perennial problems. 
Again, the new policy options that are constantly promoted bear astonishing 
similarity to late 19th and early 20th century practices. Victoria's prison system 
had a significant opportunity in the early 1980s to modernise its institutions, 
upgrade its staffing skills, and prepare for 21st century operation. 
J.E. Thomas. The English Prison Officer Since 1850: A Study in Conflict. (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1972) 89. 
Map Readings. 4 April 1997, Volume 6/97. 
CORE: an innovative approach to corrections. Department of Justice brochure. 
undated. 
-Judge slams state over private prisons - Aae. 17 June 1997. 
For example. the English Prison service has bought a 'prison ship' from the USA to 
provide accommodation for a greatly overloaded system. -Prison ship hits snag" 
Sunday Herald Sun, July 20 1997. 
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It is clear, however, that Victoria's prison decision-makers failed to change the 
moribund system. Fifty per cent of the government prison system was 
privatised by 1997. The system may have been privatised regardless. It is 
suggested, however, that decision-makers failed to fully appreciate the impact 
that implementation of unit management would have on their prison staff. 
Decision-makers had the opportunity and time to address the perceived and 
recognised differences between head office edict and operational practice. This 
chapter re-examines the three major variables addressed in chapter 1; prisoner 
management practices; the link between Head Office policy and actual 
operational practice; and the assumptions behind prison officer training. 
Contemporary prisoner management practices. 
Unit management practice is the cornerstone of contemporary Australian 
prisoner management operations. The policy has also been universally accepted 
as an important prisoner management tool. While the set of unit management 
principles used may vary by location or jurisdiction, the concept is unilaterally 
applied on the same premise: it is easier to manage a small group of prisoners 
than a large one. Many prison systems design accommodation, units to try and 
replicate, as far as possible, a 'normal environment.' 
A Fundamental tenet of the practice has been the permanent or semi-permanent 
rostering of staff to particular units. Prisoners are usually allocated to units on a 
particular needs basis - vocational, educational, strict management, drug 
rehabilitation etc. It is assumed that unit staff and prisoners will work together 
to achieve agreed or specific ends. Subtle or overt changes in operating 
practice may jeopardise the tenuous relationships that have been established 
between staff and prisoners. Prison officers are allocated a caseload of 
prisoners and are encouraged to perform many of the tasks and roles formerly 
managed by professional civilian prison personnel. Many units have a form of 
self-determination. Aims and objectives are agreed through bilateral 
communication during regularly scheduled forums. 
Unit procedures and practices, however, are subject to senior management 
approval and must be linked to the institution or system's strategic plan. In 
theory many systems have review or audit mechanisms to ascertain whether 
practice meets policy objective. Changes to policy and practice can adjust 
unworkable or superseded procedures. In practice, the reality may be quite 
different. 
As noted earlier despite innovative approaches in Europe most of the unit 
managed prisons in Australia owe their designs to American campus-type 
institutions. For example, the prototypes for I-LM Prison Barwon in Victoria are 
Pleasanton Federal Prison in Dublin California, and Otisville Federal 
Correctional Institution in New York State. 6 Both were Federal Institutions.' 
Victoria's prison administrators wished to implement a new prisoner 
management concept such as unit management. The US Federal Prison System 
initiated the unit management concept, 8 which later became known as Direct 
Supervision. 9 Victoria's three new prisons were designed "to position manned 
posts and access ways so as to maximise officer/prisoner interaction." 10 
However, a former Victorian Director of Corrective Services had visited a 
similar Federal Institution in 1979 — the Butner Federal Correctional Institution 
— and noted that 
The units are too large and there is massive wasted floor space taken up 
by extensive corridors, which create supervision problems. In fact, staff 
said that supervision was one of the key difficulties within the 
Institution. Many of the programmes that were originally operating 
have now been abandoned." 
Victoria's prison administrators however decided to implement a higher prison 
officer/prisoner ratio than the proposed US system of one officer to fifty .  
inmates. 12 
6 	Barwon Introductory Handbook, 1989-1990. 3. 
7 	America has a three-tiered system: Federal and State institutions, and local jails. 
D. Lansing, J.B. Bogart, and L. Karaki. "Unit Management: Implementing a 
Different Correctional Approach- Federal Probation, Vol. 41(1977): 43-49. 
9 	W.R. Nelson. -The Origins of the Podular Direct Supervision Concept: 
An Eyewitness Account- American Jails, (Spring. 1988): 8-16. Jo Barwon Introductory Handbook, 1989-1990, 3. 
M.J. Dawes. Overseas Study Tour Of Correctional Institutions, 
Report for the Department of Community Welfare Services, July/ August 1979. 15. 
J.B. Wells. "Direct Supervision: Panacea or Fad? Does it Warrant Full Acceptance?" 
American Jails. Vol. 1/No. 1. (Spring, 1987): 46-49. 46. 
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Indeed, Barwon was to be managed "through the use of the direct supervision 
style of prisoner management. Implicit in this style of management is the 
expectation that there will be extensive personal interaction between staff and 
the prisoners." I3 Each unit would be managed by a "Chief Prison officer/ Unit 
Manager" who would be in a position "to observe the limit he/she controls. 
This is facilitated by the design of the unit." 14 The unit manager would have 
two Senior Prison Officers (SPO) to supervise prisoners but "at no time will an 
S.P.O. be required to supervise more than 32 prisoners in an accommodation 
unit." 15 Moreover, there would be shift overlaps to ensure that the maximum 
number of staff (5) would be in the unit when all unit prisoners were present. I6 
Prisoners were to be given 
As much latitude for self-determination as is practicable. Implicit in 
that undertaking is the assumption that prisoners have the capacity for 
self-control, self-discipline, and can potentially maintain high standards 
of behaviour. Realisation of these attributes must, in part, come from 
prisoners themselves, however they will be assisted in every way by a 
regime that emphasises the values associated by co-operation and 
normality. 17 
It was also noted that, 
The prison's philosophy has been devised in such a way that it places 
on prisoners the responsibility of determining their own future and 
conditions. The presence of custodial staff will ensure that the self-
determination process occurs within acceptable limitations. Their 
responsibilities, besides those of security and discipline, will be to 
ensure that prisoners are guided in positive directions, with the ultimate 
goal of providing to the community the reassurance that prisoners 
housed in Barwon will be provided every opportunity to enable their 
effective reintegration back into the community. I8 
Staff was also reminded that they were to become involved in 
Decision and policy making and to achieve that goal, the relationship 
between base-grade staff and management is characterised by a 
mutuality of trust, co-operation, high level interaction, team work, and 
perhaps most importantly, participatory management. I9 
13 	ELM Prison Banvon Philosophy and Principles of Unit Management, undated but 
probably 1989, 16. 
14 	'bid, 15. 
15 	[bid, 16. 
16 	Ibid. 
17 [bid, 12. 
is 	Ibid. 
19 	Baryon Introductory Handbook, 1989-1990. 4. 
330 
One of the major dilemmas facing prison administrators is the unanticipated 
consequence arising from the implementation of a new system. Victoria's 
administrators noted unit management's apparent success in Scotland, Holland 
and the Federal Prison Service in the United States. 2° Victoria's Director- 
General claimed that the Victorian version of the concept was "not a replica" 
_ 
but had been adapted and modified to suit the organisation's environment. 21 
Victoria's version was not a 'replica' but an amalgam of different variables. 
For example, the three new Victorian prisons were built to US Federal Prison 
designs — based on large accommodation units. Yet the type of unit 
management that Victorian authorities wished to be implemented was 
fashioned on the Dutch and Scottish systems. Both the Scottish and Dutch 
systems operated 'small units' with nowhere like the sixty-four bed units at 
Barwon Prison. 22 Scottish unit staffing ratios were almost 1:1. 23 The Dutch 
system ranged from the De Sprang Remand Centre which had a capacity for 
133 prisoners and a staff complement of 115, 24 to the Over Amstel Remand 
Prison in Amsterdam which accommodated 680 prisoners but had a ratio of 3 
officers in each 24 bed unit, a staffing of 1:8. 25 
Again, there are doubts whether the concept was fully explained to Victoria's 
prison staff prior to implementation. The Dutch Prison System had made it a 
priority to inform staff about the proposed changes. "Nevertheless, the benefits 
of having several years of preparatory staff discussions in the late seventies 
before attempting further changes, are everywhere to be seen." 26 
2() Unit Management Guidelines: Achieving Leadership Excellence in Victorian Prisons. 
Melbourne, 00C, 1990, 18 
21 	Ibid, 3 quoted by Peter Harmsworth. 
22 	The Barlinnie Special Unit had accommodation for 10. The Dutch system generally 
operated units with between 5 to 20 places. 
23 	R. Smith. Prison Health Care, 
(Torquay: British Medical Journal. 1984) 109. 
24 	B. Apsey. M. Wockel and S. Johnson. Report of Visit to Correctional 
Jurisdictions in the Netherlands, Denmark. Sweden Finland and the Union of the  
Soviet Socialist Republics. Department of Correctional Services, 
South Australia. 1989 (the Apsey Report) 6. 
25 	Ibid, 8. 
26 	Vinson. "Impressions of an Australian visitor - 16. 
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The former Chairman for the NSW Corrective Services Commission, Tony 
Vinson, was interested in finding out what Dutch prison officers thought of the 
new unit management regime. 27 He visited a number of Dutch institutions - 
two open, two semi-open, three closed and eight remand centres - to gain a 
sample of prison officers that reflected the distribution of staff throughout the 
Dutch prison system. 2  Vinson found some prison officers' "pessimists." 
Others were "prisoner oriented." However, half of the officers interviewed 
could not nominate a change that had made work more difficult. 29 On the other 
hand, Vinson also noted that some Dutch prison officers felt that the process 
had "been hurried" and "that their views had not been sought" and that the 
"practicalities of reform had received scant attention." 30 He also found that 76 
per cent of "definite rating(s)" found that the reforms "operate(d) very/quite 
well." As Vinson notes, "this test of staff satisfaction must, if anything, be 
considered fairly stringent in a field hardly noted for the enthusiastic embrace 
of new developments." 31 
Again, two out of three prison officers provided examples of ways in which 
their work had been assisted by policy changes. Vinson also found that length 
of service could determine whether prison officers answered positively or 
negatively. For example, the longer-serving staff were less inclined to mention 
"inmate related benefits." 32 However, Vinson also found "the enthusiasts often 
involved a disproportionate number of officers with long service histories." 33 
He viewed that 
The length of time an officer has worked in the prison system could 
have any one of a number of possible effects. Long conditioning in the 
'old ways' may be hard to reverse. Cynicism with new measures may 
grow with the years but so too may personal confidence and judgement 
with a consequent reliance on formal institutional controls. 34 
27 	Vinson, et al, "Views of Prison Officers- in Brand-Koolen, Studies on the Dutch 
Prison System. 73-94. 
T. Vinson. "Impressions of an Australian visitor- in Brand-Koolen,. 
Studies on the Dutch Prison System,  11-17. 12. 
29 	Vinson, et al, "Views of Prison Officers" 77-78. 
Vinson, "Impressions of an Australian visitor" 16. 
.31 	Vinson, etal. "Views of Prison Officers - 75. 
32 	Ibid. 80. 
33 Ibid, 93. 
34 	Ibid, 78. 
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Another Australian visitor reported in 1989 that "the philosophy promulgated 
by Head Office appears to differ significantly from the reality at institutional 
level where staff openly stated they could not implement Head Office 
philosophy." 35 Apsey's views of the prison staff appear at odds with Vinson's 
findings. "Despite the stated intentions of developing a modem (sic) 
management system based on an interactive model, the prison staff did not 
appear to exhibit a high level of morale." 36 However, it must be noted that 
Apsey's data is based purely on short-term observation while Vinson 
undertook detailed research over several months. 
Again, the Scottish Prison Service undertook two studies on the operation of 
small units in that system. 37 A Working Party was set up to carry out a wide-
ranging review of the Barlinnie Special Unit (BSU) in 1994. It noted that 
i. The Unit has become fossilised and has been unable to move 
forward as a result of continuing to focus on the success of its 
early pioneering approach; 
The purpose of the unit and the position it holds in relation to 
the rest of SPS [Scottish Prison Service] is no longer clear; 
The community meetings have lost their impetus and the regime 
lacks direction; and, 
iv. 	The term 'special' has 'become an albatross around the Unit's 
neck' which is preventing it from moving forward and which 
has made it difficult for many of the concept's of unit life to be 
transferred to the mainstream. 38 
It was observed that it was difficult to judge whether BSU had been successful, 
as its purpose had never been clearly defined. 39 
35 	B. Apsey. M. Wockel and S. Johnson_ Report of Visit to Correctional 
Jurisdictions in the Netherlands, Denmark. Sweden Finland and the Union of the  
Soviet Socialist Republics. Department of Correctional Services, 
South Australia. 1989 (the Apsey Report) 7. 
36 	The Apsev Report. 7. 
37 Small Units in the Scottish Prison Service. The Report of the Working Party on 
Barlinnie Special Unit, Scottish Prison Service. 1994 (Small Units in the SPS). 
and An Evaluation of Barlinnie and Shorts Units. Scottish Prison Service Occasional 
Papers Report No 7/1994 (Barlitmie and Shorts Units). 
38 	Small Units in the SPS, 10. 
39 	Ibid, 15. 
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The Working Party claimed that the degree of interest in BSU had "generated a 
number of myths and misconceptions around the operation of the unit." The 
first was that unit prisoners controlled admissions. Secondly, that admission to 
units was perceived as a reward for bad behaviour and was seen as buying "the 
co-operation of recalcitrant prisoners by offering them an 'easy life'." And 
* finally, that workIng in a unit was perceived to be an "easy option" for staff 41) 
The Working Party noted that unit life was characterised by several practices. 
First, visits had come to dominate "virtually the whole of unit life." Some 
prisoners hid behind a "stream of visitors" which had removed the need for 
them to interact with the unit community "on any regular basis." Second, so-
called "demonstrations of responsibility and trust" between prisoners and unit 
staff by allowing unsupervised visits in prisoners cells against Unit Operational 
Instructions - in fact, allowing conjugal visits. Third, prisoners not being or 
only cursory searched with the result that alcohol consumption in the unit 
appeared to the norm rather than an isolated incident. Fourth, only one of the 
prisoners was actively engaged in any kind of "constructive activity ... from 
which he gains a significant financial profit." The remainder spent the majority 
of their time "entertaining visitors, reading, watching television or sleeping." 
Fifth, community meetings had become routinised, perfunctory, and on 
occasion had been used by certain groups of prisoners "to exert pressure on 
staff" Sixth, group cohesion had ceased to exist with each prisoner cooking 
and eating on an individual basis. Finally, incoming mail was no longer opened 
and checked for contraband in the presence of the prisoner as was the case in 
other establishments, and as it should have been "according to Standing 
Orders." 41 
The Working Party realised that BSU had been highly politicised and that 
successive governors and staff had been obliged to collude with prisoners to 
maintain a harmonious existence. Moreover, external commentators had 
likewise colluded with staff and prisoners in positive expositions of unit life. 42 
Ibid. 15-16. 
41 Ibid. 17-18. 
Ibid. 18. 
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The Shotts Unit, which opened in April 1990, was the first purpose-built unit 
of its kind in Scotland. 43 It had accommodation for 12 prisoners and was to be 
staffed by 24 officers. The central role of the Unit was to provide an alternative 
facility for dealing with long-term 'difficult prisoners.' The Unit's philosophy 
was seen to be in keeping with the Scottish Prison Service mission: 
(It) will seek to keep in custody those committed to it, maintain good 
order, look after inmates with humanity and provide them with 
opportunities for self development and change to positive behaviour:" 
The Shotts Unit Planning Group decided the process would be achieved by 
1 	Establishing a relationship between staff and prisoners which allows all 
concerned to interact freely and, whenever possible, as equally as the 
need for good order will allow. 
2 	Running the Unit as a Community in which the individuals act 
responsibly in relation to each other and act supportively towards each 
other. The main form of support should occur in community meetings 
where prisoners and staff may air their feelings in a conducive 
atmosphere. The main form of discipline and control should be the 'hot 
seat' and the legitimate sanction of the community meeting. 
3 	Regarding each prisoner as a responsible person who will be treated 
with the respect due to him as an individual and to encourage him to 
take his place and part in the life of the unit. 
4 	Encouraging each prisoner to review his own personal development and 
to take up activities which will challenge, improve and equip him to 
make progress within the prison system and prepare him for a fuller life 
on release. 
5 	To place emphasis on assisting each prisoner to achieve personal 
control, personal developments, increased self-worth, and some 
vocational or social skills. 45 
While the Unit had 'teething problems,' and had not yet delivered "the 
structured programme of personal development that was envisaged and 
expected by the Planning Group," the Unit was a necessary adjunct to larger 
institutions. It would allow 'difficult prisoners' to learn skills so that they could 
eventually return to 'mainstream' prisons. 46 
43 
	
Barlinnie and Shotts Units. 36. 
Ibid, 37. 
Ibid, 38. 
46 	Ibid, 64. 
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The Evaluation Report, however, was critical of the notion of 'community' in 
both BSU and Shorts. The Report  noted that the notion of 'community' 
Incorporates the fundamental ideal values of life in our society; respect 
for individuals, dignity and concern for the rights and welfare of others. 
Creating conditions in prison under which prisoners (and staff) can live 
as responsible community members will, to the extent that is possible, 
reveal- and support the capacity of its members to do that—A community 
ideology encourages social competence, co-operation, learning, growth 
and change. Positive social controls can thereby replace coercion, and 
diverse and potentially conflicting individual interests can be met. This 
community should be participatory involving both prisoners and staff, 
its walls should be permeable, it should be used as a context for 
'problem-solving in the present' and it should be transitory — 'part of a 
continuum with the free community' — preparing prisoners for a return 
to that community. Enabling prisoners to deal with problems 
experienced in the present according to a set of generally accepted 
rules, would empower them to manage their own futures more 
competently. 47 
The Report claimed there was a major problem with the direct application of 
this ideology in the Shotts Unit. It questioned the role of the Unit in returning 
prisoners to 'mainstream' prisons' where the notions of 'responsibility and 
community' had been largely missing. While prisoners within the Unit could 
choose how they structured their incarceration, they would certainly not have 
this freedom within the normal prison environment. The Report noted that the 
Unit had failed to plan for this eventuality. Again, "the single issue agreed 
upon by almost all staff and prisoners was that the Unit was not a community." 
The notion of 'community' was an 'ideal type' that few communities could 
match. According to staff and prisoners, there were three ways in which the 
Unit was not regarded as a community. 
The first was a perceived lack of any democratic decision-making process in 
practice. For example both prisoners and staff claimed the Unit Governor made 
the decisions. Both prisoners and staff felt that participatory or consultative 
management were 'ideals' not borne out by Unit practice. Moreover, prisoners 
did not interact with staff when involved in the decision-making process. They 
knew that staff had very little power because of the Governor." 
47 	 Ibid, 48-49. 
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Second, prisoners did not appear to accept the notion of community. They were 
highly individualistic and did not present as a cohesive group. While the Unit 
was purposely designed to reflect a 'community spirit,' prisoners tended to use 
the large communal areas to avoid other members.  
The third area of concern, and possibly the major raison detre behind the 
concept, was the quality of staff-prisoner communication. Borrowing directly 
from BSU, the use of 'meetings' between staff and prisoners was seen as a 
potent tool to breakdown ancient antagonisms. However, the meetings were 
informed that there were certain 'non-negotiables.' "It must be clearly 
understood that there are certain matters or areas of concern which remain the 
concern of Prison Service Management Group and which are therefore not 
open to the community to change." 49 
All Unit members attended a Tuesday weekly meeting — external participants 
were kept to a minimum. The meetings normally lasted three hours - however 
those attended by the Governor tended to be the longest. Prisoners took turns to 
chair meetings and various domestic, information, and grievance issues were 
discussed. A staff member and a prisoner took the minutes of the meeting. A 
version was compiled from both accounts for records and dissemination. Prison 
officers were especially reluctant to participate in meetings simply because the 
end of the meeting coincided with the end of their shift. The Report also notes 
that there was "too little decision-making power arising from meetings and a 
strong staff-prisoner divide. There was also a tendency for the meetings to 
become bogged down by domestic issues relevant to only one or two 
individuals in the Unit."" Simply, there were a number of factors which 
militated against 'community life' such as conflicts and status-fighting among 
prisoners, individual pursuits of projects, all members of the Unit pursuing 
personal goals, staff/prisoner divide, power imbalance, and an authoritarian 
Governor, among others. 51 
Ibid. 49-50. 
49 	{bid, 50. 
[bid, 51. 
51 	1bid, 53. 
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Victoria's prison administrators took various elements from a number of unit 
management jurisdictions and fully expected that the mixture would coalesce. 
A dominant feature of all three new - prisons was the use of large-style 
American-designed living units. Prisoner management strategy and unit 
operating philosophy were heavily borrowed from the Dutch and Scottish 
-- systems. For example, although there is nothing explicit in the Barwon 
Handbook or the Philosophy and Guidelines to Unit Management pamphlet 
that refers to the notion of 'community, ,52  an earlier publication notes that 
"The prison environment shall, as far as possible, be a 'mirror' of the 
community." 53 
Weekly staff/prisoner unit meetings were held at Barwon Prison upon 
commissioning in 1990. They were run on similar lines to those held in the 
Shotts Unit. It is reported that identical staff/prisoner patterns and traits to 
those found by the study into Shotts Unit arose soon after the initial euphoria of 
working or being incarcerated in a new prison wore off 54 Head Office noted 
similar situations occurred in other unit-managed institutions. 55 
It is evident that Victoria's prison administrators were under extreme pressure 
to modernise the system with the change of government. 56 It is also evident that 
the incoming Labor Government was committed to penal reform by giving 
corrections the autonomy to focus on change by separating it from its 
responsible department. Again, the government provided significant capital 
towards upgrading existing institutions and new prison building programmes. 57 
In reflection prisoner management policy intention, and new building and 
upgrading progress were never matched by operational practice. 
Barwon Prison is used to exemplify the 00C's approach to unit management. Both 
Loddon Prison and the Melbourne Remand Centre had limited discretion in 
formulating staff handbooks and operational guidelines. Both are singularly devoid 
of the mention of -*community.' 
Banvon Regional Prison — Management Philosophy, undated but probably 1988. 
CPO Sandra Moore was a foundation Chief at Banvon Prison and served from 
1989-1992. Interview 14 May 1998. 
5.5 	Prisons Structural Efficiency Implementation Plan. Office of Corrections Version 1 
June 1990. Attachment 6. 
Community Welfare Priorities. Ministerial Statement by The Hon. P.T. Toner. 
7 December 1982. 
57 	00C Annual Report. 1983-84. (iii)-6. 
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The administration was forced to admit that there were problems with unit 
management implementation throughout the system in 1990. 58 Yet, 
presumably, the administration thought that they had taken all necessary 
precautions to ensure that the concept was ready for implementation. 
Institutions had been designed and built to unit management specifications. 
_ 
New institution management infrastructure had been carefully framed to reflect 
the concept's intention. 59 Perhaps, in reflection, more consideration could have 
been given Dutch notion of 'selling' unit management to staff 60  Again, there 
was the problem of who had the mandate and experience to give unit 
management training to new and existing staff. 61 
The notions of 'selling' and training were minor individual problems. 
Appropriate action would have overcome these deficits. However put together, 
the perceived lack of training - or cursory attempts thereto, and the 
organisation's unwillingness or inability to explain the concept provided prison 
officers with a platform to resist change. Moreover, the perceived inattention 
by Headquarters personnel to quickly resolve these matters created an artificial 
climate of distrust among lower echelon staff 62  
Whether staff unintentionally or deliberately practiced former custodial 
practices in the new institutions is a moot point. The administrators' major 
problem was that policy intention was never matched by operational practice. 
Again, the committee investigating Scottish Units made similar findings. They, 
however, labelled this action as "regime slippage." 63 Victoria's prison 
administrators attempted to redress the situation. That they were less than 
successful cannot be solely blamed on prison officers. 
58 	Prisons Structural Efficiency Implementation Plan,  Office of Corrections Version 1 
June 1990, Attachment 6. 
59 	Specialised staff positions such as the Programs Manager for prisoners and the 
Human Relations Development Officer for continuing staff training were created in 
new and existing prisons. 60 Vinson, "Impressions of an Australian visitor" 16. 
61 	Strategic Services had the mandate but the STC had the infrastructure and expertise 
to deliver the specialised training. See chapters 6 and 7. 
62 	This feeling is still current among staff. For example, Supervisor Sandra Paterson. 
discussing the new business principles approach commented "how can you promote 
trust and enthusiasm in prison officers when you see nothing given and everything 
taken away. - Interview 14 May 1998. 
63 	Small Units in the SPS. 18. 
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Policy intent and operational reality — a dichotomy? 
Chapter 3 described the linkage between the 1970s 'open' prison system and 
the movement-by-various prison organisations to- establish policy-making units. 
_Various policies were offered to justify the changing focus of prisons. It was _ 
argued that a major problem was the inability of 1970s policy makers to 
understand the prison climate and devise policies accordingly. It was also 
suggested that many of the formulated policies failed to reach their potential 
through either prison officer intransigence" or prisoner dominance. 65 Again, 
many policies were perhaps idealistic 66 or were difficult to monitor. 67 
However, prisons have always attempted to implement policies that reflect the 
government's perception of the nature and purpose of imprisonment. Policy 
making was the prerogative of the prison manager prior to the 1970s. 68 When 
Australia's prison managers travelled overseas to investigate the latest penal 
trends, programmes and practices from other jurisdictions were, invariably, 
implemented. 
That prisons are judged on their capacity to maintain discipline and order is 
axiomatic. Yet, reformers have criticised contemporary penal operation arguing 
that policies must mirror societal practice. Prison policy-makers are thus forced 
to maintain the fiction of progressiveness yet balance this with society' 
admonition when a deleterious episode occurs. 
64 	Unit management in Victoria is a prime example. 
65 	See chapters 5 and 6 
66 	Many prisons gave prisoner-debating teams permission to leave the institution to 
debate outside organisations. They were usually accompanied by an education or 
welfare officer. While the majority of these 'normalisation' visits went off without 
incident, some went horrendously wrong. For example, a group of Tasmanian 
prisoners, including a murderer and rapists were apprehended for drink driving and 
being under the influence of drugs. They had been escorted by the prison Amenities 
Officer - who subsequently lost his position. 
67 	The current practice by many prison systems of giving long-term prisoners daily 
leave to attend tertiary institutions unescorted. In a classic case, Tasmanian 
authorities were pressured to allow a murderer, who claimed to be aboriginal, to 
attend university. It was later found that he spent a lot of time in local hotels. His 
privileges were curtailed upon detection and he was transferred to maximum 
security. He later committed suicide. 
68 	I.L. Barak-Glantz -Toward a Conceptual Schema of Prison Management Styles" 
Prison Journal. Vol. 61 No. 2 (1981): 42-58. 45-46. 
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Any history of penal practice, and concomitantly policy, is replete with 
examples of administrative order. And to maintain order, prison systems 
required standardisation, routine, and discipline. It is claimed, however, that 
the English prison operation is different from others. 
Although British penology does share broad characteristics with similar 
- types of endeavour in the United States - and Europe, its precise nature is 
bounded by a quite specific concatenation of social conditions. In a 
very profound sense, British penology is a determinate form of 
knowledge. 69 
Prison policy is not made in isolation. Unlike many government policies that 
arise through specific needs or from social change, prison policy, however, has 
never been considered as an equal partner in government policy consideration - 
rather, it has merely been regarded as a desideratum. While some prison 
policies such as better education facilities for the incarcerated achieve a 
modicum of success the public perception is that prisons have generally failed 
to achieve their given tasks - whatever these tasks may be. Currently they are 
failing to stop the infiltration of drugs into the system. 7° Even the most basic 
security function - that of keeping prisoners incarcerated - is constantly 
tested. 71 Newly opened institutions may give both officers and offenders better 
working and living conditions, but it has been argued that these changes are 
purely cosmetic. 72 Again, authorities are sometimes guilty of spending more 
time and resources addressing secondary or peripheral objectives. 73 And 
because their focus is perhaps distracted, they sometimes fail to recognise that 
prison officers will resist some policies covertly or overtly. 
69 	D. Garland and P. Young, The Power to Punish. (London: Heinemann, 1983) 2. 70 "Search call after prison drug death- Herald Sun. 25 July 1997, and 
"Drug drama in women's jail- Herald Sun, 24 October 1997. 
71 Prisoners have escaped, or attempted to escape, from the Melbourne Remand Centre. 
HM Barwon Prison, and the private operated MVVCC. Victoria's first private prison. 
the Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre, has attracted considerable criticism 
in its operation. Allegations were made that it was "a dangerous cocktail of 
inexperience, inefficiency, and economic expediency." "Court hears of prison 
bashings- Herald-Sun, June 18. 1997. 
L.L. Zupan. Jails: Reform and the New Generation Philosophy, 
(Cincinnati. OH: Anderson 1991) 95. 
73 	While units remain closed because of staffing shortages, some of Victoria's 
government prisons are spending considerable amounts on developing teams. 
keypoint indicators, and customer focus guidelines. 
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While prison officers may have input into some policy development, they are 
most certainly the means by which operational policies succeed or fail. Staffs 
normally accept prison policies whether they agree with the intention of the 
procedure or not. There may be grumbling and discontent about change. The 
usual specious remarks are voiced that the authorities are going 'soft on 
prisoners.' This behaviour is a normal part of the prison officer culture. After a 
period of time the change becomes part of the prison daily routine. Therefore, 
in most cases, policy intent is mirrored by operational practice. However, there 
are occasions when prison policy and prison operations separate. Some policies 
may be too complex to be completely translated into action. Again, there are a 
number of limitations that affect policy intention. 
It has been pointed out that translating policies into practice is "not quite as 
simple as may first appear." First, policy decisions "involve varying degrees of 
technical difficulties during implementation, some of which are more 
intractable than others." For example, according to Howlett and Ramesh, 74 a 
single decision, such as opening a new prison, usually translates routinely. On 
the other hand, implementing a new prisoner management strategy is more 
complex because it involves a series of decisions. Second, "the diversity of 
problems targeted by a government program may make its implementation 
difficult." The authors claim that complex problems - such as the myriad 
intentions of unit management — "are rooted in so many causes that programs 
designed to address single or even multiple causes can normally be expected to 
fall short of their objectives." Third, "the size of the target group is also a 
factor, insofar, as the larger and more diverse the group, the more dfficult it is 
to affect its behaviour in a desired fashion." 
The third point has particular significance for prisons - the target groups in this 
context being staff and prisoners. It may be that in this situation policy intent 
has not been fully developed relying instead on a set of generalisations that can 
be applied in specific circumstances to either prison officers or prisoners. 
74 	M. Howlett and M. Ramesh. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy 
Subsystems. (Don Mills. Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1995) 154 -italics in original. 
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Finally, "the extent of the behavioural change the policy requires of the target 
group determines the level of difficulty faced in its implementation." 75 It is 
simplistic to claim that unit management implementation would be more 
favourably received by prisoners than prison officers. Many prisoners still 
adhere to the 'no prison officer contact' principle. Again, fraternisation may 
result in deleterious action. Moreover, some prisoners may also suspect ulterior 
motives behind friendly staff overtures. Furthermore, some prisoners take 
advantage of the unregimented unit management regime to sort out group 
differences. 76 However, many prisoners would accept that the practice has 
positive advantages - apart from the modern conditions — compared with the 
previous custodial regime that was practiced in old institutions. It is therefore 
easier to predict that prisoners would be more amenable to the new concept. As 
such, it would be assumed that prisoners would experience lower levels of 
difficulty during implementation than prison officers. 
Staff, on the other hand, may be ambivalent about implementation. 77 Perhaps 
this is a result of the peculiar conservatism among staff. Indeed, this 
conservatism is an intrinsic part of the prison officer culture. Change in order 
and routine is usually treated with suspicion and/or scepticism. Prison officers 
have been traditionally wary of management's actions. 78 Moreover, it has been 
acknowledged for decades that feelings tend to escalate whenever a 
climatically operational change takes place. 79 The introduction of a new 
concept needs to be carefully marketed, 8° otherwise industrial action could 
result if staff perceive a change in order and contro1. 81 Again, some staff 
reverts to familiar practices after new programme implementation. 82 
75 	Ibid, 154-155. 
76 	A soccer match at the private Fulham Correctional Centre in Victoria ended with a 
"wild brawl- between Asian and Australian prisoners. More than eighty inmates were 
involved. "Race fury sparks jail brawl - Herald Sun, 28 May 1998. 
77 	K. McLennan, and D. Simmons. Prison Officers at Bathurst Gaol: Attitudes To The 
• Management Plan, Internal report for comment only, NSW Department of Corrective 
Services, 2 May, 1985, 
"Warders fury at compo rally ban" Mercury 15 May 1987. 
79 	D.R. Cressey, "Contradictory Directives in Complex Organizations: The Case of the 
Prison- Administrative Science Quarterly. 4. 1959-60, 1-19. 
sr) "Slack management at jail bad for discipline: warders" Mercury, 2 October 1987. 
81 	"Strike by prison officers over - Mercury. 23 January 1988. 
82 	McLennan. and Simmons, Prison Officers at Bathurst Gaol: Attitudes To The 
Management Plan. 2. 
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Others may not wish to be associated with or interact with prisoners "on 
anything but an administrative level." 83 Moreover, the policy may be subject to 
internal institution interpretation prior to implementation. For example, 
The scope and range of the 'discipline' is limited by, and tied to, quite 
specific demands emanating from the requirements of governments, the 
penal bureaucracy itself and the activities of charitably 7_ _13.0ased 
reformers (later to be social workers proper). On these occasions, when 
definite ideas of policy are promoted, they become subordinated to the 
internal workings of organisations. For example, although a policy of 
classification of prisoners for treatment or reform did emerge in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, the actual implementation of these 
classifications followed the demands of good prison discipline rather 
than individual treatment. 84 
Prison officers may also perceive that the intended policy masks some other 
action the administrators wish to impose. For example, Victoria's prison 
officers were about to renegotiate a new industrial agreement in 1990. It was 
reported at a Management Services Divisional Management meeting that a 3% 
increase in prison officer' salary had been approved subject to the restructure 
of the prison rank hierarchy. 85 The restructure had been initiated by Victoria's 
Public Service Board and had been developed by a joint consultative Working 
Party comprising 00C/VPSA (the Victorian Public Service Association) and 
Public Service Board (PSB) representatives. 
Whilst the prison classification restructure was part of the government's 
strategy. to achieve better productivity throughout Victoria's Public Service 
using Structural Efficiency Principles, prison officers immediately perceived 
this as an overt threat to make them accept unit management implementation. 
Although the new prisoner management strategy was to all intent operating at 
the newly commissioned prisons, there was still a great deal of confusion about 
the concept, and a En-owing disillusionment about the expanded staff roles. 86 
Staff now complained that they were performing additional tasks but were not 
trained or compensated for the expanded roles. 
83 	A. Gorta, Unit Prisoner Accommodation-The Bathurst Gaol Experience, 1983-1987. 
NSW Department of Corrective Services memorandum, 1988. 
84 	Garland and Young. The Power to Punish_ 2-3. 
85 	Management Services Divisional Meeting Minutes. 7 June 1990. 
86 	HIM Prison Pentridge: Implementation of Unit Management. December 1990. 
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Indeed, with their industrial award due for renegotiation many officers felt that 
the organisation was taking advantage of the situation by tying in unit 
management with salary negotiations. However, Headquarters made their 
position clear. It was noted that 
Rank Restructure was initiated to review the existing custodial 
- structure, and has resulted in the establishment of a restructured Prison-- 
Officer Category. Rank Restructure provides an interim broadbanding 
of classifications as a step towards Structural Efficiency and Unit 
Management whilst resolving a number of outstanding classification 
anomalies in the old custodial structure. 87 
Prison officers unilaterally rejected the -proposals. Whilst many wished to gain 
an increase in salary, it was argued that the increase was insufficient to 
compensate for the new roles. Moreover, there was the specious argument that 
salary increases would benefit staff still working in custodial institutions. A 
new industrial agreement was endorsed by the Industrial Relations Task Force, 
the Director-General, and the President of the VPSA and presented to the 
Public Service Board. Officers still refused to ratify the agreement forcing the 
administration to continue working under the provisions of the 1987 Industrial 
Agreement. 88 
That the industrial negotiations would eventually be resolved•is a moot point. 
The timing of unit management implementation and renegotiation of the 
industrial agreement left many sceptical about the process. Although these 
actions were related, many prison officers thought the issues separate. Thus, 
another major opportunity to 'sell' the concept foundered. 89 Arguably, the 
protracted process did not assist in changing staff attitudes towards unit 
management. Indeed, the process may have encouraged dissidence." 
87 	Rank Restructure Translation Procedures and Reserve Matters,  00C internal 
Memorandum from the Personnel Manager to all Governors, 14 November 1990. 
88 	Newsbreak. Vol. 5 No. 8 November 1990. 
89 	Headquarters remedied this in 1992 by detailing practices. See, For the 
implementation of structural efficiency and further development of unit management 
in H M Prison Melbourne Remand Centre. September 1992. 
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In addition to the previous named factors, Howlett and Ramesh claim that 
policy implementation is also affected by "social, economic, technological, and 
political contexts."9I They argue that "changes in-social conditions may affect - 
the interpretation of the problem and thus the manner in which the program is 
implemented."92 In other words, while the intentions of unit management were 
sound a number of factors arose which affected operations. 
For example, it has been noted that Victoria's version of unit management 
combined elements taken from other jurisdictions. It was also noted that the 
concept had a perfunctory trial at an old custodial institution. Three new unit 
management prisons opened within several months. There was no time to judge 
the efficacy of the concept in one institution and make any appropriate 
changes. Moreover, the concept was to be applied unilaterally. However, it was 
noted there was to be 
A less liberal form of Unit Management than that practiced in other 
prisons. The emphasis in Pentridge will be on discipline and work, 
although these two requirements will still be tempered with the 
availability of personal development opportunities 93 
Obviously the authorities were confident that the transition would be 
uneventful. However, perhaps, they did not anticipate that there would 
eventually be a public and legal backlash. There was concern about building 
institutions in isolated areas causing hardship and inconvenience for visitors. 94 
Moreover, there was a change in sentencing policy. Prison numbers grew 
exponentially forcing administrators into "doubling-up" - increasing inmate 
tension. 95 Again, the amount of drug-related offenders entering the system had 
raised security fears. 96 Furthermore, it was never anticipated that some well-
intentional prisoner industries would be the subject of scorn. 97 
90 Howlett and Ramesh, Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, 155. 
91 	Ibid. 
92 	Ibid. 
93 	FIM Prison Pentridge: Implementation of Unit Management, December 1990, 2. 
91 	"Prison transfers attacked" Herald Sun. 16 January 1997. 
95 	"Prison wire nabs escapee - Herald Sun. 22 May 1998. 
96 	"Drugs raise prison fears- Herald Sun. 9 October 1997. 
97 	Port Phillip attempted to use prisoners as "tele-salesmen" creating a storm of protest. 
"Row on jail phone sales push" Herald Sun, 12 July 1997, and 
"Unwanted calls- Editorial, Herald Sun. 26 July 1997. 
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Howlett and Ramesh note "changes in economic conditions have a similar 
impact on policy implementation." 98 The unprecedented funding committed by 
the Labor Government to upgrade existing and build new institutions, and to 
provide the machinery for operation soon dried up. It is by no means certain 
that the decision to implement Structural Efficiency Principles throughout the 
public sector was a direct result of the shortage of government funding. What is 
certain, however, is that correctional funding was cut from $156.6 million in 
the 1989-90 budget to $150.00 million in 1991-92 appropriation — a significant 
debit in real terms. 99 This debit obviously had ramifications for the unilateral 
implementation of unit management. 
Howlett and Ramesh further argue that economic conditions also vary by 
region, "necessitating greater flexibility and discretion in implementation." °° 
The three new prisons would have received preference for funding internal unit 
management training. Officers were informed that unit management training 
programmes were being developed by individual institutions to assist the 
change of prisoner management direction. However, officers in custodial 
institutions were amused to find that some unit management training was "a 3 
day rock climbing and abseiling orientation camp... [These] newly acquired 
skills will be invaluable ...in assisting prisoners to develop those skills 
necessary to be able to successfully integrate back into the community.' ,m1 
Indeed, it would take another two years of unit management operation before 
Pentridge officers were given documentation of how the concept would be 
applied in their jurisdiction. They were first informed of the "proposal to 
reduce the authorised staffing arrangements" and that unit management 
training was to be delivered locally "using packages developed at the Staff 
Training College by both prison trainers and 00C support staff" 1°2 . Pentridge 
officers' were well aware of the departmental priorities when allocating unit 
management finance. 
98 	Howlett and Ramesh. Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, 155. 
99 00C Annual Reports. 1989-90 and 1991-92. 10i) Howlett and Ramesh, Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, 155. 
Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. Information for Officers, 18 October 1990. 
102 	HM Prison Pentridge: Implementation of Unit Management, December 1990. 1-2. 
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The third of Howlett and Ramesh's factors, new technology, appears to have 
had little direct effect in unit management implementation. Head Office's 
initial enthusiasm for the concept was tempered by the reality that 
implementation practice was less than the required standard. l°3 Steps were _ 
taken to create a psychological instrument to measure unit management 
effectiveness. A procedures measurement manual was formulated to "bring a- — 
unique form of assessment to the forefront of Unit Management in 
Australia." 104 Like the Unit Management Guidelines, the procedure manual 
was unilaterally ignored — individual institutions claiming that they had their 
own evaluation procedures. 
The final factor in Howlett and Ramesh's framework is "variations in political 
circumstances. "105  When a government loses office the incoming party may or 
may not change previous policies per se. 106  However, they may change the way 
that policies are implemented.'" A change of administrative head may also 
result in a redirection of policy priorities. 
Mr Van Groningen said complacency and acceptance which had existed 
in the corrective services for years needed to be uprooted. "For too 
long, we have done things without evidence it's needed or without 
having thought about it. "I think it's time we started building into 
evaluation and assessment, and if we have to, be honest enough to say 
'let's abandon it." 108 
The Howlett and Ramesh typology gives researchers a powerful framework for 
detailed comment on general public policy analysis. It may not, however, be so 
stringent when analysing prison policy implementation. But it also has been 
noted that "The organization of the administrative apparatus in charge of 
implementing a policy has no less impact than the [previously mentioned] 
factors." Moreover, "policy implementation is inadvertently subject to the intra 
— and inter organizational conflicts endemic to the public policy process." 1°9 
1 03 	Prisons Structural Efficiency Implementation Plan, Office of Corrections Version 1 
June 1990, Attachment 6. 
I 04 	Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. Around the Traps, 13 December 1990. 
1:5 	Howlett and Ramesh. Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. 155. 
106 	"Private is good for public - Herald Sun, 14 March 1997. 
07 	Howlett and Ramesh, Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. 155. 
1 	"New era for our prison system - Sunday Herald Sun,  29 November 1992. 
I 09 	Howlett and Ramesh. Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, 155. 
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It was demonstrated earlier that a notable feature of the 00C years was the 
almost continual change in senior administrative personnel, and the reporting 
relationships. Murton, a noted American penoogist, claims that the change-
agent 
Often believes that organizational structures, per se, hold the key to 
- reform, [therefore] - he—may concentrate on structure exclusively and 
consequently bargain away real prison reform in exchange for a more 
sophisticated bureaucracy. It is with this "progress" of bureaucratic 
structuring that reform measures wane, change is hindered, and 
achievement is thwarted by state agencies that tend to perpetuate 
themselves rather than to serve the needs of citizenry. 110 
The problems associated with Victoria's unit management implementation 
perhaps were a secondary consideration for an organisation that was trying to 
alleviate concern with its operation."' Moreover, the internecine competition 
between the Strategic Services Division and the STC on unit management 
training delivery could not have helped. Furthermore, while Dutch prison 
policy of that period was formulated on the premise that the offender would 
eventually return to the community, 112 there had only been ambiguous 
statements about the direction the 00C was taking. 113 On the other hand, 
perhaps the policy direction was similar to that of the English system. 
British penology has been able to both exclude certain types of thought 
or social policy as irrelevant, yet offer, as an alternative, a type of 
knowledge which achieves its hegemony by its very obscurity, plurality 
of purpose and indefiniteness. In short, British penology legitimates 
itself both by denying its status as ideology and more simply, by 
fudging issues. 114 
Of particular concern to the 00C was the fact that "The 'old school' [prison 
officers] still did their own thing and played H Q against the [operating] reality 
of the prison.. ,,115  Policy and practice were still not congruent. 
T.O. Murton. The Dilemma of Prison Reform, New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976, 101. 
Report on the behaviour of the Office of Correction, 27 December, 1989 
(The Murray Report). Victoria Police Task Force Report on Allegations of Corruption 
Within The Office of Corrections, 1989 (The Mulgrew Report), and Report on the 
Accountability of the Office of Corrections. The Ombudsman Victoria, July 1990. 
112 
	
	J. Jonlunan in P. Norden. Study Tour of Swedish and Dutch Prison Systems, 
Unpublished paper, 1990. 1-15, 11. 
113 	Building a Law-Abiding Society-Together, (BLAST), Victorian Government 
Publication, 49320/88. August 1988. 
114 	Garland and Young, The Power to Punish. 2-3. 
115 	Correspondence from former Governor Helen Holland, 17 April 1997. 
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Prison officer training revisited. 
Thomas notes, 
Organisations often look to training as a means of coping —with 
difficulties, not because it will solve them, but because training has 
overtones of professionalism and intellectual attainment, which can 
keep demands for radical change at bay. 116  
On the surface it would appear that the 00C's commitment to the unit 
management concept was never matched by an equivalent commitment to unit 
management training.. Indeed, until the demise of the 00C in 1992, the 
organisation seemed ambivalent about the approach to be undertaken in 
formulating training practices. "There is a compelling need for all staff to work 
towards maintaining a prison environment that is both relaxed and under 
control." 117 Prison officers were also subjected to a plethora of trite 
information. 
The organisation had issued a number of unit management information 
guidelines but they were singularly devoid of specific direction, and were 
generally dismissed as Head Office propaganda. 118 Again, the members of the 
Head Office unit management implementation team were not highly regarded 
by the rank and file. 119 The proposed in situ unit management training was 
never evaluated — cursory visits from Head Office personnel aside to view 
operations. Many prison officers simply reverted to standard practices. But this 
was not solely a Victorian problem. "The difficult nature of unit work, 
however, makes it essential that, once in the job, staff receive comprehensive 
"120 and regular training... 
116 	Thomas. The English Prison Officer, 209. 
117 	Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. "Dynamic Security and Unit Management" 
Training Module. 1992, 6. 
For example. Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. "Around the traps" 
20 September 1990. provides information on the review of "K - Division undertaken 
by Dr David Schwartz: Unit Management in Victorian Prisons, "Around the traps- 18 
October 1990 provides anecdotal information on Tarrengower female prison: Unit 
Management in Victorian Prisons. "The way we were- 1 November 1990, discusses 
the development of the English prison service and Glasnost in the Soviet Union: and 
Unit Management in Victorian Prisons. -A meeting of minds- 21 March 1991. 
discusses a utilitarian method of conducting meetings. 
119 	Correspondence from former Governor Helen Holland. 17 April 1997. 
12t) 	Small Units in the SPS. 49. 
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The Scottish Working Party also noted that the failure to provide sufficient 
finance for ongoing training had been a major contribution toward "regime 
slippage." 121 There is no doubt that Victoria's prison officers suffered from 
limited ongoing unit management training. This, perhaps, was not intentional. 
The major problem was that three new institutions were commissioned in a 
short period. 
While it has been noted that there are many difficulties associated with the 
commissioning of a new prison, 122 these problems tend to be magnified if 
management and staff are unsure of work practices. Again, each new prison 
manager will have different priorities depending on location and classification 
of institution. 123 A unilateral policy may not be the ideal vehicle to affect 
change. There is also the difficulty in determining what constitutes 'policy.' 
There is a tendency in prisons to label almost any type of operational practice a 
policy. To the uninitiated (prison officers) the word policy has 'professional' 
connotations, or overtones of Head Office dogma. It is probably the most 
overused and misunderstood word in prisons. When a prison officer asks why a 
particular process is undertaken, the usual answer is that it is 'policy.' Prison 
practice is usually enshrined through various Standing Orders, Rules and 
Regulations, and a plethora of prison circulars which even the most astute 
prison officer would have difficulty interpreting - even if they are available. 124 
While there was a plethora of unit management information available, its 
practical use was minimal. Prison officers still relied on standing operational 
orders. These had not been changed to accommodate the new unit management 
practices. Prison officers are normally issued with a bulky set of prison 
standing orders on recruitment. They cannot be carried on a day-to-day 
basis. 125 
121 	Ibid, 50. 
122 	See, for example, the tribulations faced by the three private companies in Victoria. 
123 	Victoria opened a medium-maximum institution at Barwon, a minimum-medium 
Institution at Loddon, and a remand centre in Melbourne—all with different priorities. 
124 
	
	M. Maguire, J. Vagg, and R. Morgan, (Eds) Accountability and Prisons,( London: 
Tavistock, 1985) 7. 
125 	As previously noted. the Tasmanian standing orders weighed nearly a kilo. 
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Moreover, many procedures have been adapted or remain unchanged from the 
originals, which were promulgated last century. 126 Prison Rules and 
Regulations are practically never displayed in institution on the premise that 
prisoners may use these to challenge practices. I27 Any officer who strictly 
adheres to these procedures will soon find that practices change depending on 
— - - senior personnel. 128  What one senior officer will allow, another may not. 
Indeed, many prison practices developed over the years and became enshrined 
as policy. Officers are taught these practices during their early years and 
quickly accept them as dictum. Practices become 'policy' by default. 
Most prisons are run on informal rather than formal policies. I29 Both staff and 
prisoners become accustomed to these practices and, in the main, accommodate 
whenever some minor change is implemented. Most prison managers deal with 
tangibles, and from a base of experience and rationality. Moreover, there is a 
definite set of procedures and, which can be referred to whenever a problem 
arises. Indeed it is only when managers are confused or uncertain "that they 
mask their insecurity and insufficiency with rigid rules and authoritative 
discipline." 130 However, whenever a major operational change takes place - 
such as the introduction of unit management - the manager must expect 
difficulties with implementation from both staff and prisoners. The boundaries 
of officer and prisoner interaction have to be redefined and readjusted. It is not 
only the policy that is being changed but also, more importantly, the 
philosophy behind prison operation. In the Medical Model era 
Despite increased staff, the acquisition of a host of treatment personnel, 
the creation of innumerable treatment programs, and the well - 
intentioned interest of society in curing the criminal, we have observed 
an increase in institutional violence, disorders, rebellion, and riots. 13I 
Prison operational policy was much more clearly defined during the Restraint 
and Revenge eras. Indeed, philosophy and policy were contiguous. 
126 	Thomas and Stewart, Imprisonment in Western Australia, 4. 
127 	Maguire et al. Accountability and Prisons. 6-8. 
12X 	J.J. Dilullio. Jr., Governing Prisons (New York: The Free Press, 1987) 221-222. 
129 	Murton, The Dilemma of Prison Refonn. 65-66. 
13o 	Thomas, The English Prison Officer. 9. 
131 
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However, there was conflict between operational philosophy and policy during 
both the Rehabilitation and Reintegration phase. The Rehabilitation era was 
found wanting, 132 and has practically disappeared. 133-But there were tensions 
between professional and uniformed staff due to the disparate philosophy and 
operational policy. Treatment staff has traditionally complained that prison 
officers are moreconcerned with custody than prisoner programmes. 134 Prison 
managers and prison officers, however, are judged on their ability to maintain 
order. This was judged to be their primary function in Victoria until 1990. 135 
The divergence between philosophy and operational policy has become more 
pronounced during the contemporary Reintegration era, mainly due to the 
authorities' lack of explanation about the purpose of policies, and the 
seemingly on-going emphasis on custodial prison officer training. In retrospect, 
Victoria's prison officers' unit management training suffered from competing 
internal politics, a lack of accountability, and a failure to ensure ongoing 
concept measurement. 
It was noted in chapter 5 that the newly autonomous 00C had many major 
tasks to complete in a short period. The Director-General, Bill Kidston, 
delegated priorities to various executive portfolios. Prison officer training, a 
major focus of Kidston's vision, became a political football — particularly after 
the unit management concept was promulgated. Two corporate areas, 
Management Services and Strategic Services, became involved in training 
design. The Management Services Division was primarily responsible, through 
the Staff Training College, for all training. Strategic Services was responsible, 
inter alia, for new prisons. 
132 	R. Martinson, "What Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform" 
The Public Interest, (Spring 1974): 22-54. 
133 	D.E.J. MacNamara, "The Medical Model in Corrections: Requiescat in Pace," 
Criminology. 14 (1977): 446. 
134 	J.W. Eaton, Stone Walls Not a Prison Make. 
(Springfield, Illinios: Charles C. Thomas. 1962) 134 
135 	M.C. Filan.  A Study of the Legal and Sociological Determinants of the Work Role of  
the Victorian Prison Officer, BA diss.. Canberra College of Advanced Education, 
1978, 39 
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It may be that one reason why Strategic Services became involved with unit 
management training was a change of Director-General and the subsequent 
reallocating of tasks and priorities. Peter Breadmore was promoted to one of 
the new positions of Assistant Director of Prisons and assumed responsibility 
for Strategic Services. Prior to this, Breadmore was in charge of the new 
prisons' project. As noted, when the new prisons were built, Strategic Services 
became involved in furbishing and staffing issues. However, the staff in this 
division had little, if any background in training development and delivery. 
Breadmore successfully lobbied for new prisons training as part of new 
prisons' staffing. Strategic Services initial training input was a series of 
discussions with promotion course participants at the College. I36 Most 
experienced prison officers viewed this as Head Office intrusion into training, 
particularly when the presenters had little prison credibility. Unit management 
training was coloured thereafter. Again, it is a moot point whether Bill Kidston 
would have a different perspective on training. However, given Kidston's 
commitment to the role and work of the College, it is unlikely that unit 
management training would have been delivered in the manner it was. 
Given the political and financial commitment to unit management it appears 
paradoxical that there were no apparent adequate monitoring mechanisms. 
After two years of unit management operation, the concept was still subject to 
controversy and debate. Breadmore had acknowledged in 1990 that prison 
officers had returned to former custodial practices. I37 Yet, the feedback in 1992 
was that little had changed. A new unit management implementation team was 
created to assist prisons. Its credibility was soon questioned as it mainly 
consisted of members of the Strategic Services team who had previously been 
involved in unit management training and development. I38 Indeed, there is little 
evidence of implementation studies. 
136 	These discussions were unlike the Dutch variant. Course participant were informed 
that the concept was afait accompli and there was nothing they could do to change 
it. See chapters 6 and 7. 
137 	Prisons Structural Efficiency Implementation Plan, Office of Corrections Version 1 
June 1990, Attachment 6. 
138 	Keypoints. Vol 3 No 4, June 1992, 14. 
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For example, the NSW authorities recognised that detailed scrutiny and 
investigation of the concept was necessary to validate its usefulness. They 
undertook a series of investigations, which provided a range of data ranging 
from regime operation analysis, prisoner and prison officer attitudes, and 
prison officer training., among others. 139  These studies not only provided the 
_ 
NSW administrators with a solid framework for detailed scrutiny of the 
concept, but a basis for change if required. On the other hand, there is no 
apparent evidence that Victoria's administrators ever undertook detailed 
analysis of unit management implementation. 140  However, successive reports 
to the Minister highlighted the success of implementation. 141 
Whether any of these variables - internal politics, a lack of accountability, and 
a failure to ensure ongoing concept measurement — directly affected unit 
management operation is subject to interpretation and further analysis. What is 
certain is that prison officers' were unfairly or unjustly blamed for a reluctance 
to become fully involved in unit management implementation. It is recognised 
that a number of experienced officers resisted change. Indeed, to many the idea 
of being a prisoner's councillor and case manager was an anathema. However, 
the organisation had a significant opportunity for an attitudinal change 
particularly with the myriad recruits for new prisons. That many became 
captured by the custodial prison culture — hindering unit management 
implementation - demonstrates a failure on the part of Head Office to provide 
the necessary training climate for change. While training can never be the 
panacea for change, it is a primary instrument in effecting new practices. In 
Victoria there was a deficit between training intention and operational practice. 
139 	For example. K. Mahony, M. and Crouch, Unit Management-Bathurst, Progress 
Report, NSW Department of Corrective Services, April, 1983; K. McLennan, and 
D. Simmons. Prison Officers at Bathurst Gaol: Attitudes To The Management Plan. 
Internal report for comment only, NSW Department of Corrective Services, 2 May. 
1985; M. Crouch. A. Gorta. K. Mahony. K. McLennan, D. Porritt, and D. Simmons. 
Bathurst Gaol Evaluation Study.  Department of Corrective Services, Research 
Publication No. 12. 1987; and A. Gorta. Unit Prisoner Accommodation-The Bathurst 
Gaol Experience 1983-1987. NSW Department of Corrective Services memorandum. 
1988. 
140 	Dr David Schwartz from the NSW Department of Corrective services undertook a 
review of the operation of "K . ' Division at the MRC in 1991. 
141 	00C Annual Reports. 1989-9. 1990-91 and 1991-92. 
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Policy or philosophy? 
An underlying premise in this thesis - has been the distinct lack of understanding 
about the difference between a_prison operating philosophy and a prisoner 
management strategy. They tend to be regarded as synonymous. This 
perception is supported by the inclusion in Unit Management Guidelines of the 
following; 
All participating prisons are required to make available to all prison 
staff a documented prison philosophy approved by the Director-
General. The prison philosophy is to contain a statement of mission 
together with a set of guiding principles that clearly articulate the 
prison's purpose, standards and objectives as they relate to prisoners, 
staff conditions and services. 
The prison philosophy will conform to the spirit and intent of the 
00C's Mission Statement and Guiding Principles. It will also be 
required to comply with the Principles of Unit Management and the 
Unit Management Minimum Standards. 142 
If we accept that prison operational philosophy will mirror society's 
perceptions of how to deal with criminality, this philosophy will be a measure 
of the government's response to public opinion. Given that the public are 
normally apathetic towards prisons and prisoners, concerned at the expenditure 
and largesse when new prisons are opened, I43 or, conversely, concerned when 
prisons are apparently not performing their function, 144 the prison's operating 
philosophy may be of little public concern. Indeed, despite the concern of the 
'attentive public' new opinion would still see prisons' function as custody and 
control. Simply, a prison operational philosophy is the means for prison 
policies and strategies. 
The advice given by the 00C to Victoria's Government, however, did not 
clearly indicate that operational philosophy and unit management practice were 
separate entities. Again, it may have been that those charged with providing 
this advice were unsure of the differences themselves. 
142 	Unit Management Guidelines: Achieving Leadership Excellence in Victorian  
Prisons, (Melbourne: 00C. 1990) 130. 
143 	For example. - Crims in - Barwon Hilton'" Herald, 23 January 1990 and "Barwon 
jail opens to mixed reception- Age, 24 January 1990. 
144 	
-Court hears of prison bashings - Herald-Sun, June 18, 1997. 
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It does appear, however, that CORE has learnt from experience. The Business 
Plan for 1997/98 provides details of operational practices being based on "a 
continuum of care model." 145 
The prison philosophical base has always been the foundation on which the _ 
prison operates. Prisoners in the 1960s opposed the rationale behind 
"humanistic policies." 146 Contemporary prisoners are just as reluctant to enter 
into programmes or processes designed to bring about their resocialisation. For 
example, the NSW prison system introduced unit management with the Justice 
Model as a philosophical base. While the NSW strategy had merit, the Prisons 
Minister claimed that prisoners doing what they wanted had made unit 
management practices "untenable." I47 Moreover, it may have been that prison 
officer training had not matched the intention of the concept. Like Victoria, a 
number of NSW officers had difficulty coping with the philosophy and 
strategy. It was also reported that team management had "almost completely 
broken down." 48 In retrospect, valuable lessons could have been learnt from 
NSW and WA who also encountered unit management implementation 
problems. 149 But Victoria's prison authorities either ignored the NSW 
experience or thought they had a better model. 
Victoria's philosophical base had remained unchanged from the Community 
Welfare Services era. 150 As a result of the riots and prisoner intransigence of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, custodial training was upgraded and refined. 
Prison control and improved prisoner management tactics took precedence. 
Emergency response groups were formed. Discipline became the norm. 
145 	CORE The Public Correctional Enterprise. Business Plan, 1997/98, 
Department of Justice, 6. 
146 	Eaton, Stone Walls Not a Prison Make.  181. 
147 	"Prisons: Firm but Fair Policy Statement by the Hon M. Yabsley, Minister for 
Corrective Services, NSW. December 1990, 9. 
M. Crouch. A. Gorta, K Mahony, K. McLennan, D. Porritt, and D. Simmons. 
Bathurst Gaol Evaluation Study. Department of Corrective Services, Research 
Publication No. 12, 1987, 12. 
149 	I.C. Hill, Development of the professional role of prison officers. 
Iso 	John Dawes. the Director of the Correctional Services Division described the 
operational philosophy as the "Neo-Punitive Model of Imprisonment. - "Trends in 
Victorian Prisons - Paper presented at the Legal Studies In-Service Program on 
Correctional Services in Victoria. March 1980. 4. 
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When unit management was mooted prison officers were generally incredulous 
that such approaches would be considered. 151 Indeed, to confuse the issue 
further, the very vehicle by which the 00C wished to convey their policies, the 
Unit Management Guidelines, noted that "Good discipline is essential if 
prisons are to work effectively." 152 Prison officers were certainly confused by 
_ 
what they perceived as conflicting objectives. Proposed policy and 
contemporary philosophy had little chance of coalescing. The major reasons 
being that both prison officers and management were working towards 
different "philosophical ends." 53 
Toto cae1o? 154 
The final element in determining whether prison . policy and practice can be 
congruent is to examine the relationships between prison officers and 
management. Simply, prison officers' view 'management' as the day-to-day 
administrators of the institution. They also perceive 'prison management' as 
being subservient to Head Office edict. While this is a simplistic interpretation, 
it is arguably the way that prison officers understand the organisation 
hierarchical arrangements. On the other hand, institutional management, like 
Head Office, is subject to many other conflicting and competing forces. There 
are political, budgetary, legislative, and mandatory reporting relationships 
among others to comply with. However, prison officers do not see it in these 
terms. They perceive Head Office as being ill or uninformed about the nature 
of prison operation and policy implementation. Moreover, many experienced 
prison officers' perceive that Head Office is autocratic and inflexible with little 
idea about the true nature of prison operation. They also believe that their 
operational managers tend to provide the information that Head Office wants to 
hear. These attitudes are not new. They are part of prison officer culture. 
151 	From conversations with various SPOs and CPOs attending promotion courses at the 
Staff Training College while the author was the Senior Training Officer, 1989-90. 
152 
	
	Unit Management Guidelines: Achieving Leadership Excellence in Victorian  
Prisons, 20. 
153 	Report on the Accountability of the Office of Corrections, 
The Ombudsman Victoria. July 1990. 13. 
154 	Diametrically opposite. Ehrlich. Dictionary of Latin Tags and Phrases, 221. 
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According to prison officers', the greatest problem has always been the 
inability of prison administrators to put themselves in prison officers' shoes.' 
Prison officers' feel that until Head Office personnel can understand the 
ramifications of how their  policies affect prison routine, there is very little 
chance of change being successful. Indeed, Howlett and Ramesh note that the 
"top-down approach" is fine when goals and policies are clear and 
unambiguous. 
The most serious shortcomings with this approach, however, concerns 
its focus on senior decision-makers, who often play only a marginal 
role in implementation compared to lower level officials and members 
of the public. 1 " 
Moreover, many of the prison officers' attitudes or feelings toward 
management have a solid foundation. According to some commentators, 
irrespective of philosophical or policy change, the "social distance" between 
prison officers and prisoners has little chance of altering in the near future. 
However, the authors also noted that the "social distance" between prison 
officers and management was increasing. While these findings were particular 
to 1983 America prior to the introduction of Direct Supervision, they indicate 
that a change of policy or direction can affect the tenuous relationships 
between staff and inmates. 
The study is also noteworthy in its description of the changing patterns of 
interaction between staff and operational management. The authors found that 
"the debasing nature of the institutional work relations, coupled with the public 
stigmatization of the [prison officer] job, have resulted in a myriad of 
occupational ills." 156 This may account for prison officers' reluctance to be 
involved in a change of operational practice. On the other hand, recent studies 
demonstrate that employees will resist change when the change is actually a 
poor decision. 157 
155 	Howlett and Ramesh, Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, 157. 
156 	E. D. Poole and R.M Rigoli, "Professionalism. Role Conflict, Work Alienation and 
Anomie: A Look at Prison Management. - Social Science Journal, Vol 20 (1983): 
63-70, 64. 
157 	K.M. Banol, D.C. Martin. M. Tein and G. Mathews, Management A Pacific Rim 
Focus, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995. 593. 
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Since the 1970s prison administrators have been openly made accountable. 
Prior to this they were literally only subject to Ministerial or judicial probing 
whenever a deleterious episode occurred. The new openness plus recognition 
that prisoners had rights has forever changed the operation of prisons. A side 
affect of these actions has been the overt schism between prison administrators 
and their staffs over operational practices and procedures. It is acknowledged 
that a schism between management and staff has always been a feature of 
organisation — both private and public. A breakdown in management/staff 
relationships in the prison setting can have profound implications for 
government policy, prisoner management, prison operation, and in many 
instances for prison administrators personally 158 . 
While changing prison philosophy has determined operational practice, prison 
officers have had limited input into effecting prisoner change. Early American 
prison innovators and reformers used civilian or professional personnel to 
develop and administer programmes, practices and procedures. Prison officers 
were custodial adjuncts. Australian administrators followed suit. Relationships 
between administrators and prison officers were based on the Military Model 
of rank and bureaucratic structure. The demise of the Medical Model did not 
eventuate in any significant change in these relationships.' 59 Prison officers 
were still directed 160 and expected to act. 161 Since the advents of unit 
management prison officers have been informed that they have a major 
influence in operational procedures, operational policy and prisoner change. 162 
These delegations could only succeed if the Military Model reporting 
relationships were also changed. 
158 	For a lucid account of prison officer/management relationships, see T. Vinson. 
Wilful Obstruction, North Ryde, NSW: Methuen, 1982 
159 	The former structure intended for prisoner change under that philosophy has 
now become entrenched. Teachers, vocational training instructors, psychologists. 
social workers and psychiatric personnel are an intrinsic part of prison operation. 
160 For an account of American management and staff relationships, see T.O. Murton. 
The Dilemma of Prison Reform, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976). 
161 
	
	For an English account, see J.E. Thomas. The English Prison Officer Since 1850:  
A Study in Conflict, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). 
162 	Unit Management Guidelines:  
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It appears pointless to delegate authority and decision-making powers to lower-
level staff yet maintain the right to arbitrarily use the managerial prerogative. 
In fact, with Head Office perceiving prison officer intransigence, I63 the 
organisation could have reacted by emphasising the primacy of executive 
decision-making. Indeed, the bureaucratic structure of 00C vitiated any other 
process. A documented overt change in reporting relationships did not 
necessarily equate with actual change. However, to emphasise this change, the 
Director-General and his Executive actively encouraged debate. Graduates of 
promotion courses held at STC openly questioned them about the utility of the 
concept. I64 While the Executive may not have agreed with the proffered 
opinions, they at least had a first-hand account about the strength of feeling in 
supervisory and mid-management levels. However, Head Office must have felt 
frustrated with the slow implementation process. 
In October 1992, the Director-General notified the Minister that "Because unit 
management is more complex and requires higher levels of training, its 
introduction is being phased progressively throughout the prison system." I65 
He noted that the new prisons were operating under unit management 
principles. But of more importance, he pointed out that the Public Service 
Board had approved "the Unit Management and Structural Efficiency 
Agreement." I66 This agreement had been negotiated over a period of two years 
and had been a major cause of dissent among prison officers. Simply, the 
Agreement introduced a new five-level prison officer category, which would 
make a 
Number of efficiencies in the work conditions of Prison Corrections 
Officers, and significantly changes the work performed by Prison 
Corrections Officers. Introduction of the new structure and conditions 
will be negotiated on a prison by prison basis, in the form of local 
agreements to be approved by the Public Service Board. I67 
163 	Prisons Structural Efficiency Implementation Plan,  Office of Corrections Version 1 
June 1990, Attachment 6. 
164 	The Director-General also addressed each promotion course on the organisation's 
direction with particular reference to unit management. 
165 	00C Annual Report, 1991-92, 12. 
166 	Ibid. 
167 	Ibid, 12-13. 
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It was argued earlier that prison officers had viewed unit management 
implementation and negotiations of a new industrial agreement as separate 
issues. The two-year negotiation period effectively hindered the unit 
management implementation process. Many prison officers simply did not 
wish to take on what they perceived to be extra responsibilities and duties 
without compensation. Again, many accused Head Office of duplicity by 
ignoring custodial concerns and focussing particularly on unit managed 
prisons. 168 This two-year negotiation period also engendered an artificial 
climate of distrust against Head Office. Moreover, Head Office may not have 
been properly apprised of the true feelings of staff. 
Financial cutbacks in 00C's final year of operation had resulted in the 
postponement of promotional training, thus the Executive no longer had a 
forum at STC to glean a variety of prison views. Any information or feedback 
received would have come from either operational governors or from the vapid 
Unit Management Implementation Team. Operational governors at the new 
prisons would certainly have been reluctant to portray a negative image of 
implementation at their institutions. 169  The Unit Management Implementation 
Team dealt mainly with the operational governors. Thus, the advice provided 
to the Executive about implementation may not have accurately reflected 
practice. Again, it is possible that operational implementation difficulties were 
explained by the simple expedient of either blaming training, prison officer 
intransigence, staffing shortages, lack of funding, or a combination thereof 
In addition, there was a secondary but crucial problem. The longer the period 
that implementation took place magnified the chances of former custodial 
operating practices reappearing in new prisons. Some prison officers, used to 
accepting direction, being unsure of their authority or how to use it could easily 
take the soft option and revert to known prisoner management practices. 
168 	J.R. Beeden. Report on validation of SPO/CPO Promotional Courses 1989 to 1991. 
Report to the Co-ordinator of Training Services. Bill Paterson, October 1991. 
The governors of Loddon and Banvon Prisons received promotions to operate these 
• prisons. The governor of the MRC took a demotion from Superintendent to manage 
the prison after the appointed governor was removed prior to prison commissioning. 
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The relationships between prison officers and Head Office were certainly 
fractured by the time the Unit Management and Structural Efficiency  
Agreement  was concluded. Any number of reasons can be posited for this. For 
example, prison officers may have mistakenly blamed Head Office for 
prolonging negotiations about structural efficiency in order to change working 
practices. However, irrespective of some prison officers' perceptions, structural 
efficiency was not an 00C innovation. It was a government directive. The 
00C was also subject to Public Service Board negotiation guidelines. On the 
other hand, Head Office viewed unit management implementation and 
structural efficiency as necessary concomitants. Their negotiation and 
information strategies were based on this principle. Perhaps a concerted effort 
to inform prison officers as to why Head Office was taking this direction may 
have alleviated later doubts and suspicions, and accusations of duplicity. 
Again, the government had demanded cut backs in departmental appropriation 
in 1991. Each prison faced a deficit in their operating budget of $900,000. 17° It 
was suggested that savings could be met in "prisoner meals and clothing, and 
in prison officer uniform allowances,"" However, prison officers were the 
most likely to lose. In normal circumstances, governors had refused to release 
staff for training courses to save on overtime or replacement costs. With the 
current economic crisis, governors were instructed "that within field locations, 
non-operational areas should first be targetted. (Sic)" 172 Most would probably 
cut back on in situ unit management training. Prison officers were likely to 
perceive this action as having tacit Head Office approval, further cementing 
unfounded doubts on the reasons for unit management implementation. It is 
debateable that the traditional friction between Head Office and line prison 
officers was solely responsible for the gap between operational policy and 
actual practice. However, this friction added to other variables such as a change 
of prisoner management practice and a new award structure can be a powerful 
determinant. Victoria's administrators failed to adequately consider this. 
170 	Newsbreak. Vol. 6 No. 6 September 1991. 
171 	 Ibid. 
172 	Ibid. 
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Ab initio.'" 
The problems experienced in unit management implementation by the 00C 
did not lay with the concept per se. The fundamental assumptions underpinning 
the strategy were sound. It seems that in_Victoria's case-there were too many 
factors impinging, for the concept's immediate success. While it is easy in 
hindsight to apportion blame, it appears that both Head Office and prison 
officers were guilty by omission. For example, Head Office could have 
evaluated the concept during its trial period in Castlemaine Prison. From this 
may have come some longitudinal studies, which would have identified prison 
officer and prisoner attitudes, training needs analysis, and implementation 
strategies for new prisons, among others. The organisation failed to promulgate 
or provide stringent unit management measuring instruments. Moreover, it did 
not adequately monitor new institution implementation - relying mainly on 
anecdotal information from operational governors, Strategic Services 
personnel, and the Unit Management Implementation Team. It did not help that 
there was an almost constant turnover in Executive personnel. New Executive 
members tried to leave their imprimatur, and by so doing gave credence to the 
prison officer perception that Head Office had little idea of the realities of 
implementation. Funding cutbacks aside, the prolonged industrial agreement 
negotiations, combined with the ill-timed Structural Efficiency Principles, 
created an environment of distrust that Head Office was never able to 
overcome. Prison officers were convinced that unit management was simply a 
vehicle to downsize the workforce. On the other hand, many prison officers 
never gave the concept a chance. Belligerence and antipathy were powerful 
weapons to combat change. Ironically, many of these officers accepted 
promotions or transfers to new prisons. It is very difficult to change a prison 
culture at any time. Unit management changed Victoria's prison culture but in 
a most unexpected fashion. While prisoner management strategies are always 
subject to philosophical ideology, unit management purpose-designed 
institutions will remain for the foreseeable future - thereby causing dilemmas 
for any future prisoner management change. 
173 	From the very beginning, Ehrlich, A Dictionary of Latin Tags and Phrases, 18. 
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Conclusion 
Victoria has had a prison system since 1851. In another 150 years it will still have 
a prison system. People will still break society's horrhs and receive some type of 
sanction for their endeavours. Those sentenced to incarceration will be guarded or 
administered by the equivalent of contemporary prison officers. Key elements 
affecting management of prisons and prisoners will literally remain the same: 
ongoing debate over the philosophy behind incarceration; the training of prison 
officers to meet operational philosophy, the prison policy of future.governments; 
and the role of prison officers in the prison system. In sum, it probably will not be 
all that much different from what it is today. The same variables - philosophy, 
policy, and staff - will determine whether a future system is more or less 
successful than its forebears. 
This thesis, in investigating the development of Victoria's prison policy, has 
highlighted the problems that occur when a new prisoner management strategy is 
implemented - particularly with regard to prison officer training. The thesis has 
used several elements from the works of policy analysts in the course of its 
investigation into prison officer training. A framework incorporating variables 
such as "values, interests and resources mediated through institutions" provide 
powerful analytical tools particularly when politics are added.' For politics now 
dominate the previous closed world of prisons. 
Over the past 150 years Victoria's prison administrators have expected prison 
officers to assume a variety of roles to meet each change in operating philosophy 
and its concomitant policy directives. A new and virtually untested prisoner 
management strategy was implementated throughout Victoria's prison system by 
1990. 
G. Davis: J. Wanna: J. Warhurst: and P. Weller. Public Policy in Australia. 2nd Ed. 
(St Leonards. NSW: Allen & Unwin. 1993) 2 
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Having committed significant resources to building purpose-designed institutions. 
one would expect that administrators would match these endeavours by providing 
a new set of training procedffre -§-afid courses-to assist prison officers to understand 
and implement the unit management concept. Outside observers may have 
assumed that the organisation's specific training provider - the Staff Traininu, 
College - would be the vehicle to develop unit management training modules. 
Similarly, observers may have expected that these new unit management 
institutions would not be commissioned and opened until all staff were fully 
trained and understood the concept's principles. This training could be expected to 
inform officers of their changing roles and convince them of the benefits for 
themselves in particular, and prison operation in general. 
That none of these expectations were met focuses attention back to the central 
proposition of the thesis - that prison officer training is a critical element in the 
successful implementation of unit management. Government commitment was not 
matched by administrative endeavour. The fundamental problem was that prison 
administrators expected that prison officers would approve and accept the change 
in prison operation. Moreover, they fully expected that prison officers would be 
willing to participate in the new unit management strategy. Indeed, they had a 
mistaken belief that prison officers wanted to change their traditional role. 
Prison officers are the focal point of day-to-day prison operation. They are the 
means by which prison policies or programmes will succeed or fail. Obviously 
when there are prison riots or disturbances they are the means by which order is 
restored. Yet prison philosophy and policy is never framed with them in mind. It 
appears that they have always been considered as an adjunct or afterthought in the 
prison process. And it is difficult to foresee any change in the future. While it is 
always difficult to forecast what other jurisdictions will do, there are lessons to be 
learned from Victoria's involvement in the prison process since 1851. 
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First, it is by no means certain that prison officers wish to be more than custodians. 
_ 
There are very few people whose primary aim is to pursue a career as a prison 
officer. They gravitate to prisons for a variety of reasons. At one stage in Victoria 
most applicants saw the service as providing a tenured public service position. Yet. 
when there was a vibrant economy in the 1960s, the organisation had to recruit 
from the United Kingdom. 
Prior to the 1980s, most applicants had a limited amount of skills. They adapted to 
meet the requirements of working in the prison environment. It is a truism that for 
every officer who has remained or survived in the system two or more have left. 
The survivors become casehardened, familiar with the regulations and routine. 
They become experienced in managing prisoners, but more importantly, they get 
to know prisoners. Prison officers can normally identify changes in prisoner 
behaviour and take appropriate action. All of this is premised, however, on little 
variation in prison and prisoner routine. 
The proposition advanced in the introduction was that limitations in the 
implementation of unit management in Victoria were directly related to the failure 
to develop staff training programmes designed to meet the needs of prison officers. 
Whenever there has been a major change in prison philosophy, prison officers and 
prisoners have had to renegotiate and adjust the boundaries of their interactions 
involved in the many tasks to be performed in the daily prison routine. Prison 
officers have traditionally performed these tasks apart from specialised medical 
and spiritual functions prior to the Treatment and Medical Model prison 
philosophies. This changing focus introduced 'prison professionals' such as 
psychiatrists, psychologists, counsellors, and welfare workers, with the related 
narrowing of prison officers' roles. Although both Akeroyd and Whatmore 
upgraded prison officer training, it was never intended that prison officers be 
directly involved in the reform process. Rather, it was to get better-educated 
officers who would understand the changes that were being made. Training 
courses were designed accordingly. 
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The influx of professionals during the periods of prison philosophical change has 
not diminished. Indeed, the demand to provide services within prisons t6 mirrOf 
those provided in the public sector has eventuated in an increased 'civilian' _ 
presence. Obviously as prison budgets decrease, and prisoner programmes have to 
be maintained, it is expedient to reduce prison officer positions, and concomitantly 
prison officer training. 
The contemporary notion that prisons are to be utilised to effect change in 
prisoners' attitudes, and prepare them to adjust to society's norms, has dominated 
penal thought since the early part of this century. That very little evidence has 
been provided to verify this proposition has not stopped administrators attempting 
to find solutions. There are continued attempts to build on previous policy failures. 
And the latest 'innovation'- building open or campus-type prison accommodation 
with a concomitant unit management prisoner strategy - is symptomatic of the 
attempts to achieve the Holy Grail of penology. Again, the purpose of prisons is as 
yet to be determined. Thus, the role of prison officers is as yet to be determined. 
Current administrators have tended to relegate decisions on the future of the role to 
the 'too hard basket.' 
There is a current predilection to view prisons as 'businesses' and apply business 
rules. Yet, it is an axiom of business principles that innovative managers invest in 
their most valuable asset - staff Prisons, however, irrespective of current thought, 
are not businesses. Their primary function is to contain those who have been 
sentenced to a period of incarceration. Thus, prisons, whether privately contracted 
or government instrumentalities, will have to decide on what role prison officers 
play and provide the requisite training. To integrate prison officers into the reform 
process without adequate information and training is to demonstrate a complete 
misunderstanding of prison officers' attitudes. While there will always be prison 
officers who have a genuine commitment to effect prisoner change, the significant 
Majority of prison officers view prisoners with distrust. Prison officers' primary 
training cements this view. 
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Moreover, changing the educational standards for prison officer recruitment and/or 
promotion does not necessarily mean a change in prison officer/prisoner 
interaction:- It-has been-claimed that "corrections has attracted too many second-
class minds who have provided timorous andvacillating leadership." 2 However, it _  
is too simplistic to blame the current confusion towards the prison's goals on 
'timorous and vacillating leadership.' Prison managers are more accountable than 
before. And there is one contemporary truism about prison managers - their tenure 
is going to be limited. 3 Perhaps this is a major reason why there are confusing and 
contradictory prison goals. While governments and correctional agencies attempt 
various strategies to make prisons accountable, "if most prisons have failed, it is 
because they have been ill-managed, under-managed, or not managed at all." 4 
Victoria's prison officers have survived prison philosophical and policy changes 
since 1851. And just as everything about prisons appears cyclical, management 
perceptions of prison officers rarely change. 
Successive Victorian administrators have sacked them; 5 reduced their numbers; 6 
encouraged them to participate in vocational training; 7 disciplined then 8 upgraded 
qualifications for promotion; 9 upgraded training; I° recruited staff from overseas;" 
and again, are disposing of their services in great numbers. 12 
N. Morris. quoted in A.W. Cohn. "The Failure of Correctional Management - 
Reconsidered- Criminal Justice Review. Vol 6 No 2 (1981): 55-61, 57 
The Commissioner for Victoria's Correctional Services, John Van Groningen. has been 
moved sideways to head a policy unit. "Prison probe head moved - Herald Sun. 
24 May 1998 
J.J. Dilulio Jr. Governing Prisons A Comparative Study of Correctional Management. 
(New York: The Free Press. 1987) 7 
Champ. Penal Report. 1859. 10. 
Castieau. Penal Report. 1881. 1389. 
O'Conner. Penal Report. 1904. 4. 
Freeman. Penal Report. 1919. 768. 
Akeroyd. Penal Report. 1924. 843. 
Whatmore. Penal Report. 1951. 522. 
Shade. Social Welfare Report. 1974. 652. 
With privatisation over 50 per cent of government prison officer positions have been lost. 
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It is clear that from 1851 to the early 1970s Victoria's prison system saw little 
fundamental change in the nature of its operation. Victoria's prison policy was 
simply based on the custody and control philosophy. Successive penal heads made 
incremental adjustments to infrastructures and policies over this period - each 
leaving a hallmark of his tenure. That some were more successful than others is a 
moot point. Until the stewardships of Akeroyd and Whatmore, Victoria's penal 
administrators' primary task had been to maintain prison discipline and order in 
the system. Akeroyd and Whatmore thought that the problem of prisoner 
recidivism should be addressed by offering prisoners the opportunity to undertake 
education and vocational skills training. While these attempts at addressing the 
nature of criminality were to prove no more successful than later prisoner-change 
programmes, Akeroyd and Whatmore's actions forever changed the nature and 
practice of Victoria's prison management and operation. Future administrators 
were expected to be both treatment and control agents. 
While prison administrators directed their energies towards prisoner treatment 
programmes, their tenuous grasp on prison control was slipping. Prisoners in the 
1970s were not as quiescent as their forebears. Prisoners refused to conform to 
what they perceived as anachronistic practices. Prison officers were caught in the 
middle of the conflict. Prison officers were expected to act as discipline agents yet 
their ability to perform this function was handicapped by administrative indecision 
and procrastination. Simmering undercurrents and tensions finally exploded into 
violent altercations. Any pretence at running a treatment milieu was quickly 
dissipated or forgotten in the effort to reclaim order and control. 
Prison violence, however, was not solely restricted to Victoria. Several Australian 
states suffered similar tribulations. Various state administrative and judicial 
inquiries questioned operational policies and practices. Prison systems could no 
longer hide their inadequacies behind walls of silence. There was an immediate 
movement by prison departments to form specialised policy-making units. 
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The great difficulty, however, was that these units had very little foundation on 
. 	. 
which to commence policy-making. Senior prison administrators traditionally 
made prison policy. Most of these, however, had been -retired-or-replaced in the 
aftermath of the confrontations. The newly formed policy-units would find little of 
value in perusing the various American policy-making models as those had limited 
application in the Australian environment. Again, it would not matter that public 
policy analysis was still in its infancy. Prison administrators, having suffered 
public service and judicial probing, would be reluctant to expose themselves to 
academic investigation. 
Prison policy-making has now become a specialised process. Traditional practices 
are no longer accepted or even viable in the newly built 'new generation' prisons. 
There has been a tendency by many to view prisons as the settings for micro-social 
experimentation. Policies now have to be formulated and considered for every 
aspect of prison operation. Again, prison policy-makers have to be aware that 
these policies are framed in relation to broader influences, including the views of a 
sceptical public. For example, there are some prisoners whose crimes are so 
despicable that an attempt to 'rehabilitate' and prepare them for 'reintegration' 
into society would bring public approbation. 13 
Victoria's solution to mask a lack of policy related skills were initially to send 
senior prison administrators overseas, particularly to the United States. These 
visits were aimed at inspecting the latest penal developments. However, many 
systems in the United States were in the process of changing traditional procedures 
and practices. The ramifications of that change had yet to surface. It would take a 
number of years before any type of scientific evaluation was attempted, and even 
then the results have proven inconclusive. Taking concepts from other 
jurisdictions and applying them locally has been a tenet of prison practice. 
I 3 	For example. prisoners convicted following the Hoddle Street and Port Arthur massacres. 
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While prison philosophy and policies have been cyclical, prison officer recruiting 
standards have only recently changed in Victoria as a result of Equal Employment 
Opportunities. Previous recruiting standards, irrespective of Akeroyd and 
Whatmore's ministrations, have been traditionally framed  at obtaining personnel 
with height, weight, and age requirements, and military or paramilitary experience 
It helped if they had more than the basic education requirements. Legislation, 
however, has changed this. Contemporary recruits now bring myriad skills and 
experience into the service. These skills, paradoxically, have only peripheral use in 
the prison environment. 
The greatest attributes which prison officers' possess is the ability to monitor 
situations and detect any differences in prison routine. It is these attributes which 
make it nearly impossible for prison officers to change their age-old perception of 
prisoners. From the moment they are recruited they are constantly reminded by 
training staff and experienced officers to be careful in their interactions with 
prisoners. Prisoners also perceive prison officers in a similar light. These attitudes 
are so deeply entrenched that any future change in these interactions is unlikely. 
Prison policy-makers must be aware of this fact when attempting to implement 
prisoner management strategies or policies that upset these tenuous relationships. 
Moreover, they need to re-evaluate their prison officer training when 
implementing change and devise training courses accordingly. 
This thesis has aptly demonstrated that Victoria's prison officer training has 
always been based on the custody and control aspects of the position. This type of 
training was mandatory during the first 100 years of operation. Administrators 
should have realised that pure custodial training is not the ideal mechanism for 
prison officers to accept or even implement change. Irrespective of the Treatment 
Model's faulty premise, Whatmore's grand vision had little chance of acceptance 
by his staff. Later Victorian prison administrators either did not learn from 
previous practices, or thought that their policies were better prepared to meet all 
contingences. 
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Although prison administrators in the 1980s desired to change the moribund 
system, their choice of a new prisoner management strategy was never based On 
research. Simply, senior personnel went to the United States and made 
recommendations based on these visits. The Labor Government provided finance 
New prisons were built and opened. Unit management training was an 
afterthought. Indeed, although the 00C had been operating for a number of years, 
very few of the OOC's Directorate knew about the new prisoner management 
concept. I4 Prison officer training remained custodial simply because the system 
still operated a large number of predominantly custodial institutions. And prison 
officer training will only change in the near future because of the economic 
climate. 
The economic demands that a prison system places on state finances are quite 
profound. While there has always been a tendency by governments to provide the 
minimal amount of finance to maintain prison operation, in the current climate 
these costs have been exacerbated by building or upgrading existing institutions to 
implement new prisoner programmes and new prisoner management strategies. 
Many state systems are opting to cut costs by not only contracting out various 
traditional functions like prisoner transport and court security, but are giving 
private operators the contract to operate specific institutions. Private companies do 
not have the same staffing levels or prisoner/prison officer ratios as state systems. 
Indeed many private companies do not employ experienced staff. 15 Moreover, 
new technology has allowed prison managers to reduce staff while giving 
responsibility to prisoners for their movements. That prison officers either in the 
state or private system will countenance this lowering of staffing levels is for 
future analysis. 
Denbeigh Richards. the former Director of CBC. claims the first time he heard about unit 
management was when it was mentioned during an executive meeting in 1989 that 
Unit Management Guidelines was about to be published. Interview in Hobart with 
Denbeigh Richards. now the Assistant Director of Justice Tasmania. 19 September 1997 
1 5 The current policy of the private operators in Victoria is to only hire a limited amount of 
experienced prison personnel. -Only about 30 of the 200 officers at Port Phillip have had 
experience in the public prison system. - 
"Jailers learn respect - Herald Sun. 16 August 1997 
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While reports claim that prison officers are unhappy about the situation in one of 
Victoria's privately operated institutions, I6 prison managers and policy-makers 
must adapt to changing circumstances-be-they-political-or economic. 
However, reducing staffing numbers will mean that future training programmes 
must take account of these new practices. To simply expect traditional prison 
officer custodial training to be of any validity within the new generation prisons is 
naive. Custodial training arose as a result of custodial-designed institutions. Prison 
policy-makers will now have to design training programmes to reflect the change 
in institutional design from custody to containment. While prisons have always run 
on order and routine, there are two major factors which have will affect future 
prison officer/prisoner interactions, and, subsequently, prison order: the changing 
emphasis in prisoners rights since the 1970s, and the construction of new 
generation' prisons. 
Prisons routinely operate on the acquiescence of prisoners. Most prisoners are easy 
to manage and only wish to complete their sentence with as little trouble as 
possible. If, however, a majority of prisoners wanted to create disorder there is 
very little that prison authorities can do except to resort to negotiation or force. 
Whatever the outcomes, there will be a perceived weakening by the authorities and 
a perceived gain for prisoners. There was a clear demarcation between prison 
officers and prisoners prior to the 1970s. Custody, control, and discipline - albeit 
tenuous - was the hallmark of prison operation. Since that period prisoners have 
access to external checks and balances, the prison is now 'open,' and prison 
officers are accountable for their actions. Many experienced staff now perceives 
that discipline has gone and that authorities place too much emphasis on looking 
after the needs and rights of prisoners. Main, the rush to build and operate 
campus-style institutions has profound implications for the future role of prison 
officers. 
-Jail walkout threat - Herald Sun 25 September 1997 
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The rationale behind building this type of facility in the Australian environment 
was premised on the notion of introducing unit management, whereas the 
traditional designed Australian prison were based on the notion of custody and 
control. The obvious implication is that Victoria, like the rest of Australia, is 
moving toward the American containment model of imprisonment. This model 
operates with minimum staffing and specialised staff groups trained in riot 
prevention and emergency procedures available at a moment's notice. Indeed, the 
newly opened privately operated Port Phillip Prison in Victoria has minimum staff 
with prisoners being given coded card keys to access doors and turnstiles within 
the prison." This means that many of the old tasks - such as manning doors and 
gates - have been lost and are very unlikely to return particularly in the 
contemporary economic climate. It also means a reduced officer presence and a 
perceived diminishing role for prison officers by prisoners, prison 'civilians, - but 
more importantly, by prison management. 
110ViSSit110 verba  IS 
This thesis has investigated prison philosophy, prison 'policy, prisoner 
management strategies, and prison officer training. It has been particularly 
concerned with Victoria's prison system from 1851-1992. It has been 
demonstrated that whatever prison philosophy or policies Victoria's authorities 
have chosen to implement, prison officers' training has been predominantly 
custodial. Indeed, perhaps this is how it should be. Circumstances have now 
dictated that the prison officers' primary task is no longer purely custodial, but has 
evolved to become containment-oriented. Irrespective of the current movement to 
conduct prisons as businesses, prison officers - will always be judged on their 
ability to manage prisoners and maintain prison order. That is their strength and 
training should reflect this. 
Information provided by Mark Maloney. the Operations Manager for the Barwon 
State Emergency Response Group. 10 September 1997 
Final words. E. Ehrlich. A Dictionary of Latin Tags and Phrases. 
(New York: Harper and Row. 1987) 161 
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Governments' are reluctant to identify what purpose prisons are to be used for. It 
is certainly true that they do not rehabilitate, or even change individuals to 
reintegrate into 'normal society' - irrespective of highly publicised prison mission 
statements. Indeed, the movement to privatise prisons may be construed as a tacit 
admission that governments' wish others to decide the prison purpose. Again, it is 
unrealistic to expect prison officers to become reform agents. It does not matter 
what prisoner management strategy or policy is implemented, prison officers will 
always return to fundamentals - order and control. Entrenched attitudes are the 
reason that any change to traditional interactions has little chance for success. 
Prison officer numbers are declining as new management practices dictate a leaner 
organisation. Future governments or prison administrators will formulate new 
philosophies or policies. They will still require prison officers to implement and 
monitor these strategies. If prison administrators desire to change traditional prison 
officers' roles they must provide the training infrastructure and expertise. 
Anything less is both wastes of time and resources. 
Victoria's attempt to change its prisoner management system without proper 
planning and training procedures should be a salutary lesson to other jurisdiction's 
administrators. Indeed, the present Liberal government has tried to exculpate itself 
from previous prison policies by the process of privatisation. This does not address 
the issue. It just puts it into another domain. Moreover, the strict confidentiality 
policies of private operators may mean that the issue of prison officer training 
becomes 'closed.' Indeed, it by no means certain that private operators have any 
different perceptions of prison officers than their government counterparts. 
Port Phillip Prison operators claim that "respect and courtesy for prisoners are the 
key to training prison officers" at the new establishment. "The need to treat 
prisoners with dignity has been emphasised during 50 hours of inter-personal skills 
training for staff" 
376 
The operators are determined that "kindness is not mistaken for weakness, - thus 
staff had another 50 ho-urs devoted to "control and restraint." 19 
Policy-makers must be aware that all future policies, prisoner programmes, and 
operational procedures will be based on the mixture of political and economic 
decisions. Moreover, they must consider what effect these policies will have on 
prison officers. Rebus sic stantibus. 20 
-Jailers learn respect - Herald-Sun 18 August 1997 
literally translated as 'things staying as they are.' 
Ehrlich. A Dictionary of Latin Tags and Phrases.  195 
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